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
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
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HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY

W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.

COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.

VOL. III.

THE THIRD EDITION;

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FORMING

A SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS.



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NOTICE.

THE manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,* general Graham,† general Pelet,‡ general Campbell,§ captain Codrington,‖ and colonel Cox,¶ together with many private journals and letters of officers employed during the war.

Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph's retreat from Madrid.

* Lord Stuart de Rothesay.
† Lord Lynedoch.
‡ First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena.
§ Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar.
‖ Admiral sir Edward Codrington.
¶ Governor of Almeida.

The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. & VII. should be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII.

To her grace the duchess of Abrantes.

September 11, 1833.

MADAM,

IN the eighth volume of your "*Mémoires*" I find the following passages: —

"Toutefois, pourquoi donc m'etonner de la conduite des Portugais? N'ai je pas vu *ici, en France*, un des frères d'armes de Junot souffrir qu'on imprimât, dans un ouvrage traduit de l'Anglais, des choses revoltantes de fausseté sur lui et sur le maréchal Ney?.....Cet ouvrage, fait par un colonel Napier, et qui a trouvé grâce devant le ministère de la guerre parce qu'il dit du bien du ministre, m'a été donné *à moi, à moi la veuve de Junot*, comme renfermant des documents *authentiques*. J'ai du y lire une indécente attaque contre la vie privée d'un homme dont on ne pouvait dire aucun mal comme militaire dans cette admirable affaire de la Convention de Cintra, puisque les Anglais ont fait passer à une commission militaire ceux qui l'avaient signée pour l'Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Childe Harold suffisent seuls à la gloire de Junot, quand l'original de cette convention ne serait pas là pour la prouver. Heureusement que je le possède, moi, cet original, et même dans les deux langues. Il n'est pas dans M. Napier;"——

It is not permitted to a man to discover ill-humour at the expressions of a lady; yet when those expressions are dishonouring to him, and reputation and wit joined to beauty give them a wide circulation, it would indicate insensibility to leave them unnoticed.

To judge of the talents of a general by his conduct in the field has always been the undisputed right of every military writer. I will not therefore enter upon that subject, because I am persuaded that your grace could not mean to apply the words "*revolting falsehoods*" to a simple judgement of the military genius of the duke of Abrantes. Indeed you intimate that the offensive passages are those directed against his private life, and touching the Convention of Cintra. I think, however, your grace has not perused my work with much attention, or you would scarcely have failed to perceive that I have given the Convention of Cintra at length in the Appendix.

But, in truth, I have only alluded to general Junot's private qualities when they bore directly upon his government of Portugal, and with a fresh reference to my work you will find I have affirmed nothing of my own knowledge. The character of the late duke of Abrantes given by me, is that ascribed to him by the emperor Napoleon, (see *Las Cases,)* and the authority of that great man is expressly quoted. It is against Napoleon therefore, and not against me who but repeat his uncontradicted observations, that your resentment should be directed.

If your grace should deign to dispose of any further thought upon me or my work, I would venture to suggest a perusal of the Portuguese, and English, and Spanish, and German histories of the invasion of Portugal; or even a slight examination of only a small part of the innumerable, some of them very celebrated, periodicals which treat of that event. You will be then convinced, that so far from having wantonly assailed the character of general Junot I have made no slight effort to stem the torrent of abuse with which he has been unjustly overwhelmed; and believe me, madam, that the estimation in which an eminent man will be held by the world is more surely to be found in the literature of different countries than in the fond recollections of his own family. I admired general Junot's daring character, and having enough of the soldier in me to like a brave enemy, I have, wherever the truth of history would permit, expressed that feeling towards him and towards other French generals whose characters and whose acts have been alike maligned by party writers in this country: such indeed has been my regard for justice on this point, that I have thereby incurred the charge of writing with a French rather than a national bias, as your grace will discover by referring to my lord Mahon's History of the War of the Succession. His lordship has done me the honour to observe that I have written "*by far the best* FRENCH *account* yet published of the Peninsular War."

For my own part I still think that to refrain from vulgar abuse of a gallant enemy will not be deemed un-English, although lord Mahon considers it wholly French; but his lordship's observation incontestibly proves that I have discovered no undue eagerness to malign any of the French generals. And with respect to the duke of Abrantes, I could shew that all the offensive passages in my work rest upon the published authority of his own countrymen, especially the emperor Napoleon, and that they are milder in expression than those authorities would have warranted. It

is however so natural and so amiable in a lady to defend the reputation of her deceased husband, that rather than appear to detract in any manner from the grace of such a proceeding I choose to be silent under the unmitigated severity of your observations.

Not so with respect to that part of your remarks which relate to marshal Ney. After carefully re-examining every sentence I have written, I am quite unable to discover the slightest grounds for your grace's accusations. In all parts of my work the name of Ney is mentioned with praise. I have not indeed made myself a partizan of marshal Ney in relating his disputes with marshals Soult and Massena, because I honestly believed that he was mistaken; neither have I attributed to him unbounded talents for the higher parts of war, but this is only matter of opinion which the world is quite capable of appreciating at its true value: upon all other points I have expressed admiration of marshal Ney's extraordinary qualities, his matchless valour, his heroic energy!

In the hope that your grace will now think it reasonable to soften the asperity of your feelings towards my work, I take my leave, with more of admiration for your generous warmth in defence of a person so dear to you, than of resentment for the harsh terms which you have employed towards myself.

I remain, madam,

Your very obedient servant,

WILLIAM NAPIER, COLONEL.

Letters to the Author received since the publication of the 1st Edition.

Maunsel-house, near Bridgewater,
16th October, 1831.

SIR,

The well-merited reputation which your work on the Peninsular war already possesses, and the probability there is that from its general correctness, and the deep research displayed in its production, it will be referred to in after times as the most faithful record of the operations of the British army in the Peninsula, induces me to refer you to a passage in the 3d vol. page 348, wherein my name is mentioned as commanding the cavalry on the 8th of October, 1810, when Massena's advanced guard drove the cavalry picquets out of Rio Major.

The account which you give of that affair is substantially

correct with the exception of *my* having the command. I commanded a brigade only; sir S. Cotton was present in Alcoentre, and commanded the whole force upon the occasion, as you may satisfy yourself by referring to the London Gazette, wherein appears a letter from that officer to lord Wellington of the 9th of October detailing the whole proceeding.

As correctness must ever be the aim of the impartial historian, I trust you will do me the justice of inserting this letter in the forthcoming volume.

I have the honour to be,
&c. &c. &c.
JOHN SLADE, LT.-GENERAL.

Note by colonel Napier.—My account of the affair of Rio Major was chiefly taken from the manuscript journal of the late Major Somers Cocks, who had a distinguished share in the skirmish; in that account General Slade was mentioned as commanding the rear-guard for the day. Hence my error.

Woolwich, September 7, 1833.

DEAR SIR,

In perusing the 3d volume of your History of the Peninsular War, I observe in the account of the battle of Albuera, that you ascribe to me exertions on the right of our position, which in reality are due to sir Julius Hartman, who commanded the British and German artillery, as I did that of the Portuguese in the battle; the two commands being independent of each other, and both were thanked by lord Beresford in the orders and despatches.

I have to explain that my guns, by lord Beresford's orders, were posted, for a great part of the battle, on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and about 700 yards from the village. Their fire bore *effectually* upon the bridge, and the road from it to Albuera, and I was not ordered to the right till towards the close of the battle.

In conclusion I can only add that you will oblige me by giving publicity to this statement in a note to your next volume.

I remain, dear sir,
&c. &c. &c.
A. DICKSON.

COLONEL NAPIER'S

JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME;

FORMING

A SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,

AND CONTAINING SOME

NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO

THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

"There was a man in Islington,
And he was wondrous wise,
He jumped into a quickset hedge,
And scratched out both his eyes."

A JUSTIFICATION,

&c.

In my Reply to various opponents, I pledged myself to give authorities for certain important facts disputed by the author of the work entitled, "*Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War.*" I now redeem that pledge, which I gave, not as thinking it necessary to take more notice of a writer whose ill-founded pretensions to authority and whose incorrectness I had already so thoroughly exposed in my reply, but to shew that no weakness then withheld me from dissecting his second production as completely as I had done his first; and also because I thought it due to my readers to substantiate the accuracy of my third volume before the publication of a fourth. In this view, I will now take the disputed facts in the order of events, and placing my own statement first, in each case support it by authority.

Almeida.—The lieutenant-governor Da Costa was tried and shot. "*The only evidence against him was an explanatory letter, written, to lord Liverpool, by colonel Cox, when a prisoner at Verdun.*"—History.

Authority. Mr. Stuart to lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, July 25th, 1812.

"My Lord,—It may not be irrelevant to mention to your lordship that, *upon the evidence of a dispatch which general Cox, the late governor of Almeida, while a prisoner in France, addressed to lord Liverpool,* relating the circumstances which led to the fall of that fortress in 1810, the person who exercised the functions of lieutenant-governor at the time of the capture has been condemned to death by a court-martial."

Battle of Busaco.—"*The eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces.*"—History.

Authorities. 1°. Extract from a memoir drawn up by colonel Waller, staff-officer of the second division and an

eye-witness. "As the French formed on the plateau, they were cannonaded from our position, and a regiment of Portuguese, either *the eight or sixteenth* infantry which were formed in advance of the *seventy-fourth*, threw in some volleys, but *was quickly driven into the position.*"

2°. Extract of a letter from an officer of the ninth British regiment, also an eye-witness. "*The eighth Portuguese regiment is extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside;* but he and they were amongst the very foremost of the ranks of the ninth British."

Before quitting this subject I will notice a foolish accusation made by the author of the "*Further Strictures,*" namely, that I have, from partial motives, been silent upon a gallant charge made by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment. To which I answer, on my own authority as an eye-witness, that *no such charge as this writer has described took place.* The nineteenth Portuguese were not posted in front of the convent, that ground was occupied by the light division in first line and by the Germans in second line. There was indeed a Portuguese regiment (possibly the nineteenth) which was posted on the mountain, nearly a mile to the right of the convent and in front of the brigade of guards. When the skirmishers of Marchand's division pushed back their opponents, this regiment made an advance in support of the covering light troops; it was a handsome demonstration of vigour and courage; but it is exaggeration to call it a fine charge, because the line never was nearer to the enemy's skirmishers than a hundred yards: for the truth of this I appeal to the light division, and especially to the artillery, who were at the time firing upon the main body of the French troops said to have been charged.

Operations in the Alemtejo.—Under this head it is scarcely necessary to notice the silly special pleading of the author of the "*Further Strictures*" relative to captain Squire and the batteries constructed on the left of the Tagus during Massena's stay at Santarem. Both that officer and colonel Jones say the batteries were meant *to command the mouth of the Zezere.* It is ridiculous to suppose that captain Squire who constructed them did

Vide Jones's History of the War, page 444.

not know what their object was, or whether they were fitted to obtain it! I will not waste time in vindicating myself further; but upon the other points of importance my answers shall be full and satisfactory to all but marshal Beresford and this writer.

1°. "*Beresford arrived at Portalegre with* 20,000 *infantry*, 2,000 *cavalry, and* 18 *guns.*"—History.

Authority. Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Louzao, March 16, 1811.

"I heard of the fall of Badajos on the night of the 13th and 14th, and major-general Cole's division was moved on Espinhal on the 14th, in order afterwards to continue its route into the Alemtejo, and it marched in that direction yesterday. *We shall have in that province* 22,000 *men, of which nearly* 2,200 *will be cavalry.*"

In sir B. D'Urban's memoir it is also stated that *after the passage of the Guadiana*, the army was still 21,400 strong, with 18 guns.

2°. *Combat of Campo Mayor.—The French and the thirteenth dragoons charged through each other twice.*—History.

My authority for this fact was an eye-witness, whose testimony is confirmed in the following memoir the production of an officer of the thirteenth dragoons, who was one of those engaged, and I give it entire, as confirming my account of the affair in other important points.

"On the morning of the 25th March, 1811, the army moved from its bivouac position towards Campo Mayor, the thirteenth light dragoons in its proper place in the column of march, until the ground in front was found sufficiently open for the operations of cavalry, when the whole were ordered to the front. The cavalry consisted of the third dragoon guards, and fourth dragoons, under the command of colonel De Grey; the first and seventh regiments of Portuguese cavalry, under the command of colonel Otway; and the thirteenth dragoons, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Head and brigadier-general Long.

"On gaining the front contiguous columns of half squadrons were formed, and the whole moved forward at a brisk trot, under the guidance of general Long who directed the movements of the cavalry on that morning.

A troop from the thirteenth dragoons, and detachments from the other regiments, were sent to act as skirmishers on the rising ground on the right, and to protect the right flank of the column. At this period the strength of the thirteenth dragoons was reduced to two squadrons, having one squadron detached with the light division under the command of colonel Colborne, a troop with a Portuguese infantry brigade under the command of colonel Colliers, and the troop employed as skirmishers; in consequence, the actual strength of the two squadrons did not exceed 48 file each squadron, making a total of 192 men.

" General Long having found a fit opportunity, ordered a line to be formed, which moved on and gained the top of the rising ground, when the enemy were perceived on the plain below, formed up and presenting three strong bodies of cavalry. From an intelligent troop-serjeant-major of the enemy, who was this day wounded and taken prisoner, and who, from being employed in the office of the French adjutant-general, had a perfect knowledge of the force now opposite; it was learned that it consisted of the following numbers and regiments:—second hussars, 300 men; tenth hussars, 350; twenty-sixth heavy dragoons, 150; and fourth Spanish chasseurs, 80: making a total of 880 men. The Portuguese regiments formed on the left of the thirteenth and received orders to support; the heavy brigade were formed at some distance in the rear of the thirteenth and outflanked it on the right; the British and Portuguese infantry and artillery were forming as fast as they arrived on the ground, coming up in double quick time.

" On the thirteenth being formed, which was done with as much regularity and precision as on a field-day, general Long gave his final orders to colonel Head to attack the enemy; and the two squadrons moved forward, receiving the words, march, trot, canter, charge, from their respective leaders. The enemy came on in a gallant and determined style, and on the word charge being given, *every horse was let out, and the men cheered; the enemy did the same. The crash was tremendous; both parties passed each other, and at some short distance in the rear of the enemy, the thirteenth came about; the enemy did the same, and a second charge took place with equal violence, when the conflict*

became personal with the sabre. After some hard fighting in this manner, the enemy gave way and the pursuit commenced. During this time, two battalions of French infantry, which were in the rear of their cavalry, formed line; and on their cavalry clearing their front, pursued by the thirteenth, they opened a heavy fire of musketry on the latter, by which many men and horses fell: in this pursuit, the two regiments of Portuguese cava'ry under the command of colonel Otway joined. For some time on the road, the French dragoons in small parties made fight, but being at length totally dispersed, they no longer made resistance and surrendered when come up with.

" The pursuit now continued at a rapid rate, it being the object to gain their front and capture the whole, as well as the enormous quantity of baggage on the road, with their artillery; it was taken for granted a proper support would have been sent after the regiment, and that there was not any thing to be apprehended from the enemy's infantry which was behind; we supposed a good account would be given of them, when we considered the force of British and Portuguese that was left on the ground. The pursuit did not cease till stopped at the bridge of Badajos, when, on consultation being held, it was judged prudent to fall back on the support and secure all prisoners and captures. Sixteen pieces of artillery, each drawn by eight mules, numbers of waggons, immense quantities of baggage of all descriptions, provisions, stores, horses and mules; in short, the whole of the stores which the enemy had collected in Campo Mayor, and which on that morning were removed from thence to be placed at Badajos were, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, captured.

" On nearing Badajos, some of the drivers, supposing themselves safe when within the fire of the guns on the fortifications, refused to surrender, and kept whipping on their mules: those were sabred and the mules mounted by men of the thirteenth. The retreat was continued for some miles in the most orderly manner, the men in high spirits, until information not to be doubted was received, that the French infantry which was left on the ground were coming forward, supported by a considerable body of

that cavalry which had surrendered, but which, on seeing their infantry coming on, recovered their horses and arms. To attack this force was considered so imprudent, that it was decided (as there appeared no hopes of support) to abandon all the captures, make a detour to the right of the road, and endeavour to join the army. It can only be felt by those in similar situations, what the feelings of all were, when this decision was found to be absolutely necessary."

To this clear modest and authentic statement, I add the following observations upon the general conduct of this action, by captain Arthur Gregory and colonel William Light, both serving at the time in the fourth dragoons.

Captain Gregory. "The surprise of the French troops at Campo Mayor was so complete, that when the cavalry had got abreast of the fortress the enemy's infantry were only just turning out on their alarm post outside, arriving by two's and three's. The heavy brigades were bringing up their right shoulders to charge, *when the marshal himself rode up and stopped them.* The artillery which had opened its fire on the retiring column, were ordered to cease after a very few rounds, and the enemy allowed to retire, unfollowed and unmolested, to Badajos, over a perfectly open and flat country."

Colonel Light. The situation of the French infantry when the heavy brigades were thus halted, is thus described. "As they were retreating in close column a very short distance in advance and on our left, I had a better opportunity of seeing them than those in the centre or right of our brigade, as I was on the left of the left half squadron of the whole brigade; consequently, nearer to them than any one else. We were so near that the whole nearly of the rear rank and some officers of the flank turned round, made a sudden stop, and it appeared to me they were going to lay down their arms. I recollect saying to the serjeant next to me, 'If we go on a few yards further they will throw down their arms, for, look, they are ready to do so now.' *At this very moment we were halted, the French shouldered their arms again, gave a shout of joy, faced about and marched off.*"

This testimony, joined to the acknowledged fact that the French did triumphantly carry off their recovered guns

to Badajos, verifies the main points in my account of the affair of Campo Mayor; and with respect to the presence of colonel Colborne, which the author of the Strictures so flippantly denies, I repeat the fact upon the authority of colonel Colborne himself.

The author of the Strictures, although equivocally, denies that the thirteenth dragoons were reprimanded by marshal Beresford for pursuing the French; yet the fact was notorious at the time, and the actual reprimand, a very severe one given in general orders, has since been published by Mr. C. E. Long in his reply to the writer's aspersions on the late lieutenant-general Long. In my work I have said that they were, perhaps, *justly* reprimanded; I now retract that assertion. Having acquired more full information of the conduct of the thirteenth dragoons, and of the actual state of affairs, I retract it as unjust. I think they were *unjustly* reprimanded; I think they deserved the greatest praise, and that the "*unsparing admiration of the whole army*" was well founded.

3°. "*The breach of Badajos was not closed,*" *&c. &c.*

4°. "*Beresford should have marched upon Merida.*"

5°. "*Beresford believed that Soult would only act on the defensive.*"—History.

These assertions involve matter of opinion and matter of fact. The opinions I leave to the judgement of others. The matters of fact are as follows:—

1°. If Beresford had moved by Merida or been less slow in his after operations, *Badajos was in no condition to resist.*

2°. The road to Merida *was practicable for troops.*

3°. The impression made on the French by the unexpected appearance of so large a force, and by the valorous conduct of the thirteenth dragoons at Campo Mayor, *rendered the movement by Merida a sure operation.*

4°. Beresford, unable to judge rightly of the real state of affairs, *thought that Badajos would be evacuated, whenever the allies passed the Guadiana.*

5°. Up to the 21st of April at least, *lord Wellington did not think well of the marshal's operations.*

The first of these facts scarcely requires any authority, seeing that from the nature of the case Badajos must

have been ill-prepared for a siege, yet I have abundant proof.

Colonel Jones in his Sieges, page 3, writes thus:—"At this time (26th March) the French had been in possession of Badajos only a fortnight, and the works and batteries of their recent siege still afforded considerable cover. *The breach was open* and the garrison ill-supplied with provisions, ammunition, stores; the re-capture, therefore, not only seemed inevitable but easy if speedily invested; but the river Guadiana interfered, and there was neither a pontoon train nor other means with the army for crossing the river."

The last passage of this quotation shews that the movement by Merida was as I have asserted essential, because there was a bridge there. It is foolish to plead in bar lord Wellington's instructions to pass at Jerumenha. They were given under the notion that all things for an *immediate passage* were in readiness; but it was not so, and Beresford, following the letter neglected the spirit of his instruction, which was to recover Badajos as speedily as possible.

The important fact of the denuded state of Badajos does not however rest on colonel Jones's single testimony. Colonel Lamarre, the commander of the French engineers employed in the town at the time, in his journal of the siege, says, "The English committed a great fault in wasting eight days before Olivenza which must have fallen after the taking of Badajos, and *with a little more boldness and penetration Badajos might have been attacked with success in the beginning of April.* From the 12th of March the French had been working to fill up the trenches, to repair the breach, and to make other restorations, especially the Pardaleras which was a heap of ruins. But materials were rare, and masons scarce. It was not until the 21*st of April that the breach was closed,* and the state of the said breach had been a source of great uneasiness, because if *five or six thousand men had appeared before Badajos at the end of March, that place, in a bad state and feebly garrisoned, must have fallen in a short time.*"

This last paragraph alone proves that Merida would have been the best line of operations. But to proceed with Lamarre.

"The armament of the place was augmented by the *guns brought from Campo Mayor.*" (Those very guns which the thirteenth dragoons took and marshal Beresford lost again). "The former siege and the preparations for defence had, however, exhausted all the resources of the town, and the neighbouring country, and yet so pressed were the engineers for wood, that so late as the 22d of April," (fourteen days after Beresford had crossed the Guadiana) "a strong detachment was sent out to fetch timber." This detachment, as may be seen in the body of my work, was nearly cut off by lord Wellington, who lost no time after he arrived in ascertaining the real state of the garrison.

There is, however, other and even better proof than this of the denuded state of Badajos, namely, the original register-book of the French governor's orders and correspondence, from which I extract the following passages:—

1°. *To the royal commissary of the province, 10th April,* 1811.—"The place of Badajos being unfurnished of timber, it is proper to fix upon some place to cut it," &c. &c. "I pray you to make all diligence on this subject, and to employ all means in your power."

12th April. To the same. "I send you two states of the articles wanting in Badajos to complete us for three months' consumption of 4,630 rations of food, and 300 of forage per day, besides the objects necessary for the sick." "I pray you, in consequence, to make *immediate requisitions on the villages of the province* for the quick supply of the same." "The paymaster-general *has no funds to pay for the works of the place.*"

Order of the day, 10th April.—"From to-morrow the troops of the garrison will receive only *three quarters ration of bread daily.*"

14th April.—"*Our mills can make no more flour for want of charcoal.*" *à faire battre les meulles.* "The engineers also are much embarrassed for want of this article, which is, however, indispensable."

26th April. To the royal commissary, &c.—"No brandy can be given to the workmen; there is none in the magazines, except that which I have reserved for the gunners in case of a siege."

Thus there is no doubt of the real state of Badajos up to the end of April. But I have said that "general Imas, when he surrendered to Soult, *had plenty of provisions,*" and the writer of the "*Strictures*" asks how this can be reconciled with the French garrison *being in want.*

The following extract from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool proves the fact as to Imas. "Louzao, March 16th. *The garrison* (that is the Spanish) *wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.*" Moreover, Imas had only to hold out a few days that succour might arrive. And with respect to the cavil in the Strictures, I answer, that after he surrendered, not only his garrison but the other prisoners and the French army were principally fed from the resources of Badajos, and that the French garrison also had been living for a fortnight in that town. It is therefore quite possible that Imas might have had plenty, and the French garrison very little. For example, captain Malet, the English agent living with Mendizabel at the period of Soult's siege, writes thus:—

"Badajos, 8th February. There are sufficient provisions for several months for a garrison of 6000 men, but if the present number of troops are kept here, amounting to *nearly sixteen thousand men,* the place cannot hold out long."

I now come to the other four facts, namely, *the practicability of the road to Merida, the impression of terror made upon the French, the false notions of Beresford relative to the enemy, and Lord Wellington's opinion of the operations.*

The proof of the three first will be found in the extract from a letter addressed by marshal Beresford to the plenipotentiary, Mr. C. Stuart. For it is not a little curious, that the writer of the Strictures, who pretends to have direct authority from the marshal to contradict my statement, and who accuses me of ignorance, should yet be so ignorant himself, that I am able to rebut his charges by the testimony of the very man whose cause he espouses. Meanwhile, I make little account of his argument about the army of the centre advancing, and of the danger of the position beyond the Guadiana; because the latter

would have been in no manner different from what it was after passing at Jerumenha, and it is evident from the marshal's letter, that the army of the centre, if its existence was even known by him, did not enter into his calculations: it is introduced by this writer to mystify the subject. The notion that Latour Maubourg, for Mortier was not, as this ill-informed writer supposes, then with the army, could by passing through Badajos cut off the retreat, is also unsustainable. My proposition was to place the allies *between Badajos and the French army;* because the latter was feeble, surprised by the presence of the former, and astounded by the charge of the thirteenth dragoons. Moreover, Beresford in his public dispatch calls Latour Maubourg's army only five thousand; he could therefore have had no fear of it: and with the allied army on both sides of the Guadiana it would certainly have been easier to throw a bridge than when possessing only the right bank. But the danger of having the communication by Merida, is disproved by the fact, that lord Wellington ordered Beresford, when the bridge at Jerumenha was swept away, to occupy Merida, establish his communications by that very line and alter his cantonments accordingly.

Authorities. Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, Elvas, April 1, 1811.

"*I scarcely think the French will remain in Badajos, as I cannot believe they will let so considerable a force as will be necessary for its defence be isolated from their field army, which of itself is not very great, and cannot relieve that part so isolated but by abandoning Andalusia, and then perhaps not equal to it.* I hope to be able to pass the Guadiana, at all events, the 4th; but most vexatiously a vagabond officer of the driver's corps, in conducting the five Spanish boats saved from Badajos, absolutely overset two in as fair a road as any in England; and which, with the present swell of the river, will give me some difficulty. The pontoons sent from Lisbon (English) were only fit for infantry." "I have got the Spaniards at Alburquerque, at least all the armed; and the sooner the arms are sent for the others the better, that we may send them to their own country, *that I have now opened for them.* I propose,

in passing the Guadiana, *that they march to Merida; and, if the enemy remain in Badajos,* I shall bring them on my right to Lobau or Talavera. The chace which my countrymen of the thirteenth dragoons gave on the 25th was literally a fox-chase of two leagues without drawing bit; and which, though it lost me three battalions of infantry that must else have been surrounded, *has given a terror to the French that is, perhaps, equal to the capture of the infantry.* The Portuguese joined very handsomely, and appear equally to have enjoyed the chace."

How the thirteenth dragoons by beating the cavalry, taking the convoy, and interposing between the infantry and Badajos, while the heavy dragoons, the artillery, and infantry of the allies were on the flank and rear of the French infantry; how this prevented the latter from being surrounded does not very clearly appear; but it is clear that the road to Merida was practicable or the marshal would not have sent the Spaniards that way;—that "*he anticipated little or no opposition from the French after the Campo Mayor affair,*" seeing that, "*he had then opened the Spaniards' country for them; that the enemy were struck with terror; that their field-army was not great.*" Finally, it is as clear that he was quite unable to judge of the true state of affairs, inasmuch as his expectations were all signally frustrated by the course of events. *Badajos was not evacuated;* it would have been strange if it had. *The French did suffer its garrison to be isolated, and they did also relieve it,* and *without abandoning Andalusia.* This letter confirms also my assertion that *marshal Beresford thought Soult would act entirely on the defensive;* and that no doubt may exist on that head, I will give an extract from another of his own letters, supporting it by one from lord Wellington, which I transpose from my Appendix to this place.

Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, 27th April, 1811. Extract.

"*It is said Soult is assembling a force on our side of Seville; his number is, however, I think, much exaggerated,* but I cannot speak certain about it."

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Elvas, May 2, 1811.

"On the night of the 15th instant, I received from

marshal sir Willian Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that marshal Soult had broke up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, *notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville and the approaches to that city by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia; I therefore set out on the following morning!*"

The last paragraph indicates pretty broadly also that lord Wellington had not much confidence in marshal Beresford when opposed to Soult; but the following extract from another letter more fully discloses the cause of his repairing in person to Estremadura.

Elvas, April 21st, lord Wellington to Mr. C. Stuart.

"*I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here, and I am come to put matters in the right road;* and to come to an understanding with Castaños and if possible with Blake, respecting our future operations."

6°. *Want of guns, stores, provisions, and pontoons.*— My charge against the Portuguese government in these matters was perhaps put too broadly: yet it is untrue to say as this writer has done, that the governmeut had not to do with these matters; they had a great deal to do with them, and also with the storing of the fortresses, the food of the Portuguese troops, and the means of transport for every thing. If the writer of the "*Strictures*" has really received any information from the marshal upon this subject, he must know that on all those points the negligence of the government, and of their "*Junta de Viveres,*" and the false reports and assertions by which they endeavoured to cover that negligence, were sources of continual and most serious distress to Lord Wellington, who could not until the end of the year procure even a decree for the abolition of the "*Junta de Viveres;*" and who could at no time get delinquents punished. He must know also, that after the battle of Fuentes, the Portuguese troops were without any ammunition because of the negligence of the government; that one of the principal reforms in the administration sought for by lord Wellington was the consolidation of the branches of the

arsenal under one head; and that it was not till February, 1812, (one year after this period,) that Mr. De Lemos returned from the Brazils with full authority for Beresford to control the administration in all that regarded the Portuguese army. This writer should also have known that the engineer's stores ordered up to Elvas for Beresford's siege (for which see colonel Jones's Journal) were not, as colonel Jones supposes, kept back because *the exhausted state of the country would not afford carriages,* but because government *would not enforce the requisitions for them.*

Lord Wellington's operations undoubtedly depended much upon the Portuguese government; and I am justified in blaming that government because it almost always failed to do its duty. I am unwilling therefore, on this pamphleteer's authority, to diminish the censure. I am unwilling to suppose lord Wellington relied not upon the government but upon Beresford; because if the guns and ammunition were under the control of the marshal, he alone would be answerable for deficiencies of that kind, which would be a most serious charge. Let us now hear colonel Jones upon the extent of those deficiencies.

Journal of Sieges, by colonel J. Jones.

"The strength of Badajos had not been duly appreciated, and the means prepared for its reduction in artillery, ammunition, and stores, were altogether too inconsiderable."—"It may be considered fortunate that the approach of marshal Soult's army caused the siege to be raised, as otherwise, after a further sacrifice of men in other feeble attempts, it would have brought itself to a conclusion from *inability to proceed.*"

Were I malicious I might here leave marshal Beresford to the care of his kind friend; but as I am desirous of clearing myself more thoroughly from any charge of injustice against the Portuguese government, and although it would be sufficient to observe, that without means of transport neither guns nor ammunition nor stores could be brought up to the scene of operations, I will insert some extracts from lord Wellington's correspondence which bear more directly on the question, and which show that if Beresford had nominally the control of the arsenals, the government, through the junta of the arsenal, had in

reality the charge of supplying the guns and ammunition and provisions.

Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Celorico, March 31, 1811.

" I also beg you to draw the attention of the government to the operations on the frontiers of Alemtejo; these are becoming of the utmost importance not only to Portugal but to the allies in general. It is obvious they cannot be carried on without a constant communication with the magazines, as well at Abrantes as with those at Lisbon, for the inhabitants of Alemtejo will supply nothing to the troops. I now request you to give notice to the government that *they must either enforce their own law strictly, and oblige the inhabitants of Alemtejo to give the commissaries of the army the use of their carriages for* the payment of hire, *or the operations upon that frontier must be discontinued, and I must draw the army back to its magazines. That province has been untouched by the enemy, the carriages must be in it, and yet I have been able to procure only thirty-four, to remove the articles necessary to establish an hospital for marshal Beresford's corps at Estremos. If the government are tired of the war, and do not choose to exert themselves to oblige the people to bring forward the means which are required to enable the army to carry on its operations at a distance from its magazines, it is necessary that it should be known to the British government, that they may adopt such measures as they may think proper.*"

Elvas, May 20, 1811.

" I enclose the copy of a memorial which has been put into my hands by major Dickson, of the artillery, regarding *the march of certain guns demanded for the service of this garrison from Lisbon. I trust that the movement of the guns has not been suspended, as their early arrival is very important; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make enquiry upon the subject.*"

" *It is perfectly true that major Arentschild left the reserve of his artillery, that is, his spare ammunition, at Sarogoza between Celorico and Ponte Murcella. Why? Because his mules and cattle had been starved on the Rio Mayor, and could not draw it any farther; and because*

the magistrates of the country would supply no means of transport to draw it on."

Elvas, May 27.

"*I hear from colonel Le Mesurier that, notwithstanding the breeze which colonel Rosa has made about Arentschild, there is no ammunition for the Portuguese troops and artillery, even at Coimbra*"!!

Let me now close this part of the subject by a conclusive extract from marshal Beresford's own correspondence. In a letter to lord Wellington, dated January 25, 1811, he says:—

"*That their difficulties are increasing fast; that matters, in his opinion, are coming to a crisis; that he is in the greatest alarm about them, and is afraid to look at the state of things, as far as any Portuguese authority is concerned.*"

Siege of Badajos.—On this head, the main fact disputed is *the want of due concert in the double attack.* In my History I gave ample authority for asserting it, and this writer's cavils merely prove that he is angry, and that he does not know the meaning of the word concert, which he thinks to be synonymous with simultaneous.

But I am also accused of having, from inadvertence, marked the investment on the 5th instead of the 4th of May. So nice a critic should himself have avoided marking the Campo Mayor affair on the 26th instead of the 25th. Yet I did not commit the error, if error it be, from "*inadvertence:*" I find my authority, as usual, in the author's own appendix. Colonel D'Urban says, "On the morning of the 4th, general Stewart was put in movement," &c. and "*on the morning of the 5th invested Badajos.*"

In like manner this writer, curiously exact, asserts that the army "*was not over the Guadiana until the 8th.*" By his appendix, however, it appears that, on the 7th, only one brigade of guns was left on the other side. He says, also, that "*no Spaniards joined the marshal from Montejo,*" and that two of the ten days assigned to his operations by me are to be deducted; yet in the next page he himself assigns the same term of ten days! and with reason, because it was not till the 18th that Latour Mau-

bourg retired to Guadalcanal,—and ten and eight make eighteen. Moreover, the operations were begun on the 7th, for on that day the picquet of cavalry was surprised.

As to the Spaniards from Montejo, *I did not say they joined the marshal,* I said that, including them, he commanded 25,000 men, for which I again have the authority of colonel D'Urban's memoir, as given in this writer's own appendix, viz. " On the 10th, general Castaños *(at Sir William Beresford's desire) had caused Count Penne Villemur with the Spanish cavalry from the side of Montejo, followed by general Morillo with his division of infantry, to occupy Merida, from which the French garrison had withdrawn, and the count pushed on his advanced posts to Almendralejo.*" Wherefore these men, acting thus against the enemy in concert with the marshal, and by his desire, were justly reckoned by me as being under his command. Let these trifles pass: but before I refer to the battle of Albuera, which is the next in the course of events, I will venture upon another extract from captain Squire, who, notwithstanding this writer's displeasure, I still hold to be good authority for what fell under his own observation; and not the less so that he supports my opinion as to the marshal's want of skill at the siege, corroborates the account of his blunder at Campo Mayor, and attests the fact, that the army did generally hold his talents in scorn and were tired of his command.

" 17th May, 1811. Thank God! they say that lord Wellington or general Hill may be soon expected in the neighbourhood; *this will be a revival to our spirits,* for we have lost our character on this part of the frontier. On the night of the 12th, the real attack on the east side of the town was begun but suspended by the marshal after one hour's work; the soil was excellent. *Had we begun there on the 9th, Badajos would have been our own on the morning of the 15th. But after the affair of Campo Mayor, &c. &c.!!! what can be expected?*"

Battle of Albuera.—1°. " *Thus the youngest officer commanded.*"—History.

This is true. Blake's appointment as captain-general of Valencia and Murcia took place indeed after the battle of Albuera, but he had been created captain-general of

the Coronilla in March 1809, and as one of the Spanish regents was also of a higher rank than Beresford.

2°. "*The position was about four miles long.*"—History. That is to say, from the extreme left where the Portuguese cavalry were placed, to the extreme right where the battle ceased. And here I may observe that my plan, which is cavilled at by the author of the "*Strictures,*" was only given as an explanatory sketch, yet it was taken from the same source as his, and it does not as he asserts, extend the wood over the tongue of land to the banks of the Albuera, although some plans of the position that I have seen do so. Moreover, with reference to his description of the ground, this writer, as usual, forgets to make his appendix agree with his text. At page 113 he says, "*the rear of the position was only practicable for infantry;*" but general D'Urban's memoir says, "*it was easy for cavalry throughout.*" Which is right?

3°. "*The position was occupied by* 30,000 *infantry, above* 2000 *cavalry, and* 38 *guns.*"—History.

Here I will expose the disingenuous manner in which the author of the "*Further Strictures*" attempts to bolster up a bad cause. Having printed a running commentary upon my pages, written by somebody who is not named, he makes this anonymous critic state that the allies had only 34 pieces of artillery, thus leaving out four Spanish guns; and at the end of D'Urban's memoir there is also the same false detail; and yet these persons, who cannot, in so small a matter as they have undertaken attain any correctness, are brought forward to censure the inaccuracy of my work! The official returns of Sir Alexander Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery in the battle, make the numbers amount, as I have stated, to 38, viz.—

British horse artillery	4
Ditto foot ditto.....	6
King's German Legion, ditto	12
Portuguese, ditto	12
Spanish artillery	4
	38

Detail of troops.

Beresford's corps.			*Spaniards.*		
Infantry,	British....	7,500	4th army	Infantry,	11,000
	Germans..	1,500		Cavalry,	1,100
	Portuguese	10,000	5th army,	Infantry,	2,000
Cavalry,	British....	700		Cavalry,	500
	Portuguese	300			14,600
Total		20,000	Deduct for stragglers and deserters from the 4th army,		1,100
			Total		13,500

Beresford's.....	20,000
Spaniards	13,500
Grand Total.....	33,500

Authorities.—1°. Lord Londonderry who was adjutant-general rates the British at 7,500

2°. Two battalions of Germans I estimate at.. 1,500

3°. General D'Urban, who rates the Portuguese at..... 10,000

4°. General Harvey's journal, in which the British cavalry are rated at 700

And the Portuguese cavalry at 300

20,000

I find, also, in a very accurate journal kept by Colonel Thorne, a staff officer, that the heavy British cavalry on the 20th of March, only twenty days previous to the battle, amounted to 752 men under arms, viz.

3d dragoon guards.....	379
4th ditto	373
	752

Wherefore, taking the 13th dragoons at a low rate, the British cavalry alone had a thousand troopers in the field. But the reader will observe that I have already given authority for a greater number of men than I allowed in my work; it is therefore necessary to explain, that being in

doubt whether lord Londonderry included Alten's Germans under the general head of British, I deducted the latter from the gross number. I have never been able to procure an official return of the whole army in the field that day, probably none ever was made, but my belief is, that instead of over-rating I have under-stated the number by nearly two thousand men.

Since writing the above, I have obtained the weekly states of general Long's division of cavalry for the 8th and for the 29th of May, that is, one week before and a little more than a week after the battle of Albuera, and unless it can be shown that in the day of battle there were fewer men in the ranks than at other periods, they will be found conclusive as to the numbers of cavalry.

On the 8th of May the present under arms at Villa Franca, in front of Albuera, were, exclusive of 230 officers and serjeants, 1429 Portuguese and British troopers, the latter having 1109 men and 1076 horses.

On the 29th of May, there were 1587 men and 225 officers and serjeants and 1489 horses, the increase arising from the junction of men who had been detached. It is clear from this that the allied cavalry, including the 13th dragoons and the Portuguese and Spanish horsemen, was nearly three thousand strong.

My mode of estimating the numbers of the 5th Spanish army was as follows.

In D'Urban's memoir, Morillo's division of the 5th Spanish army is said to consist of a few weak battalions, and Carlos d'España's brigade of five battalions is called 2000 strong. One battalion of the latter was sent to Olivenza, the remaining four battalions I therefore took to be 1600 men; to these I added 400, as supposing that Castaños must have brought up some of Morillo's people to the action; and Penne Villemur's cavalry I know, from several sources, to have been at least 500 strong.

The numbers of the 4th army I obtained more certainly from the following passage in a letter of lord Wellington's, dated Nissa, April 18, 1811:—

"From a letter from Mr. Wellesley, of the 11th, I learn that general Blake was himself about to come into the Condado de Niebla, to take the command of general

Ballesteros' division and of the troops which had been under the command of general Zayas, and which were to return to that quarter. *The whole corps will amount to* 12,000 *men, of which* 1100 *are cavalry.*"

I subtracted 1100 men, as stragglers or deserters during the long march from Ayamonte, which I believe was too many, because I found in another letter from lord Wellington, dated the 4th July, 1811, six weeks after the battle, that Blake's corps was still from 10 to 12,000 strong; and in an abstract of the head-quarters returns, made 1st July, Quinta St. Joa, Blake's corps is again set down at 12,000. However, my estimate is thus borne out as well as the nature of the case will permit; and what does a thousand or two, more or less, signify in this matter, when it is plain that there were already more than marshal Beresford was able to handle, seeing that in so bloody and critical a battle one-third of his troops never fired a shot.

4°. *The French had "above* 4000 *veteran cavalry, but only* 19,000 *chosen infantry.*"—History.

In the imperial muster-rolls I found that on the 1st of May, the present under arms of the 5th corps, including the garrison of Badajos and 3500 reinforcements in march to join, were 15,885, of which 752 cavalry and 590 artillery,

leaving.....	14,543	infantry.
Deduct garrison ..	2,887	
Total	11,656	
Soult drew from the 1st corps one battalion of grenadiers	500	
Ditto from 4th corps, two regiments of infantry forming Werle's brigade.....	4,000	
From Dessolles' reserve at Cordova, Godinot's brigade	4,000	
	20,156	
For officers and non-combatants, who are always included in French returns, I deducted.....	1,156	
Total infantry....		19,000

The division of heavy dragoons was....	3,000	
The light cavalry of the 5th corps....	752	
Drawn from the 4th corps two regiments,	500	
Including officers, total cavalry,		4,252
Grand total, including a detachment left at Villalba		23,252

Having thus worked out my estimate from authentic documents, I turned to the French authors who have treated of this battle, and I found that Jomini, "*Vie de Napoleon*,"—Lamarre, "*Relation du Siège de Badajos*," —Lapene, "*Conquête d'Andalusie*,"—and Bory St. Vincent, one of Soult's staff, "*Guide des Voyageurs en Espagne*,"—all agree in stating the French at twenty-two thousand men of all arms, while the "*Victoires et Conquêtes Français*," reduces them much lower. I have, therefore, most probably overstated the force of the French.

5°. "*Nearly* 7000 *of the allies*," and "*above* 8000 *of the French were struck down.*"—History.

Authorities.—The official returns make the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese 4547

The loss of the Spaniards I estimated from common report at the time, from the authority of Colonel Jones's History, and from the Spanish accounts of the day..... 2200

Total..... 6747

It is also to be recollected that the British official return does not include a number of men, who having been made prisoners escaped and rejoined their regiments in a few days after the action. The writer of the "*Strictures*" reduces the British loss, and estimates the Spanish at only 1700; but to effect the first, he strikes out the officers and serjeants, and with respect to the last, he knows well that it is under-rated; indeed in his own text there is proof of the inaccuracy of his statement, for he says that before the British came into action, the Spaniards had lost 1500, and yet he would have us believe, that in all the after-fight, though they were constantly exposed to the fire, they only lost 200 more!

With respect to the French loss, I found in general Gazan's intercepted letter, that he had a few days after the battle more than 4000 wounded under his charge, and that some had died on the road. By marshal Beresford's despatches, I found that 350 wounded were discovered at Almendral, and that 3000 were lying killed or mortally wounded on the field. This loose estimation, taken at the highest, accounts for about 8000; taken at the lowest, about 7000. This last number is what French writers admit, and I found a confirmation of it in the official abstract of lord Wellington's analysis of the numbers opposed to him in July, 1811. He there twice estimates the French loss at Albuera at 7000 men; but with that liberality which is usually practised towards enemies on such occasions, marshal Beresford added 2000, sir Benjamin D'Urban adds 3000, and the author of the "*Strictures*" adds 4000 to this number. How far future writers of this school will go, I cannot pretend to say.

6°. *Already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority.*—History.

This is verified by the following extract from D'Urban's memoir.

"Although Blake's corps had little more than a league to march from Almendral, by a good road, guided by an officer sent for the purpose, and which the general had engaged should be upon its ground at noon, did not commence arriving till eleven at night, and was not all up till three in the morning of the 16th." Farther on it is said the posting of the corps was only "*effected after much delay upon the part of general Blake.*"

Now if the exquisitely bad grammar of this extract will permit any meaning to be attached thereto, it is, *that Blake was not acting cordially with the marshal;* but this shall be made clearer. My observation was written with allusion to Blake's *refusal to change his front;* and my authority for that fact was a staff officer of high rank who was present. In the first impression of general D'Urban's memoir, which I had before me at the time, I also found written against that part of the memoir which says that "*Blake only delayed the execution of the order,*" the following note by sir H. Hardinge, who carried Blake

the order, " *He, Blake, positively refused;* saying the attack was evidently on the front by the village. When told that the village was sufficiently occupied, *he still persisted in his refusal;* and when he consented at length to do so, gave such tedious pedantic orders of countermarch that Beresford was obliged to interfere and direct the movement himself." This is precisely what I have stated.

Here I will notice another of those absurd charges made by the writer of the " *Strictures,*" the contradictions of which are to be found in Beresford's own correspondence. He remarks, in a note on D'Urban's memoir, that from a false print in the first impression, the words *first and second* (referring to the Spanish lines) *were reversed, and that I have adopted the error.* Now without stopping to remark upon the *generalship* that would have drawn away the first line when Godinot's attack was commencing in its front, and when from being on the edge of a descent the evolutions must have been cramped and confused, and have the appearance of a retreat; whereas the second line, having more room could have more easily changed its front without offering any advantage or encouragement to Godinot's people; — without stopping, I say, to dilate upon this, I answer that *I did not follow the misprint in sir B. D'Urban's memoir,* but *I did follow marshal Beresford's despatches to lord Wellington and to the Portuguese government,* in both of which he says, " *I requested general Blake to form a part of his first line and all his second to that front.*" And so also runs my text.

7°. " *The narrow ravine of the Aroya,*" *&c.*—History.

The writer of the Strictures says there was *no ravine,* but if the rear of the position was, as he also asserts, " *practicable only for infantry,*" my expression is just. Nevertheless, I have changed the word to valley, to which he cannot object until he proves that two hills can be found without a valley between them.

8°. " *The right of the allies and the left of the French were only divided by a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from each. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult.*"—History.

If the reader will look at the plan given by the writer of the " Strictures" himself, he will there see that the hill

in question is precisely as I have described it, "*about cannon-shot from each army;*" and by referring to my text, he will see that I did never argue as this writer asserts that a large corps should have been placed there. But I do maintain, that if a small body of men had been placed there Soult could not have united fifteen thousand men and forty guns behind it without Beresford knowing anything of the matter; and if, as is probable, the French had first driven this party away, that would have indicated their intentions and the right of the army could not have been surprised as it was. Moreover, patroles of cavalry and single mounted officers might have gone across the Albuera higher up, and so have looked behind this hill, which was entirely neglected by Beresford. It was a gross error; and it was a more gross error to permit the French army to pass over that hill, to cross the Albuera, and to mount the opposite height without the slightest resistance, although during the whole movement they were within cannon-shot of the right of the allies' position. Why were they not watched? and where was the allied cavalry? We shall see anon! But what sort of a general is he who suffers his enemy to move for an hour within cannon-shot but unmolested against a position which did not exceed three miles in length? Why Mendizabel himself did not discover greater incapacity at the Gebora! But his troops were not so good! English soldiers can sustain even a Mendizabel.

9°. "*The French cavalry outflanking the front and charging here and there,*" *&c.*—History.

The idiomatic expression, "*here and there,*" shows that I never meant to say the French cavalry charged home; but that they *menaced* the Spaniards' flank. Nevertheless I have authority, whether good or bad, for an actual charge. The author of the "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,*" who I believe served with the 29th regiment in the battle, writes thus: "An endeavour was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a *charge of cavalry again forced them to retire in confusion.*"

10°. "*The Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them.*"—History.

This circumstance which occurred on the right, was related to me by a staff officer of high rank who was present. But it appears from a statement in the "*Strictures*" that the *English fired upon the Spaniards.* The confusion on the right in the beginning of the action is thus very clearly shewn.

11°. *At this critical moment general Stewart arrived at the foot of the height with Colborne's brigade,*" *&c.*—History.

The author of the "*Strictures*" says, *there was no hill,* "*only a gradual slope,*" *that the troops did not mount it,* they "*came up it in the regular manner!*" The regular manner of coming up a slope without ascending it must, no doubt, be a very modest and unassuming manner, but until I know what it is I cannot describe it. Let me, however, show that there was a *height* if there was not a *hill.*

Extract from D'Urban's memoir. "This *height* was of great importance, inasmuch as it commanded the right of the position; and the second division, under the honourable major-general William Stewart, which was now rapidly advancing to support the Spaniards, and *which arrived just as they had been forced to abandon it,* was immediately ordered by sir William Beresford *to attack and recover it.*" The writer of the "*Strictures*" says *they never lost it!*

12°. "*The* 31*st still maintained the height.*"—History.

Authority, D'Urban's memoir. Extract. "Favoured by this" (darkness from smoke and rain) "as the first brigade under colonel Colborne fell upon the enemy with the bayonet, and were driving him before them, some squadrons of Polish lancers, &c. charged." "*The* 31*st regiment, which was on the left of the brigade, &c. &c., extricated itself from the confusion, and continued the attack alone.*" It should be defence.

13°. "*Houghton's regiments soon got footing on the summit.*"—"*Dickson placed the artillery in line. The 2d division came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward.*"—History.

Authority, D'Urban's memoir. Extracts. "The 3d brigade of the 2d division, under major-general Houghton, following the first with equal intrepidity and better fortune, deployed very judiciously, and with admirable precision,

under cover of the lower falls of the heights, moved on in line to the attack, and supported and *followed by the 2d brigade, under the hon. colonel Abercromby, and the Spaniards under generals Ballesteros and Zayas, carried all before it, gained the contested ground and took post upon it.*"

And yet the writer of the "*Strictures*" says I cannot name the Spanish corps, because none moved forward! I will now give another and more correct version of these attacks; the version which I adopted, and which I copied from a note made by sir Henry Hardinge in the margin of the original impression of D'Urban's memoir.

"The 1st brigade, when they had gained the crest of *the hill,* found it so hot that Stewart ordered a charge, which the Buffs and 48th alone made in line against the enemy's column, of at least 10,000 men. Fortunately *the 31st, being the left regiment, had not had time to deploy when the two other regiments charged; it therefore held the ground while Houghton's brigade deployed in the rear, and under cover, and moved up to the support of the 31st,* holding the position and keeping up a hot fire in line against the close column of the enemy which attempted to advance, and sometimes to deploy; keeping however within short musket-shot, both sides firing grape: the destruction being infinitely greater in the dense order of the enemy than in our thin order."

In conjunction with the above, may be taken the following extract of a letter from major Elliot, of the 29th regiment, an actor in what he describes. It confirms my statements in more than one particular; and it does a justice to the 29th regiment, which from ignorance I had omitted to do.

"The attack of the 16th May commenced on the right; *and most correctly is it described by colonel Napier.* The fate of the 1st brigade, except the 31st regiment, was very soon decided; our brigade moved to the right in open column of companies under a very heavy cannonade, by which we had a captain and a good many men killed. The 29th led the brigade; the deployment was made very steadily under this fire and we became hotly engaged. *At this time a body of Polish lancers appeared on our*

right, charged, and attempted the attack on us which had proved so successful against the 1*st brigade; but major Way (now sir Gregory) foiled them by throwing back the grenadiers and* 1*st battalion company, who with an oblique fire sent them off* and we saw no more of them. We kept at it *while our ammunition lasted,* then the fourth division came up."

This last passage verifies the fact that *ammunition failed;* a circumstance which is also mentioned in the "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaign.*" It proves also that there were more charges of cavalry made than the writer of the "*Strictures*" knows of: and here I may mention a curious example of the impudent falsehood of the Spanish accounts of this war.

Penne Villemur's cavalry fled in a shameful manner, as the following statement by colonel Light proves.

"After our brigades of infantry, first engaged, were repulsed, I was desired by general D'Urban to tell the count de Penne Villemur to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy, the whole pulled up, there was no getting them farther, and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could." Now the comment of the Spanish government in their official gazette at Cadiz upon this part of the action was, that Penne Villemur, seeing three English regiments broken by the French cavalry, withstood the latter, protected the former, and was fired upon by the very regiments he had saved: finally, that the Spaniards alone defeated the whole French army!!

Having thus established most of the important disputed facts related in my history, and truth being my great object, I will notice the errors I have really made.

1°. I supposed that the second charge of the lancers (that against the 29th) took place at a later period, and that it was then the guns were captured; whereas it appears the guns were taken in the charge against Colborne's brigade. And here it is worthy of remark, that marshal Beresford's despatch suppresses the fact of more than one gun being taken, although six pieces of artillery and other trophies fell into the lancers' hands.

Five of the guns were, indeed, afterwards recovered; but in the first instance they were captured and might have been carried off.

2°. I supposed that the mutual firing between a British and Spanish regiment happened at the time the fusileers were mounting the hill. I had understood that it was so, and that colonel Robert Arbuthnot rode between both parties; but as the writer of the "*Strictures*" asserts that he has sir Robert's letter contradicting the fact, I have expunged it. Nevertheless, I still maintain, that at one period of the battle such an event did take place; and, indeed, it is proved by the contradictory evidence before noticed as to which party fired upon the other. The reader must, however, feel that many circumstances may be satisfactorily verified to a historian by conversation and by other means, and yet he may not be able to detail the chain of evidence in print. In such cases, he has a right to the confidence of his reader if he has shewn that his statements are generally accurate, and that he has been diligent in searching for truth. This I think I have shewn both in my Reply and in the present Justification. I have, I think, shewn, 1°. that my inquiries were extensive; 2°. that my authorities, even for trifling points, were sound and numerous; 3°. that the writer of the "*Strictures*," being a person of no knowledge and very unscrupulous, cannot be marshal Beresford, but is probably some expectant ready to vouch for any thing, "if thrift might follow fawning." I have not noticed his continued scurrility, because I despise it. Neither have I exposed above one-half of his mis-statements and misrepresentations, because I thought it a waste of time; and his arguments are upon a par with his facts: one or two examples will suffice.

1°. He says Soult took an hour to execute his movement across the Albuera against the right; and that the Spaniards resisted afterwards for an hour and a half! That is to say, the French general was permitted, for two hours and a half, to act against a point of the position on the possession of which depended the safety of the army. They were allowed to act there for two hours and a half unopposed, save by a few thousand Spaniards,

who were confused and disordered by a sudden change of front and by this unexpected attack; and yet the second division was within a mile of them, and the rest of the army not two miles distant! And this is meant to prove the skill of marshal Beresford! Fortunately for the latter the story of the Spanish resistance is a Spanish romance.

2°. This writer would have it believed that Beresford did at the time disapprove, and does still blame the advance of the fusileer brigade, because the enemy's cavalry might, he says, have penetrated by the gap thus made, and because he was in no danger of being beaten, and never thought of retreating! Marshal Beresford, then, by bringing up general Collins's Portuguese and the Spanish reserves to the aid of Houghton's brigade and joining them to Abercromby's troops, expected to have defeated the enemy, and without the assistance of the fusileers to have won that battle which was so hardly gained with their assistance! Truly he expected much! The regiments of Houghton's brigade, having lost two-thirds of their number, being without ammunition, and having a French column already advanced upon their right flank, were to have maintained the height until all the troops above-mentioned could be brought into line! and then Spaniards and Portuguese were to do what the fusileers did!

There was no danger of the French cavalry pushing *through the gap* made by the advance of the fusileers. General Cole had provided against that by placing general Harvey's Portuguese brigade *in the gap*, and that brigade did actually repulse an attempt made by Latour Maubourg to push his light cavalry through. But if marshal Beresford was so certain of victory, so composed and confident, so little thinking of a retreat, why did he, when the battle was gained, write to lord Wellington that he anticipated defeat if attacked the next day and was determined not to survive it? But the whole argument of the writer is nought, seeing that marshal Beresford, in his despatch, praises the attack of the 4th division, saying, " it was judicious and opportune."

There is, however, a more certain proof that marshal

Beresford did contemplate a retreat, namely, that he gave the order for it, and that order was in part obeyed. *The bridge and village of Albuera were actually abandoned in obedience to his orders, by Alten's Germans and by the artillery!* and Beresford in person rebuked colonel Walker of the Germans for being slow to obey. This fact, which I have often heard, but have ascertained to be true since the foregoing pages were written, shows, that far from being moved by common reports, or by prejudice against marshal Beresford, I was even too careful to reject what was at all doubtful.

The annexed extract is from a narrative of the campaign of 1811, written by sir Julius Hartman, who commanded the British artillery in the action, and it places the fact beyood all contradiction, unless sir Julius be the most imaginative of men; and certainly marshal Beresford had good reason to call the arrival of the fusileers *opportune*, for like Bunyan's Pilgrim, he was then in the "Slough of Despond."

"The enemy made repeated and very serious attacks on the bridge, which were unsuccessful, until the troops received an order to assemble *to cover the retreat upon Valverde.* The general-in-chief had given this order at a moment, when the result of the struggle for the possession of the heights had appeared to him doubtful. In pursuance of this order, general Von Alten and the commander of the Portuguese artillery, major Dickson, *abandoned the village and bridge, which was immediately occupied by the enemy.* Directly after, the re-taking of this was most urgently ordered, which by the valour of the troops with great sacrifice and spilling of blood was accomplished; but, notwithstanding, the possession of the bridge was never completely obtained."

I can now also upon another point, more completely fulfil my former promise to shew that marshal Beresford's errors were far greater than I had supposed them to be.

Statement of captain Arthur Gregory.

"A deserter came in, about one o'clock A.M. on the 16th; he said that an order was issued for an attack at eight A.M., he was immediatetly sent in to head-quarters and I suppose arrived."

"Between seven and eight, orders came for the cavalry, and I believe for the horse artillery, to go to the rear to forage and make themselves comfortable. As there was a difficulty about watering, one regiment went down to the river at a time. The first was the 4th dragoons, which, after watering, went to the rear; the 3d dragoon guards were going to water, and the horses (I believe) were taken off the guns of the horse artillery for the same purpose, when an orderly of the 13th dragoons came in from a picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river! General Long immediately galloped off and *found half their army across*, under cover of a hollow, which had completely masked the operation. I was dispatched to report it to the marshal, whose head-quarters were in the village of Albuera; after being detained a few minutes at the door he came out, and after questioning me sharply upon my intelligence, was going in, when I took the liberty of mentioning that the cavalry had been ordered to the rear, and that one regiment had already gone; and I asked him if it should be brought up again, and to where? His orders were, 'Let them go more to the right than they were before.' I galloped off to the spot where the cavalry had been ordered, and found the 4th dragoons with their horses unbridled and linked with the collar chains; the men had taken their accoutrements and jackets off, and were going in all directions to cut forage. A few minutes brought them together. Before I could get back, the cannonade had begun. *Had Soult delayed his attack half an hour, all the British cavalry would have been in the rear dispersed over the country.* I do not know if the brigades of foot artillery had the same orders."

Extract of a letter to captain Gregory from lieutenant-colonel Wildman, a lieutenant in the 4th dragoons at Albuera.

"I perfectly recollect the 4th dragoons being ordered to the rear on the morning of the 16th May, 1811, to cut forage for our horses, and I think it was you who came to order us up again, but whether we had begun cutting it or not before you arrived, I cannot remember."

Extract of a letter to captain Arthur Gregory from colonel Leighton, who commanded the 4th dragoons at the battle of Albuera.

"In regard to the morning of the 16th, we had, as usual, been under arms for an hour before day-break, and to the best of my recollection between seven and eight o'clock received orders to proceed for forage."

Thus it is proved that if Soult had only delayed his attack for half an hour, *not a single British cavalry soldier would have been in the field!!* How is it, then, that with the consciousness of this in his heart, marshal Beresford did not spurn the ill-timed sarcasm of Dumouriez? How is it that he did not reply, This is not Pharsalia, but Albuera. Here were not Romans, but Englishmen. The Roman soldiers could not save Pompey, but the English soldier, he who "comes on with such a conquering bravery," saved me! I am not Cæsar, but Beresford!

HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy's principal communication with France. This advantage was feebly used by the Spaniards. Kellerman's division at Valladolid, and Bonet's at San Andero, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check, and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were thus collaterally as well as directly unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the war was steadily progressive in favour of the French, yet their career was one of pains and difficulties.

Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that the artillery employed against Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country people, without an escort from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the Guerilla system commenced in those parts, and as the Partida chiefs acquired re-

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putation at the moment Blake lost credit by defeat, his dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards, hoping thus to cover past disgrace and to live in greater ease: for the regulars suffered the restraints without enjoying the benefit of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves.

Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains and every range became the mother of a guerilla brood.

On the left of the Ebro, the Catalonian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed the communication between Zaragoza and the French out-posts, and maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon.

On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molina were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, moving by the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain of Zaragoza and seizing the convent of Nuestra Señora del Aguilar, situated on a rock near Carineña, entrenched it.

On Gayan's left, general Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, established himself at Calatayud with the regular regiments of Soria and La Princessa; there he made fresh levies and rapidly formed a large force, with which he cut the direct line between Zaragoza and Madrid.

Beyond Villa Campa's positions the circle of war was continued by other bands, which, de-

scending from the Moncayo mountains, infested the districts of Taranzona and Borja, and intercepted the communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. The younger Mina, called the student, vexed the country between Tudela and Pampeluna. The inhabitants of the high Pyrenean valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, also took arms under Renovalles. This officer, captured at Zaragoza, was by the French said to have broken his parole; but he pleaded a previous breach of the capitulation, and having escaped to Lerida passed from thence with some regular officers into the valleys, where he surprised several French detachments. His principal post was the convent of San Juan de la Pena, which is built on a rock remarkable in Spanish history as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish conquerors; the bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the church, and the place held in veneration by the Aragonese was supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed as it were the investment of the third corps.

All these bands, amounting to at least twenty thousand armed men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of the French army. Meanwhile Blake, after rallying his fugitives at Tortoza, abandoned Aragon, and fixing himself at Taragona, endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia.

Suchet, while following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments as far as Morella on

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some field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to invade the districts of Vanasques and Benevarres. Their subjugation would have secured his left flank and opened a new line of communication with France, but the inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated Partizans menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. The latter marched in October to meet them, yet was soon forced to fight its way back. During its absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to kill the sick men, but the townsmen of Graus opposed this barbarity, and marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was not rare in Aragonese towns.

While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candasnos to be attacked, and some sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, and the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina still intercepted the communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, rallied Gayan's troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished a citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place colonel Henriod marched from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two thousand men and three pieces of artillery. He drove back some advanced posts from Ojos Negros and Origuela, and came in front of the main position at eleven o'clock in the morning of the 25th of November.

COMBAT OF TREMENDAL.

The Spanish position was a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue of land shot out, overhanging Origuela. On the upper part of this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open attack, skirmished as if he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. The Spaniard was thus induced to mass his forces on that side, and in the night the fire of the bivouacs enabled him to see that the main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, though Henriod with six companies and two guns was driving in his outposts; hence as the fire of the latter soon ceased, Villa Campa, convinced that a retreat was in progress, was completely thrown off his guard; Henriod's six companies then secretly scaled the rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made against the valley of Venasque, which being successful that district was disarmed. Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, yet the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way, and in December, Suchet, assisted by General Milhaud with a moveable column from Madrid, took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Then the insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was in a manner effected; for the interior was disarmed

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and quieted; and the Partidas who still hung upon the frontiers were obliged to recruit and be supplied from other provinces. They acted chiefly on the defensive, for the Aragonese were so vexed by the smaller bands, now dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro asked leave to raise a Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them.

The reinforcements now pouring into Spain soon enabled Suchet to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men, of which a part were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortoza, and the rest about Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were the only obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps, and in them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge when closely pressed by the invaders.

The policy of the Supreme Junta was always to form fresh corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Novarro, making Tortoza his base of operations, lined the banks of the Algas, menacing Alcanitz; Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the Segre; but the activity of the French gave them little time to effect any considerable organization.

Suchet's positions formed a circle round Zaragoza. Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned, and his principal forces were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and

Venasque. Of these, the first, third, and fourth were places of strength, and whether his situation be regarded in a political or a military light it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate the feelings of the Aragonese—at that time the most energetic portion of the nation—and to place the third corps, with reference to the general operations of the war, in a most formidable position.

1°. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro, and being situated at the entrance of the passes leading into Valencia, furnished a base from which Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could place the Catalonian army between two fires whenever the seventh corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat.

2°. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga having a wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons.

3°. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover a co-operation of the garrison of Monzon with the troops at Barbastro, and at Benevarres could always curb Perena.

4°. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with the moveable columns appointed to guard the French frontier; and the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guada-

BOOK IX. 1809. Dec. lupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected the operations of the third with the seventh corps; and henceforward we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they formed but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against the south.

Suchet's projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in Navarre, which at this period assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and by hardy and sudden enteprizes kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, one of Joseph's Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was quite at variance with the military authorities, and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration and a rapacious system ensued. General D'Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina's pay, and his suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, and it is certain that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive venal and

1810. Jan. weak. To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third corps; he soon restored order in Pampeluna and eventually captured Mina himself; yet he was unable to suppress the system of the Partidas. "*Espoz y Mina*" took his nephew's place; and from that time to the end of the war the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this celebrated man—undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the Partida chiefs.

Here it may be observed how weak and inefficient

this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and even as an auxiliary its advantages were nearly balanced by its evils. It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. But however this may be, it is a truth that the Partidas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms and often commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single "corps d'armée."

If a whole nation will persevere in such a system it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no people will thus persevere. The aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, are hinderers of the bold and robust, and there will be a difficulty to procure arms and stores; for it is not on every occasion that so rich and powerful a people as the English will be found in alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet

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and some others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of ease natural to mankind soon prevails against the suggestions of honour; and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their bands.

To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct the energy thus aroused, is a gigantic task, and if misdirected the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, and to represent it otherwise is to make history give false lessons to posterity. When Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord Wellington, that great man, instead of following the example of the Supreme Junta and encouraging independent bands, enforced a military organization upon totally different principles. The people were indeed obliged by him to resist the enemy, under a regular system, which however restrained all classes within just bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation was rendered subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently is to confess weakness. It is to say that the government being unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy.

The Partida system in Spain was the offspring of disorder, and disorder in war is weakness ac-

companied by ills the least of which is sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare that habits of unbridled license, of unprincipled violence and disrespect for the rights of property, are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency been cited as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by politicians who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the latter's discipline.

Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one great man is sufficient to save a nation: but when every person is permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself, for one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two to act from personal interest: in short, there will be more robbers than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina was to slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen: nay, this the most fortunate of all the chiefs would never suffer any other Partida than his own to be in his district; he also, as I have before related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show, that after considerable experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was greater than the benefit.

Extract from the Life of Mina.

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" Far from casting general blame on the efforts " made by the Catalans I admired them; but as " they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their " heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many " times it caused the destruction of whole popula- " tions without necessity and without advantage.

" When a country is invaded by an army stronger " than that which defends it, it is beyond question " that the population should come to the assistance " of the troops and lend them every support; but, " without an absolute necessity, the former should " not be brought on to the field of battle."—" It is " inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition " to hardened veterans.

" Instead of *exasperating* the people of Catalonia, " the leaders should have endeavoured to *calm* " them, and have directed their ardour so as to " second the army on great occasions. But they " excited them without cessation, led them day " after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, " forced them to abandon their habitations, to em- " bark if they were on the coast, if inland to take " to the mountains and perish of misery within " sight of their own homes thus abandoned to the " mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The " people's ardour was exhausted daily in partial " operations, and hence, on great occasions when " they could have been eminently useful they were " not to be had. Their good will had been so often " abused by the folly of their leaders, that many " times their assistance was called for in vain. The " peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, " began to demand in their turn. They insisted " that the soldiers should fight always to the last

"gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and "robbed and ill-used them when broken by de- "feat. They had been so excited, so exasperated "against the French, that they became habitually "ferocious, and their ferocity was often as danger- "ous to their own party as to the enemy. The "atrocities committed against their own chiefs dis- "gusted the most patriotic, abated their zeal and "caused the middle classes to desire peace as the "only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. "Numbers of distinguished men, even those who "had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began "to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, "but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of "the Bourbons which reigns in Spain would never "have remounted the throne.

"The cruelties exercised upon the French mili- "tary were as little conformable to the interest of "the Spaniards. Those men were but the slaves "of their duty and of the state; certain of death "a little sooner or a little later, they like the "Spaniards were victims of the same ambition. "The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted "warfare; but the treatment experienced from the "Catalans brought out this disposition prematurely; "and that unhappy people were themselves the "victims of a cruelty, which, either of their own "will or excited by others, they had exercised upon "those troops that fell into their power; and this "without any advantage to their cause, while a "contrary system would in a little time have "broken up the seventh corps,—seeing that the "latter was composed of foreigners naturally in- "clined to desert. But the murder of all wounded

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" and sick and helpless men, created such horror, " that the desertion which at first menaced total " destruction ceased entirely."

Such were St. Cyr's opinions, and yet the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was not the least successful in Spain.

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

THE narrative of Catalonian affairs was broken off at the moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich received intelligence of the Austrian war, and of Barcelona having been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening general Reille's preparation for the siege of that place, a second detachment under Lecchi proceeded to the Ampurdan. During this time Coupigny continued at Taragona, and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans and Wimphen, had composed Reding's left wing, were continually skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the communications in a more systematic manner than before.

See Vol. II. p. 102.

Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that general Verdier had replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and marshal Augereau had reached Perpignan on his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information gave St. Cyr infinite

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discontent. In his Journal of Operations, he declares his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and his observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous of his rival; but it appears by official documents that Napoleon superseded St. Cyr for want of vigour and zeal.

Augereau having served in Catalonia during the war of the revolution, imagined he had then acquired an influence which might be revived on the present occasion. He framed a proclamation vieing with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes; but the latter, however turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia escorted by a battalion, but on the very frontier, the Miguelette colonel, Porta, defeated the escort and tore down the few copies that had been posted. Augereau, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, and St. Cyr continued to command, but reluctantly, because, as he affirms, the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon's ill-will.

The most serious of these affronts was the permitting Verdier to correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr's. For these reasons, the latter says he contented himself with a simple discharge of his duty, which, rightly interpreted, means a neglect of that most important of all duties, zeal for the public welfare. But, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was certainly designed for their leader; it is rather to be ad-

mired that the emperor discovered so little jealousy. But when a man has once raised himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his former comrades, for as all honours and rewards flowing from him are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where the sanction of time is wanting to identify the sovereign with the country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is patriotism.

While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake's movement against Suchet. This order he refused to obey, and with reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake's false movement to occupy two "corps d'armée," and so retard the siege of Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniards' possession, and St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all his operations, and now wished to forestal Augereau, was extremely urgent for many reasons to commence the siege without delay; but Verdier having failed at Zaragoza, was cautious of attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme. When pressed to begin, he complained that he could not after placing garrisons in Rosas and Figueras bring ten thousand men before Gerona, which, seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient.

See Vol. II. p. 358.

St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and expe-

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dition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service of the siege at Figueras and which it was unlikely Napoleon would replenish, must by delay be exhausted, as well as the supplies which he had himself collected at Vich, he sent all his own cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan; and having thus increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again urged Verdier to be expedite.

These reinforcements marched the 23d of May, and the covering army, diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, and the inhabitants of the town remained in the mountains, unsheltered and starving, yet resolute not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility of grand sentiments which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; men and women alike, they endure calamity with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more than becomes either wise or brave men.

Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly

all his corn, resolved to approach Gerona and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in that district. In this view, he sent his sick and wounded men under a strong escort to Barcelona, disposing his reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without loss. The troops, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. In two days they passed by Folgarolas, San Saturnio, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de Farnes. The head-quarters were fixed at Caldas de Malavella on the 20th, the Fort of St. Felieu de Quixols on the coast was stormed the 21st, the Spanish privateers there sought another harbour, and the French occupied a half circle, extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola, thus cutting off the communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Coupigny, Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros.

During the march, the French defeated three Spanish battalions and captured a convoy coming from Martorel and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of Blake's army, a curious error, for Blake was on that very day being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. Strictly speaking, there was at this period no Catalonian army, the few troops in the field acted independently. Coupigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona, where he and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and political intrigues than with military affairs, were thwarting each other. Thus

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the Spanish and French operations were alike weakened by internal divisions.

Verdier was slow and more attentive to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the 6th of May; it was not till the 4th of June that reinforced with Lecchi's division he completed the investment of the place on both sides of the Ter. On the 8th ground was broken, and thus, while Blake was advancing against Zaragoza, in other words seeking to wrest Aragon from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands.

THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.

When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of the contending parties were as follows:—Eighteen thousand French held the Ampurdan and invested the place. Of this number four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier found the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, *destitute of a garrison* when he first arrived from France. A fact consistent with lord Collingwood's description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed to them by others.

St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, covered the siege with twelve thousand men, and Duhesme, having about ten thousand including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. Forty thousand French were therefore disposed between that city and Figueras, while on

Imperial Muster-Rolls, MSS.

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the Spanish side there was no preparation. Blake was still in Aragon; Coupigny with six thousand of the worst troops was at Taragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen with a few thousand held the country about the Upper Llobregat; Juan Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olat and Ripol; and in the higher Catalonia small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own system of warfare, not only disregarding the generals, as in the time of Reding, but falling upon and robbing the regular troops whenever a favourable opportunity occurred. The Spanish privateers dislodged from St. Filieu, resorted to Palamos-bay, and the English fleet under lord Collingwood, endeavoued to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, from carrying provisions by the coast.

From Gerona Alvarez Mariano did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the *Supreme Central Junta* for succours, but his cry was disregarded, and when the siege commenced his garrison did not exceed three thousand regular troops, his magazines and hospitals were but scantily provided, and he had no money. Yet his lofty spirit was in no manner daunted nor his fortitude abated.

The works of Gerona were little changed since the first siege; but there, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical force of the city had been called forth. There likewise a sickness, common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled,

See Vol. I. p. 77.

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under the title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded and to wait upon the hospitals: at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! To evince his own resolution, the governer forbad the mention of a capitulation under pain of death. But severe punishments were only denounced, not inflicted. Alvarez, master of his actions, and capable of commanding without phrenzy, had recourse to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain of cruelty and rich in honour.

On the 4th of June the siege was begun. On the 12th, one mortar-battery erected at Casen Rocca on the left of the Ter, and two breaching-batteries established against Fort Monjouic, were ready to play and the town was summoned in form. In answer came an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would be fired upon, which was the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the conduct of Alvarez.

The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the French, and on the 14th, the batteries opened against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca.

The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men.

The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the outworks of Monjouic were assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel, and the French erected breaching-batteries four hundred yards from the northern bastion of Monjouic. Tem-

pestuous weather retarded their works, but a practicable opening was effected the 4th of July, and the assault ordered, although the flank fire of the works was not silenced, the glacis not crowned, the covered way or counterscarp uninjured, and a half moon in a perfect state covered the approaches to the breach. The latter was proved by the engineers on the night of the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted, yet the storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these four days, as the batteries ceased to play, the Spaniards retrenched and barricadoed the opening.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column leaped out of the trenches, cleared the open space, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and rear by the fire from the half-moon, the covered way, and the eastern bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt but failed with a loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, between Monjouic and the city.

About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr's knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of Souham's division from Santa Coloma de Farnés, and posted it on the left of the Ter at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich were thus

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reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although an effort to raise the siege was to be expected; for the governor's letters to Blake, urgently demanding succour, were intercepted, and that general was now collecting men at Taragona.

Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take Palamos. To effect this, general Fontanes marched from St. Filieu with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some squadrons of dragoons. In passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, he was cannonaded by six gun-boats, but the artillery finally caused them to sheer off. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the attack.

The place had a good roadstead, and being only one march from Gerona was of importance. The works, partly ruined, were yet so far repaired by the Catalans as to be capable of some defence, and twenty guns were mounted. It was built on a narrow rocky peninsula with only one land-front, the approach to which was over a plain completely commanded from the left by some rugged hills; on these a considerable number of Somatenes were assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town, but Fontanes drove them from this strong position and a third time summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the Italians immediately stormed the works. The Spaniards flying towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, but the latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes' troops, having turned the town during the action, intercepted the fugitives and put all to the sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans arrived near Hostalrich, and began to harass Souham's outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr's attention to that side, while a reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of his line into the city. In pursuance of this project, fifteen hundred chosen men, under the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, endeavoured to penetrate secretly through his posts at Llagostera; they were accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishman also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino's posts unobserved. Unfortunately a straggler was taken, and St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column.

As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards marched through the hills at dusk, and received the fire of the ambuscade; they escaped by a hasty retreat, but the next day fell in with the other troops and lost a thousand men; the rest escaped the French by dispersion, but were ill-used and robbed of their arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr declares that Mr. Marshal having offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation and abandoned his men; but the Spanish general Coupigny affirms that the men abandoned Marshal and refused to fight; that Rich run away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. It is also certain that Marshal's flight was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell, fighting gallantly.

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This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Coupigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general excused himself on the ground of Blake's absence, the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona, and finally adduced colonel Marshal's unfortunate attempt, as proof that due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches a bombardment and an assault without any succour; and that during that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.

From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Coupigny nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten, how, with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand men to man the works and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment.

After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form. He opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan; his operations were, however, retarded by Claros and Rovira, who

captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier; and to prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade from Souham's division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja.

The 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted the communication between the latter place and the city. The 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic was crowned, the counterscarp blown in, the flank defences ruined, the ditch passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by storm, but no lodgement was effected. During this day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan, and at the same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel thinking their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners.

On the 5th the engineers ascertained that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops would after storming it be obliged to descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet; the line of attack was therefore changed and new approaches commenced against the eastern bastion. A second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and one assault.

CHAPTER III.

BOOK IX. 1809. August.

VERDIER, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great; for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the town, in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding facts. The Spaniards, indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, at the head of two thousand five hundred Migueletes attacked Bascara, a post between Figueras and Gerona, at the moment when a convoy escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde. The commandant of Figueras, uniting some "*gens d'armes*" and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the post on the 6th, but meanwhile the escort of the convoy had fallen back on France, and spread such terror that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. The latter refused this ill-timed demand, and in his Memoirs takes occasion to censure the system of moveable columns as more likely to create than to suppress insurrections; as being

harassing to the troops, weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing the peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength.

There is great force in these observations, and if an army is so morally disorganized that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times requiring a nice judgment, great talents, and excellent arrangement, was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is difficult to conceive a more simple or efficient mode of protecting the flanks and rear of an invading army than moveable columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr's objections. The emperor's views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all attempts to lessen them go down with a wonderful authority to posterity.

A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, made a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening of the 10th upon the Ter, and being baffled in an attempt to pass the river near Angeles, descended the left bank in the night, pierced the line of investment, and crossing by a ford near St. Pons entered Gerona at day-break. This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; yet the enemy's approaches hourly advanced, pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the town still remained inactive. In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were

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not wanting to themselves. While defending the half ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, they failed not to protest against the cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them; and the Supreme Junta of Catalonia forwarded their complaints to the Central Junta at Seville, with the following remonstrance.

"The generals of our army have formed "no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not "one of the three lieutenant-generals here has "been charged to conduct an expedition to its "help; they say that they act in conformity to a "plan approved by your Majesty. Can it be true "that your Majesty approves of abandoning Ge-"rona to her own feeble resources? If so, her "destruction is inevitable; and should this cala-"mity befal, will the other places of Catalonia "and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate "her fidelity when they see her temples and houses "ruined, her heroic defenders dead or in slavery? "And if such calamities should threaten towns in "other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Ca-"talonian assistance when this most interesting "place can obtain no help from them?"—"Do you "not see the consequences of this melancholy re-"flection which is sufficient to freeze the ardour, "to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defen-"ders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our "frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, "our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall "to the enemy, and the country has no longer any "real existence."

In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree passed to afford Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an immediate effort to raise the siege. But how little did

the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and insulting the English general after the battle of Talavera; and this Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic with the pen, was selling to foreign merchants the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the Milans. As he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the circle of investment, and his arrival created considerable alarm among the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged was also among the besiegers; the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients, and the battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength: even the generals were obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of their brigades. Moreover the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, was extended along thirty miles of a mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake's operations.

Verdier was filled with apprehension lest a disastrous action should oblige him to raise the long-

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protracted siege, notwithstanding his fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. Cyr's best qualities were developed. A very learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; and though apparently wanting in those original and daring views which mark the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, "that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed couraged; Blake's inaction was rather the thing to be dreaded; for not more than two days' provisions could be procured to supply the troops when together, and it would be necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably act immediately; hence it was necessary to concentrate as many men as possible in the course of the night and next day to deliver battle; and there were still ten thousand good troops under arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing corps."

On the other hand, Blake, with an army numerous indeed but by no means spirited, was from frequent defeat become cautious without being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving army is not to protract but to raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. He had collected about two thousand beasts of burthen,

loaded with flour, in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. This convoy, Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man, undertook to conduct to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to the line of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused colonel Henry O'Donnel to fall upon Souham's posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting this attack with another detachment under general Logoyri. At the same time he directed colonel Lander to collect the Miguelettes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession of "*N. S. de los Angelos*," a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to harass the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to pass.

O'Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of the position occupied by one of Souham's battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground. The Spanish general, being then joined by Logoyri, renewed the skirmish, but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; partly that being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. He however argued that his

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opponent must be exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his forces and broken the covering line at once; wherefore, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own troops on the Oña, by a flank march, close under the beard of his unskilful adversary.

Souham's division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o'clock the head of Pino's division entered this line, prolonging it by the left in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At twelve o'clock, these two divisions were established in position, and four miles in their rear Verdier was placed with a strong detachment of the besieging corps on the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, took post at Salt to guard the bridge and the flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded; the mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians were, if attacked, to retire to Sarria and look to the security of the parc and the trenches.

A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions. The heads of Blake's columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas, but scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who under cover of the mist had been

moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and descended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy.

Having gained the flat ground he was in rear of Millosewitz, who was at Salt watching the garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros. Verdier's troops the nearest support were six miles distant, and separated by rugged heights, and Millosewitz had placed no guards. The Spaniards thus got unperceived close to the main body and with one charge put it to flight. The fugitives in their panic at first took the direction of the town, but being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, making for Fornels, and would have gone straight into Blake's camp if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that general's positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino's division, St. Cyr instantly directed them back again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve. It was too late, the latter had already entered the place, and Alvarez, sallying forth, destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio; then thinking the siege raised he sent five hundred sick men from the town to the convent of St. Daniel, which had been abandoned by the French two days before. Verdier, after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria to save his parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for the Westphalian troops had hastily retired across the Ter, before these partizan chiefs, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. Thus the place was succoured for a moment, but as Blake made no further movement Alvarez was little

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benefitted by the success. The provisions received, did not amount to more than seven or eight days' consumption, and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour this food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.

While Millosewitz's troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake's army was victorious and the French in flight; hence he refrained from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could have come to their support.

St. Cyr having now but one day's provisions left, resolved to seek Blake and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the mountains when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible with reference to the means at Blake's disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed, and trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted Conde's troops to go back or to remain as they pleased; exacting, however from those who stopped an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and citizens were

as firm as their chief; and the townsmen freely sharing their own scanty food with the garrison made common cause in every thing.

Garcia Conde's success must be attributed partly to the negligence of St. Cyr's subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much danger or difficulty. Nor were St. Cyr's dispositions for the next day perfectly combined; giving Blake credit for sound views, he was so expectant of a great battle that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate to the town, and it was a fault to leave only two thousand men in that place, with their front to the garrison and their rear to the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier's reserve, and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.

St. Cyr says, that his generals of division were negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and when his advice was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he himself was

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placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted authority. He, however, acknowledges that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made, and he was bound while he retained the command to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour: in other respects his prudence and vigilance were such as beseemed his reputation. It was not so with Blake, the whole of his operations proved that he had lost confidence and was incapable of any great enterprize. He should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions, and then notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away with a cold look and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side for the return of Garcia Conde, who deceived by this wile came out at daybreak on the 3d, with fifteen hundred men and the beasts of burden. He halted for a little time, just beyond the gate, to examine the country in front with his glass, and as every thing appeared favourable, his troops were beginning to move forward, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had indeed posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the ambush were performing the regular service of the camp at day-light, and with a cry of astonishment the Spanish column hastily retreated again into the town.

Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr drew Mazzuchelli's brigade from behind Palau, placing it in the valley of the Oña to fall on Conde's rear when he should again come forth. He likewise put a battalion on the hills to head the Spanish column, and drive it back either upon Mazzuchelli's brigade, or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino's division.

The 4th, one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly but did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead; and that battalion did not fire because as Mazzuchelli did not attack, it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filed off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed plied their guns against the rear of his column. Being informed by the peasants at Castellar that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, Conde made for Caza de Selva, and general Pino having notice of his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the Spanish line of march; these battalions took a wrong direction, the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their rear was attacked by Pino's personal escort, which took fifty

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men and some mules, the main body escaped with honour.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona, Mazzuchelli's brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable; but the French store of powder failed and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained: Alvarez profited of this interval to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Lander, the officer sent by Blake on the 31st of August to seize the convent of *Madonna de los Angeles*, had fortified that building and introduced small supplies of provisions. This revived in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at Madona de los Angeles and with the assistance of Blake's army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. This bold and skilful conception he was unable to effect, because in a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th he was beaten by a single French regiment, and the same day Mazzuchelli's Italians stormed Madona de los Angeles and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira, who were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer, but he was repulsed with loss and the French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th,

Alvarez made a general sally by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, Verdier, thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between the generals of the covering and the besieging forces were rife; the engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, those of the former said they were not, adding that while the fort of Calvary outside the walls, although in ruins, remained in possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted. Meanwhile either from negligence or the disputes between St. Cyr and marshal Augereau, above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in a body at Perpignan, and general Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary were first taken.

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Souham's division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, and on the 19th Verdier's troops advanced in three columns down the valley of Galligan to the assault; bnt the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on the

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Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a loss of six hundred men. Verdier accusing his soldiers of cowardice, blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering army to the assault, and affirmed that his design was to cause a failure, moved thereto by personal jealousy. Thus complaining he returned to France, but St. Cyr asserted that the troops behaved well and calling a council proposed to continue the attack. His proposal was resisted and the siege turned into a blockade.

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Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the blockade, yet his object was merely to introduce another convoy, and St. Cyr, divining his intention, and judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering line and then fall on him before he could reach the town. In this view, Souham's division was placed behind Palau, Pino's division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi's division of the investing troops was directed to meet the Spaniards in front while the two former came down upon their rear.

Blake assembling his troops on the side of Hostalrich, made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men under Wimphen to protect the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O'Donnel led the advanced guard. At day-break, on the 26th, O'Donnel fell upon the rear of the French troops at Castellar, broke through them and reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy;

but the two French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person coming with a part of Souham's division upon the left flank of the convoy, pressed it strongly and obliged the greater part to retrograde. Pino's division then run up from Casa de Selva to attack the rear-guard under Wimphen, the route was complete and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O'Donnel with a thousand men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town, the remainder of the convoy was taken, the Italians gave no quarter and three thousand of the Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras to menace Blake's communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Filieu de Quixols and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings, which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. "If," said Alvarez, "the captain-general be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins the memory of which will afflict posterity!"

St. Cyr having repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future supply, found Augereau in a good state of health, and obliged him to assume the command. Then, he says, every thing needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon's affairs. Peace had been concluded with

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Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples had failed, all the resources of the French government were become disposable, and not only the seventh but every "corps d'armée" in Spain was reinforced: moreover Verdier expressly affirmed that the emperor had before furnished ample means to take Gerona, but St. Cyr wilfully impeded the operations.

Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, reached the camp before Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course of the following night, O'Donnel, issuing from the town on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham's quarters, obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans at Santa Coloma; thus successfully executing as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused.

Blake, on the 29th, took possession once more of the heights of Bruñola, but Souham with an inferior force put him to flight, which enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of Hostalrich. This place, fortified with an old wall and towers, was defended by two thousand men and supported by the fire of the castle; nevertheless it was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake and his

army were only a few miles off. Meanwhile rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th, was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d, when several of the smaller vessels were burned the rest driven on shore at different places, and two line-of-battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and some of the armed vessels, taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, protected their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, and presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board disposed for defence besides the shore batteries. However on the 31st, captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a squadron, and sending his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British seventy men killed and wounded.

Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the governor to capitulate went over in a body to the enemy. During November, the French were inactive for want of powder; but famine and sickness tormented the city, and on the 6th of December, ammunition having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the walls were carried by the besiegers. Alvarez, thus confined to the circuit of the walls, was cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts. He had been ill for some days, yet rousing himself for a last effort, made a general sally on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts, and opening a way to the outworks of the Con-

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stable, carried off the garrison; the next day overcome by suffering he became delirious. A council of war then assembled, and after six months of open trenches Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike, affirm, that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigour and contumely which excited every person's indignation; and that in violation of the capitulation the monks were, under an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits however of dispute. The monks during the siege, had formed themselves into a regular corps named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform, and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute them prisoners was a violation, although it might be a harsh interpretation of the capitulation.

Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France, but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; yet constancy alone

could not have enabled them to defy the regular progress of the engineer, the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity; but the French combinations were not scientific, and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence.

2°. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjouic was ill judged and worse executed, says, "The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there was easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clifts, and the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca; but on the side of Montjouic, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap with great loss and difficulty." If, however, the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña and Montjouic, and the forts of the Constable and Capuchin, regular places complete in themselves, would have remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor, who defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, would have surrendered all because a lodgement was made in an isolated quarter. These things are however ordinarily doubtful, and certainly it must always be a great matter with a general to raise the moral confidence of his own army, and to sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success.

3°. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjouic is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of

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the rules of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege; that during that month disease invaded the army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the trenches.

4°. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted than that against Montjouic; and considering these facts, together with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, the maladministration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost and so many more kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken at all.

5°. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely, they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy, and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are good and evil principles in man, how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who one year before surrendered the Barcelona Montjouic at the insolent summons of Duhesme! The influence of a base court had then degraded public feeling and what was weak in his character came to the surface, but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments all the nobility of the man's nature broke forth.

6°. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The number of enemies who came against the latter was rather less than those who came against the former city; the regular garrison of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand, that of Gerona about three thousand. The armed multitude in the one amounted to at least twenty-five thousand, in the other they were less than six thousand. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza; the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance; above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for; the fighting was more successful, the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater, the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled that of Zaragoza, and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men.

7°. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the

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coast of Catalonia and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post, and that place being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans indeed were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, and still more, the long and difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders' task most difficult.

8°. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined it possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered; hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the governors of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of de-

fence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days' march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to revert to the operations of the "*Central Supreme Junta*," that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives and the fortunes of the Spanish people, were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

CHAPTER IV.

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WHEN sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition no good could be expected from the change, otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

"*Spain,*" said lord Wellesley, "*has proved untrue to our alliance because she is untrue to herself.*"—"*Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.*"—"*No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity.*"

The evident discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of assistance; but he being accredited

to the existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; yet still averse to sacrificing any power projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading under licenses with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some peculiarly heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived.

But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing Junta to have in rotation a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; the council, so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the proposal in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and government.

This project was foiled by Romana. Being of the commission he dissented from his colleagues;

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and it was on this occasion that he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this History. Yet the bad acts therein specified although sufficiently heinous were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, and insolent of demeanour; and that some amongst them having as merchants contracted for supplying the army, did in their public capacity raise the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles.

See Vol. II. p. 348.

Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, not members of the Junta. It was to be assisted by a fresh chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, and to be styled "*The Permanent Deputation of the Realm.*" One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which he thought could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The "*Permanent Deputation,*" being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not fail to conquer and no Cortes would be assembled.

Some time before this, when the terror caused by sir Arthur Wellesley's retreat from Spain was fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to lord Wellesley for advice as to the best form of government;

that nobleman recommended a "*Council of Regency*," and like Romana he also proposed a second council; but with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with a list of grievances, "*a Bill of Rights*" founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy, and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. It must, however be acknowledged, that lord Wellesley condemned the existing system as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency: the English cabinet never forgot that they were the champions of privilege, nor, that the war was, essentially, less for the defence of Spain than the upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe.

To evade Romana's proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having thus in some measure met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded Romana's plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the king's rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then enlarging on their own merits in

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a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for to use the words of lord Wellesley, "*no plan had been adopted for any "effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses, "or relief from exactions; and the administration "of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, com- "merce, the security of persons and property, and "every other great branch of government were as "defective as the military establishments.*"

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush the enemy and firmly establish their own popularity and power. They were encouraged by a false but general impression throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; meanwhile fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta's old army; the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for owing to the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little on the population that the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville were sufficient for every exigency.

In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province, made a movement towards him, he regained

the Sierra Morena, taking post first at St. Elena and finally at La Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached the prince of Anglona with eight hundred horsemen to reinforce the duke Del Parque, and then quartered the rest of his forces behind the Guadiana. In the latter end of October, there were sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura; six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service of the depôts behind the Morena.

In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and Carrera, amounting to thirteen thousand men, completely equipped from English stores brought out to Coruña in July, made a movement into the rugged country about the Sierra de Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same time general Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, took possession of Astorga and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla. In this situation, a French detachment attempted to surprize one of the gates of Astorga, but were repulsed.

See Vol. II. p. 427.

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Soon afterwards Ballesteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the Asturias and armed and equipped them from the English stores, came down to Astorga, crossed the Esla and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda and from thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies of Gallicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Gallicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, had demanded in September, through Perez Castro the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him. The demand was referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, who gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period.

Letter from Sir A. Wellesley, Spt. 23, 1809. MS.

"The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since.

"But, besides these considerations, the enemy

enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the duke Del Parque's intended operations. He could march a part or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford, with the corps of Ney which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction.

" In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbad a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions which they ought never to have quitted.

" Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the

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enemy's hands, was resolved not to give the duke Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the Portuguese government, not to risk Beresford's army in a situation which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an attempt on that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion if Ciudad was to be saved; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, he had long been of opinion the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies, and Portugal at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tran-



, to organize and equip and discipline her Those objects could not be accomplished,

unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success was doubtful and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and what was worse, time which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort."

This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the Spanish Junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. "*When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation.*" "*When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food as was the case when lately in that country.*" "*When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain.*" Thus sir Arthur replied, and the duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself.

Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence with Don M. Forgas, October 19, 1809, MSS.

To favour the junction of Ballesteros, his first movement was towards Ledesma, but general Marchand drawing together at Salamanca, eleven thou-

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sand men and fourteen guns, marched to meet him, whereupon, without having effected his junction, he fell back to Tamames, and took post on the side of a mountain of remarkable strength. There he awaited the enemy with a thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers.

BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

General Losada commanded the Spanish right, count Belvidere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballesteros could arrive, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th, and immediately fell upon Del Parque's left. The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily, their infantry, surprised in the midst of an evolution by the French horsemen, were thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns, and discomfited the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers, but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be enclosed by Ballesteros in that disordered state, then retreated to Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his vic-

tory until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballesteros, he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men for Ledesma, crossed the Tormes on the 23d, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand's retreat; but that general had timely information, and was already at Toro behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames reached Madrid, Dessolle's division was detached through the Puerto Rico to reinforce the sixth corps, and Kellerman was directed to advance from Valladolid and take the command of the whole.

When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta, having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

CHAPTER V.

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In the arrangement of warlike affairs difficulties are always overlooked by the Spaniards, who are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success; this continues until the hour of battle, but then when it might be of use generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta, having, to deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley had retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, that, forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisionary system for the future administration of the capital, and with a care, which they denied to the army that was to put them in possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Alburquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their eyes upon general Areizaga, they chose him, though his only recommendation was, that at the petty battle of Alcanitz Blake noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October, and being of a quick lively turn and as confident as the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid.

This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only Villa Campa with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the duke of Alburquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna; the duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, precisely on that plan which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed every chance was so much in favour of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga's irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque's forces with Alburquerque's, at Talavera, was also certain to fail; because, the enemy's masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque's rear.

Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate, and permitted Areizaga to march under the impression that it was so. Nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley, being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. But

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the Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even officially inform him of Areizaga's march until the 18th of November, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Alburquerque and Del Parque's forces. Sir Arthur, however, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act, and he assured the Junta that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of November, commenced his march from La Carolina with sixty pieces of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the baron Crossand, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters, which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms; yet the men being young, robust, full of life and confidence, and without impediments of any kind made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry

of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.

Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to France, Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards Talavera; for the false reports had in some measure succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English, and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta.

8. Journal of Operations, MSS.

The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn from Placentia, was on the 5th posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, while scouting parties watched Naval Moral and the course of the Tietar.

The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.

Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolle's troops; the other half, under general Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud's cavalry at Ocaña.

The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, commanded by marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yebenes, a day's march in advance of Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command

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of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army including the French and Spanish guards, was above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle's division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

8. Journal of Operations, MSS.

In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six thousand Spanish horsemen supported by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and a second column, likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, passing the Puerto de Piche had fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos. All the prisoners agreed that the Spanish army was above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of Belluno immediately concentrated the first corps at Yebenes, but kept his cavalry at Mora: he thus covered the roads leading from Consuegra and Madrilejos upon Toledo.

On the 8th there were no Spaniards in front of the first corps, yet the exploring officers sent towards Ocaña were chased back by cavalry, hence Soult judged, what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga continuing his reckless march had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The detached division of the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez, and from thence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry at that point on the

Victor on the same day fell back with the orps to Ajofrin.

the 10th, Gazan's division of the fifth corps rdered to march from Talavera to Toledo, and first corps which had reached the latter town,

was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who, holding fast at Ocaña, had sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards continuing their movement met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña.

COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani's cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus pressed, drew back behind their infantry which was close at hand, and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons; the latter were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the French cavalry, were beaten with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga's main body was however coming up, Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña, and the next morning took up a position on some heights lining the left bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez. The Spaniards then entered Dos Barrios, but there their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from the Morena like a stream of lava, and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. This swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or position, without

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plan of action, Areizaga had rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling and bewildered.

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and wrote to his government of Sebastiani's stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded the dukes of Alburquerque and Del Parque to unite at Talavera. Alburquerque commenced his movement immediately, and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the public that sir Arthur was also coming on. Areizaga thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first incertitude, made on the 14th a flank march by his right to Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique to turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter.

Appendix, No. II. Section I.

To the south of Ocaña the ground is open and undulating, but on the north, the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented at Santa Cruz ridges, which stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place. Meanwhile Soult was awake to his adversary's projects. He could not believe indeed that he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army, and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet's report from Oropesa; but in the night it arrived, stating that rumours of a combined

8. Journal of Operations. MSS.

Spanish and English army being on the march were rife, but the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches. Soult, now judging that though the rumours should be true, his central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada and Arzobispo, to replace the fifth corps at Talavera, and be in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, information being received of the duke Del Parque's retreat from Salamanca to Bejar and the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth corps, Dessolle's division was recalled to Madrid.

During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in march, general Liger Belair's brigade continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the king's guards at Madrid formed a reserve for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, and Dessolle's division was in the Guadarama on its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga's flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new combinations.

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the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry the first and fourth corps with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez up the left bank of the Tagus, operating so as to force Areizaga to deliver battle; and with a view of tempting him by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken down.

While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and a part of his cavalry spreading in small detachments, scoured the country and skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French garrison to retire from Guardalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied the former town on the 12th; but the next night eight French companies and some troops of light cavalry, making a sudden march surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took eighty horses and a piece of artillery.

The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon; and during this time, the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to the duke of Belluno.

The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed the work, withdrew his divisions from

the right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th, the cavalry of the first corps having now reached Villarejo de Salvanes, he destroyed his bridges, called in his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Zarza.

Hitherto the continual movements and unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the French to fix a field of battle, but now Areizaga's march to St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close together, the duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with the first corps, the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on the rear by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga, and if the latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez, and the fourth corps received a like order. The king, quitting the capital, arrived at Aranjuez on the evening of the 18th, with the royal French guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolle's division, in all ten thousand men. The same day, the duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps at Villarejo de Salvanés, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges

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near Aranjuez in two hours; and about one o'clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, partly at the bridge of La Reyna, partly at a ford. General Milhaud with the leading squadrons immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen, and was thus led to the table-land between Antiguela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve hundred dragoons he was going to retire, but at that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole furnishing a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these troops came Sebastiani who took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing to the charge.

CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA.

The Spaniards came on at a trot, and Sebastiani directed Paris to fall with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers upon their right flank. This being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion, which the Spanish general endeavoured to remedy by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left centre in one vast column, whereupon Sebastiani, seizing the critical moment, charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves. The enormous mass yielding to the

shock first got into confusion, and finally gave way; many were slain, several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of the French bore no proportion in men, but general Paris was killed and several superior officers were wounded.

This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was now endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion, and in the night came information from the duke of Belluno together with the reports of the officers sent towards Villa Maurique. All agreed that a rear-guard only was to be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza, and it was clear therefore the Spaniards were in march, and a battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the king's forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the 19th at Ocaña, but judging from the cavalry action that the French could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same plain in two lines a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which, commencing gently half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve to the west, and finally connects itself with certain rugged gullies whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine the Spanish left was posted, crossing the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the

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gullies, the other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the town, and the latter was occupied as a post of reserve; but the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge *in front* of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, which closed in towards Noblejas and was there fringed with rich olive woods. These were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga's dispositions.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganising his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the command of marshal Mortier, who was also empowered if necessary to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by general Senarmont. The royal guards remained with the king, and marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements.

Before day-break on the 10th, king Joseph marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At Antiguela his troops, quitting the high road, turned to their left, gained the table-land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga's army in order of battle. The French cavalry instantly forming to the front covered the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish out-posts fell

back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile front and opened a sharp fire.

About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including the battery of the royal guard. But Areizaga's position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralyzed by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked; the centre was scarcely better situated, and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horsemen, who were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the attack.

BATTLE OF OCAÑA.

At ten o'clock, Sebastiani's cavalry, gaining ground to the left, turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry, and drove general Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same manner, followed Leval in second line, and general Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two columns:

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the principal one, flanked by the cavalry, was directed to turn the Spanish right, the second to keep the centre in check, and each were supported by reserves.

These dispositions were completed at eleven o'clock, at which hour, Senarmont massed thirty pieces of artillery and opened a shattering fire on Areizaga's centre. Six guns detached to the French right, played at the same time across the ravine against the Spanish left, and six others swept down the deep hollow to clear it of the light troops. The Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but they discovered no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing fire brisk, and from the centre of their line sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval's and Girard's columns as the latter pressed on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back, their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape, and Senarmont immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and prolonging his fire to the left raked Areizaga's right wing in its whole length.

During this cannonade, Leval constantly pressing forward, obliged the Spaniards to change their front by withdrawing their right wing *behind* the shallow part of the ravine. By this change, the whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form having the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont's artillery tore

their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive; their augmenting fire dismounted two French guns, Mortier himself was wounded slightly, Leval severely, the Spanish line advanced, the leading French divisions wavered and gave back.

The moment was critical. The duke of Treviso lost no time in exhortations to Leval's troops, but like a great commander, brought up Girard's division through the intervals of the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank; for he expected that Areizaga's powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard's fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder, and meanwhile, Dessolles, having gained ground by an oblique movement, seeing the enemy's right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself and issued forth on the other side. The light cavalry of the king's guard, followed by the infantry, then poured through the town, and on the extreme left, Sebastiani with a rapid charge cut off six thousand infantry and obliged them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely, and the second line of infantry also gave ground when the front fell back upon it in confusion. Areizaga, entirely confounded, now ordered the left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained, endeavoured to keep the troops toge-

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ther in the plain, striving to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolles' divisions, being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, having secured his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke and fled, each man for himself, across the plain; but on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine, leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios in an oblique direction, continually contracted the space, and the pursuing cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters, and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, and to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted: hundreds after being deprived of their arms, were desired in raillery "to return to their homes and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for." This fatal battle commenced at eleven o'clock; before two, thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards contrived to make away towards the mountain of Tarancon, others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena, and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia.

Meanwhile the first corps, having passed the Tagus by a ford, re-established the bridge at Villa

Maurique before ten o'clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed Areizaga's traces. At Villatobas the light cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on took a thousand of the fugitives, who were making for Tarancon. The duke of Belluno, being thus apprized of the result of the battle, halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward to La Guardia, where they joined Sebastiani's horsemen, and the whole continuing the pursuit to Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred horses. This finished the operations of the day. Only eighteen hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred men killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand; and before nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors!

S. Journal of Operations MSS. Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809, MSS.

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced; this body he directed on Madrilejos to cover the retreat of the fugitives, but so strongly did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz's men fled without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares, and still fewer at La Carolina.

Ibid.

CHAPTER VI.

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JOSEPH halted at Dos Barrios for the night, and the next day directed Sebastiani with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilejos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta upon the Sierra Morena, the fifth corps by Tembleque and Mora upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted by detachments from Aranjuez to Consuegra. The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolles' first brigade, returned on the 20th to Madrid.

Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha, but the duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Alburquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing if Del Parque gained any advantage over the sixth corps an insurrection would take place in Leon, he sent Gazan's division of the fifth corps from Toledo, through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand's assistance, and Kellerman was directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, the British remained about Badajos; not that Wellington was indifferent to the

impending fate of his allies, but there was no mode in which he could help them with any prospect of success or safety for his own army. Alburquerque, however, following his orders, advanced to Peralada de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the duke Del Parque. But that general, who had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and therefore advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Hence, when Alburquerque expected him on the Tagus he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and having reached Alba the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio.

Meanwhile Kellerman, having collected all the troops of his government, was joined by Marchand, and moving by Medina del Campo, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno on the 23d. Their cavalry fled at once, but their infantry standing firm repulsed the assailants, and the 24th Del Parque carried his whole army to Fresno. His intent was to give battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Alburquerque reached him, and he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan's division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes. This attack was repulsed and the French

Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, MSS.

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fell back upon their supports, but the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, back to the right bank.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery. Without hesitating he sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, while with the other he charged fiercely upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right being thus exposed were broken and sabred, but those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallying his cavalry on the other side of the river, brought them back to the fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of some French infantry which arrived just in the dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at day-break a French patrol came up with his rear whereupon the whole army throwing away their arms fled outright. Kellerman, having meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete.

After this defeat Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains behind Tamames, and in ten or twelve days again collected about twenty

thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of those famished soldiers. Many actually died of want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured! Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient to the last degree in suffering.

This result of the duke Del Parque's operation amply justified sir Arthur Wellesley's advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke of Alburquerque's advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to the Central Junta. It might therefore be imagined that the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten thousand men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should *reinforce Alburquerque to enable the latter to maintain the strong position of Meza d'Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter.* Meanwhile Del Parque's force, thus reduced one-third, could, he said, be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, and as he informed them, only delayed *to protect Estremadura until the duke of Alburquerque had received the reinforcement.* The only reply of the Junta was an order, directing Alburquerque *immediately to quit the line of the*

Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809. MSS.

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Tagus, and take post at Llerena behind the Guadiana. Estremadura was thus abandoned to the enemy, and Alburquerque was placed in a bad position, with his front open to an attack from Almaraz, his right flank and rear to one from La Mancha.

This foolish and contemptuous proceeding being followed by Del Parque's defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; and that eight thousand men, who had escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença under general Echevarria. The numbers reassembled in the Morena were therefore, the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered, sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment, and there was no reason why the British army should remain in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Alburquerque's retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta to oblige sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura, but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side. Yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand men, at Abrantes.

The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed him for stopping too long,

but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It was not the battle of Talavera, it was the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection. This is easy of demonstration. Joseph having rejected Soult's projects against Portugal and Ciudad Rodrigo, dared not invade Andalusia by Estremadura, with the English army on his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha without drawing sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried sir Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have refused Cadiz as a place of arms to their ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English army behind the Morena. Areizaga had then sixty thousand men, Alburquerque ten thousand, and it is therefore no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand could have been organized for defence: moreover all the Portuguese troops, in the south of Portugal, would have been available to aid in the protection of Estremadura.

From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at the former, the allied army could have protected Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the

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passes of the Morena and having their left flank, protected by Estremadura and Portugal, their right by Murcia and Valencia; having rich provinces and large cities behind them, a free communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

Sir J. Moore's Correspondence.

It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so but for the impossibility of dealing with the Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia, conditions they would not accede to, but without which he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English, but political and moral considerations weighed in that argument.

Lord Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura during a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir Arthur persisted at such an enormous sacrifice of men to hold his position on the Guadiana; yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother's wishes than his own judgment that he remained after Areizaga's army was assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear-sighted as to their perverseness than lord Wellesley. The latter being in daily inter-

course with the members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notions that Spain could be put in the right path, and England war largely in conjunction with the united nations of the Peninsula instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellerman remained at Salamanca to watch the movements of Del Parque, Gazan returned to Madrid; Milhaud, with a division of the fourth corps and some cavalry, was detached against Echevarria, but on his arrival at Cuença, found the latter had retreated by Toboado to Hellin in Murcia: he then combined his operations with general Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, but as the Spanish regiments of Joseph's guard had fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners taken at Ocaña had offered to join the invaders' colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain. Spanish authors assume that none entered the enemy's ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have reassembled in the

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Morena and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action. However the battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of offensive operations, which the Austrian war and the reappearance of a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful, the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted that it would join Alburquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of Areizaga's acting without such assistance gave currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is in war often more useful than the truth; in this therefore they are to be commended; but when deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an error but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, no understanding with the allied commander as to their mutual resources and intentions, had taken place.

2°. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga's movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong,

no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke may not be carried; but who even on the smallest scale acts on this principle, unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government! No general is bound to obey orders, at least without remonstrance, which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory; and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3°. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general first met with opposition and halted for three days, evidently without a plan and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front, yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward with his whole army on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus; Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would then, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculable chances were all adverse, and the troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

4°. The flank march from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus the Tajuña and Henares,

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only great rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow; so late as the 15th he had passed the Tagus with but two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French, moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then Areizaga, who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani when the latter had only eight thousand men, sought a battle on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of thirty thousand, the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yevenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish general, who pretended to treat his adversaries as if they were blind men.

5°. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of Alburquerque's and Del Parque's operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga's, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere's former plan for Alburquerque; a plan founded on the supposition that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication

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with Valencia, which would however have been still exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet, without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were capable of such a difficult operation as taking an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th; whereas on the 16th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men were in a condition to teach Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. In fact there were no mountains to hold. Between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain, and on the 18th, there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga's army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men, undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action he commanded a retreat, quitting the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6°. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced to do ought but commend movements so eminently successful; yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga's rush from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate; this was perhaps the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to

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have attacked it in front at Zarza on the 19th; a curious arrangement, because it might in conjunction with the fourth corps, then at Toledo, have fallen on the flank and rear from Mora a week before, that is, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours' march.

7°. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus, Areizaga did not quit Dos Barrios until the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must however be acknowledged, that Soult could not at once fix a general who marched fifty thousand men about like a patrole of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary's positions or his own line of operations.

8°. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralyzed the left of the Spaniards; the disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory, prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops! why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive his advantages, controul the higher military genius of his advising general? was he distracted

by disputes amongst the different commanders? did the British army at Badajos alarm him? or had he ulterior projects of aggrandizement in his thoughts which prevented him from doing justice to the interests of his brother? The latter has been affirmed; and accurate knowledge upon such points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

9°. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga's army exceeded fifty thousand men; Alburquerque's ten thousand; thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, at Tamames had just overthrown the best troops in the French army; Villa Campa and the Partida bands on the side of Cuença were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why then was sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? "*Be-*
"*cause moral force is to physical force, as three to*
"*one in war.*" He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, and he foresaw, to use his own expressions, "*that after one or two battles, and*

Letter to Lord Liverpool, MS.

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"*one or two brilliant actions by some and defeats* "*sustained by others, all would have to retreat* "*again:*" yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy's superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who assert that Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, and blame sir John Moore's conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man's toil has been the sport of fools!

The battle of Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection. After his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and every where weak.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

NAPOLEON, victorious in Germany, was ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, but he complained of the past inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque's defeat on one side and Echevaria's on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, yet immediately afterwards recalled it, as well as the first corps, which since the battle of Ocaña had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps through La Mancha was however remarkable. For the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives. CHAP. I. 1810.

Joseph's vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre under Renovalles and Mina; partly because lord Wellington, previous to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos as a matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district, and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette, and ostentatiously

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copied into the Seville papers, made Joseph suspect it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans who were very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. When the troubles in Navarre were quieted by Suchet, and the distribution of the British army in the valley of the Mondego known, Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that "war should support war," paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest.

Appendix, No. IV. Sect. 1.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National Cortes had been short-lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious, and the general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,—that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,—that Alburquerque would, from the side of Estre-

madura, fall upon the enemy's rear,—that a second Baylen might be expected. But while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent property to Cadiz and announced that they would transfer their sittings to that town on the 1st of February. Meanwhile, desiring to seem active, decrees were issued for a levy of a hundred thousand men, for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money, belonging to individuals; and sums left for pious purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state.

To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena and imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was confined in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon where it is believed his infamous existence terminated. The celebrated Padre Gil was sent on a mission to Sicily. While on his passage he told an English gentleman, "*They have sent me on this embassy to get rid of my never ceasing remonstrances; and I have submitted to this banishment for fear I might be got rid of in another way!*" Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Gallicia the Conde de Noronha resigning his command issued a manifesto against the Junta: the public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence violence. Andalusia was but one remove from

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anarchy when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army.

The military preparation of the Junta harmonised with their political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand poinards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces at the disposal of the Junta were still numerous enough, if well directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had still twenty-five thousand men at Carolina in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Alburquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized, Blake had not arrived, and Alburquerque, distracted with contradictory orders, transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions intrigues and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel and containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink.

This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia, on the left by Portugal, both in possession of the allies. The northern [illegible] only was accessible to the French, who [illegible] it either by La Mancha or Estre[illegible], between those provinces, the Toledo

and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military communication until near the Morena, where abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they leave a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia.

Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal road to Seville was practicable for artillery; entering the hills a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful strength called the Despenas Perros, it led by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through the Puerto del Rey, but it fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros; there were other passes also, but all falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha.

To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence, roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, leading to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or rather paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One entering the mountains by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz; and just beyond these roads the ridges separating La Mancha from Estremadura begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and

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Agudo. Hence an army entering Estremadura to invade Andalusia, must still pass the Morena, moving by one or all of three great roads, namely, from Medellin and Llerena to Guadalcanal; from Badajos to Seville by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo, or, by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way through Belalcazar to Guadalcanal. But all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, led, after crossing the mountains, into the valley of the Guadalquivir. The waters of this river, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, then bending gradually towards the south, they flow by Seville and are finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the pasess of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was established at La Carolina, and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy And here it may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience of war have yet taken a contracted view of their profession.

From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. Now without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing if the flanks can be turned by

other roads, we may be certain there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can; and a numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat or to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed situations, for defiles are doors the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are never posted in the middle, but behind a bridge to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of some great generals may indeed be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place only detachments in the defiles of mountains, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy's columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; yet, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Alburquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong de-

[illegible] before Areizaga could have been safely [illegible].

Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior [illegible] resources for an obstinate defence. Parallel [illegible] the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar. These ridges cut off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean, while the space between them and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country:—1°. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2°. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3°. The coast-tract, between the mountain and the Mediterranean. This last is studded in its whole length with sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, thus descending, the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But to reach the Mediterranean coast, the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed, and most of [illegible]or parallel ridges enclosing the valleys [illegible]ters run towards the Atlantic. Now all [illegible]eys contain great towns, such as Jaen and [illegible] Ubeda, Grenada, and Alcala Real, most

of which, formerly fortified and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real or Ecija, while the mountains, on both flanks and in the rear were filled with insurgents, and while Alburquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey's sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and with his accustomed celerity fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured.

But in this the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those once forced, Seville was open; from that great city the French could penetrate into all parts; and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province and from its political position the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and all establishments necessary to a great military power.

INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.

The number of fighting men destined for this enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements, but the king was disposed to take a more prominent part in the mili-

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tary arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid and to watch the British army, the second corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus; two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan's division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud's from Aragon; the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king's guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia.

During the early part of January, the troops gained by easy marches the foot of the Morena, where Milhaud's division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of defence between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena, and the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, the whole army being then collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery the king's guards the reserve and the fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey.

On the left, Sebastiani occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes with the fourth corps, and prepared to penetrate by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban into the kingdom of Jaen.

On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo to watch Alburquerque,

occupied Almaden de Azogues with the first corps; he pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga's line of defence in the Morena and Alburquerque's line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquiver, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda secured the bridges over the Guadalquiver.

In the centre, Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan's division, crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works; the pass was then abandoned, and Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, pouring through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took possession of Andujar; having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish pride engendered by that victory was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses. Meanwhile the duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, his patrols appeared close to Cordoba, and his flanking parties communicated with the fifth corps at Andujar. Thus two days and skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles rendered vain the lofty barrier of the Morena, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.

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In Seville all was anarchy. Palafox and Montijo's partizans were secretly ready to strike, and the Ancient Junta openly prepared to resume their former power. The timid, and those who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz, but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the multitude, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. The Central Junta, fearing alike the enemy and their own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, even while their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz they assured the people, that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but no danger could thence arise; because the duke Del Parque was in full march to join Alburquerque, and those generals, being when united stronger than the enemy, would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would cooperate from the Morena and gain a great victory!

It was on the 20th of January at the very moment when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published; and it was not until the day after, that the Junta despatched orders for the duke Del Parque, who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo, to effect that junction with Alburquerque from which such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Alburquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, left general Contreras at Medellin with four thousand five hundred men destined to form a garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the

22d, with about nine thousand, towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; but he had scarcely commenced his movement when he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, and the French patrols already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement he continued to receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of which he disregarded and others he could not obey, but, conforming to circumstances, when the Morena was forced he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquiver at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 25th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy's progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central Junta, burst at Seville.

Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the quarters of the city called out for the deposition of the Junta and the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, the Junta of Seville was re-established by acclamation, the Central Junta committed to it the defence of Andalusia and endeavoured to reach Cadiz, each member as he could, but all with the full intention of reuniting and resuming their authority: however on the road some of them were cast into prison by the people, and some were like to be slain at Xerez.

The Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, calmed the tumult in the

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city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency. This was readily acceded to, but the events of war crowded on and overlaid their schemes. Three days after the flight of the Central Junta, treason and faction were so busy amongst the members of the Seville Junta that they also disbanded. Some remained in the town, others, amongst them Saavedra, repaired to Cadiz, the tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city, but he evaded this dangerous honour and proceeded to Badajos.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville elected a military junta, and discovered the same disposition as the people of other towns in the Peninsula had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza had then assumed command they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city; but there were none so firm, or so ferocious, a feeling of helplessness produced fear in all and Seville was ready to submit to the invaders.

When the passage of the mountains was completely effected the French corps received their artillery, the centre and right wing remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps which had approached Cordoba returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaen, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda drove him upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish general made one more

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stand, and being again beaten with the loss of all his artillery his army dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away their arms escaped to Gibraltar, and Areizaga flying with a remnant of horse into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superseded by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani entered Grenada, and was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people.

The capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, and the king moved with the centre and right, to Cordoba where also the invaders were received without any mark of aversion.* Thus the upper country was entirely conquered. But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia,

* Dupont's proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.*"

Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it "*a gratuitous atrocity,*" and "*an inhuman butchery,*" and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that, *capacity and cruelty are rarely united*; that *Dupont was a fool*, and that *Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon*, but that he must have "*dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred.*"

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of "*the Annals,*" *as the era of good government in France.*

I rejected Foy's authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation, at variance with the *official journal of Dupont's operations*, was also contradicted by the testimony of a *British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event.*

"Some time after the victory, *order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police.*"—Journal of Operations.

Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where the *French were well received.*—Letter from a British general to colonel Napier.

On this point therefore I am clear; but the author of the "*Annals,*" after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, "It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by colonel Napier *without any quotation of authority.*"

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, *six months* previous to the publication of the *Annals*, colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, *because there was no quotation of authority*, transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had authority for every statement and would willingly *furnish the author with any or all of them*: no notice was taken of this offer.

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where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before the city. Judging now that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada and seize the Grenadan coast, with a view to facilitate the attack on Valencia. And to insure success, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment from Andalusia to meet him under the walls of Valencia. Dessolles meanwhile occupied Cordoba and Jaen, but the first and fifth corps and the king's guards proceeded towards Ecija, where, it will be remembered, Alburquerque's cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. When the French approached the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. Alburquerque then despairing for Seville resolved to make for Cadiz. To forestal the enemy he gained Utrera with great expedition, and moving by Lebrija and Xeres, journeying night and day, reached Cadiz on the 3d of February. Some French cavalry skirmished with his rear at Utrera, but he was pursued no farther, save by scouting parties, for the king had now altered the original plan of operations: the first corps, instead of pushing for Cadiz, marched by Carmona against Seville, where the advanced guard arrived on the 30th. Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence. Seven thousand soldiers, chiefly fugitives from the Morena, were in garrison, and

Suchet's Memoirs.

the populace, still governing and announcing a lofty determination, fired upon the bearer of a summons. Nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on the 31st with all its stores founderies and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. Thus the lower country was also conquered; there remained only Cadiz and the coast tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue.

The first corps was now sent against Cadiz, the fifth against Estremadura; and during these events Sebastiani placed fifteen hundred men in the Alhambra, incorporated among his troops a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in the battle of Baylen, and seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people, led by a Capuchin friar, imprisoned the local Junta, and being resolved to fight the French collected in vast numbers and armed in all manners above Antequera and Alhama, where the road from Grenada enters the hills. This insurrection, spreading along the mountains and even in the Viega or plain of Grenada, was not to be neglected. Sebastiani, fearing that the insurgents who had Gibraltar on one flank, Murcia on the other, and many sea-ports and fortresses in their own country, should organize a regular warfare, marched against them, and after a slight skirmish at Alhama, penetrating the hills, he drove the whole upon Malaga, near which place his advanced guard under general Milhaud defeated them with a loss of five hundred men and entered the town fighting. A few of th

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vanquished found a refuge on board some English ships of war and the rest submitted. More than one hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors; Velez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was entirely quelled, for in every other part both troops and peasantry were terrified and submissive to the last degree.

General Campbell's Correspondence from Gibraltar, MSS.

Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Alburquerque with such diligence as to reach Chiclana on the 4th, and it is generally supposed that he might have rendered himself master of Leon; for the defensive works at Cadiz and the Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of sir George Smith's negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Alburquerque's troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed and in every way inefficient: the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities as usual occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal.

Appendix, No. III. Sec. 1.

Venegas was governor of Cadiz, but when it was known that the Central Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any autho-

rity; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were obliged to submit. However, by the advice of Jovellanos they appointed a Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves, and though the Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding at first, the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere finally induced them to acquiesce. On the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, general Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed Regents until the Cortes could be assembled, but Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain.

The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with usurpation—the public voice added peculation and other crimes; the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestrated their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces, thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of speech and dexterous in argument: yet Spain is not the only country where men possessing all the grace and ornament of words, have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen.

Alburquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta and commander of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack, and the French, deceived as to its real strength, after an ineffectual summons proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps

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Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, which, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town towards the Morena; they evaded him and fled to Ayamonte, where they might have been destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve would not, from national jealousy, suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier, but Mortier, disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos summoned it the 12th of February. However Contreras, detached as we have seen by Alburquerque to this quarter, was in the place, and the French marshal finding it, contrary to his expectation, in a state of defence retired to Merida. This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza, and Alburquerque in the other province. Yet great as were the results of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained, and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles. The French took ten days to traverse that space, a tardiness for which there appears no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns and even the villages greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her gates at once, and thinking the possession of that town would produce the greatest moral effect in Andalusia and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of the campaign to march thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville

had been however, transferred along with the government to Cadiz, and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Alburquerque; but fearing to leave a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon his flank, he resolved first to reduce Seville. He met indeed with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negociation. The first his humanity forbad, the latter cost him time, which was worth his crown; for Alburquerque's proceedings were only secondary, the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded; but, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy's movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon Guadalcanal was the forced result of his position: he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos.

From Guadalcanal he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Alburquerque, indeed, supposed the French to be already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later;

BOOK X. 1810. February.

but they could easily have entered it on the 24th, and as he believed they had done so it is apparent that he had no confidence in the people's disposition; in this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city, and when the French approached, we find him marching with a surprising energy towards Cadiz. Yet he was again late in deciding, for the enemy's cavalry moving by the shorter road to Utrera overtook his rear-guard; and the infantry would assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him if the king had not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Alburquerque, and he in return saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

LORD WELLINGTON'S plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia. The stupendous campaign he was then meditating, involved relations with every part of the Peninsula, and it is necessary to trace the Spanish operations in all quarters previous to describing it, lest frequent references should destroy the unity of narrative essential to a just handling of the subject.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

January. Suchet being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre directed an active pursuit of the student Mina, who availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy was actually master of the country between Pampeluna and Tudela. He was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Medianoz cut him off from the Cinca river.

Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march

BOOK X. 1810. January. Suchet's Memoirs.

and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication; the garrison however made a strong resistance and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre and a division under Loison was at Logroño; wherefore Harispe having, in concert with that general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable columns, which chased Mina into the high parts of the Pyrenees, where cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity truly Spanish, repaired to Olite in disguise, that he might see the new general pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But Suchet, while seemingly occupied with the disputes between the French officers and Joseph's civil authorities in Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials for a methodical war of invasion beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, he returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, although some petty actions had taken place, his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Ge-

rona, and other events in Catalonia, however, baffled Napoleon's calculations, and this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was then ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; an eighth corps, now forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the seventh corps was to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. But neither was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph's letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, constituted Aragon a particular government, and rendered Suchet independent of the king's orders, civil or military. This decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had, however, been intercepted, and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon's real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia; yet wishing first to intimidate the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, who was defeated on the side of Cuenca and his troops dispersed. After this success he proceeded to fortify a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry and some field artillery; at the same time he caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zara-

BOOK X. 1810. February.

goza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the intercepted order to commence the siege of Lerida reached Terruel; nevertheless, as Habert's column, which had marched on the 27th, by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

The first day brought Suchet's column in presence of the Valencian army. Ventura Caro, captain-general of the province, was already in march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares. The bed of this torrent was a deep ravine, so suddenly sunk as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance of the Spaniards' centre, were occupied, and commanded one bridge; their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was rather more practicable. The French general judging rightly, that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia while Habert's column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight on the 2d, to turn the left of the position also, and so cut off the

retreat of the vanguard; nevertheless, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards fell back with little loss upon their main body, and Caro retired to the city of Valencia. Suchet then entered Segorbe, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea-coast. The country between these lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the columns united in the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain.

Suchet coming before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb Seranos and the harbour called the Grao. His spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire, and in the night of the 10th commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns with their ammunition and escort between Terruel and Daroca; he also cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventoza, and having

BOOK X. 1810. March.

invested the post at Terruel nearly won the castle on the 7th by a bold and ready witted attempt. The 12th, the head of Suchet's column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza. During his absence Pereña had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida entered the latter town and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and though several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, if an accident had not thrown him into their hands, a prisoner.

Suchet's failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. The principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded; and although Suchet labours, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon's avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures any progress could be made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures was thus lost for want of the co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which with some interruption, run to the Atlantic shores; for the sierras separating Valencia Murcia and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain are but continuations of those shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, and the hills thus broken by the river push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona from Tortoza, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, that is to say, the districts containing Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described, and it only remains to notice the western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the principal spine.

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This portion is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and like the eastern region it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each the bed of a river descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera, and near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia. Now the mountain ridge, separating the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and

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Taragona stands Momblanch; and between Taragona and Tortoza the Fort St. Felippe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes of the higher valleys took refuge from the moveable columns, and from whence they sallied to harass the flanks and rear of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps was between the mountains and the sea-coast, parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications across, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted.

Detachments, and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains or by sea from Taragona, continually harassed the French flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, Cervera, and Taragona. From this last place the generals communicated with Tortoza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, drawing succours of all kinds from those places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief periods of lassitude in the Spanish army occasioned by great defeats that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers.

Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Taragona; seeing the Miguelettes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, passing by the hills and by sea, could join the garrisons, interrupt the communication, and force the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land; and to insure their arrival the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; this being often renewed furnished the Catalans many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell he retired again to Taragona; Augereau then attacked the Miguelettes and Somatenes in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin's squadron of succour for Barcelona was intercepted by admiral Martin, and the insatiable craving of that city obliged Augereau to reassemble his army and conduct a convoy there by land; yet he was obliged to return immediately, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the place. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated, and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which he supposed would, following the emperor's design, be before Lerida or Tortoza. But at this time Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O'Donnel,

BOOK X. 1810.

who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommencing the warfare on the French communications, forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida. Thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other's movements.

The events touched upon above shall now be briefly described.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

When Gerona fell general Souham scoured the high valleys with a division and defeated the Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira at Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; at Ripoll he destroyed a
January. manufactory for arms, and being afterwards reinforced with Pino's division, marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu, and though the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, he soon forced a passage and took possession of Vich. Meanwhile, Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia rejected the duke Del Parque and took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O'Donnel, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake's army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham's advanced guard pursued, and at Tona captured some baggage; but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers assailed the

heights of Sespina charged with a shock that sent them headlong down again. Souham rallied his beaten troops in the plain and the next day offered battle again but O'Donnel continued his retreat and the French general returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona by the road of Cardedieu. He had previously ordered Duhesme to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers with some guns near the junction of the roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O'Donnel; but colonel Guery, commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, and took no military precautions. O'Donnel was now joined by Campo Verde and sent that officer to fall upon the French posts. Passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, Campo Verde put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; those at Granollers, threw themselves into a large building and defended it for three days, at the end of which Augereau succoured them. Finding the streets of Mollet strewed with French carcasses, the marshal ordered up the division of Souham from Vich but passed on himself to Barcelona; and when there, affecting to be convinced how oppressive Duhesme's conduct had been, sent him to France in disgrace. After this act of justice, or of personal malice, for it has been called both names, Augereau, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham returned to Vich.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau, and the suc-

BOOK X. 1810. February.

cess of Campo Verde's enterprise produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners were marched from town to town, the action everywhere exaggerated, the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the baron d'Eroles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced, the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the Somatenes on the coast and to direct the application of succours from the sea. The Partisans also, reassembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.

O'Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from the Lerida side to his assistance, and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya in the beginning of February. From this point he harassed the French in front of Vich, while Rovira occupied the heights above Roda in rear of that town. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies and having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention to him, and O'Donnel, descending the mountain of Centellas on the 20th, suddenly entered the plains and the French general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action by driving the enemy's posts from the side of Roda back upon the town; O'Donnel then coming close up on the front of the French line, opened all his guns, and throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse front filed his cavalry under cover of their fire to the right, intending to outflank Souham's left. The latter general, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who were at the first charge driven back in confusion. The Spanish foot then fell in on the French centre but failed to make any serious impression, whereupon O'Donnel, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in the head. On the contrary O'Donnel having rallied his cavalry and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left. At this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all, for there was no retreat, hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss being separated from the rest surrendered. Rovira was then driven away from the rear, and the Spanish

BOOK X. army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy.

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O'Donnel's advance had been the signal for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succour thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and being closely pursued by the moveable columns dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O'Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired to the camp of Taragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal.

It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, that the emperor directed the seventh corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet's operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli who had taken the command of Souham's and Pino's divisions to march upon Manreza, while he himself, with the Westphalians, repaired once more to Barcelona and from thence directed all the subsequent movements.

The marshal's brother passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza the 16th of March, and was there joined by general Mazzucchelli; all the inhabitants had abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade from Moncada to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement by Montserrat upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, whereupon

the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Taragona. The French, acting under orders from Barcelona, then left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca. CHAP. II. 1810. March.

O'Donnel, whose energy and military talents were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, general Juan Caro marched with six thousand men against the French in Villa Franca, and on the 28th killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores, but being wounded himself resigned the command to general Gasca after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, then detached columns both by Olesa and Montserrat to reinforce Swartz, and the first reached its destination, but the other, twelve hundred strong, was intercepted by Gasca and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. Campo Verde immediately coming down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch and Rovira hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz, thus menaced, evacuated the town in the night, and thought to baffle the Spaniards by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel; but he was followed closely by Rovira and Milans, and so pressed on the 5th of April, that with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage he reached Barcelona.

These operations having insulated the French

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1810. April.

divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched by sea with orders to recal them to Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte at the head of two battalions and some cavalry across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix on the Lower Ebro. Villatte accomplished his object and returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes who were gathering round the defiles in his rear, and he regained Reus just as Severoli, having received the order of recal, was commencing his march for Barcelona. In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that O'Donnel perceived the disorder from Taragona, and sending a detachment under colonel Orry to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli's rear guard covered the retreat successfully until a position was attained near Villa Franca, where Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken and his troops rejoined their main body. Campo Verde now fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements.

Vacani. Istoria Militare degl' Italiani in Ispagna.

The situation in which Augereau had voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.

CHAP. II.

1810. April.

For Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains to be passed only at certain defiles, and Reus and Manresa were beyond those defiles, and several days' march from each other. Rovira and Milans, lying about San Culgat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; O'Donnel being at Taragona, was nearer to the defiles of Cristina than the French divisions at Reus; his communications were open with Campo Verde by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Queralt; with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurni and Igualada. The French marshal had, indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, yet this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion at Villa Franca was put to the sword, Swartz saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight, and the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat. O'Donnel, who one month before had retired from the battle of Vich broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon Lower Catalonia and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising change yet one in which fortune had no share.

Napoleon's Memoirs.

Augereau's talents for handling small corps in a battle have been recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign. But the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the

BOOK X. 1810.

state of a viceroy when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man and excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant indefatigable and eager; he merited the success he obtained, and with better and more experienced troops that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O'Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Taragona, and neither the action of Vich nor the disasters at Mollet Villa Franca and Esparaguera, would have taken place.

Napoleon, discontented as he well might be with these operations, sent M'Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but meantime, the latter reached Gerona and disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

This citadel had been invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable, and the French at first endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade. Towards the middle of February they commenced the erection of mortar batteries, and Severoli pressed the place more vigorously than before; O'Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, but every attempt to introduce supplies failed; the garrison was thus reduced to extremity, and honourable

terms were offered; but the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them and prepared to break through the enemy's line; an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne's days, and, as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful. When every thing was ready O'Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence and from the side of St. Celoni to favour the enterprise. On the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred resolute men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, afterwards turning to his right he broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded and taken, together with about three hundred men. Many were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, eight hundred reached Vich in safety, and this courageous action was so far successful. Thus, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but they had cost two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges.

CHAP. II. 1810. April. Napoleon's Memoirs. May.

Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized. This event, which facilitated the passage of the French vessels stealing from port to port with provisions or despatches, finished Augereau's career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr's. The latter, victorious in the field was humane afterwards. Augereau seeking to frighten

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1810. May. Victoires et Conquêtes des Française.

those people into submission whom he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, and his cruelty produced precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus, all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.

CHAPTER III.

CHAP. III.

1810. March.

WHILE Augereau lost the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand; of these he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa however, with from three to four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina and the mountains of Albaracin.

Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other, circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards when they took Fraga destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, was close on the right flank and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although longer, was safer and less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was already a considerable military esta-

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blishment. The battering train, consisting of forty pieces with seven hundred rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there under the guard of Habert's division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval leaving general Chlopiski's brigade at Daroca, to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point from Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments.

The right bank of that river being guarded by Leval's division, and the country on the left bank secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained two divisions of infantry and about nine hundred cavalry disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O'Donnel at Manreza, Garcia Novaro was at Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortoza; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the Upper Segre.

Such were the relative situations of both parties, when general Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novarro's detachments within the walls of Tortoza, and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated, as I have before related, with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. While this was passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, but the other passed the Segre at Camarasa.

Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra at its confluence with the Segre.

Suchet himself repairing to Monzon the 10th of April, placed a detachment at Candasnos to cover his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry, and all his cavalry, by Almacellas against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the Noguerra and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. But Suchet's line of operations from Aragon was short, direct, and easy to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than the consumption. Augereau's line was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption.

Lerida contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated upon the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona and about sixty-five miles from each, it possessed a stone bridge over the Segre and was only a short distance from the Ebro and the Cinca rivers; its strategic importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plain of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular governor was named Gonsalez; but Garcia Conde was appointed chief commandant to appease his discontent at O'Donnel's elevation, and the troops he brought with him had

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encreased the garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The river Segre covered the town on the south east; the head of the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch enclosing a square stone building; the body of the place on the north side, was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall was, on the east, joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, an assemblage of huge solid edifices clustered about a castle of great height and surrounded by an irregular work with good bastions, and ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.

The descent from the citadel into the town was gentle, and the works were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was squeezed out about two or three hundred yards, the salient part being secured by an entrenchment, with two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen.

To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight hundred yards, the hill on which Afranius and Petreius encamped to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work with ditches above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando secured the whole of the flat summit. All the works of

Lerida were in good condition and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery; the magazines were full, and a local Junta having been formed to excite public feeling, two officers of artillery were immediately murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.

This siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, but the information derived from colonel Villatte, and the appearance of Spanish Partizans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that the seventh corps had already retired, and the burthen would rest on him alone; wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnel's plans should be clearly indicated before he commenced the attack. Meanwhile he established a communication by means of a rope ferry across the Segre, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences prepared materials for the construction of batteries.

Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and Balaguer, the remainder were thus distributed.

On the left of the Segre four thousand men, including a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed at Alcoteletge as a corps of observation, while Harispe with three battalions invested the bridge-head of Lerida. The ferry-boat was thus protected, and all danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins; but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by patrols.

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1810. April.

Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for there were rumours that O'Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and the Somatenes of the high valleys in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation to Balaguer. The governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa above that town to be broken; he then advanced as far as Tarrega, forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he was still uncertain of Augereau's movements, and like every other general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O'Donnel was at Momblanch with two divisions, ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoteletge.

This rapidity was well-timed, for O'Donnel had already passed the defiles of Momblanch with eight thousand chosen infantry and six hundred cavalry. He was encamped at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida on the 22d, when a note from Garcia Conde informed him the French reserve

was drawn off and the investing force weak. Being willing to seize the favourable moment, he immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o'clock in the morning of the 23d, made a halt of two hours, and then resumed his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an open country on which O'Donnel could perceive no covering force. Trusting implicitly to Conde's information, already falsified by Suchet's activity, the Spanish general descended the hills and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high road, the other two marching on the right and left. The centre outstripping the flankers beat back the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general charged with his three hundred hussars upon the centre Spanish column so suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion and fled towards Margalef, to which place the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish the garrison sallied over the bridge, but as the French infantry stood firm, and the rout of O'Donnel's people was complete, they soon returned to the town.

Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing and guessing the real state of affairs, marched at once with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef,

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hoping to cut off the Spaniards' retreat. O'Donnel had however rallied his troops and was now in line of battle, having his artillery on the right and his cavalry on the left, but his second division was still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the French cuirassiers, commanded by general Boussard, drove them back on the line of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, and Boussard came with a rude shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon guards made a vain effort to form square, the confusion became extreme and nearly all the Spanish infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division; yet the main body of the latter checked their fury, and O'Donnel retreated in good order without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. This action, although not discreditable to O'Donnel was very unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcasses; three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was dismissed by the road of Cervera that he might spread the news of the defeat.

Suchet, wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the besieged, attempted the night after the battle to storm the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the

latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, from whence the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them. A parley ensued and it was finally agreed the French should retire without being molested; thus the Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the dead on the field of Margalef and to review the prisoners; but Garcia Conde replied, "*that Lerida had never looked for external succour in her defences.*"

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

The absolute retreat of Augereau was now fully ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef and the apathy of the Valencians encouraged Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to France by the way of Jaca, the battering train was brought up from Monzon, the other necessary preparations were completed, and the Spanish out-posts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th. The following night ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen: the Spaniards threw fire-balls, and opened a few guns but without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke the besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed, and breaching and counter batteries were commenced. Six sixteen-pounders were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long

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twelve-pounders to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the Spanish musqueteers incommoded the trenches from the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of investment on that side.

In the evening of the 4th, six hundred Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, while another body coming from the Magdalen menaced the right of the French works. The guards held the latter in check and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town; but to meet such dangerous irruptions a ditch and rampart, serving as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken down to the river. The Spanish light troops however still continued to ply the trenches from the other side of the Segre; wherefore ground was broken close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right to embrace a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at day-break on the 7th. The mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three hundred men, stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of

the parallels took the two mortars and penetrated as far as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French reserves, yet they suffered from the Spanish guns in the pursuit, and in the night a violent storm of rain damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches.

From the 8th to the 11th the besiegers laboured at their works, and opened a second parallel one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries, which being closer under the citadel-rock would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted, three new batteries were constructed, and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers.

On the 12th the fire recommenced from eight batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied, at first sharply, but in a little time they stammered in their answers, the French artillery took the ascendant, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos and a portable magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable; but after dark, some Swiss deserters, coming out through the openings, brought intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches were retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet's hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high. He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens, and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs, easily

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excited are as easily discouraged, and he designed to carry the breaches briskly, and with one sweep to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely mar the defence of that formidable fortress. First however he resolved to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar, and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one marched against the redoubts, the others were ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in the Fort and meanwhile though the people in Fernando resisted desperately, that redoubt was also taken and two-thirds of the defendants were put to the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a hundred men.

During this operation the great batteries played into the citadel only, but at daybreak renewed their fire on the breaches; steps were also cut in the parallel to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault; and all the materials necessary to effect a solid lodgement on the walls were conveyed into the trenches. These arrangements being completed at seven o'clock in the evening of the 13th, the signal was made and four storming parties jumped

out of the trenches. Two made for the Carmen, one for the Magdalen, one moved close by the river, and the Spaniards being at this moment preparing a sally to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, did so little expect this assault that they suffered the French to mount the breaches without opposition. However they rallied, and poured such a fire of musquetry and artillery upon the heads of the principal columns, that the latter staggered and would have yielded if Habert had not revived their courage; he led them into the town, at the very moment when the troops on the right and left also forcing their way turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river general Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself following close upon the steps of the storming parties with the reserve, the Spaniards were overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat into the citadel.

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It was now that the French general put his design in execution. Harispe's brigade passed the bridge, and made for the gate of St. Anthony which looked towards Fort Garden; he thus cut off all egress from the town, and this done, the French columns advanced from every side in a concentric direction upon the citadel, driving with shouts and stabs and musquetry, men, women, and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then flying up the ascent the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and the whole crowded the summit of the rock; but all that night the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and at daylight the fire was redoubled; then the carnage swelled until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the

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cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. At twelve o'clock the horrible scene terminated. The capitulation which followed was honourable in terms to the besieged, but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida with its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, the whole loss of the garrison having been only twelve hundred men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced by a proceeding, politic indeed, yet scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For though a town taken by assault be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people into a situation where they must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless the governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it on the ground that it prevented a great effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers' blood at the expense of women's and children's, and had Garcia Conde's nature been stern, he also might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

CHAPTER IV.

LERIDA falling Conde was, as a matter of course, accused of treachery. There seems no foundation for the charge. The cause stated by Suchet sufficed for the effect; yet the defence was unskilful. The walls of the town could not be expected and scarcely did offer an impediment to the French general; hence the cidadel should have been the better prepared; and as the besiegers' force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet's utmost efforts. Engineers require the relative strength of besiegers and besieged, to be not less than four to one; here the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succouring armies. For Lerida had communications, 1°. With the armed population of the high valleys; 2°. With O'Donnel's corps of fourteen thousand; 3°. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with four thousand men; 4°. With Tortoza, where the marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six thousand; 5°. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand regular, and more than thirty thousand irregular soldiers.

It is evident that if all these forces had been directed with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only

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the siege would have been raised but the very safety of the third corps perilled; and it was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnel and the Valencians in check. Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this; and St. Cyr asserts, that the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau with more troops and fewer enemies might have done the same, and yet have spared six thousand men to pass the mountains. Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnel; would have had a covering army to protect the siege; and the succours, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

Augereau has been justified on the ground that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,—the well-arranged system of fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the country,—the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work,—the aid

of an English fleet; all combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; by the capture of the second Suchet obtained large magazines, stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strong-holds; and he had taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O'Donnel with abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San Felippe Balaguer, and Tortoza, the link of connexion between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued; and during every great operation, the Partisans being unmolested recovered strength. Thus during the siege of Lerida the marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcanitz with five thousand men, and he would have carried the castle if general Laval had not despatched two thousand men from Zaragoza to its succour: when the Spaniards, after a skirmish in the streets, retired.

Meanwhile Villa Campa intercepted at the defile of Frasno, a convoy going from Calatayud to Zaragoza, escorted by four hundred men. Their commander, colonel Petit, was forced to abandon his stores and fight his way for ten miles, but his detachment, though reduced to one hundred and

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eighty wounded men, passed the Xalon river and at the village of Arandiza finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but at the same time suffered the troops to burn alive an old man, the Alcalde of Frasno, who was taken among the French. This action happened the day Lerida fell, and the next, Chlopiski, following Villa Campa's march from Daroca, reached Frasno, but the Spaniards were no longer there; Chlopiski, then dividing his forces, pursued them by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory of arms, and so pressed the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and for the most part retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the side of Navarre with some other bands, was vigorously repulsed by the garrison of Ayerbe.

These petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the Spaniards, proved the stability of Suchet's power in Aragon. His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would permit; and however questionable the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided measures; for the retreat of the seventh corps set free, not only O'Donnel's army, but Campo Verde's and all the irregular bands. The Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force on the Upper Segre the very day of the assault;

eight hundred Miguelettes attacked Venasque three days after: and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera by Aramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana above Talarn and Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled. Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida. The Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; general Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo Verde from Cervera and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. If the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O'Donnel, less hasty, had combined his march at a later period with these Somatenes and with Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; but now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French; and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza.

This place situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The French general could not advance in force against Tortoza, nor avail himself of the water-carriage until Mequinenza should fall; and such was his activity that one detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place. Musnier's division, descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the investment on the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A

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shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the rivers, narrowing as it approached their banks until it ended in a craggy rock seven hundred feet high, and overhanging the town which was built between its base and the water. This rock was crowned by a castle with a rampart, that being inaccessible on two sides from the crags, and covered on a third by the town, could only be assailed on the fourth along a high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, which joined the rock to the parent hills: but the rampart on that side was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades. No guns could be brought against the castle until the country people, employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. Meanwhile the brigade which had defeated Lazan at Alcanitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro and completed the investment. The 30th of May, general Rogniat, coming from France with a reinforcement of engineer-officers and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, and taking the direction of the works contracted the circle of investment.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

June.

The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st of May. The 2d of June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces of which six were twenty-four pounders, were brought over the hills, and the Spanish advanced posts were driven into the castle. During the night, ground was broken two

hundred yards from the place under a destructive fire of grape; and while this was passing on the height, approaches were made against the town on the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched close to the water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation, but of eleven boats freighted with inhabitants and their property nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were perfected, the breaching-batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry; the works against the town were also advanced, but in both places the nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. The trenches above were opened chiefly by blasting the rock, those below were in a space too narrow for batteries, and were searched by a plunging fire, from the castle and from a gun mounted on a high tower on the town wall. However the troops on the right bank of the Ebro plied this wall with musketry so sharply, that the garrison abandoned it, and both wall and tower were then escaladed without difficulty, the Spaniards all retiring to the castle. The French now placed a battalion in the houses, putting those next the rock in a state of defence; the garrison of the castle then rolled down large stones from above, yet they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy.

The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were completed; and in the night forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th, Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp, and on the 8th, six-

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teen pieces of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards replied with vigour, and three French guns were dismounted, yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and at nine o'clock in the morning the fire of the place was silenced and the rampart broken in two places. The defence was prolonged awhile with musquetry but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment that at ten o'clock the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five guns and large stores of powder and of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched against Morella in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fort, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, general O'Donoju advanced with a division of the Valencian army to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works were then repaired and Morella became a strong and important place of arms.

By these rapid and successful operations, Suchet secured, 1°. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2°. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance to those provinces; 3°. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4°. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which after the fall of Lerida could safely engage

beyond the Llobregat. But to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O'Donnel's base. The first could only be effected, by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing Taragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the emperor.

Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions in the eastern region of Catalonia was increased by O'Donnel's measures, and that general, still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by past defeats nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway rendered him hateful to the people; but he was watchful to confirm the courage and excite the enthusiasm of his troops; he conferred rewards and honours on the field of battle, and being of singular intrepidity himself his exhortations had more effect. Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were by dint of experience becoming known. With these helps O'Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and found full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell one after another, each serving by its fall to strengthen the hold of the French in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress.

The foundations of military power were, however, deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, and ten thousand

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British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land on the rear of the French or to join the Catalans in an action, could at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralyzed the operations of the seventh corps and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortoza, Taragona, and even Lerida. But while those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy; and when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed, and the people worn out with suffering, a British army, which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern coast of Spain. Notwithstanding their many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle, and yet too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory of Salamanca shewed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgment. Even then he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow view continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

SUCHET'S preparations equally menaced Valencia and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Grenada and made excursions against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, those of the Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the fourth in Grenada, Dessolles' division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda; the fifth corps, with the exception of six battalions and some horse left at Seville, was in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions both of money and provisions, moveable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to

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discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. Cyr, that they were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people exasperated by disorders and violence, and at the same time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms, and Andalusia became like other parts of Spain the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.

King Joseph's Correspondence, captured at Victoria, MSS.

The Grenadans of the Alpujarras were the first to resist; the insurrection spread on one side to Murcia, on the other to Gibraltar; succour was obtained from the latter place, and Blake aided the movement with his troops. The communication between the first and fourth corps was maintained across the Sierra de Ronda, by a division posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars quartered in the town of Ronda. From the latter place, the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the other extremity Blake marching from Almeira, took Ardra and Motril; and at the same time the mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba interrupted Dessolles' communications with La Mancha. These movements commenced early in March, the king was then in the city of Grenada, and he immediately sent a column across the mountains, by Orgiva, to fall upon Blake at Motril, while another column, moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off his retreat. This forced the Murcians to disperse, and Dessolles at the same time defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda. The garrison of Malaga then marched to restore the communication with the first corps, and rallying the troops beaten at Ronda retook that post on the 21st of March. During their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered Malaga,

killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, and would have done more but that another column from Grenada came down on them. The insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. It had however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison and a part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha. The capital was meantime left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader's service. The king now fearing the Valencian and Murcian armies would invade La Mancha repaired thither, and after a time returned to Madrid. The duke of Dalmatia remained to command in Andalusia. He proceeded to organize a system of military and civil administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal and supported by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold. But this will be better shown hereafter, at present it is more convenient to notice

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Mr Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Marshal Victor, declining an assault on the Isla, had spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers he thus enclosed are too numerous, and in their relative

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bearings too intricate for minute description; yet looking as it were from the French camps, I will endeavour to point out the leading features.

The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having the left on the sea-coast, was carried across the Almanza and Chiclana rivers to the Zuraque. This line of eight miles was traced along a range of thickly wooded hills, bordering a marsh, which was from one to three miles broad; it was traversed by the above-named rivers and by many navigable watercourses and creeks, and cut in its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea.

The channel, nine miles long, two or three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the marsh, and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge of Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island in the harbour mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable save by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand, the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon. In form a triangle, its base rested on the channel, the right side on the harbour, the left on the open sea, the apex pointed towards Cadiz. All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high and strong ridge

in the centre about four miles long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands: this ridge, within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence.

At the apex of the Isla stands the Torre Gardo, from whence a low narrow isthmus about five miles long connected it with the rocks upon which Cadiz is built. Across the centre of this isthmus, a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line was the land front of Cadiz, regularly fortified.

On the Chiclana side the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh; and though the Spaniards possessed the Santi Petri, the French, having their chief depôts in the town of Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might force the passage of the channel. For the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation, the thick woods behind afforded the means of constructing an armed flotilla; and such was the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high road it could only be approached by water, or by narrow foot-paths, leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.

The French centre, called the Puerto Real division, extended from the Zuraque on the left to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete, on the right, a distance of seven miles. From the Zuraque the line run to the town of Puerto Real, being traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. Puerto Real was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpen-

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duke president of their own body, they accused him amongst other things with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and they finished with a menacing intimation, that supported by the populace of Cadiz they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Alburquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, it was thought he meant to go to South America; but he died in London some months after of a phrenzy, brought on it is said by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received. He was judged to be a brave and generous man, yet weak and hasty, easy to be duped.

Appendix, No. 3. Sec. 2.

The misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favourers and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy. And this state of affairs would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish storehouses, and if the Regents, their arrogance and pride abated by necessity, had not now asked for and obtained that aid of British troops which they had before so haughtily refused. This saved the place, and at the same time general Colin Campbell who had succeeded sir John Cradock as governor of Gibraltar, performed a great service to his country. For by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algesiras should be demolished. Both measures were very essential to

General Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

Behind the line of blockade, Latour Maubourg occupied Medina Sidonia with a covering division; his left was upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watched the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the blockading position of the first corps, and the progress of events within the city shall now be related.

The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the regency, and the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already touched upon. Alburquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander in chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have unlimited power; but in reality he possessed no authority, except over his own soldiers, nor did he meddle with the administration. The regency, appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the Junta of Cadiz. And that imperious body, without honour, talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile privately trafficked with the public stores.

Alburquerque's Manifesto.

Alburquerque's troops were in a deplorable state, the whole had been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the duke affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, though fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Alburquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta replied by an exposition false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning; for though they had elected

Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz. 1810. MSS.

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duke president of their own body, they accused him amongst other things with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and they finished with a menacing intimation, that supported by the populace of Cadiz they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Alburquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, it was thought he meant to go to South America; but he died in London some months after of a phrenzy, brought on it is said by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received. He was judged to be a brave and generous man, yet weak and hasty, easy to be duped.

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General Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

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the present and permanent interests of England, and the last especially so, because it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress and gave it a secure harbour. Moreover Gibraltar contained at this period a mixed and disaffected population of more than twelve thousand persons; and merchandize to the value of two millions sterling which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment. Ceuta, chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, was miserably neglected, and had only six days' provisions; it was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the straits, and the possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries were exceedingly active.

General William Stewart, detached from Lisbon by lord Wellington, arrived at Cadiz with two thousand men the 11th of February; one thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, and the whole were received with an enthusiasm which proved that sir George Smith's perception of the real feelings of the people had been just; and that Mr. Frere's unskilful management of the Central Junta had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The 17th a strong Portuguese regiment was admitted into the city; it was followed by more British troops, and the whole force finally assembled behind the Santi Petri channel was not less than four thousand Anglo-Portuguese and fourteen thousand Spaniards.

Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz. 1810. MSS.

The ships recovered at Ferrol had been transferred to Cadiz, and there were in the bay twenty-three men of war, four of the line and three fri-

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gates being British, besides the Euthalion and Undaunted, which now arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars. Thus money troops and a fleet, in fine all things necessary to render Cadiz formidable were collected. Yet to little purpose. Procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities, the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments marred every useful measure, and there was so little enthusiasm amongst the people, that no citizen was enrolled, or armed, or volunteered either to labour or to fight.

General Stewart's first measure was to recover Matagorda, the error of abandoning which was to be attributed as much to admiral Purvis as to the Spaniards. In the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain M'Lean of the ninety-fourth, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled fort, effected a solid lodgement. The French cannonaded the work with field-artillery all the next day, but the garrison, supported by the fire of Puntales, was immoveable.

The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh meat; and a tempest, beating on the coast from the 7th to the 10th of March, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary's. One ship of the line was taken, the others were burned and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men,

amongst others a part of the fourth English regiment, fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty. CHAP. V. 1810. March.

On the 15th of March the enemy's outposts at San Petri were driven in by major Sullivan of the seventy-ninth, to cover an attack meditated by general Stewart against the Troccadero; this design was however baffled by the surf in one quarter and the difficulty of crossing a shoal in another.

In the same month Mr. H. Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary, arrived; and on the 24th general Graham, coming from England, assumed the chief command of the British troops and immediately caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence was quite inadequate, and to secure it, twenty thousand soldiers, with a system of redoubts and batteries requiring the labour of four thousand men for three months, were absolutely necessary. The Spaniards had only worked beyond the Santi Petri, and without judgement. Their batteries in the marsh were ill-placed, their entrenchments on the tongue of land at the sea-mouth of that channel were of contemptible strength; the Caraccas, which they had armed with one hundred and fifty guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, and the important posts of Matagorda and the Troccadero were abandoned; yet advanced batteries had been absurdly pushed to the junction of the Chiclana road with the royal causeway in the marsh; that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently ex- Appendix, No. 3, Sect. 1.

BOOK X. posed without support to flank attacks both by water and land.

1810. March. It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans and offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house or destroy a garden; their procrastination paralyzed their allies, and would have lost the place, had the French been prepared to press it vigorously. They were so indifferent to the progress of the enemy, that to use general Graham's expression, they wished the English would drive away the French, *merely that they might go and eat strawberries at Chiclana.* Nor were the British works when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed well and rapidly completed; for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a paucity of engineer-officers; and from the habitual negligence of the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores nor implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from the private journals of commanders of British expeditions during the war with France, would prove an incredible carelessness of preparation on the part of the different cabinets: the generals were always expected to make bricks without straw, and the laurels of the British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success of the venerable hero Abercrombie was due more to his perseverance and unconquerable energy in repairing the neglect of the ministers before the descent, than to his daring operations afterwards.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st, and both sides continued to labour at their lines. But the allies worked slowly and without harmony,

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the Spanish supplies were interrupted, scarcity prevailed, many persons were forced to quit the city, and two thousand troops were detached by sea to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana. Notwithstanding this, so strange and wayward a people, and so false, are Spaniards in authority, that the Junta assured Mr. Wellesley their magazines were full, and induced him to send wheat and flour away from Cadiz in the midst of the scarcity.

General Graham's Correspondence, MSS.

Matagorda being small, and of a square form, without a ditch, without sufficient bomb-proofs, and having one angle projecting towards the land, it was little calculated for resistance, and could bring only seven guns to bear; yet though frequently cannonaded it had been held fifty-five days and now impeded the completion of the French works. A Spanish seventy-four, supported with an armed flotilla moored on the flanks, co-operated in the defence; but some houses on the Trocadero covered heavy French batteries, and the 21st, at daybreak, a hissing shower of heated shot falling on the ships made them cut their cables and take shelter under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, and the enemy shot so quick and close, that a staff bearing the Spanish flag was broken six times in an hour; the colours were then fastened to the angle of the work itself, but the men, especially the sailors, besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing

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the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty had fallen, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. A bastion was then blown up under the direction of major Lefebre an engineer of great promise, but he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. And here I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and though a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered it and fulfilled her mission.*

Matagorda being thus evacuated the French covered the point with batteries, but the war languished in front of Cadiz, while in other parts it was brisk. Sebastiani's cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and he himself entering the city of Murcia forced Blake to retire upon Alicant and Carthagena. Meanwhile the troops blockading Cadiz were pressed by scarcity, and general Campbell augmented their difficulties by throwing a detachment into Tarifa, and driving the foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle. The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, but their usual tardiness enabled the

General Campbell's Correspondence. MSS.

* An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found in a small volume, entitled, "*Sketches of a Soldier's Life in Ireland*," by the author of "*The Eventful Life of a Soldier.*" This last work was erroneously designated, in my first volume, as "*The Life of a Sergeant.*"

enemy to return with four hundred foot and some cavalry, who were not repulsed until they had driven off several herds of cattle. General Campbell then increased his detachment to five hundred men, with some guns, and placed the whole under the command of major Brown of the 28th.

In May the French prisoners cut the cables of two hulks and drifted in a heavy gale to the French bay. They beat off the craft sent after them by throwing cold shot from the decks, and above fifteen hundred saved themselves in despite of a fire from the boats of the allied fleet and from the batteries; a fire was mercilessly continued after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures thus struggling for life and liberty had been treated with horrible cruelty, and being all of Dupont's or Vedel's corps were prisoners only by a dishonourable breach of faith.

Appendix, No. III. Section 1.

Cadiz now presented a scene of great disorder. The Regency had recalled Cuesta to the military councils, and he immediately published an attack on the deposed Central Junta; but he was answered so as to convince the world, that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited; the English general was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect. However the departure of Alburquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops, and at his instance, the Municipal Junta consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the

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1810. June.

Isla. English reinforcements continued also to arrive, and four thousand Spaniards from Murcia joined the garrison, or rather army, now within the lines; yet such was the state of the native troops, such the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy's works. It was however necessary to do something, and after some ill-judged plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy embarked with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid the Serranos or peasants of the Ronda.

General Graham's Despatches. MSS.

These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by captain Cowley and Mr. Michel, two British artillery-officers sent from Gibraltar. General Campbell also offered to reinforce Lacy from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga. In that city there were twenty thousand males fit to carry arms, while the French were only two thousand, and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle containing but twelve guns and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. This enterprise Lacy rejected. He demanded instead that eight hundred men should be detached from Gibraltar to make a diversion to the eastward, while he should land at Algesiras, and move against the town of Ronda; this was assented to, and the English armament sailed under the command of general Bowes. Lacy made good his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French had fortified it, and were too strong at that point, or rather Lacy, a man of no enterprise, was afraid to act. And when he was joined by the wild and fierce Serranos, he arrested the leaders for some offence, which so dis-

gusted their followers that they disbanded. The French alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia by Blake and by an insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion. The insurrection at Baeza was then quickly crushed; and general Rey, marching from Seville against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July.

Here it is fitting to point out the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength of the allies in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, thirty thousand; the British in Gibraltar five thousand; in Sicily sixteen thousand; forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy and favourably placed for harassing that immense, and except on the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted line of French operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz: for even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble under Murat in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralyze this mighty power!

It is true that vigilance, temper, arrangement and favourable localities, are all required in the combined operations of a fleet and army, and soldiers disembarking, also require time to equip for service. But Minorca offered a central station and a place of arms for the troops, a spacious port for the fleet; the coast of Catalonia and Valencia is pacific and safe, seldom or never does a gale blow home on

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1810. July.

shore; the operations would always have been short and independent of the Spanish authorities: and lord Collingwood was fitted by talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the operations of a siege and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas the slight expeditions of this period were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies.

In July, the British force in Cadiz was increased to eight thousand five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks; and his works have been much censured, as ostentatiously extended and leading to nothing. This is however a rash criticism. The Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla, and as the true point for offensive operations was at the Troccadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which in ordinary times was fetched from Puerto Maria, finally to enable the flotilla constructed at San Lucar to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labour; and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps

generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were in this view not unnecessary or ostentatious.

Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper's government, while the National Cortes and Regency were shut up in a narrow corner of the province. The preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there; for the English generals were well assured, that otherwise some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works no mischief could have been apprehended; and Graham's division, consisting of excellent soldiers, would have been set free, instead of being cooped up without any counterbalance in the number of French troops employed to blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly in securing the submission of Andalusia; and if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla.

CHAPTER VI.

BOOK X. 1810. March.

WHILE the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville was tranquil. A few thousand men, left by Mortier when he moved against Badajos, sufficed to control the city. From this force also, eight hundred men marched under general Remond, to attack the viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly imploring a refuge in Portugal. The viscount had four thousand men, but he dreaded an engagement, and passed by Gibraleon to the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla; the French, instead of following him, occupied Moguer and Huelva, at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, to cut off the supplies which Cadiz drew from thence. The viscount seized the occasion to return to Ayamonte and embark his troops for Cadiz; but he was soon replaced by general Copons, who came with two thousand men from the Isla, to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia, and a great part of that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste.

In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles had reduced the struggle to

a trifling Guerilla warfare; but in La Mancha, the Partidas were become so numerous, and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph's ministers described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands.

It remains to speak of Estremadura, which was become the scene of various complicated movements and combats, producing no great results indeed, but important as being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal.

The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, south of the Tagus, may be divided into three parts. 1°. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana. 2°. From Badajos to the Morena. 3°. From the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Alburquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the principal Portuguese places. The three first, on either side, are in the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses.

From Badajos to the Morena forming the second division the country is entirely rugged and the chain of fortresses continued; on the Portuguese side, by Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish side by Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche.

From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side,

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extremely rugged, presented the fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The Portuguese frontier furnished Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin. The greater number of these places were dismantled, but the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza.

Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

When Mortier attempted Bajados, on the 12th of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided that a fortnight's blockade would have reduced it; but the French general, who had only brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde by the Spaniards, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana then returned to Badajos, and Mortier, leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida to connect himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo on the right of the Guadiana. This corps, commanded by general Mermet, had occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of Andalusia, communicating with the sixth corps by the pass of Baños, and forming the link between Mortier and Kellerman. The latter during the first part of January was at Bejar and Miranda de Castanar watching Del Parque, but when the British arrived on the Mondego, he withdrew to Salamanca. Del Parque then leaving Martin Carrera with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata, marched with thirteen thousand men through

the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Alburquerque and his left on the Guadiana.

When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult's brother, coming with four thousand men from Talaxera, crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, marched by Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey, and reaching Montijo pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by degrees, general Reynier took the command, and was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and fascines as if to besiege Badajos.

These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre; and then, Romana, finding himself by the junction of the duke Del Parque's army at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act against the communications of the French. His first division, commanded by Charles O'Donnel, brother to the Catalan general, occupied Alburquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five thousand Asturians under Ballesteros was sent to Olivenza. The fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier's communication with Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the

BOOK X. 1810. March.

1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballesteros with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras' movements, repaired to Zafra, but left the second corps at Merida. The 10th, Romana again advanced towards Alburquerque, and pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, where it was surprised by general Foy. O'Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy in return, but the latter fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards then occupied Caceres. At this period however the insurrection in Grenada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement in Valencia caused by Suchet's retreat, made Joseph order Mortier to return to Andalusia. The marshal therefore destroyed the works of Merida on the 19th and marched for Seville, leaving general Gazan's division at Monasterio to form a connecting post with Reynier. The latter had meanwhile sent his stores to Truxillo, and taking the field drove the Spaniards out of Caceres, but instead of following them over the Salor, he took post at Torremocha and O'Donnel returned to Caceres.

There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1°. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2°. A shorter but more difficult road which running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes have no cross communications in the Morena; but on the Estremaduran side a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra; and

on the Andalusian side there is one from Araceña to Ronquillo.

When Mortier retired, Ballesteros, designing to surprise Gazan, marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros; there he was joined by Contreras and their united corps, ten thousand strong, gained the royal road of Zafra, and fell on the French general in the evening of the 29th. The action was undecided, but being renewed the next morning the Spaniards had the worst. Contreras then retired to the mountains above Ronquillo; but Ballesteros, marching by Araceña reached Huerva within a few leagues of Seville. General Girard, who commanded in that city, drove him back to Araceña; yet he returned again by the Condado de Niebla, and finally established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto.

Meantime, Romana detached troops to seize Merida and cut Reynier's communication with Gazan, but the former general coming with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived. His design was to take Contreras, who was still at Ronquillo, in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened if O'Donnel, advancing from Caceres, had not menaced Merida and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless Contreras was attacked by Gazan at Pedroche, and so completely defeated that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th with only two thousand men; and at the same time Ballesteros, assailed by a detachment from Seville, was driven from the Tinto back to Araceña. Reynier, freed by the defeat of Contreras, then marched to Montijo, and O'Donnel retired from Caceres; yet his rear guard was defeated at La

BOOK X. 1810. April.

Rocca the 21st; and he would have been lost if Mendizabel, and Hill also, had not come to his aid, whereupon Reynier, declining a general action, retired to Merida.

While these events were passing in Estremadura, the insurrection in the Alpuxaras was quelled by Sebastiani, the Valencians remained inactive, Joseph returned to Madrid, leaving Soult to govern Andalusia, and Mortier then marched back to Estremadura. Contreras had now been superseded by Imas, who immediately reoccupied Ronquillo on the French marshal's rear; Ballesteros took post at Aroche on his flank; Hill returned to Portalegre, and Romana encamped with twelve thousand men near Badajos. But there were strong factions in that place, a Spanish plot to assassinate him was discovered, and yet the villain who was to have executed the atrocious deed escaped. These things rendered the Spaniards weak, and notwithstanding Romana's presence, Reynier and the younger Soult, passed the Guadiana below Badajos with only four hundred cavalry, and closely examined the works of that fortress in despite of the whole Spanish army. At the same time Mortier's advanced guards again arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men joined the second corps from Toledo.

Mr Stuart's Correspondence. MSS.

The want of provisions would not permit the French to remain concentrated, and Mortier soon returned to the Morena to watch Imas, but in May, a French detachment again came close up to Badajos, and then taking the road to Olivenza would have cut off Ballesteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to Elvas arrested the movement. Ballesteros, ignorant of his danger, once more menaced Se-

ville, but was again driven back upon Aroche with a loss of three hundred men. To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal, by the Lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing at Gibraleon and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballesteros' movements. Yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the first corps; and O'Donnel endeavouring during Reynier's absence to surprise Truxillo, failed and regained Alburquerque with difficulty.

It would be perplexing to trace in detail all the movements on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte; yet two circumstances there were of sufficient historical importance to demand notice. In the beginning of July, Lacy being in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballesteros near Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against the first, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph's service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality the other of robbery and violence, would but for the mediation of the British authorities have commenced a regular war, and this mutual jealousy and hatred was extended to the governments on both sides.

Hitherto Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save when Romana was hardly pressed; for though the latter's demands for aid were continual, most of his projects were ill judged and contrary to lord Wellington's advice. But more important affairs were now at hand. On the 26th

BOOK X. 1810. June.

of June, Reynier passed the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then turned to Montijo upon Merida. It was before known that he belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura. The spies now affirmed that he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill therefore gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of Beira. Reynier's operations were however postponed, and the great combinations in which he was afterwards involved belong to another place.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Although apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana, as far as Badajos, is separated from the valley of the Tagus by a range of heights connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Alburquerque. The country between those hills and the Tagus contained fertile valleys, with considerable towns, such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres, and to profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as Caceres; beyond that town, the Salor presented a barrier behind which the Spaniards, supported by the fort of Alburquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force and act accordingly: hence O'Donnel's frequent advances and retreats.

2°. Reynier could only operate seriously in unison with the fifth corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana; Merida, on account of its stone bridge, was the pivot of all his movements. But Mortier's base was in Andalusia, and his front was necessarily spread from Zafra to Merida, both to cover his communications and to draw provisions from the fertile district of Llerena. The road of Xeres de los Cavalleros was however always open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballesteros and Contreras on that line were to harass Mortier's communications with Andalusia. This gives the clue. Romana, holding Badajos and being supported by Hill, opposed the enemy in front with the Spanish centre, while his moveable wings under O'Donnel, Contreras, and Ballesteros, acted against the French flanks, each having Portugal to retire upon as a place of refuge. This general plan was well considered, but Romana's projects were ordinarily so vague and injudicious, that lord Wellington forbad Hill to assist him unless for definite and approved objects. Hence the latter's apparent inactivity.

3°. To stop Romana's movements, Mortier had only to unite the 2d and 5th corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo. This he ardently desired, yet Soult would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections, and descents from Cadiz; and to say that either marshal was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier united could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, fifty guns,

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BOOK X. 1810.

and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana, after garrisoning Badajos Olivenza and Alburquerque, could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor unless lord Wellington detached largely from the north; the king and Soult would then have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences are not to be assumed.

On the other hand, Soult, judging that ere further conquests were attempted, the great province of Andalusia should be rendered a strong hold and independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. His exact and economical arrangements provided for the current consumption of his troops, and he formed vast reserve magazines without overwhelming the people; and the native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously; yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries flowing from disorderly and wasting armies may honestly assist a general desirous to preserve regularity. All this was not the work of a day, and meanwhile, the marshals under Soult's orders, being employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire controul of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations because thus only could they be distinguished. But the duke of Dalmatia, while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, was well assured, that in fixing a

solid foundation for future military operations he should also obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator of a conquered country.

4°. Soult's views clashed with the wishes of the king, whose poverty forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. He who wields the sword will always be first served. Guided by Napoleon's orders, the duke of Dalmatia resisted Joseph's demands, and thus excited that monarch's anger and jealousy in an extraordinary manner. Yet he never lost the confidence of the emperor, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquillized, the military resources of the country drawn forth, considerable bodies of native troops were raised, and successfully employed to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity, the mines of lead at Linares were worked, the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the founderies, and every provision for the use of a large army collected. Privateers were fitted out, commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada; and a secret but considerable traffic, carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

5°. Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the advantages of each plan being considered leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men in Estremadura during

BOOK X. 1810.

the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet, in the latter month, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men in Massena's invasion whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of this reasoning will however be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon's recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business, or that absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire he neglected Spanish affairs; or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. It is however scarcely necessary to seek any other cause than the inevitable errors which mar all great military combinations not directed by a single head.

CHAPTER VII.

CHAP. VII.

1810. January.

THE operations south of the Tagus having been now described, those which occurred north of that river shall also be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in one great line across the Peninsula from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies.

It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and beyond the Douro, the Gallician army under Garcia, in number about ten thousand, occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, and Astorga, menacing the right flank and rear of the sixth corps. Mahy was organising a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias, the captain-general D'Arco commanded seven thousand men, three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under general Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence six hundred miles long was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance save at Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese troops were lying.

On the other hand, the French who held the in-

BOOK X. 1810. February.

terior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable columns: thus they menaced all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney having resumed the command was supported by Kellerman with the forces of his government, and by the eighth corps under the duke of Abrantes.

The invasion of Andalusia had been the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain. While Victor and Mortier menaced Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet entering the Asturias threatened Gallicia by the Concija d'Ibas. At the same time, Loison occupied Leon and Medina del Campo with eight thousand men newly arrived from France, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Gallicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February his cavalry cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched against Astorga, while Bonet destroyed Ponte's force at Potes de Sierra, and menaced Gallicia by the pass of Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, threatened at once by Bonet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former and carried the remainder to Villa Franca to support Mahi.

Ney however made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by some of Kellerman's troops who advanced to Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the eighth corps at Benevente,

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1810. February.

intending to besiege Astorga in form, but he was suddenly called towards Madrid lest disorders should arise in the capital during the king's absence. Mahi and Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking to relieve the Asturians by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon; but as Loison still remained at Benevente they were unable to effect their object, and after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga retired to Villa Franca.

Bonet did not pass Nava de Suarna, general Arco rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, and Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Gallicia, marched with the remnant of the old army of the left to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney's force repeatedly chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon sometimes into Portugal. It is however unnecessary to trace all these movements, because the French, while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead the allies and to cover their own projects.

Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion of Portugal by the northern line was not finally arranged until a later period; yet it seems probable, that while Bonet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria, not as Loison announced, for the invasion of Gallicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the second corps to the

BOOK X. 1810. March.

aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. But whatever designs might have been contemplated they were frustrated, partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals; for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally; and every where it was plainly seen that the French corps d'armée, however formidable in themselves, would not in the absence of Napoleon act cordially in the general system.

When the commotions in the south subsided Junot returned to Old Castile; Loison then joined the sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman retired to Valladolid, and his detachments placed on the Douro maintained the communications between Ney and Junot. The latter, having drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four pounders and two mortars; meanwhile his covering divisions took post at Puente Ferrada and Puebla de Senabria, to watch that line and observe Benevente and the Mombuey road. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army. The Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that Mahi had twenty thousand well organized troops; it now appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill provided and prone to desertion.

Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes who commanded in this place was

an officer of courage, and his garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry besides cannoneers and armed peasantry. The Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works, but there was little ammunition, scarcely twenty days' rations, and nothing outside the walls capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain and had three suburbs; Puerto de Hierro to the north, St. Andreas to the east, Retebia to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, but conducted his real approaches against the front between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia.

The place was invested the 22d, and before the end of the month the Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies were repulsed, and the trenches opened. A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia which were filled with Spanish infantry. However the town suffered from shells, the wall was broken on the 20th of April, and the assault was ordered. A previous attack on Retebia had failed, yet Santocildes was so distressed for ammunition that he offered to capitulate. Junot refused the terms demanded, and at five o'clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked troops run up to the breach; but it was well retrenched, stockaded and defended with great obstinacy, while the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The storming-party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks and in front, with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, it would have been

BOOK X. 1810. April.

totally destroyed but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralyzed the Spanish defence. Three hundred French are said to have fallen on the breach itself; yet the remainder finally effected a lodgement in the ruins, and during the night, a second attack on the Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgement: strong working-parties were then sent forward and they cut through the stockade into the town, whereupon the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains as if he would have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to Lugo and recalled his detachment from Mombuey; but the French from Benevente overtook and defeated it at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile Junot, having placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, restored Bonet his division, and that general, who had retired to Santander during the siege, re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Gallicia by the roads of Concija and Sales: several slight actions ensued but the French penetrated no farther, and the Junta of Gallicia reinforced the Asturians with three thousand men.

During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at Salamanca, and a strong detachment of Kellerman's troops seized the pass of Baños. This alarmed Martin Carrera, he quitted the hills and joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were commencing, and the line of communication with France was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large

battering-train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, had arrived at Salamanca, and general La Martiniere reached Valladolid with a reinforcement of ten thousand men for the eighth corps. General Drouet passed the Pyrenees with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in Spain; and he was followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the current rumour that the emperor himself was coming to take the chief command. Fortunately for the allies, this rumour, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph's ministers and the French ambassador at Madrid, was not borne out by the event, and a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed, that marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps under the impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal, but the intrigues of marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes; that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had really resolved to repair in person to the Peninsula, but his marriage and some important political affairs diverted him from that object; finally that Massena prince of Esling was chosen to supply the emperor's place, partly for his great name in arms, partly that he was of higher rank than the other marshals and a stranger to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French emperor.

That Massena's base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments of Sala-

BOOK X. 1810. May.

manca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the troops he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king; and it would seem some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils; because in the imperial muster-rolls, the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that army; yet during the month of April only, a circumstance strongly indicating Napoleon's intention to assume the command himself. The northern line was, however, definitively adopted, and while the prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

Lord Wellington's Correspondence, MSS.

In the beginning of the year the governor of this fortress had caused such suspicion of his intentions that lord Wellington demanded his removal. Don Andreas Herrasti the actual governor, was a veteran of fifty years' service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance and benign manners excited respect, and his courage and honour accorded with his venerable appearance. His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men besides the citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works however consisted merely of an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, flanked with a [illegible] projections containing some light guns. A se-

cond wall, about twelve feet high, called a "*fausse braie*," with ditch and covered way, surrounded the first, yet it was placed so low on the hill as scarcely to offer any cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church and secure it as he could.

Beyond the walls and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthern entrenchment and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork on the north-east. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts and saw to the bottom of the ditch.

The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo was easy for the movement of troops, especially on the left bank of the Agueda to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle-gate. The Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep and overhung with huge desolate crags.

During February and March, the French had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo, but they departed as lightly as they came, and their intentions appeared doubtful until the 25th of April, when a camp was

BOOK X. 1810. June.

pitched on a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city. In a few days a second and then a third arose, and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress.

This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested the place, the eighth occupied San Felices Grande and other points, the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river. The battering train with a great escort was still two days' march in the rear, for the rains, inundating the flat country between the Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges were established on the 2d and 7th of June, the one above, the other below the town. On the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. That night Julian Sanchez, issuing silently out of the castle gate with two hundred horsemen crossed the river and piercing the line of French posts on the left bank, reached the British light division, which was then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This event induced Ney to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general Crawfurd the 25th, on which day also the French batteries opened.

The French plan was to breach the body of the place without attending to the Spanish fire. Their salvos, from forty-six guns, constantly directed on

one point soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; nevertheless the besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well, that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches and killed above a hundred of the assailants.

On the 27th, the prince of Esling arrived in the camp and summoned the governor to surrender. Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so good a soldier. The fire was then resumed until the 1st of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, and work regularly forward to blow in the counterscarp and pass the ditch in form. Meanwhile to facilitate the progress of the new works, the convent of Santa Cruz was, in despite of a fierce resistance, stormed on the right flank, and on the left the suburb was won, with great loss indeed, and several changes of fortune for Herrasti made a vigorous sally, but the French finally remained masters of every thing beyond the walls of the fortress.

Intercepted French Correspondence, MSS.

During the cessation of fire consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences; but on the 9th of July, the besieger's batteries established on the Lesser Teson re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, and a reserve magazine exploded on the walls; the counterscarp was also blown in by a mine on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch was filled by the ruins and a broad way made into the place.

Three French soldiers of heroic courage now

BOOK X. 1810. July.

rushed out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus in broad daylight ascertained the state of affairs, discharged their muskets in token of success, and with matchless fortune retired unhurt to their comrades. The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal; a few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city when the white flag suddenly waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, signifying by his gestures that he desired to capitulate: he had stricken manfully while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver hairs that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation. Thus Ciudad Rodrigo fell.

Six months had now elapsed since the French, resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces broken and scattered to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none, and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous, and that he has been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake whose turbulent waters were foaming and dashing on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances

must appear, yet the whole forms what has been called the Spanish military policy: and without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man who like Milton's phantom paved a broad way through their chaotic warfare. CHAP. VII. 1810. July.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is the province of history to record foolish as well as glorious deeds that posterity may profit from all; and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people. In their constancy, in the unexampled patience with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their generals skilful, their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, when I say they were incapable of defending their country. Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years which the war lasted, rise up in support of this truth; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could, baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon is a mental illusion. Spain baffle him! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished indeed the opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia,

BOOK X. 1810.

or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the English, with a fleet for grandeur and real force never matched, with an army and a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress; the snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from him by tearing France along with it. What weakness then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious. She was invaded because she adhered to the great European aristocracy. She was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment over the principles of the French revolution.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

THE defence of Portugal was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation. Calmly and deliberately he formed his resolution after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his great project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, who secretly and with malignant perseverance laboured to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs.

After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the Central Junta upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley's departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place; a change very sudden indeed, but not unex-

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pected, because the ineptitude of the government, was in private acknowledged by many of its members; the failure of the Walcheren expedition was only the signal for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues which had rendered the cabinet of St. James's the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly denounced lord Castlereagh to his colleagues as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. Nevertheless he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan and conduct the fitting out of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England; but when it became evident that loss and ruin waited on the unhappy Walcheren expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise. The intrigue thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised as "*a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private.*" This was followed by a duel, and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool were then empowered to form another cabinet, and, after a fruitless negotiation with lord Grey and lord Grenville, assuming the lead themselves offered the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley.

Lord Castlereagh's statement.

Mr. Canning's statement.

Contrary to the general expectation he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal which were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by that general, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, embued with the same sentiments bound by a common interest and resolute to sup-

port him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise and commendable in lord Wellesley to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions to be enabled to forward projects promising so much glory to his country and his own family. The first proceedings in parliament justified his policy.

Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur Wellesley had been created baron Douro and viscount Wellington; but those honours, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who with few exceptions assailed the general personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought, his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and obliged one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!

See Parliamentary Debates.

Lord Grey, opposing his own crude military notions to the practised skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action; and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so sternly fought so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators! The passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully so successfully executed that it seemed rather the result of inspi-

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ration than of natural judgement, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth!

This spirit of faction was however not confined to one side: there was a ministerial person at this time, who, in his dread of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation: "*any thing provided blood were spilt!*" A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general's abhorrence of this detestable policy; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord Wellesley's accession to the government was essential to the success of lord Wellington's projects.

Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of Europe, and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as because it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. It is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favourites, but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid grounds; that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.

Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo and while the Cabinet was yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, brought by continual reverses to a more

sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded lord Wellington's opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the general on the 14th of September 1809; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal was necessarily to be modified according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who during the interval had succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department.

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster the former *could not then make an attack upon Portugal;* and if events should enable them to do so, the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it. Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. Badajos, 14th Nov. 1809. MSS.

"But the peace in Germany," he said, "might "enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain "largely, when the means of invading Portugal "would be increased; not only in proportion to "the additional troops then poured in, but also in "proportion to the effect which such a display of "additional strength would necessarily have upon "the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, "*until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive,* the French would find it difficult, if not impossible to obtain possession of "Portugal, *provided England employed her armies* "*in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organised to the full*

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" *extent of which it was capable.* But the number " of British forces employed should not be less " than thirty thousand effective men; although the " Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, con- " sisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry three thou- " sand artillery and three thousand cavalry; and " the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, ex- " clusive of the ordenanças."

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. " The actual yearly cost of the British " army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of tran- " sport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only " half a million sterling more than they would cost " if employed in England. Hence the most im- " portant consideration was the expense of reno- " vating and supporting the Portuguese military " and civil services. The British government had " already subsidised the Portuguese Regency at " the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, " being the expense of twenty thousand men which " the latter were bound by treaty to place at the " service of the English commander-in-chief.

" But this was far from sufficient to render the " Portuguese army efficient for the impending " contest. The revenue of Portugal was between " eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses " between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a " deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. " Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of " the civil and military demands had been paid " and the public debt and the salaries of the public " servants were in arrear. The advances already " made by Great Britain amounted to two millions " of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four " millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry,

"it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; "and it was obvious that the administration would, "when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money "from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

"It was impossible to diminish the expenses of "the Regency, and yet the French invasion and "the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished "the country that it was impossible to raise the "revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people "were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, "and the customs, which formed the principal "branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to "nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade "from the mother-country to Great Britain. This "transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to "Portugal, and therefore justice as well as policy "required that England should afford pecuniary "assistance to the Regency.

"Without it nothing could be expected from the "Portuguese army. The officers of that army had "for many years done no duty, partly that their "country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had "continued in the same garrisons and lived with "their families; and to these advantages added "others arising from abuses in the service. Now "the severe but necessary discipline introduced by "marshal Beresford had placed the Portuguese "officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had "been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insuffi-

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" cient to support them in a country where all the " necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it " was far below the pay of the English Spanish and " French officers, with whom or against whom they " were to fight.

" If therefore the war was to be carried on, it " was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred " and thirty thousand pounds yearly to enable the " Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese " officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before " mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of " about three hundred thousand pounds to supply " the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. " Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might " take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into " pay, which could be done at an expense of two " hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such " assistance the difficulties of the moment might be " overcome; but without it, he, lord Wellington, " felt assured that the whole financial and military " system of the Portuguese would break down at " once; all the expense hitherto incurred would be " cast away, and all hopes of defending the country " extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

" There remained two other points to consider— " the re-embarkation of the British army in the " event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese " nation continuing the contest alone. As to the " first, he could carry off everything safely except " the horses of the cavalry and artillery, those could " not be carried off if the embarkation took place " after a lost battle; and if the embarkation took " place under other circumstances, the expense of " horse-transports would be more than the worth of " the animals. As to the second point, if the Bri-

" tish army evacuated Portugal under any circum-
" stances he could not give hopes that the contest
" could be prolonged effectually by the natives.
" Although I," he said, " *consider the Portuguese*
" *government and army as the principals in the con-*
" *test for their own independence, and that their suc-*
" *cess or failure must depend principally upon their*
" *own exertions and the bravery of their army, and*
" *that I am sanguine in my expectations of both*
" *when excited by the example of British officers and*
" *troops, I have no hope of either if his Majesty*
" *should now withdraw the army from the Penin-*
" *sula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by*
" *defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate con-*
" *sequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the*
" *enemy, probably without a contest; and other con-*
" *sequences will follow, affecting the state of the war*
" *not only in Portugal but Spain.* If therefore it
" should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or
" if eventually the British army should be obliged
" to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend
" a consideration of the means of carrying away
" such of the Portuguese military as should be de-
" sirous of emigrating, rather than continue by their
" means the contest in this country."

Such were lord Wellington's views, but it must be observed that though Peniche and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, neither were likely to come within the scope of his operations. And his hope of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral Berkeley's assurance that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be

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occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d'Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian's for an embarkation. But the admiral's views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus for the purpose of an embarkation if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

The ministers, although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which from the recent loss sustained in the Walcheren expedition they truly observed would in case of disaster endanger the safety of England, assented to lord Wellington's proposals; they undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; and being thus pledged to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency.

Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops were placed in healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, and he expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to

twenty thousand, nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters and the artillery parc were established at Viseu in Upper Beira; the cavalry was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celorico, and Santarem; general Hill was left with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes; the remainder of the infantry, one regiment employed to form the garrison of Lisbon excepted, was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

The defensive plans of the English general were at first grounded upon the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern line in preference to the centre or southern line of operations against the Peninsula: that is, *attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile*, rather than *Andalusia from the side of La Mancha*. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone but every part of the Peninsula was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops flushed with their recent German victories were crowding into Spain; they reinforced the corps to their right and left, scoured the main communications, and followed the footsteps of the old bands as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether *Portugal should be defended at all;*

BK. but at the same time he transmitted one of those clear
— and powerful statements, which he invariably drew
1810. up for the ministers' information previous to under-
January. taking any great enterprise, statements, in which, shewing the bearings of past and present events and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS. "The enemy," he said, "aimed at conquering the south, he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources; and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or necessity or even expediency might engage them. The armies might, however, be lost and the authorities dispersed but the war of Partisans would continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist within its walls; yet it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs left Portugal untouched, yet it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers' attention.

"They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men regularly organized could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last six months, for the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before

fifty thousand men composing the militia could possibly contend with the enemy: and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers which is only to be acquired by military experience.

"When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass *that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government.* Thence arose this question, 'Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy or of benefit to the allies?'

"It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to their prince, detested the French government, and were individually determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs."

BOOK XI. 1810. January.

Under these circumstances, and *adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain*, he demanded to know whether, "*the enemy bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found.* But under any circumstances, the British army could be, he said, embarked in despite of the enemy."

Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which with equal ignorance and malice has often been thrust forward in disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas Wellington did defend that country. The former, premising that he was not prepared at the time to answer in detail a question of such magnitude, observed generally, "that the frontier though rugged was an open one and could not be defended against a superior force; nevertheless Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celorico, and Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy and cover the embarkation of stores, &c., which could only be made at Lisbon. That the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and he hoped they could alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal "*because the latter was without a military force*, and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Roliça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops." But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the *state of affairs existing at that moment*, being expressly founded *on*

Appendix, No. II. section 12.

the miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered.

Now lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy which prevailed during sir John Cradock's time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force reorganized, and her regular troops disciplined paid and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards and prepared for defence; lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion, that Portugal *might* be defended against the enemy then in the Peninsula, provided *an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation.* And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, *although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted.* Lisbon also he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celorico, the very places recommended by sir J. Moore, as temporary posts.

Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.

Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.

But in all things concerning this war, there was

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between those generals a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.

"*The French*," said sir John Moore, "*will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country.*"

Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

"*The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be*," said lord Wellington, "*the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence necessity or even expediency may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans will probably continue.*"

Letter to lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810, MSS.

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, lord Wellington, at the first indication of Joseph's march, designed to make a movement similar in principle to that executed by sir John Moore on a like occasion; that is, by an irruption into Castile to threaten the enemy's rear in such sort, that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred from this project by the knowledge that fresh troops were entering Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it; and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers then and since have accused him of looking on with indifference

Appendix, No. II. Section 9.

if not with satisfaction at the ruin of the Central Junta's operations; as if it only depended upon him to render them successful.

Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already explained. His own were abandoned, 1°. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not arrived, his hospitals were full and he could not, including Hill's division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the field. Hill's division, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,—a danger, which success in Castile would, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, only increase. 2°. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before-mentioned. To bring them into line was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other hand Lord Wellington knew the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops of Kellerman's government, to be at least thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; and though the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning was sound shall now be shown.

Lord Wellington's Correspondence, MSS.

The invasion of Andalusia was only part of a general movement throughout Spain. When the king forced the Morena, Kellerman marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar with the sixth corps, thus securing the defiles leading

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into the valley of the Tagus; at the same time, the second corps coming down that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Banos, and with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold of Andalusia, three *corps d'armée*, namely, the sixth, second, and fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could on an emergency be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of lord Wellington's. And certain it is that Mortier's movement from Seville would not have stopped at Badajos if general Hill's force had been employed in Castile instead of supporting the Spaniards in Estremadura. But the French combinations were more powerful than they appeared even to Lord Wellington. Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing or to cross the western Pyrenees. The first detachments reinforced the divisions in the field, the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth corps, and the former, under the command of the duke of Abrantes, advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the plains of Valladolid when Andalusia was invaded, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman's troops, have overwhelmed the British army but for that sagacity, which the French with derisive but natural anger and the Spaniards with ingratitude, have termed "*The selfish caution of the English system.*" Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a machine as a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly

Rolls of the French army.

as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, incapable of attaining and consequently incapable of losing any military reputation. CHAP. L 1810.

CHAPTER II.

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THE greatness of the French reinforcements dispelled the idea of offensive operations. Lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of circumstances the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; yet the majority yielded to the influence of his brother rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and they threw the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. The deep designs, the vast combinations, the mighty efforts by which he worked out the deliverance of that country were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now it is easier to admire than to comprehend the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even thought him serious in his undertaking.

But having now brought the story of the war down to that period when England, setting Portugal and Spain as it were aside, seriously undertook the contest with France, it will be well to take a survey of the respective conditions and plans of the belli-

gerents, and to shew how great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.

State of the French.—France, victorious and in a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish the number of men required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. The utmost strength of the Spaniards had been proved, and if the French could crush the British armies, though disorder and confusion might be prolonged for a few years, no effectual resistance could be made; the people would, as in the war of succession, gradually accommodate themselves to the change of dynasty, and the more easily that the little worth of Ferdinand was now demonstrated by a recent effort to effect his escape. Baron Kolli, an agent employed to communicate with him, had been detected and his place was supplied by an agent of the French police with a view to ascertain the real intentions of the captive monarch; the latter influenced entirely by personal fear refused to make the attempt and most basely denounced the supposed baron to the French government. The only real obstacles to the subjection of the whole Peninsula were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which, though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most important of these must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive king.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that

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even the Spaniards never accused him of any thing worse than being too fond of social pleasures. But it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon's policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain could only be a tool of the emperor's. To have refused a crown like his brother Lucien would have been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept and then resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly which, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon's path. Joseph's object was to create a Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means; but the scales fell from the hands of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while the English supported Spain it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused: neither was it possible to recast public feeling until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne.

Now Joseph's Spanish ministers were men who joined him upon principle, and who, far from shewing a renegado zeal in favour of the French, were as ardently attached to their own country as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand VII. Whenever Spanish interests clashed, and that was constantly, with those of the French armies, they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so strenuously that in Paris it was even reported they intended to fall on the emperor's troops. Thus civil contention weakened the military operations,

Appendix, No. IV. Sect. 1.

and obliged Napoleon either to take the command in person, or to adopt a system which, defective in itself, will nevertheless be found to have been the best adapted to the actual state of affairs. CHAP. XL 1809.

A wise policy does not consist in pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and balancing opposing interests in such a manner that the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon's measures, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, and there are not sufficient materials yet before the world to do this correctly; yet we may be certain that his situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that he was not merely a conqueror, he was also the founder of a political structure too much exposed to storms from without to bear any tampering with its internal supports. If money be the sinew of war it is also the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy than the care with which he handled financial matters: he avoided as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public credit so fatuitously cherished in England. Now he could not without hurting France transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make "*the war maintain the war.*" But Joseph's desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were alike opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds of the contributions always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy, yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been impolitic

in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called "*particular military governments*," such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia, in which the marshal or general named governor, possessed both the civil and military power: in short he created viceroys as he had threatened to do when at Madrid; and though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon's measures.

Vol. I. 20.

Many persons, principally French, eager to lower a great man's genius to their own level have asserted that he fomented quarrels between his marshals to prevent danger to his throne, and these military governments were adopted with that view. This is absurd, because their disagreements were more sure to be fatal to him than their combinations against him. Could he prevent their disputes? The plan of the military governments kept them separate and defined their separate powers and districts. The real disadvantages of it were that it mortally offended the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, or attentive only to their own situation without regarding the general objects of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro; indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon was at one time contemplated by the emperor.

Appendix, No. IV. Sect. 2 & 3.

On the other hand, Joseph was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies,

Mémoires de St. Hélène.

joined to the Guerilla warfare, had at this time relaxed the discipline of the French armies and introduced a horrible licence, while the military movements were feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops with least devastation, was to make the success of each "*corps d'armée*," and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. Some of the commanders indeed, had neither the sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation, but others, such as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people and yet provided all necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly not have been attained under the supreme government of the king, because he knew little of war, loved pleasure, was too easy and obliging of disposition, and had a court to form and maintain. I am aware that Soult and Suchet, especially the former were included by Joseph amongst those who by oppressing the people extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was certainly the result of personal enmity, and facts derived from less interested quarters, as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the king could understand.

There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy common to the small states of that country might be broken, and the whole rendered amenable and ready to assimilate when he judged time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal's

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sway, however wisely adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and violence, was of necessity onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued this system would have been replaced by the peaceful government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war only could introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the constitution of Bayonne.

King Joseph's Correspondence. MSS.

Nevertheless, the first effects of establishing this system were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of succours from France; and to avoid these, men who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly fled from the military governments. The Partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia, as assassins beyond the pale of military law, the Regency answered by a retaliatory declaration. And both parties had strong grounds for what they did. The Junta, because the defence of the country now rested chiefly on the Partidas. Joseph, because the latter while claiming the usages of war did not act upon them, and were by the Junta encouraged in assassination. Mina, and in-

deed all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient to keep them; Saraza even publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might murder the mother and infant together! And such things were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring in argument were however overcome in practice: the question of the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no quarter on either side. Suchet's Memoirs.

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the military governments, sent the marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother, and to complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced one act of the latter which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas, by which infinite confusion was produced and the utmost indignation excited without the slightest benefit political or military. Another object of Almenara's mission was to ascertain if there was really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro, which gave rise to a curious intrigue. For his correspondence being intercepted was brought to Mr. Stuart the British envoy, and he, in concert with Romana and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulating the style and manner of Napoleon's state-papers, composed a counterfeit senatus consultum and decree for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to France. This was so cleverly done and transmitted to Joseph that he believed it real and his fears and discontent were greatly increased; meanwhile his distress for money Appendix, No. IV. Section 2. Appendix, No. IV. Section 5.

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was so extreme that his ministers even were at times actually destitute of food.

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable. Reckoning the king's French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than *three hundred and seventy thousand men and eighty thousand horses*. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four thousand were prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand were detached; leaving nearly two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, ready either for battle or siege: and there was a fresh reserve, eighteen thousand strong, in march to enter Spain. In July this prodigious force was organized and distributed in the following manner:—

Appendix, No. I. Section 1.

Governments or Armies in the 2d Line.

			Total Strength.
1. Catalonia.....	Seventh corps	Duke of Tarento..	55,647
2. Aragon.....	Third corps	Gen. Suchet	38,007
3. Navarre	Detachments and a division of the Imperial Guards....	Gen. Reille.....	21,867
4. Biscay	Detachments.....	Gen. Caffarelli ..	6,570
5. Old Castile, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria	Divisions of the Imperial Guards and Cavalry	Gen. Dorsenne ..	10,303
6. Valladolid, &c. ..	Detachments	Gen. Kellerman..	6,474
7. Asturias	One division.....	Gen. Bonet.....	9,866
		Total for the governments....	143,766

Armies in the 1st Line.

Army of the South, composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult	72,789
Army of the Centre, composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the king.....	24,187
Army of Portugal, composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena	86,896
The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed by divisions along the great line of communication from Vittoria to Valladolid	23,815
A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal	10,605
	218,272

The plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the interior circle was still held by the French, and their lines of communicaton were crowded with troops.

State of Spain.—On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia were opposed to the third and seventh corps, yet their utmost efforts could only retard, not prevent the sieges of Taragona and Tortoza. In the centre, the Murcian troops and those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partizan warfare from Alburquerque to Ayamonte, but he looked to Hill for safety and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Gallicia and Asturia did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the armies, that at a later period Contreras was used to send through the country moveable columns attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages to furnish their quota of men. Yet with all this severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, Gallicia never was of any signal service to the British operations.

Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.

But as in the human body, livid spots and blotches mark the decay of vital strength, so in Spain the Partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of

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the marauding French columns; and finally the Regency, desirous of pushing the system to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas in each province, enjoining them diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the Partidas. Particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to the means, and every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven eight or nine squadrons of this irregular force, and all, when circumstances required it, were to unite and act in mass.

Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

The first burst of these bands occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians in concert with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia. Franquisetto and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad Real and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, Temprano, and Juan Abril, keeping the circuit of the Carpentino mountains from the Somosierra to Avila, descended sometimes on the side of New, sometimes on the side of Old Castile, sometimes in Estremadura; they carried off small French posts even close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia at the very gates of that town. On the other side of Madrid, Duran with two thousand men, and the Empecinado with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara as far as Cuenca, and they ventured

sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was always formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, having more than two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria. The chain of communication between these great bands and the Empecinado was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia; the two first acting about Burgos, the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron continually hung upon the flanks and rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo. He acted in concert with Campillo on one side and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Gallicia sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. All these bands were vexatious, though few were really formidable. To curb them, the French fortified all their posts of communication and correspondence, and they slew numbers, most of them being robbers who under pretence of acting against the enemy pillaged their own countrymen: but enough has been said upon this subject.

While reduced to this irregular warfare to prevent the entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies and provoking civil war, as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was with them of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America, and money, arms, and troops, were withdrawn from the Peninsula to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists. Nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of expecting Na-

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poleon's innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions, to crush whole nations acting in the same manner at three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.

England.—In this country the ministers' policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1°. The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2°. The furnishing money for the expenses; 3°. The recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year. The other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition in parliament was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers were indeed justly attacked, but when particulars touching the contest in Portugal were discussed, faction was apparent. Thus Beresford's report as to the numbers and efficiency of the native forces was most unjustly questioned; and the notion of a successful resistance in Portugal was assailed by argument and by ridicule, until doubt was widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English general.

On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully and like men expecting that

fortune would befriend them they knew not why or wherefore. They dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and cowardice, weakness, treachery and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected his numbers were contemptible, if a victory was gained his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit and to stifle reason was neglected.

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country was inundated with bank-notes, and destitute of gold. Napoleon's continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which, sooner or later, are the inevitable result of a factitious currency were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter in the session of 1810, made a report in which the evils of the existing system and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice and ruin attending the full payment in coin of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William

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Cobbett's Paper against Gold.

Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views.

The government first endeavoured to stave off the bullion question; but soon finding they must either abandon the prosecution of the war in the Peninsula, or deny the facts adduced by the committee they adopted the latter. On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the house voted in substance that a pound note and a shilling were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, although light guineas were then openly sold at twenty-eight shillings each. Lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, exposed the fraud and hollowness of the system; and the vote of the Commons, although well calculated to convince the minister's opponents that no proposition could be too base or absurd to meet with support in the existing parliament, did not remove the difficulties of raising money. No resource remained except that of the desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. England from the peculiar circumstances of the war had obtained a monopoly of the world's commerce by sea, and the ministers declaring therefore that her prosperity was unexampled, began a career of military expense the like of which no age or nation had ever beheld before: yet without one reasonable hope of ultimate success save the genius of their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might extinguish for ever.

State of Portugal.—In this country three parties were apparent. That of the *people* ready to peril body and goods for independence. That of the

fidalgos, who thought to profit from the nation's energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the *disaffected*, who desired the success of the French, some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire as chiefs, if the enemy triumphed. In common with many others those noblemen had entered the French service under the authority of their prince's edict issued when Junot took possession of Portugal; but when Massena's invasion was projected, Freire more honourable than his companions refused to bear arms against his country: the other two had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of operations which is at this day in the French military archives.

The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but the fidalgos working in unison with and supported by the regency, were a powerful body whose political proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock demand notice. The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the marquis de Olhào called the Monteiro Mor, and the marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency; but they, and every other member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses. The military organization carried on by Beresford being only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country was necessarily hateful to the regency and to the fidalgos, because both profited from their degeneracy. Their discontent joined to unavoidable

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difficulties in finance and other matters, greatly retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia, and ordenança, nearly nugatory. However, the energetic efforts of Wellington and Beresford, aided by Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few nor inactive, gathered. The times necessarily permitted an unusual freedom in discussing public affairs in Lisbon, and it naturally followed that the views of designing men were most obtruded. These opinions being repeated in the English parliament, were published in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon, as if they were new. Thus a picture of affairs, painted in the most glaring colours of misrepresentation, was continually exposed when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

After Das Minas' resignation, Mr. Stuart and three Portuguese, namely, Antonio, called the Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, and doctor Noguiera, were added to the regency by an intrigue which shall be hereafter noticed. The last was a man of talent and discretion, but Souza, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder. Seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals, he was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable. An exceedingly powerful cabal was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction of the civil and military

affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the Brazils; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon; the chevalier Souza was envoy at the British court, and a fourth of the family, don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency. Playing into each others' hands under the guidance of the subtle Principal, they concocted very dangerous intrigues, and their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley's energetic interference reduced the latter indeed to a reasonable disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they dared not attempt by force they sought to attain by artifice.

In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers had, fortunately for the cause, been replaced as envoy by Mr. Charles Stuart, a gentleman well experienced in the affairs of the Peninsula. Disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political agents with the generals, he immediately applied his powerful understanding and resolute temper to forward the views of lord Wellington; and it is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans of the commander had been employed.

To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in Portugal, but with the fidalgos it was a question of interest more than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which perceiving that they must stand or fall

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with the English army heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, being the same people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, desired not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces, of which they themselves were the lords, in the administration of the country, and would consent to no operations militating against this design. And to this obstacle was added the natural indolence of the people, which fostered by the negligence and fears of the regency rendered it most difficult to obtain the execution of any works, or the fulfilment of any agreement in which the Portuguese government or the civil authorities were concerned.

Another spring of political action was the hatred and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties during the military operations, but it had one advantageous effect upon the people in their intercourse with the British. For when the Spaniards shewed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they had no feeling in common with their neighbours. Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent and sister to Ferdinand, claimed not only the succession to the throne of Spain, in the event of her brother's death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent.

To persuade the Spanish tribunals to acknowledge her claim was the object of Pedro Souza's mission to Cadiz, and the great council of Castile, always anxious to overthrow the Spanish regency,

readily recognized Carlotta's pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique law of Philip the Fifth. But the regents would pay no attention to them. Souza however renewed his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, and having by corruption obtained from the majority of the members a secret acknowledgement of the princess's claim was full of hope when his further progress was suddenly arrested by lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success would affect, not only the military operations in Portugal by placing them under the control of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards if power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, although at first he thought it might prove beneficial in the event of the Peninsula being conquered, he soon judged it a scheme concocted at Rio Janeiro to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should reside at Madeira, where surrounded by the contrivers of this plan she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, negligence in business, and personal intrigues, were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country will be shewn in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

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WHEN lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he had reference to the number that could be fed and managed with such an inexperienced staff and civil administration as that of the English army rather than to what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing from recent experience in Spain, what passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people nor the free promises of their governors. He insisted that his own authority as *marshal-general of Portugal* should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or "ordenanças;" for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means.

Appendix, No. V. Sect. 9.

Armed with this power and with the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency to revive and enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be enrolled and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and

carry off their property on whatever line the invaders should penetrate. And that this might be deliberately and effectually performed, he designed to oppose the enemy with the regular allied forces in such sort, that without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, converted into soldiers, should close on the rear and flanks, and cut off all resources save those carried in the midst of the troops.

But it was evident, that if the French could find or carry supplies sufficient to maintain themselves until the British commander should be forced to embark or be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to pieces and the miserable ruined people submit without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary to find a position covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions had been made under the directions of sir Charles Stuart in 1799, and were, together with the French colonel Vincent's minutes, in lord Wellington's possession. From those documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras is said to have been derived; but the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be made by an army in movement before an equal or a greater force. It was lord Wellington, who first

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conceived the design of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula.

Hereafter the Lines shall be described more minutely, at present it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations, and redoubts, secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the English general's undertaking. He was a foreigner, ill supported by his own government, holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure, and vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility of that country. Yet in this apparently weak position he undertook to overcome the abuses engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and make a slothful people arise in arms, devastate their lands, and follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times. And he succeeded.

His first effort was the revival of the ancient military laws, and this notwithstanding the secret opposition of the regency and the fidalgos he did so effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the remainder "ordenanças." This multitude was however necessarily subject to many deductions. The "*capitans mor*," or chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, the fidalgos evaded service by the connivance of the government, the total number of "ordenanças" really assembled, fell far short of the re-

turns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the militia. Only thirty-two thousand had muskets and bayonets, and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived at absence under false pretences, to such an extent, that scarcely twenty-six thousand ever remained with their colours. The regular troops were more efficient, thirty thousand of them in the pay of England were completely equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. The disposable native force was therefore only fifty-six thousand men, one-half of which were militia.

At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, of which six thousand were in hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. Thus the latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the army on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British. This was the ministers', not the general's arrangement, and hence, the ordenanças being set aside, the actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington cannot be estimated higher than eighty thousand men, while the frontier to defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, was four hundred miles long.

The great military features, and the arrangements made to take advantage of them in con-

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formity with the general plan of defence, shall now be described.

The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to invasion :—

1°. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro.

2°. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.

3°. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the Tagus.

4°. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching in one line from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

These divisions may be simplified with respect to the military aspect of the country. For Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira ; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of the whole; yet each had a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle, that the country should be wasted and the best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described, Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded

on that line, except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of the enemy.

An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications could be maintained directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously by Placentia and the pass of Baños; and the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps could either advance simultaneously or unite and force their way at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus, would offer an extent of ninety miles against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions:—

From Ciudad Rodrigo.—1°. By the valley of the Douro.—2°. By the valley of the Mondego.—3°. By the valley of the Zezere.

From Coria—1°. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus.—2°. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

Now to advance by the valley of the Douro would be a flank movement through an extremely

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difficult country, and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The first passing by Almeida and Celorico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella.

To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes although rugged are practicable for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land offers a position where a large army, for a small one it is dangerous, could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. The position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers to reach Castello Branco, and that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus, or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the positions if defended nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre. The Sobreira Formosa may however be turned on its own left by the

Estrada Nova, which running by Enchabarda joins the Castello Branco road near Cortiçado.

Such and so difficult being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that an enemy might be met and fought with advantage on the threshold of the kingdom: yet it is not so. For, first, the defending army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could in two marches unite, and attack the centre or either extremity with an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists in this, *the Tagus is, from June to December, fordable along its whole course as low down as Salvatierra, not far from Lisbon.* A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place below Abrantes would therefore render all the frontier positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons *the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers.*

Both the conformation of the country and the actual situation of the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal attacks would be by the north of Beira, and by the Alemtejo, while an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes. Under this impression, he made the following dispositions.

Elvas, Almeida, and Valença on the first line of fortresses, Peniché, Abrantes, and Setuval, on the

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second line, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silviera and the British colonels, Trant and Miller, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença on the Minho.

The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, were guarded by the Portuguese colonel Lecor, and John Wilson, with ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion.

In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves.

There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the fifty composing the whole militia force. These were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval.

The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes.

The British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows :—

		Men.	
1st Division	General Spencer, about	6000	Viseu.
2d Division, including the 13th Dragoons.	General Hill,	5000	Abrantes & Portalegre.
3d Division	General Picton,	3000	Celorico.
4th Division	General Cole,	4000	Guarda.
Light Division	Robert Crawfurd,	2400	Pinhel.
The Cavalry	General Cotton,	3000	Valley of Mondego.
	Total	23,400	under arms.

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordenança, and the whole of

the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celorico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could in two marches be united, either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could in as short a period unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on the line of the Tagus.

If the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco. And Hill also could reach that place much quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an arrangement which merits particular attention.

It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains, and to have repaired the roads between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus; it passed through Niza to the defile of Vilha Velha, where by a flying bridge the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and though the distance from Abrantes to Castello

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Branco is nearly the same by Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed by the engineers was excellent.

Thus all the obstacles to an enemy's march by the north bank were preserved, and the line by Vilha Velha enabled Hill to pass from Portalegre or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank movement in less time than Reynier. It also provided a lateral communication for the whole army, a matter afterwards found of vital importance in the combinations, inasmuch as it supplied the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, which otherwise would have been adopted. The French also, in default of a direct line of communication between Estremadura and the Cuidad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños: and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

Notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a battle lost there would in the dry season decide the fate of Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the very basis of lord Wellington's defence; and all his dispositions were made to oblige *the French to move in masses* and *to gain time himself;* time to secure the harvests, time to complete

his lines, time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança; above all things time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his combinations will shew that they were well adapted to effect these objects.

1°. The enemy dared not advance except with *concentrated masses*, because on the weakest line of resistance he was sure to encounter above twenty thousand men.

2°. If choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana's troops and even forced back Hill, the latter, passing the Tagus at Abrantes and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3°. A formidable attack on the central line of invasion could not be made, without giving sufficient warning by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the previous passage of the Elga and Ponçul rivers. Hence, as the Estrada Nova had been broken up, Beresford and Hill could safely occupy the Sobreira Formosa; or, if the enemy menaced the line of the Tagus at the same time, they could assemble behind the Zezere. But an invasion by the centre, save with a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not to be expected; for though the enemy should force the Sobreira and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter in default of heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river with rugged banks well lined with troops would be in his front; the Tagus

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on his left; the mountains of Sobreira in his rear; and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would thus have time to fall back.

4°. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida to the valley of the Mondego; and to insure this, the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken, besides being watched by troops while that from Thomar by Espinal to the Ponte de Murcella was repaired and widened. Thus the inner and shorter line was rendered easy for the allies, while the outward and longer line was rendered difficult for the enemy; and to secure quick reports, telegraphs were established from Lisbon to Elvas, to Abrantes, and to Almeida.

The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel, run in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella into the Douro; all having this peculiarity, that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen into profound and gloomy chasms, and there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open. If the French adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca on the main road, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celorico, where they would have to choose between the right and the left bank of the river for

their farther march. In the latter case, they must march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains until they reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, behind which they would find the allied army in a position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case the allied forces having *interior lines of communication* could, as long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva or in front of Coimbra. Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to be apprehended, and it behoved general Hill to watch vigilantly and act decisively in opposition to general Reynier. For the latter having necessarily the lead in the movements, might by skilful evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the allied divisions on the Mondego, or drawing him across the Tagus, furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the southern bank of that river.

In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the enemy's actual situation, and to a summer invasion; but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and the roads deteriorated, the defence would have been different. Fewer troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus, and as both the Zezere and the Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the allied troops could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern line.

Every probable movement being thus previously

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well considered, lord Wellington trusted to his own military quickness and the valour of the British soldiers to baffle any unforeseen strokes during the retreat, and once within the Lines, the Portuguese people and the government doing their part, he looked confidently to the final result. He judged that in a wasted country, with thirty regiments of militia in the mountains on the flank and rear of the enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines and his retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be expected; and how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the British forces: measures were also taken to procure a like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese troops and such of the citizens as might wish to emigrate.

Lord Wellington's Correspondence. MSS.

How to feed his own army remained a question.

In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have supposed because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies, there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country. But it was unevenly distributed, difficult to get at, and the people are of a nature to render it impossible to depend upon contracts even where they are friendly. Some places were exhausted, others overflowing, the difficulty was to transport

provisions, and in this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards, first to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the people. After a time scarcely any food for man or beast, some cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted, was to be obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable war; and yet it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle against famine, even near the sea; at a distance from that nurse of British armies the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.

Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; Figueras and Raiva de Pena Cova on the Mondego, finally, Oporto and Lamego on the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by lord Wellington, and his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celorico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred miserable bullock-cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the troops. When additional succour could be obtained it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount of transport, and all his magazines

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in advance of Lisbon were so limited and arranged that he could easily carry them off or destroy them before the enemy could seize them in a retreat. Such then were the means and such the preparations made for the defence of Portugal, and it must be evident to the most superficial observer, that, amidst so many difficulties, such intricate combinations, lord Wellington's situation was not one in which a general could sleep: due allowance being made for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his talents and steel-hardened resolution.

In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence of the emperor,—the erroneous views of the king,—the rivalry of the marshals,—the impediments to correspondence,—the necessity of frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,—the iniquity of the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who, for the most part spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could not patiently endure a service, replete with personal dangers, over and above the ordinary mishaps of war, and promising little ultimate reward.

For the English, the quicksands were—the memory of former failures on the continent,—the financial drain,—a powerful and eloquent opposition, pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the general dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a panic amongst the minis-

ters which all lord Wellesley's vigour would be unable to stem,—the intrigues of the Souza party, and the necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for the sake of defending a *European cause*. Finally, the babbling of the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army. On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula, and while her enormous army threatened to crush every opponent in the field, she offered a constitution and recalled to the recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the educated classes did not shrink less from the British government's known hostility to all free institutions. What then remained for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the armies,—the chances of another continental war,—the complete dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,—the recruiting through the militia, which was in fact a conscription with two links in the chain instead of one; lastly, the ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of Europe and raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of the British troops, I will set down what many years' experience gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams.

That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his pow-

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erful frame distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty and his movements free, the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not indeed possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors although he may perceive them; but he is observant and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.

It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy, no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, overthrowing with incredible energy every opponent and at all times prove, that while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him!

The result of a hundred battles and the united

testimony of impartial writers of different nations have given the first place amongst the European infantry to the British; but in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.

CHAPTER IV.

BOOK XI. 1810. February.

In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted in actual concert, with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave generous and disinterested Spaniard through whom this connexion was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters as the military correspondent of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity of zealously seconding the English general; but in the manner of doing it he never forgot the dignity of his own country; and as he was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations.

It will be remembered that in February, Ney threatened Ciudad Rodrigo, at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre. Lord Wellington immediately reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light division across the Coa, to observe the enemy's proceedings. The Portuguese Regency became alarmed and demanded more British troops; but lord Wellington replied that the numbers already fixed would be as great as he could feed; and he took that occasion to point out, that the measures agreed upon with respect to the native

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forces were neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, while the carriages and other assistance required for the support of the British soldiers then in the country were not supplied. These matters he urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops. At the same time, as the Regency, hoping thus to make him unpopular, intimated their wish that he should chastise the offenders himself, he told them, he advised severe measures, but would not be made the despotic punisher of the people when the actual laws were sufficient to enforce obedience.

When Ney first appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, and the second corps under Mermet was at Placentia, lord Wellington was considerably embarrassed. The French might then have passed from Placentia across the Tagus, and pushed between Hill and the army in Beira, or even between the latter and Lisbon, seeing that the Portuguese government had with their usual apathy neglected the works projected for opening the road from Thomar to Espinal. Instead of being within three or four marches, lord Wellington was by this neglect placed nine marches from the Tagus; and having at this time no sure channels of information he was forced to keep keen watch upon the second French corps, and hold his own troops in hand to withdraw from the frontier, in case the enemy should suddenly cross the Tagus and menace Lisbon by the left bank. This was in February; but when Del Parque's movement from Gata to Badajos occupied the attention of Mermet, and Junot commenced the siege of Astorga, the repairs of the road to Espinal being also in a forward state, his situation was different; the Portuguese army was then brought up to Cea and Viseu,

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and the militia in the northern provinces were ordered to concentrate at Braga and guard the Tras os Montes.

Ciudad Rodrigo being soon afterwards seriously menaced, lord Wellington brought up a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte and transferred the head-quarters to Celorico, designing by a sudden incursion with his whole army to strike at the French magazines in Salamanca. But when he considered the force in his front, which could be reinforced by Kellerman and by Junot and would then be strong enough to defend the Tormes, he resolved to confine his views to the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo, that is, if occasion should offer without detriment to the general defence of Portugal.

He was now however cramped both by the British and Portuguese governments. The resources of Portugal were not brought forward, and he could scarcely maintain his actual position, much less advance; yet the Regency treated his remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera. Indignant at their conduct, he told them "their proceedings were evasive and frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for private interests; that the resources were in the country, could be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and to be effectual must begin with the higher classes." Then, issuing a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both magistrates and people, and by this

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vigorous interference procured some immediate relief for his troops.

CHAP. IV.

1810. May.

Meanwhile general Crawfurd had commenced a series of remarkable operations with the light division. This body of infantry was composed of three regiments singularly fitted for any difficult service. They had been for several years under sir John Moore, and being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms, that in six years of real warfare no weakness could be detected in their system, and in all that time they were never overborne by courage or skill. With these matchless soldiers Crawfurd felt he might venture much, but while the French posts were on the Agueda, he could not remain without cavalry beyond the Coa, unless some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celorico. He proposed therefore, that while he advanced to the Agueda general Cole should take the line of the Coa with the fourth division. General Cole however refused to quit Guarda and lord Wellington approved of his denial; yet being anxious to secure the line of the Coa with a view to succour Ciudad Rodrigo he brought up the third division to Pinhel. Then reinforcing Crawfurd with the first German hussars, furnishing four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers, and with a superb troop of horse artillery commanded by captain Ross, he gave him the command of all the outposts, and ordered both Picton and Cole to support him if called upon.

In the middle of March Crawfurd lined the bank of the Agueda with his hussars from Escalhon on the left to Navas Frias on the right, a distance of twenty-five miles following the course of the

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river. The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between Almeida and the Lower Agueda, the artillery was at Fort Conception, and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores which soon afterwards arrived were placed in reserve, making a total of four thousand men and six guns.

The French at this period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and Salamanca, but as they did not occupy the pass of Perales, Carrera's Spanish division, now at Coria, was in communication with Crawfurd, whose line although extended was very advantageous. For from Navas Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at Navas Frias; one at Villar about a league below the first; one at Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices called the bridge of Barba del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two first bridges, which were distant, the troops could always concentrate under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a few companies of the ninety-fifth riflemen were considered capable of opposing any numbers. This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen, but that river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without apparent reason. When it was fordable, Crawfurd always withdrew his outposts and concentrated his division, and his situation demanded a quickness and intelligence in the troops the like of which has seldom been known. Seven minutes sufficed for the troops to get under arms in the middle of the night, a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring them in order of battle to the

alarm-posts with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain. CHAP. IV. 1810. March.

The 19th, general Ferey, a bold officer, desiring either to create a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or thinking to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close to the bridge of San Felices. There he waited until the moon, rising behind him, cast long shadows from the rocks and rendered the deep chasm dark as pitch; then silently he passed the narrow bridge, and ascending with incredible speed the opposite side, bayoneted the sentries, and fell upon the piquet so fiercely, that friends and enemies went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great the confusion, that the British companies could not form and each soldier encountered the nearest enemy fighting hand to hand; their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, urged the contest with such vigour that in a quarter of an hour the French column was borne back and pushed over the edge of the descent.

This skirmish proved, that while the Agueda was swollen the enemy could gain nothing by slight operations; but it was difficult to keep in advance of the Coa, because the want of money had reduced the whole army to straits, and Crawfurd, notwithstanding his prodigious activity, was unable to feed his division, wherefore giving the reins to his fiery temper he seized some church-plate, with a view to the purchasing of corn. For this

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rash act he was rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed, and fortunately the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned.

When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo, in the latter end of April, lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his head-quarters to Celorico. Carrera then occupied the pass of Perales, but being menaced by Kellerman he came down in May to Ituero, on the Azava, a small river flowing into the Agueda; his left was thus connected with the light division posts at Gallegos, Espeja, and Barba del Puerco. Crawfurd and Carrera now agreed that in case of attack the British should concentrate in the wood behind Espeja; and if unable to maintain themselves there, should unite with the Spaniards at Nava d'Aver and both retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to Guarda.

It was at this period that Massena's arrival in Spain became known to the allies: the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak of the emperor's commanding in person, and all agreed that serious operations would soon commence. No good information could be obtained, yet the river continued unfordable and Crawfurd maintained his position until the end of May. But then certain advice of the march of the French battering-train was received through Andreas Herrasti, and the 1st of June, Ney, descending from the hills upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw one trestle bridge over the Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above the fortress, and a second at Carboneras two miles below. This

sudden concentration of the French troops relieved all the northern provinces of Portugal from danger; wherefore lord Wellington immediately brought down sixteen regiments of militia from Braganza to the Lower Douro; and as his provisions came by water to Lamego, the army was thus enabled to subsist, and the military horizon was beginning to clear.

The 8th, four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda, and Crawfurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja. The Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village, and such is the extraordinary presumption and absurdity of that people, that at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed and when the eye could scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate front, Martin Carrera thought fit to invite marshal Ney to desert! Indeed nothing could be more critical than general Crawfurd's position was at this period. From the Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour's march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close upon the village, while wide plains behind almost precluded hope in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered indeed some security to his left; because the channel of the former river there became a chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge of Marialva, which was two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, as the enemy's bank was highest, it was necessary to keep posts

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beyond the Azava to obtain a good prospect, and the bridge of Marialva could be turned by a ford below the confluence of the streams.

The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but as the enemy occupied himself with the raising of redoubts to secure his bridge at Carboneras, and with other preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, Crawfurd, trusting to his own admirable arrangements and the surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous position. He thus encouraged the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protected the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging parties.

On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices and other points, and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, were occupied by the French army.

The 23d, Julian Sanchez broke out of Ciudad and galloped into Gallegos.

The 25th, the French batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the Azava, and Crawfurd withdrew his outposts to the left bank.

The 26th, it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and five hundred wounded.

The 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: "*O venir luego! luego! luego! a secorrer esta plaza.*" "Oh! come now! now! now! to the succour of this place."

On the 1st of July the gallant old man repeated his "*Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez.*"

Meanwhile lord Wellington, still hoping that the

enemy by detaching troops would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, reinforced Crawfurd with the 14th and 16th light dragoons, and transferred his own quarters to Alverca, a village half way between Almeida and Celorico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack, and Romana came from Badajos to propose a combined movement for carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of securing Rodrigo; he had in a manner pledged himself to make it a point in his operations; his army was close at hand, the garrison was brave and distressed, the governor honourably fulfilling his part. To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck would be a grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms. The English troops desired the enterprise, the Spaniards demanded it as a proof of good faith, the Portuguese to keep the war away from their own country: finally, policy seemed to call for this effort, lest the world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade, and thus proved himself a truly great commander and of a steadfast mind.

It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand men, and of these twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the

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Portuguese cavalry and garrison, and scarcely half could be brought into line. For Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, was at this very moment collecting boats and making demonstrations to pass the Tagus and move upon Coria. French troops were also crossing the Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar as a reserve: this reserve and Hill's corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty thousand French veterans. The attempt would also have taken the army two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from that place; hence, a division must have been left at Guarda, lest Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first.

Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes of using them. 1°. In an open advance and battle. 2°. In a secret movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo with a view of capturing the battering train by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But without dwelling on the fact that Massena's information was so good that he knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana's visit, such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved even in the early part of the siege, and certainly not towards the end when the enemy were on the Azava.

Appendix, No. VII. Section I.

An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing over a plain in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, must have exposed its flanks to the enemy's bridges on the Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the

bottom of a deep bend of the river and the French were on the convex side. What hope then to withstand the eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns which would have come pouring over the bridges on the flanks and the fifty thousand infantry which would have followed them to the attack. What would even a momentary success have availed? Five thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual state of affairs in that country?—The militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and advanced to retrieve his honour: and how could he then have been opposed? CHAP. IV. 1810. June.

Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, saying that he was afraid!—that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him away—that he was a man insensible to military honour and permitted his ally's town to fall without risking a shot to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety failed, lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. "If thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!"

Ciudad Rodrigo, left to its fate, held out yet a

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little longer, and meanwhile the enemy pushed infantry on to the Azava. Carrera then retired to the Duas Casas river, and Crawfurd, reinforced with the sixteenth and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, but concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. From thence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida by San Pedro, or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising grounds in the evening of the 2d of July, and then sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the ranks of infantry in succession and slowly, within sight of the enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. His artifice succeeded and he thus gained two days, but on the 4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below the bridge, pushed at full speed towards Gallegos and drove back the picquets; the enemy then passed the river and the British retired skirmishing upon Alameda, leaving however two guns, a troop of the 16th, and a troop of German hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard had just drawn up on a hill half cannon-shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed the road to Alameda, when a column of French horsemen was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as it approached the bridge, yet resolute to pass and preserving the most perfect order notwithstanding some well-directed shots from the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg of the hussars, proposed to charge those who

first came over. The English captain acting with him did not conceive his orders warranted such an attack, but the gallant German riding full speed against the head of the advancing columns with his single troop, killed the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from the Portuguese Caçadores of the division.

This skirmish was not followed up by the enemy, and Crawfurd took a fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception. His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera's divisions, were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding parties however entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco, for three nights successively, and Crawfurd thinking to cut them off formed two ambuscades, one near Villa de Puerco with six squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo; he also placed his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos and even in advance of it.

A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French parties were observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of cavalry at Barquillo, and the open country on the right would have enabled the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and their point of retreat; but this was circuitous, and Crawford preferred pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road. The enclosure however proved difficult, the

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squadrons separated, and the French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather steep rise of land, yet so far from the edge as not to be seen until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived galloped in upon them. The charge was rough and pushed home, but failed, for the troopers received the fire of the square in front and on both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French captain, Guache, and his serjeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully. Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy's cavalry came out of Barquillos, and the two British squadrons having re-formed, rode against it and made twenty-nine men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile colonel Talbot mounting the hill with four squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the latter again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and fourteen men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made good his retreat. Crawfurd then returned to the camp, having had thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair.

That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light division and marched by the pass of Perales to rejoin Romana. Crawfurd now assumed a fresh position a mile and a half from Almeida, and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington replied that he would give him two divisions if he could hold his ground, but that he could not do so, and knowing the temper of the man repeated his former orders *not to fight beyond the Coa.*

On the 21st, the enemy's cavalry again advancing, Fort Conception was blown up and Crawfurd fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to cross the Coa, but nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving the whole French army, he had kept a weak division for three months within two hours march of sixty thousand men, appropriating the resources of the plains entirely to himself. But this exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of sufferance not real strength, with headstrong ambition he resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to fight on the right bank.

His British force under arms now consisted of four thousand infantry eleven hundred cavalry and six guns, and his position, one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his right was on some broken ground, his left, resting on an unfinished tower eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in the bottom of the chasm.

COMBAT OF THE COA.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire, when a few

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pistol shots in front followed by an order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance gave notice of the enemy's approach. The morning cleared and twenty-four thousand French infantry five thousand cavalry and thirty pieces of artillery were observed in march beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine, but Ney, observing Crawfurd's false disposition, came down with the stoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain, the allied cavalry gave back, and Loison's infantry, running up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side. Part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back, and the forty-third regiment was, most unaccountably, placed within an enclosure of solid masonry ten feet high, situated on the left of the road, about half-musket shot down the ravine and having but one narrow outlet. The firing in front soon became heavy, the cavalry, the artillery and the Portuguese caçadores successively passed the enclosure in retreat, and the sharp clang of the rifles was heard along the edge of the plain above. A few moments later and the imprisoned regiment would have been surrounded without a hope of escape, but here, as in every other part of the field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful effort burst the wall, and the forty-third, re-formed in column of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen. There was no room to array the

line, no time for any thing but battle; every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the ninety-fifth and fifty-second, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command, yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left; and all, regulating their movements by a common discretion, kept together with surprizing vigour.

It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns ranged along the summit played hotly with grape, and their hussars galloping over the glacis of Almeida poured down the road sabring every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow this movement with the whole of the French cavalry and so cut off the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him on; and, so mixed were friends and enemies at this moment, that only a few guns of the fortress dared open and no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and as the attack was made without Massena's knowledge he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. Falling back slowly, stopping and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were yet so fierce and eager, that even the

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horsemen rode in amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.

The retreating troops now approached the river, and the ground became more open, but the left wing being the hardest pressed, and having the shortest distance to retreat, arrived while the bridge was quite crowded with artillery and cavalry. The right wing was still distant and major M'Leod of the forty-third perceiving all the danger rallied four companies of his regiment on a hill covering the line of passage; he was immediately joined by some of the riflemen and at the same time the brigade-major Rowan posted two companies on another hill to the left, flanking the road. These two posts were maintained for some time while the right wing filed over the bridge behind them, but at last the French gathering in great numbers and making a serious rush, forced the British companies back before the bridge could be cleared and while a part of the fifty-second was a considerable distance from it. The danger was imminent, but M'Leod, a young man, yet endowed with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called on the troops to follow, and waving his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing and the animating action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs; the enemy's skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement, stopped short, and before they could recover from their surprise the fifty-second passed the river, M'Leod followed at full speed and the whole gained the other side without a disaster.

As the infantry passed the bridge they planted themselves in loose order on the side of the mountain, the artillery drew up on the summit, and the cavalry was disposed on all the roads to the right. This disposition was made to watch some fords two miles above the bridge, and also to observe the bridge of Castello Bom; for it was to be apprehended that while Ney was thus attacking in front, Junot might pass at those places with the eighth corps, and so get between the light division and Celorico. The river was however rising fast from the heavy rain, and at all events it was impossible to retreat farther until nightfall.

The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, soon opened a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly, his columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcases floating down between the hostile bands showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and the next instant, the head of a noble column darkened the long narrow bridge, a drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform leaped together to the front, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived the English soldiers' aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won ere a shot had brought down an

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enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading French section fell as one man! The gallant column still pressed forward, but none could pass that terrible line; the killed and wounded rolled together until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back.

The shouts of the British now rose loudly, yet they were confidently answered, and in half an hour, a second column more numerous than the first again crowded the bridge. This time however the range of fire was better judged, and ere half the distance was won the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed, or slain; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was then renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the very foot of the bridge, merely waved his handkerchief and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was this brave man's touching appeal unheeded, every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. And this last effort was soon made, but with fewer numbers and less energy, for the impossibility of forcing the passage was now quite apparent.

Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French, as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed the bridge; by the English, from ignorance of their object. One of the enemy's guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and many continued to fall on both sides until about four o'clock, when

a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire, the men amongst the rocks returned unmolested, to their own side; the fight then ceased and Crawfurd retired in the night behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, or taken; and it was at first supposed that lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second which had been posted in the unfinished tower were also captured; but that officer kept close until the evening, and then with great intelligence passed all the enemy's posts, crossed the Coa at a ford, and rejoined his regiment.

The French lost above a thousand men, and the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold. But Massena claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, which was true, for the iron guns intended to arm an unfinished tower near Almeida were lying at the foot of the building, and thus fell into his hands. They belonged however to the garrison, not to the light division, and that they were not mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence. Had it been otherwise, the French cavalry could not have charged the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida itself would have been retarded.

During the fight general Picton came up from Pinhel alone, and when Crawfurd asked him for the support of the third division he refused, and they separated after a sharp altercation. Picton was certainly wrong, because Crawfurd's situation was one of extreme danger. He could not retire, and Massena might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello Bom, upon the

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right flank of the division, and destroyed it between the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawfurd were, however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first, promised little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements and fiery temper of the second: nor did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command; both were prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors; and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising and intrepid; yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling troops under fire. This also they had in common, that both, after distinguished services, perished in arms fighting gallantly; and being celebrated as generals of division while living, have since their death been injudiciously spoken of as rivalling their great leader in war.

That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and Crawfurd more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; but to compare either to the duke of Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was then conducting, the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support.

CHAPTER V.

CHAP. V.

1810. July.

DURING the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, an expedition, sailing from Coruña under Porlier, seized and dismantled Santona, and other points on the coast, and Mahi coming down from the Gallician mountains menaced Astorga, while part of his army under Toboado Gil occupied Puebla de Senabria and acted in concert with Silveira. Mahi's movements were unopposed by Kellerman and Serras during the siege of Rodrigo, because the former occupied Banos at too great a distance, and the troops of the latter were too widely spread. But when the place fell, the eighth corps repassed the Tormes to gather provisions, which enabled Serras to concentrate and act against the Gallicians. Mahi was then driven back to the hills, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla de Senabria, drew closer to Silveira in expectation of an attack. Serras however merely placed a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons in Puebla and then fell back to Zamora while the eighth corps returned to the Agueda. These were the only efforts of the Spaniards to draw off any of the besiegers from Ciudad and give the English general an opportunity of recovering it.

Meanwhile Bonet had defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol on the frontier of Gallicia, but he returned to Oviedo on hearing of the expedition to Santona. The Spaniards th[illegible] re-embarked for Coruña and the project of a l[illegible]

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armament, to be directed against Santander itself, was adopted. For the success of this small enterprise elated the allies, and Mahi boasted, that if arms and ammunition were supplied by England he would clear the plains of Leon as far as the Esla river. His desires were fulfilled, and sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend a great naval expedition against the Asturian and Biscay coasts.

General Reynier now passed the Tagus with the second corps, but this movement should have been executed in June; for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete in the middle of that month and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia; but Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked their detachment at Los Santos on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its succour with one division of infantry and all his cavalry. This was however the moment when Lacy's expedition to the Ronda had drawn Mortier with the fifth corps from Seville, and the French troops on the Odiel falling back to the Tinto enabled Copons to advance and gather provisions on the former river. This state of affairs was so threatening, that Reynier, after disengaging his detachment, instead of returning to Merida endeavoured to surprise Imas at Xeres de los Cavalleros, and failing in that he pushed across the Morena against Ballesteros; and his march was so sudden that the Spanish general who was at Campo Frio, beyond Araceña, could only save himself by a hasty flight into Portugal. During these events Lacy was beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, and D'Aremberg and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer: Reynier then going back to Merida resumed his design of passing the Tagus.

His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected this opportunity of destroying them; but as it was necessary to cover the operations from Hill's division which was concentrated at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, a strong rear guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and Kellerman's division advanced from Banos to Coria to awe the latter. Quitting Merida the 10th, Reynier marched by Truxillo and Caceres upon Alconete and Almaraz, at which places he passed the Tagus. His rear guard followed on the 16th just in time to avoid an attack; for general Hill had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second corps back with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. The passage of the Tagus being thus effected by the French general, Hill made a parallel movement which on his part only required thirty-six hours; and meanwhile, lord Wellington assembled at Thomar, under the command of general Leith, a reserve of eight thousand Portuguese, and two thousand British infantry just arrived from England.

When Reynier reached Coria he detached a force by Perales upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by a strong body of Portuguese cavalry under general Fane, encamped with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns at Sarzedas, just in front of the Sobreira Formosa. His advanced guard was in Castello Branco, his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul, and he detached a brigade of Portuguese

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infantry to Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda and to cover the Estrada Nova. Behind him Leith occupied the line of the Zezere, and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus.

Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra, but he was repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry. He then divided his forces between Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a post of one hundred and fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio Del Monte, and by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether he meant to repass the Tagus, to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join Massena. Meanwhile, Ballesteros returned to Aracena, Imas to Xeres de los Cavalleros, O'Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d'España surprised the post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, soon obliged to concentrate his troops again, for Mortier arrived on the Guadalquiver with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the state of affairs in August, when Massena, informed that Reynier was at last across the Tagus, directed the sixth and eighth corps and the cavalry to invest Almeida. This led, as we have seen to Crawfurd's combat on the Coa, during which Loison, imagining the governor to be a native general, pressed him to desert the English, "*that vile people whose object was to enslave the Portuguese.*"

Lord Wellington's situation was now embarrassing. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms, they might disregard Almeida, and their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of so doing. The

sixth corps and the reserve cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida, but by telegraphic intercourse with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and the heads of the columns pointed towards Celorico. Loison's advanced guard entered Pinhel the day after Crawfurd's action; the second corps being divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and having boats near Alcantara on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. It was known by an intercepted letter that Napoleon had ordered Reynier to invade by the line of Abrantes, while the fifth corps entered the Alemtejo, and Massena acted by the valley of the Mondego; but as Reynier was by the same letter placed under Massena's command, and the fifth corps was not then in a condition to move against the Alemtejo, no certain notion of the enemy's intention could be formed.

The eighth corps and the divisions of Serras and Kellerman, being between the Tormes and the Esla, might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check; and this was undoubtedly the surest course, because the taking of Oporto would have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, dispersed the northern militia, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy's strength in horse: in fine, Massena, though dilatory, had one hundred and sixteen thousand men;

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the initial power was his, and the English general was forced to await his movements.

The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward, yet to retire at once would have seemed timid; hence lord Wellington remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although the enemy's posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. The 28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, but the infantry withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division which remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celorico; the other divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the Portuguese troops were a day's march behind. The sick and wounded men were transferred daily to the rear, the line of retreat was always kept free from encumbrance and the army prepared for action. In this state of affairs the enemy made a demonstration towards St. Joa de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa on the Douro, but the whole finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the garrison on the 3rd of August, left the communication with Almeida again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier's horse being encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, was beaten by the Portuguese cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken: the French then also withdrew from Penamacor.

Meanwhile, on the side of Gallicia, Kellerman entered Castro Contrijo, and part of Serras' troops, advancing towards Monterey, ordered provisions for ten thousand men on the road to Braganza. Silveira immediately marched against Puebla de Senabria, drove off the French cavalry and invested the Swiss on the 7th. They capitulated on the

10th at the moment when Serras, who had so carelessly left them there and neglected to succour them in time, was coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were thus captured, and Silveira in his foolish pride would have given battle to the French, but Beresford, alarmed at his rashness, sent him imperative orders to retreat. He obeyed, yet in so slovenly a manner as to abandon his rear-guard under colonel J. Wilson, who nevertheless saved it under circumstances of such difficulty that he received the public thanks of the marshal.

This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect lord Wellington's counsels, were now discontented by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had obtained Campo Mayor for him as a place of arms, with leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he had shewn him that Hill's departure greatly augmented the necessity of caution. Romana, despising this counsel, joined Ballesteros. Their united forces amounted to eighteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, besides Partidas; and the English general, foreseeing they would offer battle, be defeated, and thus lay open the Alemtejo, ordered Hill to send Madden's Portuguese cavalry in all haste to their succour. That officer crossed the Tagus and reached Campo Mayor the 14th, but he was too late; Romana's advanced guard under Mendizabel, already defeated at Benvenida by Mortier on the 11th with a loss of six hundred men, was going to lay down its arms when fortunately Carrera arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged it. The whole then

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Captain Carrol's despatches

treated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, pursued by the French who slew or took four hundred. The next day Mortier entered Zafra and Romana retired to Almendralejos.

The defence of Portugal was now shaken to its centre, for there was nothing in front to prevent the fifth corps from penetrating to the Tagus, and thus drawing lord Wellington in all haste from Beira, before the measures for laying waste the country as he retired were ripe for execution. But a similar accident saved the necessity of this. For Lacy, sailing from Cadiz under the convoy of captain Cockburn of the British navy, landed three thousand men near Moguer and drove the duke of Aremberg towards Seville, while Copons drove general Remond upon Zalamea. The French soon rallied and forced Lacy to re-embark; yet on the first alarm Mortier had been recalled to the Morena, and Romana once more occupied Zafra. This affair at Moguer was contemptible in itself, but the check it gave to Mortier's progress, and the very tumid dispatch written by captain Cockburn on the occasion gave it a momentary celebrity.

It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier's cooperation, for on the day the latter entered Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida. Lord Wellington immediately brought up the Portuguese army and placed it at Celorico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso, while the British troops occupied Pinhel, Freyadas, and Guarda. In these positions, expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, he hoped to delay the enemy for two months, when the rainy season would give him farther advantages in defence of the country. His original intention had been to keep the light divi-

sion always on the Cabeça Negro, overhanging the bridge of the Coa, in the view of securing a communication with the fortress, or forcing the French to invest the place with their whole army. Crawfurd's rashness marred this plan, and he was personally so dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena's tardiness and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led lord Wellington again to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge and the fords, and taking the French battering train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving this great stroke in his mind an unexpected and terrible disaster broke his measures.

SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.

This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, an excellent ditch and covered way, was extremely defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some near ground on the side of the attack the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not secure, and with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, and his garrison, composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four thousand men.

Colonel Cox's Narrative.

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On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the 26th the second parallel being commenced, sixty-five pieces of artillery, arming ten batteries, opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames, and the garrison was unable to extinguish them, yet the counter-fire was briskly maintained and very little military damage was sustained. Towards evening the cannonade slackened on both sides, but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached and the greatest part of the guns thrown into the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, only six houses left standing, the stones thrown out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the governor beat to arms, and running to the walls, with the help of an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained. No attack was made, but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at the gates, bearing a letter from Massena with an offer of terms.

Cox, though farther resistance was impossible, hoped the army would make a movement to succour him if he could impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in the act of refusing the prince of Esling's offer, when a mutiny, headed openly by the lieutenant-governor Bernardo Costa,

and secretly by José Bareiros the chief of artillery, who had been for some time in secret correspondence with the French, forced him to yield. The remainder of the native officers, disturbed by fear or swayed by the influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution to hoist the white flag. The governor unsupported except by the British captain, Hewit, and seeing no remedy of force, endeavoured to procrastinate. He was ignorant of Barieros' proceedings, and thinking him honest sent him with counter-proposals to the French camp, but the traitor immediately informed Massena of the true state of the garrison and never returned. The place then capitulated, the militia being to return to their homes, and the regulars to remain prisoners of war.

While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. This act equally unjustifiable and strange, because Massena's aide-de-camp, colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing commenced, was excused on the ground of an error in the transmission of orders; yet it lasted during the whole night, and Cox asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the militia were also violated. Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that when the garrison, still amounting to three thousand men, perceived the marquis d'Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under general Pamplona; and the truth of this account is confirmed by two facts, namely, that the Arganil militia were sent in by Massena the

Justification of Colonel W. Cox.

Note by Gen. Pelet, Appendix to Vol. XII. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.

Mr Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

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next day, and the twenty-fourth Portuguese regiment did certainly take service with the enemy in a body. Yet, so easily are men's minds moved by present circumstances, that the greater number deserted again when they afterwards saw the allied armies. Bareiros by joining the enemy escaped punishment, but Da Costa was, long afterwards, shot by order of marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited this chastisement, yet the evidence on which he was condemned was an explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool by Cox while the latter was a prisoner at Verdun.

The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple and cessation of fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp; but the surrender was first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th, when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa, the powder magazine in Alburquerque, being struck with lightning, also exploded and killed four hundred men.

Reynier now made several demonstrations towards Castello Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, but his real object was soon discovered, for on the 1st of September he suddenly entered Sabugal, and the British picquets on the Pinhel river were attacked the following day by the sixth corps. Massena's plans now seemed ripe for execution, and [illegible]ington transferring the head-quarters to Govea, [illegible]ew his infantry behind Celorico, and placed [illegible]valry in front of that place, with posts of obser[illegible]n on the flanks at Guarda and Trancoso. Rey-

nier however suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara again involved the French projects in obscurity.

In truth, Massena, chilled by age and honours had wasted time, he found it difficult to feed his troops, he was disinclined to commence the invasion so late in the year, and undecided as to the mode, for his knowledge of the country was derived entirely from Alorna and Pamplona. It was now two months since Ciudad Rodrigo fell, Almeida had only resisted ten days, yet the French army was still behind the Coa; and it would seem from a second intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon in September, that he expected further inaction: "Lord Wellington," he observed to Massena, "has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle but fall boldly on after having *well observed where the blow may be given.* You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, and the positions of the enemy change too often to direct how you should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight thousand men." This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how strongly lord Wellington was thrusting Portugal forward in the press, and before his letter arr[illegible] Massena had commenced the invasion. A re[illegible]

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able event in the world's history it proved, and it is essential to a clear understanding of the operations which followed to describe the country in which they were conducted.

The advanced positions of the allies extended from Almeida across the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda, to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco, thus guarding at each side of the Estrella the two great entrances to Portugal by the Beira frontier. The enemy could not penetrate therefore unless by force, and a serious attack at either side was to be the signal for a gradual retreat of the whole in concentric directions towards Lisbon. Guarda was the connecting point and could not be abandoned until the last moment, because the enemy while menacing Celorico could then move unobserved either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate general Hill from lord Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great as such a perpendicular line of march would be. To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, a Portuguese brigade was placed in Fundao, and general Leith's corps was stationed at Thomar, at equal distances from two entrenched positions which formed a second temporary line of resistance. The first of those positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella closely hugs the left bank of the Alva. During the spring and summer, the Portuguese militia, destined to reinforce this second

line on the Zezere under Leith, had been kept in winter quarters, because the destitute state with respect to money, in which the English ministers kept lord Wellington, prevented him from bringing them into the field until the last moment. However they were now in second line to Hill, whose power of retreating from Sarzedas to the Zezere has been already noticed, as well as the military road opened through the mountains to Espinhal, by which he could gain the Alva river. It has also been shown that from Celorico to the Alva, a distance of sixty miles, the road is one long defile between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. Now the ridge upon which Celorico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, closes this defile at one end and is covered by the Mondego. In like manner the Sierra Murcella closes it at the other end and is covered by the Alva. The principal road leading through this great defile had been repaired and joined to the road of Espinhal, being a branch also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between Celorico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable; because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices in rear of Celorico; and the enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra.

Lord Wellington, keeping the head of his army one march behind Celorico in observation of the flanking routes over the Estrella, and his rear close to the Alva, was master of this line of operations; and as the Mondego was fordable in summer and

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bridged at several points, he could pass it in a few hours and meet the enemy on that line: and there also the road was one great defile between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramula. This mountain, stretching with some breaks from the Douro to Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line; but a transverse ridge called the Sierra de Busaco running exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, bars the way on the right bank as that Sierra bars it on the left bank. Coimbra was thus covered on the right of the Mondego and this road, the worst in Portugal, was also crossed by several deep tributaries of that river, the most considerable of which were the Criz and Dao. There was however a passage through the Caramula near Viseu by which the French could gain the great road from Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra.

Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point was obviously towards the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass of his forces there. Massena, ill-acquainted with the military features of Portugal was absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras; indeed, so circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English army; neither the Portuguese government, nor the British envoy, although aware great defensive works were constructing knew their nature; they imagined the entrenchments immediately round Lisbon were the lines! Many British officers laughed at the notion of remaining in Portugal, and the major part supposed the campaign on the frontier to be only a decent cloak to cover the shame of an embarkation. In England

the opposition asserted that lord Wellington would embark; the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it. And the British ministers seem to have entertained the same opinion, for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool were unknown to lord Wellington, and commenced thus:—"*As it is probable the army will embark in September.*"

CHAPTER VI.

THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

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MASSENA'S command extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos. His troops present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. But thirteen thousand were in the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, nineteen thousand under general Drouet at Bayonne. This last named body entered Spain in August as the ninth corps, but though replaced at Bayonne by another reserve under general Caffarelli, it did not join Massena until long afterwards, and his efficient troops were not more than seventy thousand: and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, only fifty-five thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow the prince of Esling's march, and the void thus made at Burgos and Valladolid was filled by sixteen thousand of the young guard. This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, never thinking of retreat; no man ever made bolder marches, yet no man secured his base with more care. Here, he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses,—namely, As-

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torga, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida; and while he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand in reserve. The total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed "a point" upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.

Massena's instructions were to convert Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. But either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult's army from Andalusia, he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot's march in 1807 warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celorico, and Viseu. The strength of the positions upon the Alva river was known to him, as were also the measures taken to impede his descent from Covilhao to Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp asserted, with singular ignorance, that the road by Viseu to Coimbra along the right bank of the Mondego was easy, and that no important position covered that town. The French general thus deceived, resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days' bread to the soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join lord Wellington.

Note by General Pelet. Vide Victoires et Conquêtes des Français, vol. xi.

In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier's at Guarda, Ney's and the heavy cavalry

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at Maçal da Chao, Junot's at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were alike menaced, and the allies kept in suspense as to the ultimate object. Massena thus hoped to gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill's distance from that town was greater. To cover his real project with more care, and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused Guarda to be seized on the 12th, by a detachment, which however withdrew again immediately as if it were only a continuation of former feints: meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, menacing Estremadura, suddenly destroyed his boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched rapidly towards Sabugal.

On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda. On the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy and retired up the side of the Estrella; the cavalry in front of Celorico was also forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was in serious progress, and having ascertained that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier's corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.

On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering the Mondego. He was there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun's horsemen, and the whole passed the river. Pushing through Celorico their horsemen drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço, but the first German hussars turned there and charging the leading squadrons made some prisoners. The road

now branched off, to Fornos on the right, to Gouvea on the left, and a French brigade advanced along the latter to cover the march of the main body towards Fornos. This feint was soon discovered, for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers out singly to observe the enemy's motions; and such is their activity that they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover, almost within musquet-shot, for whole days on the skirts of his columns until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the true direction of his march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, was close on the left of Reynier's troops this day, he saw and reported the great movement on Fornos, and following the column with some German cavalry made several prisoners and took the baggage of a general. The French operations being thus decided, lord Wellington made the first, third, and fourth divisions march towards the Alva, withdrew his heavy cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred that night to Cea.

The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard approached Mongualde. But the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, observing ten thousand of the northern militia who under the command of Trant, J. Wilson, and Miller, were now collected upon the Douro to harass Massena's right flank and rear. Trant was already at Moimenta de Beira in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego, the ordenança were all in arms, the country

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on both sides of the Mondego laid waste, the mills destroyed, and the helpless part of the population hidden amongst the highest mountains.

On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of Viseu. Pack's Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at Fosdao taking post beyond the Criz, while general Pakenham entered Coimbra with a brigade of the first division.

On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer who commanded the cavalry post which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celorico ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass upon the worst road in Portugal!

The allies were now in motion to cross the Mondego, when a false report that the enemy was again on the left bank arrested the general movement. The next day the truth became known, and the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry, passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places. The light division marched to Mortagao in support of Pack; the third and fourth entered the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao; the horsemen occupied a plain between the light division and Pack's brigade. But now the eighth corps pointed towards the valley of the Vouga, and thus rendered it doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra. General Spencer moved therefore with the first division upon Milheada, and

Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul and Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva. And general Hill was only one march behind. For having discovered Reynier's movements on the 12th, and at the same time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he with a ready decision, anticipating Lord Wellington's orders, sent his artillery by Thomar, and marching rapidly with his troops by the new way reached Espinhal on the evening of the 20th: there he was joined by general Lecor, who with equal vigour and judgement had brought the Portuguese brigade by long marches from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river; thus the whole of the allied army was united on the very day the main body of the enemy entered Viseu: the French horsemen were indeed on the Criz, but the bridges had been destroyed by Pack and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled. CHAP. VI. 1810. Sept.

Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from day to day for his artillery, which being still twenty miles from Viseu on the 19th, Trant formed the hardy project of destroying it. Quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night with a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia and five guns, he passed between the convoy and the army, and on the 20th surprized a patrole of ten men from whom he learned that the guns were close at hand and Montbrun's cavalry in their rear. The enterprise was serious but the defiles were narrow, he charged the head of the escorting troops and took a hundred prisoners with

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some baggage. The convoy fell back, Trant followed, and such was the ruggedness of the defile that Montbrun's cavalry could never get to the front. The French were now in such disorder that a resolute attack would have ruined them, but the militia became alarmed and unmanageable; the enemy rallied a few men and repulsed the Portuguese horsemen with a loss of twelve troopers, and Trant seeing nothing more could be effected returned to Moimenta de Beira and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and quality of their assailants still fell back in confusion and the artillery did not reach Viseu until the 23d whereby Massena lost two most important days.

While these events were passing in the valley of the Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto; it was however quickly obliged to reimbark, and Copons was defeated by general Remond with the loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio and pushed his cavalry towards Seville, whereupon Soult sent the fifth corps against him and he was beaten at Fuente de Cantos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre, and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden's Portuguese cavalry coming up charged the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo on the 18th, throwing as he passed a

garrison into Olivenza and three battalions into Badajos. The latter place was however in no condition to resist a serious attack, wherefore he directed the Junta to repair to Valencia d'Alcantara, and took refuge himself under the guns of Elvas. CHAP. VI. 1810. Sept.

Lord Wellington's anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh insurrection had broken out in the Grenada mountains where the French posts of Motril and Almunecar were taken: Copons also advanced to the Tinto: and all these events falling at one time prevented Soult from sending more than twelve thousand men to Estremadura. This force was quite inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, because several British regiments withdrawn from Cadiz and others coming from England, reached Lisbon about this period and formed a reserve of more than five thousand good troops for the allies. Wherefore the French, who were suffering severely from sickness, returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Cavalleros and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. But to understand its importance, it is necessary to shew how increasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English general.

The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, yet the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely asserting that the provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries, and as falsely pretending that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically

Appendix, No. II.

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assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were assurances of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency. They insisted also that the frontier should be defended, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more readily embarrass the operations, and even proposed to have the fleet and transports sent away from the Tagus! Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to increase the growing confusion.

Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

Appendix, No. II. Section II.

When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards, writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly declared that Massena was advancing in front with a hundred thousand French, and that eighty thousand more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being made public, created such a panic amongst the English merchants that one and all they applied for ships to carry their families and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the commotion. To dry up this source of mischief lord Wellington issued a proclamation; and in the orders of the day declared, that he would not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition of such hurtful conduct.

To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and severe manner. Reproving them for the false colouring given to his communications he declared he would never *permit public clamour and panic to induce him to change in the smallest degree a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end.* Yet this remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents, and such was their violence that before he reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell them, "*their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army.*" However their factious proceedings had been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego the Tagus and the Lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter, and the people were unprepared to expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their property.

Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders on the Mondego or wasting the country by force as he retreated. But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital; where nothing was prepared to save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding and inflame the people's minds. And this when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion to show,

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panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to fight, although Massena had seventy thousand veterans, and lord Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more than half of which were untried soldiers.

The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain every thing by a victory, while his powerful cavalry and the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent a defeat from being very injurious. A serious check might induce him to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself with the capture of that city and the reduction of the northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general's resources could not be much improved; and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal would longer endure the war without any palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense. It was in this state of affairs that lord Wellington passed to the right bank of the Mondego to fight a battle forced upon him.

While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, Spencer held Milheada with the first division, observing the great road from Oporto; the light division was at Mortagao, watching the road from Viseu; the remainder of the army was in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard repaired the bridges over the Criz and passed that river, lord Wellington recalled the first

division and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco for his position of battle. CHAP. VI. 1810. Sept.

This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts with its right on the Mondego, while its left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by a rugged country impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest afforded an easy communication from right to left, and just behind the right hand extremity, was the ford of Pena Cova which enabled the troops to pass the Mondego and gain the Murcella ridge behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence; the artillery of the allies, placed on certain salient points could play along the front and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry. But neither guns nor horsemen of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was very unfavourable to an attacking army. For though after passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march with a wide order of battle to Mortagao, from thence, a succession of ridges continually rising led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm so profound the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts it was so narrow that twelve-pounders could range across.

From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco, one by a large convent on the enemy's right of the highest point of the ridge; an-

other on the left of this culminant point, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara; the third, which was a branch from the second, following the Mondego to Pena Cova.

When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. "*But if he does I shall beat him,*" was the reply of the English general. He was however well assured that the prince would attack. His advanced guard was already over the Criz; the second and sixth corps were in mass on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so daring a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, make a retrogade movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was indeed only anxious for a battle, and being still under the influence of Alorna's and Pamplona's false reports as to the nature of the country in his front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him.

CHAPTER VII.

General Pack, after destroying the bridges over the Criz, fell back upon the light division. This was on the 22d, but on the 23d the enemy re-established the bridge, passed the river, and forced the British cavalry to abandon the plain and take to the hills behind Mortagao. Here a regiment of heavy dragoons and three squadrons of light horsemen remained, but lord Wellington sent the rest over the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, from whence he recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St. Antonio de Cantara the latter at the convent. Meanwhile the light division, falling back a league, encamped in a pine wood, where happened one of those extraordinary panics that in ancient times were attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a phrenzy, started from sleep and dispersed in every direction: nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror until some persons called out that the enemy's cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically run together in masses and the illusion was instantly dissipated.

The 24th, the enemy skirmished with the picquets in front of Mortagao, and the light division retired leisurely to some strong ground four miles in the

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rear, where they halted and some of the French cavalry coming up too closely in the evening, were charged by a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons and overthrown with a loss of thirty men.

Early on the 25th, Crawfurd moved down from this strong post to the front, and appeared somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa. For the enemy's cavalry were now gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry columns were plainly descried on the table-land above Mortagao; they were coming on, all abreast, with a most impetuous pace, and heavy clouds of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed that the whole French army had passed the Criz and was in full march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging pistol-shots, when lord Wellington arriving ordered the division to retire, and taking the command in person covered the retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry and Ross's troop of horse artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose, for the enemy with incredible rapidity brought up both infantry and guns, and fell on so briskly, that all the skill of the general and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear-guard could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a sharp cannonade and an hour's march brought everything back in good order to the great position; and almost at the same moment the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps. The French batteries opened while the English troops were yet mounting the steep ascent on which the convent was situated, and Reynier, taking the left hand route along which a Portuguese battalion

had retired, also arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third division. Before three o'clock, forty thousand French infantry were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath. CHAP. VII. 1810. Sept.

Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another with that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up of unknown ground. He desired to fall on without delay, but Massena was still at Mortagao ten miles in the rear, and an aid-de-camp sent to inform him of the state of affairs, after attending two hours for an audience, was told that everything must await the prince's presence. Thus a most favourable occasion was lost. For the first division of the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge, Leith's troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing the Mondego, and Hill was still behind the Alva. Scarcely twenty-five thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals between the divisions.

Reynier coincided with Ney, and they wrote in concert to Massena, on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. But the prince of Esling did not reach the field until twelve o'clock that day, bringing with him the eighth corps which with the cavalry he formed into a reserve to connect the sixth and second corps; then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front he proceeded carefully to examine the position from left to right. The situation of the allies was now however greatly Appendix, No. V.

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changed. Hill's corps, having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of defence having the Lusitanian legion in reserve; Picton, with the third division supported by Champlemond's Portuguese brigade, was next to Leith; Spencer, with the first division, occupied the highest part of the ridge, between Picton and the convent. The fourth division was on the extreme left, covering a path leading to the flat country about Milheada, where all the cavalry remained except one regiment of heavy dragoons kept in reserve on the summit of the Sierra. Pack's brigade and some other Portuguese troops formed a sort of advanced guard to the first division, being posted half way down the mountain. On their left the light division, supported by a German brigade and the nineteenth Portuguese regiment of the line, occupied a tongue of land jutting out nearly half a mile in front of and lower than the convent, the space between being scooped like the hollow of a wave before it breaks. The whole mountain side was covered with skirmishers, and about fifty pieces of artillery were disposed upon the most salient points.

Ney was now averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but Massena resolved to attempt carrying the ridge. Reynier thinking he had only to deal with a rear-guard encouraged the prince, and the latter too confident in the valour of his army and his own fortune directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps the cavalry and the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack, the light troops, dropping by twos and

threes into the lowest parts of the valley, endeavoured towards evening to steal up the wooded dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the picquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and caçadores checked this proceeding, but similar attempts made with more or less success at different points of the position, seemed to indicate a night attack. This excited all the vigilance of the troops, yet none but veterans tired of war could have slept, for the weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses on either side glittered with innumerable fires, around which more than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed five columns of attack; Ney with three of them was opposite the convent, Reynier with the other two at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three miles apart. Reynier's troops, having comparatively easier ground before them, were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to be in movement; and though the allies resisted vigorously and six guns played along the ascent with grape, in less than half an hour the French were close upon the summit: so swiftly and with such astonishing power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing every thing that opposed their progress. The right centre of the third division was forced back, the eighth Portuguese regiment broken to pieces, and the

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hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit of the sierra; but at that moment lord Wellington caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, a heavy musketry was poured into their front, and in a little time, the eighty-eighth regiment and a wing of the forty-fifth charged so furiously that even fresh men could not have withstood the shock. The French, quite spent with their previous efforts, opened a straggling fire, and then both parties went mingling together down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion, their track strewed with the dead and dying even to the bottom of the valley.

Meanwhile those French battalions which had first gained the crest formed with their right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse side of the Sierra; the position was thus in fact gained if any reserve had been at hand; for the greatest part of the third division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged; some of the French skirmishers were actually descending the back of the position; and a misty cloud capped the summit, so that the hostile mass, ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen except by general Leith. But that officer had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he was now coming on rapidly, he had however two miles of rugged ground to pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the

right of the French, while the ninth, under colonel Cameron, assailed them in front. A precipice stopped the thirty-eighth, but Cameron, being told by a staff-officer of the critical state of affairs, formed his line under a violent fire, and without returning a shot run in upon and drove the French grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached; and yet with excellent discipline refraining from pursuit lest the crest of the position should be again lost; for the mountain was so rugged that it was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. The victory was now secured in this part. For Hill's corps edged in towards the scene of action, Leith's second brigade joined the first, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.

Ney's attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could be discerned, the ascent was steeper and more difficult than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawfurd in a happy mood of command had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third and fifty-second regiments drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, the German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures in which the guns of the division were placed, and beyond them the ri[illegible]

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men and the Portuguese caçadores were planted as skirmishers, covering the slope of the mountain.

While it was still dark a straggling musketry was heard in the deep valley separating the armies, and when the light broke, three heavy masses, detached from the sixth corps, were seen to enter the woods below and throw forward a profusion of skirmishers. One of these divisions under general Marchand emerging from the dark chasm and following the main road, seemed intent to turn the right of the light division; a second under Loison made straight up the face of the mountain against the front, but the third remained in reserve.

General Simon's brigade, leading Loison's attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed nor its speed in the least abated. Ross's guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, the enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key, and soon the skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, the artillery drew back and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit.

Crawfurd, standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of this attack, and now turning, with a quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge! the next moment a horrid shout startled the French column and eighteen hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the

enemy, that each man of the first section raised his musket and two officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They could do no more! The head of their column was violently thrown back upon the rear, both flanks were overlapped at the same moment by the English wings, three terrible discharges at five yards' distance shattered the wavering mass, and a long trail of broken arms and bleeding carcases marked the line of flight. The main body of the British now stood fast, but some companies pursued down the mountain, whereupon Ney threw forward his reserve division, and opening his guns from the opposite heights killed some of the pursuers; thus warned they recovered their own ground, and the Germans were brought forward to the skirmish. Meanwhile a small flanking detachment had passed round the right, and rising near the convent was charged and defeated by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment under colonel M'Bean.

Loison shewed no desire to renew the fight, but Marchand's division having formed several smaller bodies and gained a pine-wood half-way up the mountain on the right of the light division, sent a cloud of skirmishers against the highest part at the very moment of St. Simon's disaster. Such however was the steepness of the ascent that Pack's Portuguese alone sufficed to hold them in check, and half a mile higher up Spencer shewed a line of the foot-guards which forbad any hope of success. Crawfurd's artillery also, opening from the salient point which the light division occupied, heavily smote the flank of Marchand's people in the pine-wood, and Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous cannonade for an hour

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relinquished that attack also. The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two o'clock parties from both armies were, under a momentary truce, amicably mixed together searching for and carrying off wounded men.

Towards evening however a French company seized with signal audacity a village only half-musket shot from the light division, and refused to retire, whereupon Crawfurd in great anger turned twelve guns on the intruders and overwhelmed them with bullets for half an hour; after paying the French captain this distinguished honour, the English general recovered his temper, and sent a company of the forty-third down which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain, driving an ass loaded with all her property through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her.

In this battle of Busaco, the French were, after astonishing efforts of valour, repulsed in the manner to be expected from the strength of the ground and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them, and their loss, prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was certainly great. General Grain-d'orge and eight hundred men were slain, generals

Foy and Merle wounded, general Simon was made prisoner. Their whole loss may be estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies did not exceed thirteen hundred, because their musketry and artillery were brought into full activity, whereas the French sought to gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire, and suffered accordingly.

Massena now judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and as it could not be turned by the Mondego, because the allies might pass that river by a shorter line, it was proposed in council to return to Spain; but at that moment a peasant informed the French general of a road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula ridge to Boyalva, and he resolved to turn lord Wellington's left. To mask this movement he renewed the skirmishing with such vigour on the 28th that a general battle was expected; yet an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the casting up of earth on the hill covering the road to Mortagao soon indicated some other design. It was not however, until evening, when the French masses of infantry in front were sensibly diminishing and the cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains towards the allies' left, that the project became quite apparent. At this moment Wellington arrived from the right, and observed the distant columns for some time with great earnestness; he seemed uneasy, his countenance bore a fierce and angry expression, but suddenly mounting his horse he rode away without speaking: one hour afterwards the whole army was in movement. Hill recrossed the Mondego and retired by Espinal upon Thomar; the centre and left of the army defiled in the night by narrow roads

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upon Milheada; the guns followed the convent road, and the light division furnished the rear-guard until Fornos being passed the open country enabled the cavalry to take that duty. Busaco was evacuated.

Massena's scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it has been erroneously asserted, that Trant's absence from Sardao alone enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was however at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva, before one o'clock on the 28th; but having in obedience to an erroneous order of Baccellar marched from Lamego by the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could bring only fifteen hundred militia into line. Hence his absence or presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had, as lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself. And now the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British horse on the 29th, cut off one of his patroles, and the next morning drove him with the loss of twenty men behind the Vouga.

When Massena's main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condeixa and Pombal. The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché, the light division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the Mondego, and Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern provinces upon the Vouga. The misconduct and the folly of the Portuguese government was now

made evident. Notwithstanding the proclamations, and the urgent and even menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Regency had not caused the country behind the Mondego to be laid waste. During the few days the enemy was stopped at Busaco only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated that city was still populous, and when the approach of the enemy left no choice but to fly or risk the punishment of death and infamy announced in the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued that the most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, with children of all ages, the sick, the old, the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or were carried forth the most part with little hope and less help to journey for days in company with contending armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine and the roads firm or the greatest number must have perished in the most deplorable manner. And all this misery was of no avail, the object was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions were left and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined.

On the 1st of October, the allied outposts were driven from the hill on the north of Coimbra, the French horsemen entered the plain, where they suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the British cavalry were drawn up in line, on open ground; the disparity of numbers was not very great, and the opportunity seemed fair for a good stroke; but after a time the British were withdrawn across the Mondego, and so unskilfully, that the French, following briskly, cut down some troopers even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented

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from forcing the passage by a strong skirmish in which fifty or sixty men fell.

This scrambling affair forced the light division to march hastily through the city to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the bridge; all the inhabitants who had not before quitted the place then rushed out, each with what could be caught up in the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with sick people and children. At the entrance to the bridge the press was so great that the troops halted a few moments; they were under the prison; the jailor had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding to the windows endeavoured to tear down the bars with their hands, and even with their teeth; they bellowed in the most frantic manner, the bitter lamentations of the multitude on the bridge increased, and the pistol shots of the cavalry engaged at the ford below were distinctly heard. William Campbell a staff officer breaking the prison doors freed the wretched inmates, and the troops forced their way over the bridge; but at the other end the defile, cut through high rocks, was so crowded no effort could make way, a troop of French dragoons which had passed the ford hovered close on the flank, and a single regiment of infantry could have destroyed the division, wedged in a hollow way, and unable to retreat to advance or to break out on either side. At last a passage was opened to the right, and the road was cleared for the guns; but it was dark before the troops reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles.

That night the head-quarters were at Redinha and the next day at Leiria, the marches were therefore easy, and provisions were abundant, yet the

usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra a quantity of harness and intrenching tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed or abandoned to the enemy. And while the town was flowing with rum, the light division and Pack's Portuguese brigade, only a quarter of a mile distant, were obliged to slaughter their own bullocks, and received but half rations of liquor!

Lord Wellington arrested the growing disorders with a strong hand. Three men taken in the fact were hanged at Leiria for plundering; and some regiments more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy's inactivity, restored regularity amongst the allies, while Massena's conduct, the reverse of the English general's, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. At Coimbra, he permitted such waste, that resources were dissipated in a few days which would have supplied his troops for two months under good arrangements; and during this licentious delay the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. "*Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike.*" This simple but profound expression in Napoleon's letter of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling's operations should be judged.

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2°. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celorico by the route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French general did not quit Viseu to march against Coimbra until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a "*vigorous attack.*" The prince of Esling should have brought the allies to action in a forward position; and he might have done so when Almeida fell, or before that event, because the complement of mules for the service of the army being then incomplete, the commissariat was dependent upon the country carts, and when the first retrograde movement took place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, and produced infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy finally contrived indeed to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but intermediately a vigorous advance of the French army would have forced the English general to fight near the frontier, or to retire more hastily than would have beseemed his reputation or suited his political position.

3°. If the prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that a line his adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and jealously guarded was more likely to offer advantages than the circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having the stronger and more moveable army, should have followed closely. A rapid pursuit through Celorico, would have brought him to the Alva river before general Hill, or even Leith, could have joined lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought

with only half his army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If he offered battle with so few troops, his position could be turned on the left by the slopes of the Estrella; on the right by crossing the Mondego; for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill and Leith arrived. Now the road by Viseu, being the longest and least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the difficulties of the way; and to gain Coimbra and force the allies to a battle before Hill arrived were objects more readily to be attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike was therefore not "*well considered*," and it is clear that the prince had not rightly estimated the greatness and difficulty of his enterprise.

4°. When the rocks of Busaco, glittering with bayonets, first rose on the prince of Esling's view, two fresh questions were to be solved. Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or availing himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations could be made? The last question has been already partly discussed; but contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his adversary's rashness on the spot. First, with respect to the attack. Sixty-five thousand French veterans had no reason to believe, that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced troops distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were

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impregnably posted. It would have been no overweening presumption to expect to carry some part of the position; and it is an error to suppose that guns could not have been used; the light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of artillery employed on that point would have greatly aided the attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle in a position, makes his attacks without connection and without artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even with such valiant soldiers as Massena commanded.

5°. "*An army should always be in a condition to fight.*"

"*A general should never abandon one line of communication without establishing another.*"

"*Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious.*"

These maxims of Napoleon, the greatest of all generals, have been illustrated by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest their value. Massena violated all three by his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, some desperate crisis of affairs alone could warrant such a departure from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another art says, "*genius begins where rules end.*" Here genius was dormant and rules disregarded. For Massena was not driven to a desperate game; the conquest of Oporto was open to him, so was a march to the Vouga by Viseu. Yet he threw his whole army into a single narrow defile within ten miles of an enemy in position. And, as I have been told by an officer of Ney's staff, with such dis-

order, that the baggage, the commissariat, the wounded and the sick, were all mixed together with the artillery cavalry and infantry, each striving who should first make way, while discord raged amongst the generals, and confusion amongst the soldiers: and all this in the night.

"*Massena's army was not then in a condition to fight—he made a flank march within reach of an enemy in position, and he abandoned his line of communication without having established another.*"

6°. Lord Wellington was within four hours march of either end of the defile through which the French army was moving. He might have sent the first division and the cavalry, forming with Portuguese regular troops and Trant's militia a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand men, to Sardao, to head the French in the defile, while the second, third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao, assailed their rear. That he did not do so is to be attributed to his political position. His mixed and inexperienced army was not easily handled, war is full of mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was as dangerous as such an attack would have been, and in a military view the battle of Busaco should not have been fought; it was extraneous to his original plan and forced upon him by events; it was in fine a political battle.

7°. Massena's march was successful. The allied army could not cope with him in the open country, between Busaco and the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field. Lord Wellington therefore, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinhal roads. But the prince

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of Esling was at Avelans de Cima and Milheada on the 30th, when the allied cavalry and the light division were still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly on to Leiria by the route sir Arthur Wellesley followed in 1808 against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the patriarch's faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must have been risked before the Lines could be reached.

8°. When the allies had gained Leiria and secured their line of retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general's hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the ninth corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of communication with that city and with Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards, extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes and given his hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south, not only would the campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary's political and military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and hailed the renewed advance of the French army: it was the rising of a heavy cloud discovering a clear horizon beneath.

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9°. Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence of the Lines, and believed the country to be open for the usage of all arms beyond Coimbra. It is strange, when Junot, Loison, Foy, and many other officers who had served in Portugal were present, that better information

was not obtained; but every part of this campaign illustrated Massena's character as drawn by Napoleon:—He was dull in conversation, but decided and intrepid in action; danger gave his thoughts clearness and force. Ambitious and selfish, he was neglectful of discipline, regardless of good administration, and consequently disliked by his troops, and his dispositions for a battle were always bad; but his temper was pertinacious to the last degree; he was never discouraged!

10°. The French reached Coimbra at the moment when fourteen days' bread carried by the soldiers was exhausted. It is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to carry so much bread. Other nations, and notably the English, would not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans and it ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous discipline and well-confirmed military habits; yet without it men are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. But the secret of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted by previous habits for military service, instead of being stretched as it were upon the bed of Procrustes by a discipline which has no resource but fear.

CHAPTER VIII.

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FROM the 1st until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded with a slender guard at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants who were averse, or unable to enter the Lines, immediately came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city when Trant, Miller, and Wilson closed upon his rear with ten thousand militia, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida.

On the evening of the 4th the French drove the picquets from Pombal, and the next morning pushed so suddenly upon Leiria as to create a general confusion. The road was however crossed by a succession of parallel ravines, and captain Somers Cocks, defending one with a single squadron, charged the head of the enemy's column vigorously and checked its march until Anson's brigade of horsemen and Bull's artillery came up. The French then formed three columns, and endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre one, while the others turned the flanks. But the ravines were difficult to pass, Bull's artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number.

The British lost three officers and about fifty men in this action; but the French lost more, and in five hours did not gain as many miles of ground, although they had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated, the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and Obidos; and at the same time a native force, under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed in one column by the way of Rio Mayor; but meanwhile the most daring and hardy enterprise executed by any Partizan during the whole war, convicted him of bad generalship and shook his plan of invasion to its base.

SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.

Colonel Trant had reached Milheada, intending to unite with Miller and J. Wilson, for which purpose the latter had made a forced march; those officers were still distant, but as his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved to attack the French in that city without waiting for assistance. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry at full gallop through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, the astounded enemy made little or no resistance, and the convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion. Thus on the third day after the prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly

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five thousand prisoners, wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson arrived, and spreading their men on all the lines of communication picked up three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto. During the first confusion the Portuguese militia used some violence towards some of their prisoners, and this has given occasion for the Abbé du Pradt, and other French writers, to accuse Trant of having disgraced his country and his uniform by encouraging their cruelty. But it was his exertions which repressed the cruelty, and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances was not sufficient refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, addressed to colonel Trant by the French officers who fell into his hands.

Appendix, No. VIII.

This disaster made no change in Massena's dispositions. He continued his march, and on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded the brigade, took no heed of this; the enemy pushing rapidly on was like to have taken the battery of artillery in Alcoentre and great confusion ensued; for though the royals and the sixteenth finally drove the enemy out of the town, sabring many and taking twelve prisoners, the combat was renewed by the French in the morning and the British ultimately retreated. Meanwhile the army was occupying the lines. The first fourth and fifth divisions forming the centre entered them by Sobral; the third division on the left by Torres Vedras; Hill's corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack's brigade should have entered by Aruda,

See Notice at the beginning of this Vol.

but Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there at three o'clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather was stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the general. He knew that all the cavalry had already filed into the lines, yet he posted no guards, sent no patroles forward, and took no precaution against a surprise, although the town situated in a deep ravine was peculiarly exposed to such a disaster.

Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and about four o'clock observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was instantly given and the regiments got under arms; but the principal post of assembly had been marked on an open space very much exposed to an enemy's guns, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The numbers of French increased every moment, and they endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up; but though this feint was easily seen through, the general rashly desired the regiments to break and reform on the other side of the archway out of gun range. In a moment all was disorder. The streets were crowded with the followers of the division and with the baggage animals, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the officers and soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated.

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Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy's infantry descending the heights, endeavoured to turn the town on the left, while some pushed directly through the streets in pursuit: thus with his front in disorder, his rear skirmishing, and the night falling, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was however so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained: yet, so uncertain is every thing in war, this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter. For the division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the dark to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. In this state, the cavalry patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off; a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda and by the presence of the enemy's scouts on that side. This information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he therefore made a retrograde movement towards Alverca, with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true state of affairs was however quickly ascer-

tained, and Hill regained Alhandra before daylight on the 11th.

During this time Reynier and Junot passed Alemquer with the second and eighth corps. The first marched upon Villa Franca, the second upon Sobral; but Reynier's operations were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his picquets only entered Villa Franca the next day. It was different on Junot's side. General Clausel, one of the most distinguished men of the French army, leading the head of the eighth corps, came upon Sobral in the dusk and dislodged the first division; he then occupied the ridge upon which that town is built, and before morning had thrown up some works close under the allies' position in the centre of those justly celebrated works commonly but improperly known as

THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

They consisted of three distinct ranges of defence.

Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal Engineers, printed for private circulation.

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long.

The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus, to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus, to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outward

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line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, enclosed an entrenched camp, the latter being designed to cover an embarkation with fewer troops if such an operation should be delayed by bad weather. This second camp enclosed Fort St. Julian whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade, and it was so armed and strengthened as to enable a rear-guard to resist an army.

The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these works at Passo d'Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation.

Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal; the others were only appendages, the third as a final place of refuge, the first as an advanced work, to stem the primary violence of the enemy and enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. But while Massena had remained inactive on the frontier, the first line acquired great strength, which was now so much augmented by the rain that lord Wellington resolved to abide the attack permanently.

The ground presented to the French was divided into five parts or positions and shall now be described in succession from right to left.

1°. *From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix.* This distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp, fifteen to twenty feet high, cut along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Por-

tuguese divisions under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats manned with British seamen.

2°. *From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte.* This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here, and the defence of the ground was entrusted to the light division under general Crawfurd.

3°. *The Monte Agraça.* This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position by a deep ravine which led to nothing; the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira; the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of the mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt armed with twenty-five guns, and three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, were clustered around it. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack's brigade; and on the reverse slope, which might be about four miles in length, general Leith was posted in reserve with the fifth division.

4°. *From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras.* This position, seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only when the rains had set in that the resolution to defend the first line permanently was adopted. But the ground, rough and well defined, with the valley in front deep and watered by the Zizandre, now a considerabl[illegible]

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river, presented a fine field of battle. Here the first and fourth divisions, reinforced by a sixth, formed of troops recently come from England and from Cadiz, were posted under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; his quarters being fixed at Pero Negro, just under the lofty Socora rock, on which a telegraph was erected to communicate with every part of the line.

5°. *From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre.* The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first by a great redoubt mounting forty guns; secondly, by smaller forts judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with minor redoubts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which unfordable itself overflowed and formed an impassable marsh. Such were the defences of the first line; they were defective at several points but strong, and there was a paved road, running parallel to the foot of the hills through Torres Vedras, Ruña, Sobral and Aruda to Alhandra. The second line of defence now to be described from left to right was far more formidable.

1°. *From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra.* In this distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills, naturally steep and artificially scarped, covered by a deep and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.

2°. *The Tapada or royal park of Mafra.* Here there was some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts constructed with great labour and care, well considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, and in some degree connected with the secondary post spoken of above: the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, was in front and obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

3°. *From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas.* In this space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça or head of which is in the centre of and overtops all the other mountain masses. A road conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other part of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and behind was a parallel and stronger ridge which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front; and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre on the left, or the defile of the Cabeça de Monte Chique on the right, must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter, consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, they commanded all the approaches, and both from their artificial and natural strength were nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeça itself and its immediate flanks were secure in their natural precipitous strength; so likewise were the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas,

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wherefore, save the blocking of one mule path, they were untouched.

3°. *From Bucellas to the low ground about the Tagus.* The defile of Bucellas, naturally very narrow and rugged, was defended by redoubts on each side, and a ridge, or rather collection of impassable rocks called the Sierra de Serves, stretched to the right of it for two miles without a break, and then died away by a succession of ridges into the low ground on the bank of the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an accessible opening, two miles and a half wide, laboriously defended indeed by redoubts, watercuts and retrenchments, and carefully connected with the heights of Alhandra; yet it was the weakest part of the line, and dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

Five roads practicable for artillery pierced the *first line* of defence. Two penetrated at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were only four points of passage through the *second line*, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. Now the aim and scope of all the works was to bar those roads, and to strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them without impeding the movements of the army. Those objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the *first line* would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the *second and stronger line;* moreover the guns of the first line were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, immoveable, and useless to the enemy.

The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works, but the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped. For the great Monte Junta, rising opposite the centre of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda, in a slanting direction, yet so close to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. This pass being entirely commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda; which though not absolutely impassable, was so rugged that any movement across would require time and could be overlooked from the Monte Agraça, from whence the allies could pour down on both sides of the Baragueda and fall upon the front and rear of the French while in march. And this could be done with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the Lines; and a system of signals was established, by which orders were transmitted from the centre to the extremities in a few minutes.

Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting *the Lines;* too little for the professional reader, too much perhaps for a general history; but I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours; partly that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British engineers who constructed them; partly to show that lord Wellington's measures of defence were not, as some French military writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position.

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To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty forts and work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, and the militia and ordenança of Estremadura furnished a powerful reserve to the regular army. The native artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line; the British marines occupied the third line; the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided in various ways the operation in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and the return of all the men on furlough rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British troops reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis.

It was, however, necessary not only to have strength but the appearance of strength, and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana that the latter without much attention to the wishes of his own government, joined the allies with six thousand men forming two divisions. Yet the English general did not thus persuade him until assured that Massena's force was insufficient to drive the British from Lisbon. He felt that it would have been dishonest to draw the Spaniards into a corner, where they could not from want of shipping have escaped in the event of failure. The first division, led by Romana himself, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega the 19th, and was posted the 24th at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça;

the other followed in a few days. Thus before the end of October, one hundred and twenty thousand fighting men of all kinds received rations within the Lines, seventy thousand being regular troops disposable and unfettered by the works.

While Romana was making for the Lines, the remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden's Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra; Ballesteros, at the same time, moved upon Aracena, and Mortier, ignorant of Romana's absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, to be near Soult who was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune helped the dispositions of the English general to widen the distance between the French armies and to diversify their objects at the moment when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most important point.

Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works the existence of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra he at once judged inattackable, but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn Alhandra and come at once upon the weakest part of the second line; yet the abattis and redoubts erected, and hourly strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; the nature of the ground about Aruda also was such that he could not ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division to oblige Crawfurd to shew his force.

That general, by making the town of Aruda an advanced post, had rendered it impossible to dis-

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cover his true situation without a serious affair; and in an incredible short space of time, the troops had secured the position in a manner really worthy of admiration. For across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall sixteen feet thick and forty feet high was raised; and across the great valley of Aruda a double line of abattis was drawn, not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chesnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged by main force for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles including the salient points, other stone walls were built six feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes; so that a good defence could easily have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men.

The next points that drew Massena's attention were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first line, no outworks had been constructed; neither the valley of Zibreira, nor the hills above Runa, had been fortified. Here it was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were protected by great forts, a powerful mass of troops was permanently posted there, and six battalions, drawn from Hill's corps and placed at Bucellas, could in a very short time have come into action.

Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts

of Torres Vedras forbad any flank movement, and the French general therefore disposed his army between Villa Franca and Sobral so as to menace all the weak points in his front, without losing the power of concentrating in a few hours. The second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, was extended along some open ground as far as Aruda, and was protected there by cavalry. The eighth corps holding the ridge Clauzel had seized close to Sobral, also occupied the lower spurs of the Baragueda, and lined the Zizandre as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa, the outposts of each army being there nearly in contact. The sixth corps was not brought beyond Otta.

These dispositions were not made without fighting. The French attempted to dislodge the seventy-first regiment from a field-work near Sobral on the morning of the 14th; but they were first repulsed and then driven from their own retrenchments, which were held until evening, and only evacuated because the whole of the eighth corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing its position. The loss of the allies in this and other petty affairs amounted to one hundred and fifty, of which the greatest part fell at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher; but the English general Harvey was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise.

The war was now reduced to a species of blockade. Massena only sought to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord Wellington endeavoured to starve the French before succour could arrive. The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and commenced

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magazines at Santarem, where his principal depôt was established. The latter drew down all the militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting them in communication with the garrison of Peniché on one side, and on the other with the militia of Lower Beira. Carlos d'España also, crossing the Tagus, acted between Castello Branco and Abrantes. Thus the French were completely enclosed without any weakening of the regular army.

Obidos, surrounded by an old wall, had been early put in a state of defence to form a post of communication between the northern militia and Peniché, but the Portuguese government having neglected to furnish it with provisions it was evacuated when Massena first came down. The concentrated position of the French permitted it to be again occupied temporarily. Major Fenwick entered it with three hundred northern militia, and being supported by a Spanish battalion, and a strong detachment of British cavalry sent from the Lines to Ramalhal, hemmed in the French on that side. Meanwhile a moveable column under colonel Waters having made incursions from Torres Vedras against the enemy's marauding detachments, captured many prisoners and part of a large convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable quantities.

During this partizan warfare the main body of the allies remained quiet, to the surprise of many persons; for Massena's right was very much exposed, and lord Wellington had four British divisions besides Romana's troops, forming altogether a mass of

twenty-five thousand men close round Sobral. Now by directing the reserve of six battalions from Bucellas to join the light division at Aruda, and reinforcing them with the cavalry, the English general could have assembled ten thousand men at that point. This would have been sufficient, in conjunction with Hill's troops, to menace the second corps and hold it in check, while the twenty-five thousand pouring at daylight from the Monte Agraça, from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps before the sixth could come up from Otta. But war is a curious and complicated web! The Portuguese government was a more dire enemy to the English general than the French, and scarcely could he maintain even a defensive attitude against the follies and intrigues of men, who have, nevertheless, been praised by a recent writer, for their "earnest and manly co-operation," with what justice and knowledge of facts shall be shewn in the next chapter.

See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.

CHAPTER IX.

BOOK XI.

1810. October. Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

THE presence of the enemy in the heart of the country embarrassed the finances. The Regency applied to England for an additional subsidy, and Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy. He also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving. Corn at any price was sought for in all countries, Ireland, America, and Egypt, and one thousand tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo; small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands and from the left bank; and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war; a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object; finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the

port of Lisbon: this was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled.

All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended in that hour upon lord Wellington's firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been increasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. Their private letters contained hints at variance with their public despatches. They evidently wished their general to abandon the country, yet threw the responsibility entirely upon him. They thought him rash, but it was they who were unequal to the crisis; and having neither the manliness to resign with modesty nor to carry on the contest with vigour, cast their base policy with a view only to their own escape in case of failure. During the retreat from Beira, affairs had seemed so gloomy to some officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their feelings; the letters of general Spencer and general Charles Stewart especially, appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted them to lord Wellington, and by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their contents showed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind.

Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the circumstances which had induced him to defend Portugal, and which he had before explained to the very minister he was addressing. He shewed how, up to that

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period, his opinions had been in every instance justified by the results, and hence he assumed that it was reasonable to confide in his judgement for the future. Then tracing out the probable course of coming events, he discussed both his own and the enemy's designs, and with such sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other records of lord Wellington's genius to be lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity.

Having thus with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly that they were unfaithful servants of their country and their prince; and he threatened *to withdraw the British army altogether* if the practices of which he complained were not amended.

Appendix, No. V. Section 4.

"The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had," he said, "entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the *senseless suggestions of the Regency*. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide food for the army and the people and keep the capital tranquil." "With principal Souza," he said, "it was not possible to act, and if that person continued in power the country would be lost. Either the principal or himself must quit their employment. If it was to be himself, he would take care the world

CHAP. IX.

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should know the reasons, meanwhile he would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency.

" He had hoped," he resumed in another letter, " that the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of seeking to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure the tranquillity of the capital. But like other weak individuals they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy." " I have," he said, " little doubt of final success, but *I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain even with the best arrangements.*"

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These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord Wellington's complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of those intrigues which have been before touched upon. Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed that the struggle could be maintained on the frontier; and when they should have been removing the people and the provisions from the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the coun-

Appendix, No. V. Sect. 8.

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try upon the general; yet they knew that he was ignorant even of the names and places of abode of the officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders.

When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves. But they made the execution referable to the general, without his knowledge, and well knowing he had no means of communicating with the country people: and this at the very moment of the enemy's advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, had alone enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were addressed; but the object of the Regency was to nourish and soothe the national indolence, and throw the odium of harsh and rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from this odium. He avowed in his proclamations that he was the author of the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should shelter themselves under his name; but he was not willing to lose the fruit of his responsibility, nor content that men whose courage did shrink from the trial, should seek popularity with the populace at the expense of the best interests of the country.

After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government, convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, permitted their envoy Mr. Stuart to have a seat in the Regency; and influenced by lord Wellington, they insisted that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of

the native authorities. Lord Wellesley, who was ashamed of his colleagues, also gave assurance, that if the army was forced to quit Lisbon, the Portuguese troops should be carried to Oporto and the war recommenced in that quarter; but Mr. Stuart prudently reserved this information until the necessity should arrive, well knowing that the Patriarch and Souza, who had already proposed to go there themselves, would eagerly seize the occasion to urge the evacuation of Lisbon. The 2d of October Mr. Stuart took his seat as one of the regents, and in concert with doctor Nogueira, the Conde de Redondo, and the marquis Olhao, the first decidedly adverse to the Souzas and the other two moderate in their conduct, proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and the Principal. And it was full time. For both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by lord Wellington.

They were deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces; they had openly declared the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and if the enemy forced the British to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should, they said, go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, the Principal Souza proposed that the Regency should fly to the Algarves, and when this was indignantly opposed by Mr. Stuart, he threatened to quit the government. The dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and on the 6th of October drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above.

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When the army approached the lines, Souza proposed that the Portuguese troops should remain outside while the British took shelter within! a notion so preposterous as almost to justify marshal Beresford's observation, that he knew not whether the proposer were more fool, rogue, or madman. But nothing checked the restless Principal. He pursued his designs with the greatest activity, and in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington's plans of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments from anger at some wanton ravages, which in despite of the general's utmost efforts had marked the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; and the Principal having got the superintendence of the succours for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies were echoed by the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; and they were so successful that the slightest encouragement from the Brazils would at this time have formed a national party openly opposed to the conduct of the war.

To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro to excite the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch

himself wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English general. But the extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from revelations, made at the time by baron Eben and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper called the *Braziliense*. CHAP. IX. 1810. October.

Those persons, abandoning their faction, asserted that the Patriarch, the Souzas, and while he remained in Portugal the ex-plenipotentiary Mr. Villiers, being personally inimical to lord Wellington, Beresford, and Forjas, were seeking to remove them from their situations, and get the duke of Brunswick appointed generalissimo in place of Beresford. This part of the project was very naturally aided by the princess of Wales; and the caballers in London had also sounded the duke of Sussex, but he repulsed them at the outset. Part of their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in London, as the Braziliense was in Lisbon; and in their correspondence they called lord Wellington *Alberoni*, lord Wellesley *Lama*, Beresford *Ferugem*, Mr. Stuart *Labre*, the Patriarch *Saxe*, Antonio Souza *Lamberti*, colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, the under-secretaries of state, *Thin* and *Bythin*, sir Robert Wilson *De Camp*, lord Liverpool *Husband*, Mr. Villiers *Fatut*, Mr. Casamajor *Parvénu*, and so on of many others. After Mr. Villiers' departure the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan. For overborne by Mr. Stuart's vigour in the council they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit that which suited their purpose to the Conde de Linhares and

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the chevalier Souza, who undertook to present, after their own fashion, the information so received to the cabinets of St. James' and Rio Janeiro.

Mr. Stuart having thus obtained their secret was resolute to suppress their intrigues. Yet he first endeavoured to put them from their mischievous designs, by the humourous expedient of writing a letter to Domingo Souza in his own cypher, warning him and his coadjutors not to proceed as their party was insecure, and because Mr. Stuart, lord Wellington, Beresford, and Forjas, being united and resolved to crush all opposition, might be made friends but would prove dangerous enemies! This had apparently some effect at first, yet Principal Souza would not take any hint, and the violent temper of the Patriarch soon broke forth again. He made open display of his hostility to the English general; and it is worthy of observation, that while thus thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom they denominated well-wishers to the French, provided they were not of the Fidalgo faction. By a decree of the prince regent's, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection were permitted, the informer's name to be kept secret. In September, 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon; many persons were suddenly sent to the islands and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty, and the government pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London house which they indicated; yet it does not appear that a direct crime was brought home to

any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.

All these things proved that vigorous measures were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general cause, and lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was crushed for a time, lord Wellington's power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza, and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, who had been the contriver of the obnoxious change in the members of the Regency, and whose proceedings generally were in unison with the malcontents and mischievously opposed to lord Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's policy in Portugal. The subsidies were placed under lord Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's control, and admiral Berkeley was appointed to a seat in the Regency; in fine, Portugal was reduced to the condition of a vassal state; a policy which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce. But firm in their attachment to independence and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other. These remedies for the disorders above related were however not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal, of which notice shall be taken hereafter. While the army was in the Lines the evils were in full activity.

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The strength of the allies' entrenchments defying a front attack, rendered it likely that Massena would finally operate by the left bank of the Tagus. This was to be dreaded. He could in the Alemtejo more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his own resources. Lord Wellington had therefore repeatedly urged the Regency to make the inhabitants carry off their herds and grain from that side, and from the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To effect these objects a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy was close upon the river, both banks being then still stocked with cattle and corn, and what was worse, forty large boats lying on the right side. The French were therefore enabled to enter the alluvial islands in the river called the Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions; and while the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, and Abrantes, with empty magazines.

Lord Wellington, thinking the ordenança on the left bank, of whom five hundred were contrary to his wishes armed with English muskets and furnished with two pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel any plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the Lines: he wanted numbers there, and he also judged that the ordenança would if once assisted by a regular force leave the war to their allies. Meanwhile Antonio Souza was continually urging

the planting of ambuscades and other like frivolities upon the left bank of the Tagus, and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval adopting the idea suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvatierra on the river side. This ridiculous movement did not fail to attract the enemy's attention, and lord Wellington fearing the French would pass over a detachment to disperse the Portuguese troops and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress; but his retrograde movement immediately caused the dispersion of the ordenança and consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, the alarm spread to Lisbon, and there was no remedy but to send general Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, which could be ill spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and kept a strict watch upon the enemy's movements as high as the mouth of the Zezere.

Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; for the Admiralty, pretending to be alarmed at a fever generated by the infamous treatment the prisoners received at the hands of the Portuguese government, refused permission to have them transported to England in vessels of war, and no other ships could be had. Thus the rights of humanity and the good of the service, were alike disregarded, for had there been real danger lord Wellington would not have continually urged the measure. About this time

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also, admiral Berkeley admitted that his elaborate report, which, made the year before, stated that the enemy, even though he should seize the heights of Almada could not injure the fleet in the river, was erroneous: hence the engineers were directed to construct lines on that side also but it was in the eleventh hour.

Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been succoured from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted between April and December, and of the militia two-thirds were absent from their colours; for as no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force against delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British stores within the Lines the desertion was alarmingly great.

Appendix, No. V. Section 7.

Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the Regency, lord Wellington complained of the opposition to the Prince Regent, which produced such a paroxysm of rage in the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose influence was from various causes very great, took occasion to declare that "*he would not*

suffer burthens to be laid upon the people which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish the war in the heart of the kingdom."

Appendix, No. V. Section 10.

But it was his and his coadjutors' criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time ten times the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster if the measures previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. But now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched, the inhabitants remained, the mills but little injured were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the deep mortification to find his well-considered design frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There was every reason to believe that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. "It is heart-breaking," exclaimed the British general, "*It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.*"

Appendix, No. V. Section 7.

CHAPTER X.

BOOK XI.

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THE increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters, unhappily very numerous at this period, soon convinced Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in his rear, and from the vengeance of individuals driven to despair by the excesses which the licentious French soldiers too often committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with a pertinacity only to be appreciated by those who have long made war, the French general maintained his former position until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert; then reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp, in which to make head against the allies while his foragers searched more distant countries for food.

Early in October, artillery officers had been directed to collect boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun's cavalry, stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions and stored them at Santarem; and both there and at Barquina, a creek in the Tagus below the mouth of the Zezere, rafts were formed and boats constructed with wheels to move from one place to another, but the extreme paucity of materials and tools made the progress slow. Meanwhile Fane reinforced with some infantry watched closely from

the left bank, Carlos d'España came down from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of Ourem; Wilson's Portuguese militia infested the country from Espinhal to the Zezere and Loison's division was detached towards Thomar to hold him in check.

Towards the end of October, all the hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem; and on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body four hundred infantry and two hundred dragoons were led by general Foy, against Abrantes, and after skirmishing with the garrison they made towards Sobreira Formosa, whereupon the allies' bridge at Villa Velha was foolishly burnt. But Foy immediately pushed for Pena Macor with a smaller escort, and the 8th he gained Ciudad Rodrigo on his way to France, having undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon, a task which he performed with singular rapidity courage and address. The remainder of his escort retired down the Zezere and being attacked by Wilson suffered some loss.

The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th of November, but the enemy having now entrenched the height over Punhete restored it, and cast a second at Martinchel higher up the river. Massena then commenced his retrograde march with great circumspection, because his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the movement from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear,

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Montbrun's cavalry marched upon Leiria, and his detachments scoured the roads to Pombal on the one side, and towards the Zezere on the other. Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, which had been reinforced with a brigade of dragoons.

These dispositions being made, general Clausel withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps passed the defile in the morning of the 15th; the march being protected by some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and by a strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then fell back towards Santarem by the royal causeway, while the eighth continued its march by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas.

These movements were not interrupted by lord Wellington. The morning of the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after day-break ere he perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability of the French general's operations. Fane had reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from Ciudad Rodrigo, but the enemy's intention was not clearly developed. It might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras while the allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer: at the same time he called up his cavalry,

and requested admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the other bank if necessary.

Early on the 16th, the French were tracked, marching in two columns upon Rio Mayor and Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it was clear they had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel in retreat or to make for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear before the reinforcements and the convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could be joined with. The first division was immediately brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division and cavalry marched in pursuit. Four hundred prisoners, principally marauders, were soon picked up, and a remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter, a serjeant of the sixteenth dragoons. Having only five troopers with him he came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men who were cooking, they run to their arms, fired, and killed one of the dragoons, yet Baxter broke in amongst them and with the assistance of some countrymen made forty-two captives.

Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th Dragoons.

The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, and the head of the second corps reached Santarem. General Fane, deceived by some false movements, now reported that the whole army was in full retreat, and the troops at Santarem a rear-guard; and as this information seemed to be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that

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he had cast a second bridge. Hill immediately passed the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, being directed to succour Abrantes, or to head the march of the French according to circumstances. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack's brigades upon Cartaxo, the light division upon the village of El Valle on. the Rio Mayor. Here there was a considerable rear-guard left by the French, and general Crawfurd forgetting the lesson on the Coa, would have provoked an unequal engagement but for the opportune arrival of the commander-in-chief: in the evening the French joined the main body at Santarem.

Hitherto lord Wellington, looking to his Lines with a jealous eye, had acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was even slack, although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the Lines or of the pursuing troops to have pushed the first, second, and light divisions and Pack's brigade vigorously against the enemy's rear. On the 18th however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, the English general, whether deceived by false reports, or elated at a retrograde movement, evincing his own superior sagacity, prepared with a small force to assail at Santarem what he thought to be only the rear-guard of an army in full retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any farther, his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off his army with good skill, and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution.

Santarem is situated on a mountain, rising almost precipitously from the Tagus and extending about three miles inland. A secondary range of hills formed an outwork in front, covered by the Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side until within a mile of the Tagus, but then uniting to flow in a direction parallel with that river for many miles, and through an immense alluvial flat, called the plain of Santarem. Advancing from the Lines, the allies had ascended the right of the Rio Mayor as far as the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway eight hundred yards long, which bridged the river and led directly to the French position. On the allies' right a sedgy marsh, not impassable though difficult from water-cuts, covered the enemy's line down to the Tagus. On the left hand, the double stream of the Rio Mayor overflowing presented a vast impassable swamp covering the French right. The causeway was therefore the only practicable line of approach, but it was narrow and barred at the enemy's end by an abattis and a gentle eminence from the summit of which a battery looked down the whole length. But to force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary step. The secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the great height of Santarem could be reached, and finally, the town with its old walls offered a fourth point of resistance.

In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison's division of the sixth corps, he being placed there to watch the Tagus and keep up the chain of communication with Punhete. On Reynier's right, in a rugged country which separates Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de

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Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete, the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena's head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete the cavalry were disposed, as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at Thomar in reserve, having previously forced Wilson's militia to retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal.

Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables; the Sierra de Alcoberte with cattle; he presented a formidable head to the allies at Santarem; commanded the road through Leiria to Coimbra with the eighth corps and the cavalry; that through Thomar and Ourem to Coimbra with the sixth corps; and by help of his bridges over the Zezere, had opened two new lines of retreat towards the Spanish frontier, one through Castello Branco, the other by the Estrada Nova to Belmonte. He also preserved the power of resuming offensive operations, whether by a passage of the Tagus on his left, or by turning the Monte Junta on his right. Thus paralyzing the allied army, he appeared, even in retreating, to act on the offensive.

His first dispositions were however faulty in detail. Between Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British general might penetrate to turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from the rest of the army. Reynier fearing such an attempt hurried off his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, dispatched a regiment up the Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected the allies to pass between him

and the eighth corps, and then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this hurried march of Reynier's baggage that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to the Zezere, and induced lord Wellington to make dispositions, not for a general attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army; but for assaulting Santarem in front with a small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear guard. At least such was the general belief at the time, but it would seem from lord Wellington's correspondence, recently published, that his intention was only to make the enemy disclose the strength of his position. This would however have certainly brought on a serious battle.

On the 19th, the light division, entering the plain between the Rio Mayor and the Tagus, advanced against the heights by the sedgy marsh; the first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the causeway, while Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry crossed the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira, to turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, and the skirmishers of the light division were actually exchanging shots with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it became known that the guns belonging to Pack's brigade had not arrived: lord Wellington then ordered the troops to retire to their former ground. That the French were determined to maintain their position was now evident. Every advantageous spot of ground was occupied, the most advanced centinels boldly returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were descried, some in arms, others cooking; the strokes of the hatchet and the fall of trees resounded in the woods clothing the

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hills, and the commencement of a triple line of abattis with the fresh earth of entrenchments were discernible in many places.

On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed, but they soon ceased, and orders were sent to general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank of the Tagus. General Crawfurd, however, still thought it was but a rear-guard at Santarem. His spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, and followed only by a serjeant advanced in the night along the causeway, where he commenced a personal skirmish with the French picquet, and escaping from their fire miraculously, came back convinced that the French army was not in flight.

The 22d lord Wellington designed to examine the enemy's right, but Clauzel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to Santarem, and Massena having satisfied himself that no great movement was in agitation, recalled the baggage of the second corps and directed Clauzel to drive back the allies' posts near the town of Rio Mayor. This counterstroke made lord Wellington withdraw the first division and Pack's brigade to Cartaxo, and the light division was also held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of Santarem was maintained for several months, and many persons have rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to shew here that they acted wisely and like great captains.

It has been already seen, how, without any extreme dissemination of his force, the French general

menaced several points and commanded two distinct lines of retreat. But he had other objects also in view. He expected the arrival of several detachments and convoys from Castile, and the ninth corps, which had lately been placed under his orders. His new position, touching at once upon Leiria and the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to these reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem and Alcanhete; but he thought his adversary would not venture on such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, with an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in great evolutions. Thus thinking, he was guided by his long military experience, and calculated upon moral causes with confidence: he who cannot do so is but half a general.

Like a great commander he counted likewise upon the political effect his menacing attitude would produce. For while he maintained Santarem, he appeared as it were still to besiege Lisbon, and encouraged the disaffected, who he certainly expected to rise in his favour; meanwhile he prolonged the sufferings of the city, and it has been estimated that forty thousand persons died from privations within the Lines during the winter of 1810. He thus shook the English influence in Portugal, and rendered the final result so doubtful in appearance that few men had sagacity to judge rightly upon the subject. At this period also, the illness of George the Third, by reviving the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strength-

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ened the opposition in parliament, and it was most important to enforce their arguments against the war by the position of the French army. Wherefore, while any food was to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in holding his ground; and if he committed great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander.

On the other side the English general's political difficulties were so great that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle incessantly against their fears. Desirable, to relieve the misery of the Portuguese people, from their state of horrible suffering; above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena and again shut up the allies in their works.

Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that the disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines at Almada, were most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England, seeing that any serious military check would have caused the whigs to triumph in parliament, and the troops would have been withdrawn from Portugal. So powerful indeed was the opposition, and so much did the ministers dread the cry for

economy, that forgetting the safety of the army in the keen love of place, they actually issued orders to discharge all the transport ships to save expense! In fine, Mr. Percival the prime minister, with the narrow cunning and selfish spirit which marked his whole public career, was, to use an expression of his own, *Starving the war in the Peninsula* despite of lord Wellesley's indignant resistance in the cabinet, and lord Wellington's energetic remonstrances in the field.

In this balanced state, it was essential, that a battle upon which so many great interests hung should not be fought except on terms of advantage. Those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, having received some reinforcements from Halifax and England, had more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found that the latter could from the advantage of position actually bring more soldiers into the fight. The Portuguese army had since the month of April lost four thousand men by death, four thousand more had been discharged, and ten thousand had deserted. To replace this loss thirty thousand recruits had come in, the numbers were therefore increased, but the efficiency for great operations rather diminished; and every department was neglected by the government which neither paid the soldiers nor provided them with food. The Spanish auxiliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at open discord with the Portuguese, and their generals neither able in war nor amenable to those who were. Meanwhile as the heights of Almada were naked, the defence

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of the left bank of the Tagus required twelve thousand men; and two British divisions were necessarily kept in the Lines, because the French at Alcanhete were nearer to Torres Vedras than the allies were at Cartaxo. Reynier also might break out from Santarem during an attack on Pernes, wherefore ten thousand men were wanting to hold him in check. Thus the disposable troops, comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits, would have fallen short of forty-five thousand, while Massena could bring nearly all his force together on one point, because a few men would have sufficed to watch the British division on the left of the Tagus and at Santarem.

Lord Wellington's experience in the movement of great armies was not at this period equal to his adversary's; and the attack was to be made in a heavy difficult country, where the Alviella, the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, furnished a succession of defensive lines to Massena, and in case of defeat the means of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If the allies failed, the Lines were gone and with them the whole Peninsula. The advantages to be derived from success would not compensate the risk. Lord Wellington thought the relief of the northern provinces and perhaps of Andalusia would be the reward of a victory, but those objects might be obtained without fighting, and the certain result would be to bring the greatest part of the French troops in Spain upon his army, without obtaining any aid from the Spaniards. "I cannot forget," he

wrote to lord Liverpool, "that last year I brought upon myself and general Cuesta, not less than five corps d'armée, and the king's guards and reserve, more than equal to a sixth corps; and that when the whole of Castile and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces nor even one raised!" These things being considered, lord Wellington judged it better to remain on the defensive, to strengthen the Lines, to forward the works at Almada, and meanwhile to perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, to improve the organization of the militia in rear of the enemy, and to quiet the troubles and remedy the evils occasioned by the Patriarch's faction. Amongst those evils, the destitution of the fortresses was so prominent, that at one moment he was on the point of drawing off the garrison from Abrantes to prevent the men from starving.

In this defensive view the light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied El Valle and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the English end of the causeway was mined; and a sugar-loaf hill, looking straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery, and laced in front with a zigzag covered way capable of containing five hundred infantry: the causeway being thus blocked, the French could not while the waters kept up make any sudden irruption from Santarem.

On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the inundation to Malhorquija, and thence by a range of heights to Rio Mayor. Behind the latter place, Anson's cavalry was stationed in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and

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Alcanhede; and in rear of Anson, a position was entrenched at Alcoentre and occupied by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which the remainder of the troops were disposed in succession. The first division and the head-quarters were at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of El Valle; some troops were at Alemquer and Sobral; and Torres Vedras was always occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round the Monte Junta.

Massena, satisfied that his front was now safe, continued to build boats and fortified a post at Tancos on the Tagus, but he expected with impatience, the arrival of a convoy, escorted by five thousand men, which general Gardanne was conducting from Ciudad Rodrigo. This reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in Castile when the army entered Portugal, had marched by Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and the 27th was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on either side would have opened the communication and secured the junction; but Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, and deceived by a false rumour that general Hill was in Abrantes and ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal with such haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost many men. Hill was not at Abrantes, but it is remarkable that lord Wellington had contemplated sending him there to make an attack upon the French posts beyond the Zezere; and it was only the advance of

Gardanne's column the strength of which he could not clearly ascertain that deterred him! Such is the uncertainty of war.

Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by the ninth corps, continued to strengthen his position at Santarem, which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. Thus general Ferey crossing the Zezere with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without difficulty, and returned without loss; Junot occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps; and on the 9th of December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however, baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet made some movements, avowing a design to invade the Tras os Montes, but the 22d of December he occupied the line of the Coa with the ninth corps, and Massena's patroles appeared again on the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords. At the same time all the spies reported that a great reunion of forces from the south was to take place near Madrid.

These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto; or that the reinforcements coming to him were so large, that he meant to throw bridges over the Mondego and occupy the northern country without quitting his present position. It was known that a tenth corps was forming at Burgos, and the head of the fifth corps was again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquiña were numerous and large; in all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling for a mighty effort on

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both sides of the Tagus, and it was thought, before the end of January, more than forty thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena. Preparations were made accordingly.

An outward line of defence, from Aldea Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, Palmella, and St. Felippe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable, soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could be brought against them. To procure these, lord Wellington on the 29th of December wrote so earnestly to lord Liverpool upon the necessity of reinforcing the army, that five thousand British troops were ordered to embark for Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily.

At this time sickness forced general Hill to go home, and as Soult was collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented and marshal Beresford assumed the command, for the Portuguese army was now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d'Espana's brigade, which being at Abrantes was also under his orders. That general was however so troublesome and his troops so ill-behaved, that Wellington who had not asked for their assistance threatened to send them back to Spain.

To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by Vellada if in retreat, and by Abrantes if in advance; were the instructions given to Beresford. His head-quarters were fixed at Chamusca, his troops disposed along the Tagus from Almeyrim by Chamusca to the mouth of the Zezere, and signals of communication from one quarter to another were established. The roads leading to Spanish Estremadura were scoured, and a sure and rapid intercourse opened with Elvas and other frontier fortresses. Beresford also organized good sources of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and at Thomar; and in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere; yet he placed them, against the advice of the engineers, at too great distance from the river, and in other respects unsuitably, offering nothing threatening to the enemy: the French craft dropped down towards Santarem without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth regiment, moored of his own accord a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, and disposed fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being observed.

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Meanwhile on the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of both armies were of necessity tranquil. Anson's cavalry, however, acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy's foraging parties; and in the Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the militia, which it is time

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to notice as forming an essential part of lord Wellington's combinations.

It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier of Portugal, was so long delayed, that instead of keeping the communications of Massena free and securing his base it lost all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras' division that the Tras os Montes were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to the Lower Douro, appeared on the 29th of October before Almeida. Its former garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately after deserted to Silveira, who now blockaded the place closely, and made a fruitless attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices.

In November, the head of the ninth corps at last reached Ciudad Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions collected in Castile for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this convoy from reaching its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, and he ordered Miller to be at Viseu the 16th in support. But on the 13th general Gardanne raised the blockade of Almeida and entered Pinhel with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry; he was supported by the ninth corps and proceeded to conduct the convoy by Sabugal towards Penamacor. The 16th, being between Valverde and Pereiro Gavillos, Silveira fell upon him, killed some of his men and took many prisoners, but the French being still too strong for him he retired on the 17th to Trancoso, where he met with Miller and the latter then

occupied Guarda. Gardanne pursued his march, and, as we have seen, after reaching Cardigos retreated in a panic.

Drouet had not yet received the order to put himself under Massena's command, but urged by Foy, he moved forward into Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, of his intention to penetrate the Tras os Montes. The 17th December, he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, crossed the Mondego the 18th, and encamped near Gouvea the 22d. From thence his cavalry and one division under general Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied Trancoso; but Drouet himself with eleven battalions, and the troops under Gardanne, which he had rallied, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th.

Hitherto lord Wellington's communications with Baccellar, had been carried on through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being enclosed; and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, occupied Leiria and spreading towards the sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival and of the state of Massena's army; he intimated that a great operation was in contemplation, and the fifth corps daily expected in the Alemtejo; finally he directed Claparede to seize Guarda, to forage the neighbouring villages, to watch the road

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of Belmonte, and if Silveira should be troublesome to crush him. That vain and insufficient man, inflated with his previous petty success had already attacked Claparede and was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad near Trancoso on the 30th; Oporto was thus laid open, and Bacellar in great alarm called Miller and Wilson to its succour. They immediately moved upon Viseu, but the last having recrossed the Mondego took a hundred of Drouet's stragglers before the order for retreat reached him; both then hurried their marches, but Silviera having meanwhile again provoked Claparede, was by him pressed so closely from the 10th to the 13th of January, that he was driven over the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, and the French general seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before any troops could concentrate to oppose him. However, when Bacellar brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller's and Wilson's corps reached Castro d'Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira and was closely followed by colonel Wilson.

During these events the passage of the ninth corps having relieved the French troops in Leon, they again menaced Tras os Montes, which drew Silveira to Braganza; Miller died at Viseu, and only Wilson and Trant remained to harass the enemy's parties. In this state of affairs Claparede took post at Guarda and following his orders seized Covilhao. At the same time Foy, returning from France, and having collected three thousand infantry and cavalry, convalescents from Massena's hospitals in Castile, attempted to rejoin the army by the road of Belmonte. He had escaped innumerable perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas with the loss

of his despatches and half his escort; and now at Enxabarda, entering the Estrada Nova, he was, notwithstanding Claparede's vicinity, harassed by colonel Grant with a corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira; and although he suffered nothing by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the mountain from cold. However on the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where affairs were coming to a crisis.

During December and January, the country being always more or less flooded, the armies had continued in observation, and Wellington, hearing that a serious attack on Cadiz was in forwardness, prepared to send some British regiments to the assistance of that place. Meantime Massena whose positions were laboriously strengthened, reinforced his out-posts and extended his marauding excursions in proportion to his increasing necessities. But both generals watched the side of Rio Mayor with great jealousy, especially as the season advanced and the roads became firmer. Thus, on the 19th of January, some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before, a fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, induced Junot to drive their outposts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of affairs, and immediately a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish, he returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign.

Early in February, a column of six thousand French again scoured all the country beyond the Zezere, and found considerable stores concealed near Pedragoa, after which it marched to the Mondego and carried off from below Coimbra four hundred oxen and two thousand sheep intended for

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the allies. These marauding excursions gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle, and brought in a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aid-de-camp of general Clausel's. Massena had however organized a secret communication with Lisbon, through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos in that capital. Their agents, under the pretence of selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas, and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa; and it was suspected that the treason extended to the provisioning of the enemy on so large a scale as to be one of the secret resources which enabled Massena to brave the difficulties of his position so long. It is certain that herds of cattle were placed in the way of the enemy under such circumstances as to create doubts if it could be done without design. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained a French officer of rank. Thus both generals had excellent information; and in this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events hitherto unnoticed bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject of another book.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. "*War is not a conjectural art.*" Massena

forgetting this, assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra; but the battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would re-embark if pressed, and the Lines put an end to that dream: yet once awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shews what thirty thousand additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus could have done. Had they arrived on the heights of Almada before admiral Berkeley's error was discovered, the supply of provisions from Alemtejo and from Spain, would have been transferred from Lisbon to the French armies; the fleet would have been driven from the Tagus; and then the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little chance of final success, would probably have induced the British general to abandon the country.

2°. It has been observed, that Massena might in the first week have easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and driven the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy, the fords impassable, and the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge. To detach a small force would have been useless, to detach largely dangerous. To collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the entrenchments necessary to defend it in the face of the allied forces, would

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have been neither a safe nor sure operation; moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps.

3°. Lord Wellington, conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, had like to have received a severe check at Santarem yet he recovered himself in time. It has been also urged that he might have straightened the enemy's quarters more effectually at that place; that Hill's corps, passing through Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, lined the Zezere, cut off Massena's reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon his positions, or even to capitulate. This idea, advanced at the time by colonel Squire, an engineer of great zeal and ability and perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination. As a simple operation it was doubtless feasible, and we have seen that a partial attack of this nature was contemplated by lord Wellington. But a successful result to the larger design of colonel Squire was not so certain. The Lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of leaving the Tagus unguarded before an enemy who possessed eighty large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, is apparent; Hill's corps must then have been replaced, and the army before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works at Punhete a sure matter; the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and the sixth corps, being within a short march, might have passed at Martinchel and taken general Hill in flank.

4°. The same officer, at a later period, miscal-

culating the enemy's numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy thousand, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus at Azingha, behind the Almonda river, and march upon Golegao, while lord Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst of the enemy's extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could scarcely have launched such a thunderbolt. Massena had still fifty thousand fighting-men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought down to pass the Tagus, and the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor would scarcely have escaped the enemy's notice. Exact concert, in point of time, was essential, but the eighth corps could have held the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier from Santarem, and Ney from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and the Tagus; moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable from rain during December, and in January, Soult, of whose operations I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo.

A disaster for the allies would at this time have relieved the enemy's difficulties, when nothing else could. Lord Wellington, convinced of this, earnestly wished Massena to retire; and was so far from desiring to hem him in and force a battle, that he even doubted if he had not already rendered his line of retreat too difficult by the operations of the northern militia. A campaign is like other works of art: accessaries however splendid must be rejected when not conducive to the main object. That judgment which duly classes the

BOOK XI. 1810.

value of every feasible operation is the best quality of a general. Lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree, and both his genius and his courage were made subservient. Without this mental balance, he might have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but he could never have conducted the war to a successful end.

BOOK XII.

CHAPTER I.

CHAP. I. 1810.

THE operations in Portugal were so deeply affected by Spanish affairs that some account of the latter is absolutely necessary to elucidate them. And as a general direction it may be observed, that the defensive position of the allies, viewed as a whole presented a great crescent extending from Coruña to Cadiz, in the concave of which the French armies were operating. Their main body was menacing Lisbon, the most important point; and it was clear that if checked there they could reinforce it from the wings, unless the allies at the horns of the crescent acted vigorously, and upon a system which the harbours and fortresses at either extremity indicated as suitable for those who possessed the absolute command of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at Cadiz, a squadron of frigates at Coruña, and how far this warfare relieved the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now show.

The Gallician troops under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of Leon, were always reported to be above twenty thousand men when arms or stores were demanded from England; but there were never more than ten or twelve thousand in line. They suffered Serras' division, only eight thousand strong, to spread over the plains of Leon, from Benevente to the Agueda during Massena's advance; and the arrival of the ninth corps, in Octo-

BOOK XII. 1810. October.

ber, quite paralyzed the Gallicians, although the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys.

Behind Mahi there was a second army, from four to six thousand strong, embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and in the latter province, about eight thousand men, including the irregular bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched the movements of Bonet's division. This general frequently mastered but could never hold the Asturias, because the country is a long defile lying between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for partizan warfare in connexion with a fleet. If he penetrated towards Gallicia, British and Spanish frigates from Coruña, landing troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and excite insurrections on his rear. In this manner, when he had defeated Ponte at Sales, just before Massena's invasion of Portugal, Porlier forced him to withdraw from Castropol; and the advantage of such operations being thus shewn, sir Home Popham and general Walker were sent to direct the naval and military affairs at Coruña. Preparations were made to embark a large force under Renovales, for an attack on Santona and Santander, the Partidas of the interior were to co-operate, a battalion of marines from England was to form the garrison of Santona when taken, and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion along the coast. But Serras then threatened the frontier of Gallicia, Mahi remained in suspense, and this with the usual procrastination of the Spaniards and the late arrival of sir Home Popham, delayed

Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

the expedition until October, although Porlier, Escadron, and other chiefs had commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September. Finally, Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, aware of the preparations at Coruña, fell back towards Santander, leaving only a post at Gihon.

On the 16th of October Renovales sailed, but with only thirteen hundred men. He was accompanied by general Walker, who carried ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition, and on the 19th, entering the harbour of Gihon they captured some French vessels, while Porlier on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners. The next day Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded his landing, and the 2d of November he returned to Coruña with only eight hundred and fifty men. A frigate and brig containing the remainder of his men had foundered in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all the Spanish naval force along the coast, and wrecked twelve vessels even in the harbour of Coruña. Mahi, now leaving Toboado Gil's division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias, and being joined by the troops of that province, and soon after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; yet he effected nothing, and Bonet reestablished his line from Gihon, through Oviedo to the borders of Leon.

During these actions the Junta of the Asturias continued to be distinguished by their venality and indifference to the public good. Their province was in a miserable state, and the powers of the British naval officers on the coast not being defined, disputes between them and general Walker arose, and the Junta was thus enabled to

BOOK XII. 1810. Nov.

interfere improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Gallicia was comparatively rich, but its Junta, culpably inactive in the discharge of duties and oppressive, disgusted the whole province. During the winter a great body of the clergy had combined to oppose both the Provincial Junta and the General Cortes; and they assumed such a menacing attitude, that Mahi, then in the Asturias, dreaded personal violence, and applied for an English vessel to take him to Coruña. One Acuña was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, but the discontent spread, and the army was more employed to overawe this faction than to oppose the enemy. Finally general Walker, despairing to effect any thing useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal.

Abstract of General Walker's Military Reports from Gallicia. MSS.

The expeditions from Coruña naturally increased the audacity of the inland partidas, who became really dangerous only when they had a sea-port, where they could receive supplies and reinforcements, or by embarking save themselves in extremity and change their theatre of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of Biscay, and directed all the reinforcements, in their progress towards Portugal, to scour the disturbed countries to the right and left. The ninth corps had been thus employed during the months of August and September, but when it passed onward the partidas resumed their activity; Mina, Longa, Campillo, and Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers sufficient to attack large French detachments with success. To aid them, general Walker repeatedly

recommended the taking possession of Santona with a corps of British troops; for that town, offering the best winter harbour along the coast, was built on a mountain promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, and could have been made very strong. It would have cut Bonet's communication with France by sea, and given the British squadron a secure post from whence to vex the French coasts, and furnished a point of connexion with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre.

Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a corps of four thousand men to secure it; but lord Wellington earnestly dissuaded him from such maritime operations. "For," said he, "unless a very large force be sent, it will scarcely be able to effect a landing and maintain the situation of which it might take possession. Then that large force will be unable to move or effect any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient. It is vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the first thing they will require uniformly will be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and every thing which the expedition would have a right to require from them; and after all, *this extraordinary and perverse people will scarcely allow the commander of the expedition to have a voice in the plan of operations to be followed when the whole shall be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be ready.*"

Letter to Lord Liverpool, 7th May, 1811. MSS.

Meanwhile Caffarelli's reserve entered Spain and

BOOK XII. 1810.

Napoleon ordered Santona to be fortified; other reinforcements from France also occupied the northern provinces, and marshal Bessieres took the command of the young guard, together with the third and fourth governments and that of the Asturias, including Bonet's division. This force was called the army of the north, and the 1st of January, 1811, it exceeded seventy thousand men, fifty-nine thousand and eight thousand horses being present under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance to the army of Portugal. This was the state of the northern parts of Spain.

Appendix, No. I. Section 6.

In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately under the king, at first twenty thousand strong, was before the end of the year carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of French and Spanish guards, and of juramentados or native troops who had taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he was to protect his court, watch the movements of the Valencians, and chase the Guerillas of the interior who were very numerous. The summer and autumn of 1810 were, for reasons before mentioned, a period of great activity with these irregulars; petty actions were constantly fought by them around the capital, many small French posts and many isolated soldiers and officers were cut off, and few despatches reached their destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts, which run from Madrid through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the army of the north; through Guadalaxara and Calatayud to the army of

Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south. One line also run by the valley of the Tagus and the bridge of Arzobispo to Truxillo; where a brigade of cavalry was generally stationed to communicate with the fifth corps, during its incursions into Estremadura. This warfare of the Partidas though harassing to the French was merely a succession of surprizes and massacres; little instruction, and no pleasure can be derived from the details; yet in the course of the summer and autumn, not less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling affairs, took place between the moveable columns and these bands. The latter were however generally beaten, and at the close of the year, only the Empecinado, Duran, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained their reputation; while the country people were so harassed, that counter Partidas, in many places assisted the French.

The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or at least supporting the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, troubled by the Partidas and having many convoys to protect, would not stir. He was averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was thwarted by his brother's regulations; plots were formed, or supposed to be formed, against his person; and in this uneasy posture, the

Appendix, No. IV. Section 4.

BOOK XII. 1810.

secondary part he was forced to sustain combined with his natural gentleness which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and devastation continually before his eyes, rendered his situation so irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France, a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces, it remains to trace the more important military operations at the southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably situated to press the left flank of the invaders.

Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although the two districts were completely separated by very rugged mountains. He was thus forced to keep a large body of troops in the stripe of country bordering the Mediterranean, although it was continually menaced on the one flank from Gibraltar and the Spanish camp at San Roque; on the other by the Murcian army; and in front by descents upon the coast, against which from the shallowness and length of their position the troops could never concentrate in time. Moreover the Murcian army, based upon the cities of Murcia and Carthagena, menaced alike the coast line and Grenada; the latter by the route of Baza and Guadix, where any movement was sure to occupy the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or Gibraltar fell upon their posts along the Mediterranean coast.

Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada, where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions, sometimes against the Murcians,

sometimes against the Spanish forces on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to the patriots on one flank, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands where for two marches no water is to be found, always offered a sure retreat on the other. The French general's principal object was however to gain the different important castles on the coast. Estipona and Marbella were stifly defended, and the latter after sustaining many attacks, was only reduced on the 9th of December, when the garrison of one hundred men took refuge on board the Topaze frigate. But Sebastiani's hold of these towns, and even the security of his troops along the coast, depended upon the preservation of his communications across the mountains with Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville; and this was a difficult task; for general Campbell sent British officers into the Ronda to stir up and lead the wild mountaineers of that district, and they were very successful until their operations were marred by Lacy's misconduct.

The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer of 1810 have been already noticed; but in October, general Campbell and admiral Penrose acting in concert with the governor of Ceuta, renewed the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a flotilla of gun-boats supposed to be destined against the islands near Ceuta. The French depôt for the siege of Marbella, then in progress, being at Fuengirola, only thirty miles from Malaga, an attack there was sure to draw the troops from the latter place; and the more so because general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda.

BOOK XII.

1810.

EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA.

General C. Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

On the 13th of October, captain Hope sailed from Ceuta with the Topaze, a division of gun-boats, and a convoy containing a brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo: in all fifteen hundred men. Lord Blayney who commanded this force, was directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing was effected and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving only three hundred men in Malaga; lord Blayney was as instantly apprised of the success of his demonstration, yet he remained two days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, after the heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate had failed to make any impression on the walls. During this time his dispositions betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day, while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not exceed two hundred men, having descried the approach of Sebastiani's column, made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British part of the investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, rallied his men and retook the artillery, but at this moment two squadrons of French cavalry came up, and mistaking them for Spaniards he ordered the firing to cease and advanced towards them. He was immediately made prisoner, his troops again fled to the beach, and would have been all

sabred but for the opportune arrival of the Rodney with the eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spaniards, untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without loss, but of the British, two officers and thirty men were killed or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly two hundred serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct and terminated in disaster and disgrace.

Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the marquis of Portasgo appeared in the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez Malaga and in the neighbouring villages, and Blake, who had returned from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced with eight thousand men towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately furnished money to Portasgo, embarked a thousand stand of arms for the people of Valez Malaga, and Penrose sent a frigate to cruize along the coast. But Sebastiani, now relieved from the fear of a coast descent, soon quelled this insurrection and then turned against Blake. This general had been held in check by general Rey with a small force, and when Milhaud arrived with Sebastiani's cavalry, he retired behind the Almanzora river, but was overtaken and defeated on the 4th of November; his army then dispersed, and as a contagious fever now broke out at Carthagena and spread along the coast to Gibraltar and Cadiz, operations on the side of Murcia ceased.

General Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

BOOK XII. 1810. October.

In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade of the Isla and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de Neibla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his efforts nor the descents would have availed, if Ballesteros had not also co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Araceña and the Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballesteros have maintained the war there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under cover of which, Romana's army supported his line of operation, and sent him at times some military supplies. On the possession of Badajos therefore the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended.

Seville was the heart of the French defensive system in Andalusia; Cadiz, Estremadura, and the Condado de Neibla were the most important points of offence. The want of provisions, the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption of troops from Cadiz threatening their posts at Moguer and Huelva, always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballesteros brought them towards Araceña; and in like manner the advance of Romana towards the Morena brought them to Estremadura. But Romana had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the fifth corps alone was disposable, either for offensive movements in Estremadura or for the defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; in which view he frequently sent Mortier

across the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia.

In October, Romana, as we have seen, entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier unconscious of Romana's absence had retired across the Morena, occupied Merida. He wished to establish himself in the yet unwasted country about Llerena, but the appearance of a moveable column on the frontier of La Mancha sent him back to Badajos, and on the 20th of November he united with Ballesteros. The French then fortified Gibraleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla, while Girard's division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being joined by the column from La Mancha foraged the country towards Llerena. Mendizabal immediately advanced to Zafra with nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, including Madden's Portuguese brigade, but meanwhile Copons being totally defeated at Castillejos in the Condado, by D'Aremberg, retired to Puebla de Gusman.

At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer already noticed, and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in September; but all men's hopes and expectations had been wonderfully raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years of intrigues and delay the National Cortes had assembled, and the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard. Yet only partially. For the members of the Cortes could

BOOK XII. 1810.

not be legally chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy, and some members were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, hence many persons unknown even by name to their supposed constituents were chosen. A new principle of election was also adopted. For all men twenty-five years old, not holding office or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if chosen, which had never before been the rule. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent those dependencies.

Towards the latter end of September this great assembly met, and immediately took the title of Majesty. It declared the press free in respect of political but not of religious matters; it abolished some of the provincial Juntas, re-appointed captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in the very spirit of democracy. These things, aided by a vehement eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of liberty.

The Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of Cadiz, the Regency, had all been in succession violent and oppressive while claiming only to be popular leaders. This spirit did not desert the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and their reformations, outstripping the feelings and understandings

CHAP. I.

1810. Sept.

of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to the French. It was not for freedom, but from national pride and religious influence that the people struck. Liberty had no attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the merchants; and the Cortes, by suppressing old establishments and violating old forms and customs, shocked those very prejudices which had produced resistance to Napoleon. And nothing beneficial was given in return. For in the administration of the armies, the conduct of the war, the execution of the laws, the treatment of the colonies, there was as much of vanity and intrigue, of procrastination negligence folly and violence as before. Hence the people were soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was openly attacked, by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the clergy became bitter enemies of the Cortes. The great cause of feudal privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes was towards the enemy; and a broad line of distinction was thus drawn between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the prosecution of the war. Ere the contest finished, such a distemperature arose between them as would inevitably have thrown the whole Peninsula into Napoleon's hands, if fortune had not betrayed him to the snows of Russia.

The Regency, jealous of the Cortes and little pleased with the inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of the republican spirit; and so anxious to check any tendency towards innovation, that early in the year they had invited the duke of Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him to issue

BOOK XII. 1810.

proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours of a royal prince: for their intent was to oppose his authority to that of the Local Juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the Cortes. He had touched at Taragona and had been well received, but at Cadiz the people regarded him with indifference, and Mr. Wellesley opposed his stay, because lord Wellington judged that his reception in Spain would tend to render the Spanish war popular in the South of France; the English ministers to prevent future embarrassments from his intrigues sent him a verbal invitation to reside in England; but this he did not accept, the Cortes, aware of the cause of his arrival, obliged him to quit Spain. Soon after this the Regency of five was displaced and one of three appointed. Joachim Blake, Gabriel Cisgar, and Pedro Agar were the men chosen, but during the absence of the two first, substitutes were provided, and one of them, Palacios, making some difficulty about taking the oath was immediately declared to have forfeited the confidence of the nation: so peremptorily did the Cortes proceed. The new regents were not more pleased with the democratic spirit than their predecessors, yet wishing to retain the power in their own hands, they refused to listen to the princess of Brazils' claim. Thus factions sprung up on every side; for the republicans were not paramount in the Cortes at first, and the majority of that assembly were so subtilely dealt with by Pedro Souza, that they privately admitted Carlotta's claims both to the succession and the immediate control of the whole Peninsula.

Don Manuel Lapeña was declared captain-general of Andalusia, and commander of the forces in

the Isla. He was subservient to the views of the Cortes, and the new Regency, jealous of Romana's power, removed him at the instigation of his enemies in Badajos from his command in December, and ordered his troops to separate from the British forces and come to Cadiz. The conduct of those troops had been very unsatisfactory, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to keep Massena in check, that lord Wellington sent colonel O'Neal to remonstrate with the Regency; and as he plainly proved, that the fall of Estremadura and total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, a momentary respite was obtained.

CHAP. X. 1810. December. Mr Stuart's Papers, MSS.

In matters relating to the war against the French or to the administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable of acting cordially on any wise plan; but with respect to the colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British government, the first Regency had published a decree in May, permitting the South Americans to export their own products under certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her assistance, gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz; and its resentment was so much dreaded that in June the Regency disowned their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the printers of it for having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated at this treatment, the colonists, who had resisted all the intrigues of the French with a firmness and singleness of purpose very displeasing to the government in Old Spain, for the latter always wished to have them ready to follow in their

BOOK XII. 1810.

wake, openly discovered their discontent, and then the authorities in the mother-country, throwing off the mask of liberality and patriotism exposed their own secret views. "It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain," was the proclamation of the Regency, in answer to a declaration from the Caraccas avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand: meaning, that if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper, America must follow as having no right to decide in any case for herself.

When the Cortes met, America expected some justice. She had contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, and many of her sons had served zealously in person; she had also been declared an integral part of the empire by the Central Junta; and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the great National Assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was a mere form. "The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand years," and "I know not to what class of beasts the Americans belong:" such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better to give Spain to Joseph if America be retained, than to save Spain if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public documents, and openly acted upon; for when repeated insults, treachery, and violence, had driven the colonists to defend

their rights in arms, the money and stores supplied by England for the support of the war against the French were applied to the fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of the National Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England.

The military events shall be noticed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

BOOK XII. 1810. Nov.

WHILE the Spaniards in the Isla were occupied with the debates of the Cortes, the French works were laboured with care. Their chain of forts was perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and a week's provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers overland, and in November, one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports were thus assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was however alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, an artillery officer of the highest reputation.

At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some notable pieces of ordnance invented by colonel Villantroys, called cannon-mortars. These huge engines, one of which now stands in St. James's Park, were cast at Seville,

and being placed in slings on the French works, threw projectiles with such prodigious force as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards. But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion: nevertheless they produced alarm in the city, and were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult's real design was to ruin by a superior fire the fort of the Puntales, then to pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side of the besieged there was neither concert nor industry.

Two drafts, made in August and September by lord Wellington, had reduced Graham's force to five thousand men, and in October the fever broke out in Cadiz; but as Soult's preparations became formidable, reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and at the end of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese, were still behind the Santi Petri. Hence Graham felt confident, 1°. That, with due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire should be silenced. 2°. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be maintained. 3°. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt of the Cortadura was lost.

To ensure the superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general Graham perseveringly urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wel-

Graham's Despatches. MSS.

BOOK XII. 1810. Dec.

lesley, but neither their entreaties nor the imminence of the danger could overcome the apathy of the Spaniards. Their troops were wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from being assisted, was vexatiously impeded, and it was the end of December before Graham, after many altercations, could even obtain leave to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence, although the enemy might by a sudden descent enter it in the rear and cut off the army in the Isla from the city. The duke of Dalmatia's preparations for an attack were now nearly ready and the result was to be dreaded, but the events in Portugal suddenly stopped his progress.

Appendix, No. III. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.

When Massena had passed the frontier, his communications with France became so uncertain that the emperor's principal source of information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then that the army of the north was directed to support the army of Portugal, and the ninth corps was made a component part of the latter; the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between Santarem and the Zezere, to besiege Abrantes, and if forced to retreat momentarily, he was still to keep his bridges and protecting works on the Zezere with a view to a renewed invasion from Castello Branco. He was also instructed to expect Soult who had been several times commanded to move through the Alemtejo to his assistance, and was now censured by Napoleon for suffering Romana to join Wellington unmolested, when he ought to have been closely

The King's Correspondence, captured at Vittoria.

followed by the fifth corps. The emperor seems even to have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold any particular province. CHAP. II. 1810. Dec.

Massena's instructions reached him in due time, Soult's were intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive before the end of December. This delay at such an important crisis shews that thirty thousand additional men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty of the French communications. When they did reach him the duke of Dalmatia, forced to postpone his designs against Cadiz, repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour Maubourg's cavalry and five thousand infantry of the first corps. The instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined any specific operation. The prince of Esling was to communicate his plan, to which Soult's was to be subordinate; but no certain intelligence even of Massena's early proceedings had reached Seville, and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz until his operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and situation of the other.

The duke of Dalmatia did not know of Romana's march, but he excused himself well for not following him; Mendizabal had remained with considerable forces, and five fortresses were in the allies' possession on the frontier; these he dared not leave be- Marshal Soult's Correspondence. MSS.

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1811. January.

hind. Even now, considering that Sebastiani's hands were full, that the blockade of Cadiz must be maintained, and Seville protected from the Spaniards in the Neibla and at Araceña, he judged that he could not draw off more than twenty thousand men from Andalusia; and with such a force he dared not penetrate to the Tagus, leaving Olivenza and Badajos on his rear; Ballesteros also was sure to join Mendizabal and act upon his communications; and Romana alone, without counting Hill's troops, could, he supposed, bring ten thousand men back against his front; he therefore demanded leave to besiege the fortresses before he marched upon the Tagus. While awaiting this answer he took order for the siege of those places and for the security of Andalusia during his absence. Dessolles' division had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot's took its place at Cordoba. A column of observation was posted under general Digeon at Ecija; Seville, entrenched on the side of Neibla, was given over to general Daricau, and a detachment under Remond was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of sixteen thousand infantry, including artillery sappers and miners, and about four thousand cavalry with fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen hundred carts for stores and provisions, were also prepared: and his administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy of five thousand young Spaniards, called "*escopeteros*" (fuzileers) to maintain the police of the province.

King Joseph's Correspondence, MSS.

SOULT'S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

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Mortier, moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, whereupon Mendizabal retired to Merida, and Ballesteros, obeying orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. But winter tempests raged, the French convoy which moved on Araceña, was overwhelmed by storms, and detained at the foot of the mountains: to protect it and to drive Ballesteros from Frajenal, Gazan was sent from Zafra; but the Spanish leaders, as well those in Estremadura as in Cadiz, were all this time ignorant of Soult's intentions. Some asserted that he was going to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, others that his object was only to crush Ballesteros. Lord Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave Mendizabal notice, that the French were assembling at Seville: so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were the Spaniards. But when the French broke into Estremadura, terror and confusion spread far and wide. Badajos was ill-provisioned, Alburquerque though garrisoned was in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and in the midst of all this disorder, Ballesteros was suddenly drawn off towards the Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment of invasion.

Appendix, No. II. Sec. 5, 6.

Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, the accessible bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of Merida on the 6th.

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Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, and while Latour Maubourg's dragoons held Mendizabal in check on the side of Badajos, Briche's light horsemen collected cattle on the side of Estremadura. Gazan's division, still posted near Frejenal, protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye's brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, marched from Truxillo against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to Alcantara.

FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.

This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions a covered way and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little importance to the French; but it contained four thousand troops and it was therefore of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to furnish the place with good means of resistance: the marquis decided on the former, but Mendizabal slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into the place.

It was invested on the 11th. An abandoned outwork, three hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession of the first night, and breaching and counter-batteries for eight and six guns were marked out. The trenches being opened on the west, approaches were carried on by the flying sap against the old breach; but the rains were heavy and continual, the scarcity of entrench-

ing-tools great, and it was not until the 18th, when the head of the great French convoy had passed the mountains, that the works could be properly advanced. CHAP. II. 1811. January.

On the 19th the covered way was crowned; the 20th the breaching batteries opened their fire, two mortars threw shells into the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the counterscarp. In the evening, Mendizabal skirmished unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg's horsemen covering the siege, and on the 21st the mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch. The Spanish general, unable from the absence of Ballesteros' division to relieve Olivenza, now demanded succour from Romana. He was ill but he sent Carlos D'España with two thousand men from Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own division from Cartaxo the 20th. The 21st, the governor of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain the place to the last moment; yet he capitulated the next day, having still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one hundred effective soldiers. The prisoners were immediately sent to Cordoba, escorted by a regiment, and on the 26th Soult marched against Badajos. French Official Journal of Operations MSS.

Meanwhile Ballesteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and after a sharp battle, driven over the Guadiana into Portugal with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded: his artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, the infantry took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola. Ballesteros' force was thus in a few days reduced by three thousand men, and that nothing

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might be left to alarm the French in that quarter, the Regency recalled Copons' force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve thousand men, who well employed might have frustrated the French designs against Badajos, were dispersed, withdrawn, or made prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult's expedition.

For many months previous to these events lord Wellington had strived to teach the Spanish commanders there was but one safe mode of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his counsels when the sudden arrival of the French threw every thing into confusion; but the defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of Olivenza and the concentration of the armies were all neglected. Romana, as we have seen, sent his divisions towards the frontier and they reached Montemor the 22d, but the 23d they received Mendizabal's orders to halt, as Olivenza had surrendered, and the 24th Romana died of an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss, yet his influence was on the wane; he had many enemies, and his authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops, and by his riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles his revenues did not suffer by the war.

Mendizabal now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana's orders to adopt lord Wellington's plan. This was to concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten thousand men, on the frontier, and before the enemy appeared on the right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great natural strength

close to Badajos; the right was to touch the fort of St. Christoval, the front to be covered by the Gebora river and the Guadiana; the fortress of Campo Mayor was to be immediately in rear of the left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabal should be entrenched on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English general thought Soult could not invest or even straighten the communications of the town; yet knowing well the people he dealt with, he prophetically observed, "*with soldiers of any other nation success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation in which Spanish troops are engaged.*" CHAP. III. 1811. January. Appendix, No. II. Sec. 6.

When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Alburquerque, another in Valencia d'Alcantara; Carlos d'España was in Campo Mayor, and Virues was with Romana's divisions at Montemor. When Soult drove back the out-posts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabal shut himself up with six thousand men in that fortess; but though a siege had been expected for a year, the place was unprovisioned. It was still possible to execute the English general's plan, yet no Spaniard moved, and on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora and cut off the communications with Campo Mayor and Elvas.

FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the Guadiana with the Rivillas. The first is a noble river five hundred yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet

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high and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the waters. The town, spreading out like a fan as the land opens between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good counterscarps, covered way and glacis. On the left bank of the Guadiana the outworks were, 1°. the Lunette of San Roque, covering a dam and sluice on the Rivillas by which an inundation could be made; 2°. an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3°. the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower Guadiana and the Rivillas and two hundred yards from the ramparts.

On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill crowned by the regular fort of San Christoval three hundred feet square overlooked the interior of the castle; and a quarter of a mile farther down the stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval but commanded on every side.

Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of the Gebora, and opened three attacks against the town the 28th, two on the side of Picurina the other on that of the Pardaleras. The 29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather spoiled the French works; Gazan's division was distant, the infantry before the place were few, and on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared the trenches; some of the Spanish cavalry also, gliding round the left of the French parallel sabred several of their engineers and sappers and then retired.

Conquête de l'Andalusie, par Edouard Lapéne.

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Siège de Badajos, par le Col. Lamare.

In the night of the second a violent tempest flooded the Rivillas, carried away all the French bridges, drowned men and horses, damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest distress; and the next morning the Spaniards, sallying from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded eighty men and ruined part of the parallel. The cavalry employed in the investment could not now forage, the convoys only came in by detachments, scarcity was felt in the camp and the rigour of the winter bivouacs caused sickness. Gazan arrived with his troop on the 3d, but the French cavalry was withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana in consequence of the severe weather, the Spanish communication with Elvas was re-established, and Mendizabal called all the divisions from Portugal to his assistance: Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d'España, and Madden united at Campo Mayor, and even Julian Sanchez brought down his Partida from Upper Estremadura to the Tagus.

Lord Wellington's Correspondence. MSS.

Mr Stuart's Papers, MSS.

In the night of the 5th, Mendizabal repaired to Elvas and took the command of Virues' divisions. He passed the Caya the next morning, and being joined on his march by the troops from Campo Mayor, pushed the few French cavalry posts still on the right bank of the Guadiana over the Gebora: Madden's Portuguese even crossed that river and captured some baggage beyond. But the French being reinforced soon returned and though still inferior in number forced Madden to recross the stream and killed many of his rear-guard; the Spanish cavalry which was in reserve, seeing this fled shamefully, and meanwhile the infantry entered Badajos; for Mendizabal, again neglecting lord Wellington's counsel, instead of taking the strong position behind

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the Gebora resolved to raise the siege by a sally. Yet he delayed the execution until next morning, at the risk of being shut up in Badajos with his whole army; and this would inevitably have happened if a greater body of the French cavalry had passed the Gebora in pursuit of the beaten horsemen.

Badajos now contained sixteen thousand fighting men, and the projected sally was made with great vigour by Carrera and Carlos d'España; for breaking out on the Picurina side with five thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, with one burst they carried all the trenches and batteries. The soldiers fought with surprising ardour, but the generals, unworthy to command such soldiers, had forgotten even to provide the means of spiking the guns when taken: the whole operation was mismanaged and when Mortier fell with his reserves upon the front and flank of the column, it was driven back in disorder with a loss of six hundred killed and wounded. It was a hard struggle for the French lost several engineers and four hundred men; but while the action was being fought Latour Maubourg's cavalry had occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut the Spanish communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor. He was however too weak to maintain himself there, and Madden forced him to repass the Gebora on the 9th. Mendizabal then gave up Badajos again to the care of the governor Rafael Menacho and pitched his own camp round San Christoval.

Some days previous to these events the French had bombarded the place, a proceeding only mischievous to themselves; for the inhabitants fled in great numbers to avoid the danger, leaving behind them provisions which enabled Menacho to feed his

garrison without difficulty. But Soult now seeing the great numbers and the real resources of the Spaniards if their generals had known how to use them, began to fear lest delay should produce a change of commanders or of system, and to forestal the danger resolved to bring matters to a crisis. In this view he stormed the Pardaleras on the 11th; on the 12th he sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo, and the 14th, he threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which obliged Mendizabal to remove from the heights in front of that fort.

Meanwhile, the knowledge that Castaños was appointed captain-general of Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana's soldiers. They had long considered themselves independent of the central government, and in this mood, although the position behind the Gebora was at last occupied as recommended by lord Wellington, no attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had expressly advised Mendizabal to increase the great natural strength of this position with entrenchments; his design being that the Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field operations, should have an impregnable post from whence they could safely aid in the defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the Alemtejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements, which he expected in the latter end of January, should enable him to raise the siege. Mendizabal, with the arrogance peculiar to his nation, rejected this counsel. He hung twelve days on the heights of Christoval in a torpid state; and when driven thence by the French shells, he merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, neither casting up entrenchments, nor keeping a guard in his front, nor disposing his

Appendix, No. X. Section 2.

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, MSS.

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men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon him.

BATTLE OF THE GEBORA.

The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position, yet this did not deter the duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and surprise the camp; and first, to deprive Mendizabal of the aid of San Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar-batteries again threw shells on the 17th. The great swell of the rivers would not permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the 18th, but on that day the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry, four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. And the combinations were so exactly executed, that precisely as the day broke on the 19th, five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry were formed in order of battle on the right bank of the Guadiana.

The Gebora was still to be passed, and behind it the Spaniards had ten thousand infantry, a considerable artillery, and two thousand cavalry, besides many armed followers of the camp; the whole number not being less than fifteen thousand. But a thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance, and Soult riding through the French ranks and exhorting the soldiers to fight manfully commenced the passage of the Gebora; the cavalry forded five miles up the stream, the infantry on the right and left of the broken bridge. Some random shots fired by the French guns

gave Mendizabal the first alarm, and though the mist still hid all things, the clamour amongst the Spanish multitude when the cannon first opened indicated their surprise, whereupon Mortier, acting under Soult, rapidly formed the line of battle.

At eight o'clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the sun and the certainty of victory flashed together on the French soldiers. For their horsemen were already around the Spanish left, while in the centre, infantry cavalry and guns heaped together, were waving to and fro in disorder, and the right having fallen away from San Christoval was unsupported. In a few moments, general Girard placed three battalions between the Spanish army and the fort, the artillery roared, and the French bore forward as one man to the attack. Six battalions pressed on the front, Girard moved against the right, the cavalry charged the left, the Spaniards instinctively crowded in disorder upon their own centre and there for some time they resisted by their inert force; but the French infantry closed with a destroying musquetry, the horsemen spurred in with loose bridles, and the huge quivering mass was divided and slaughtered. The cavalry fled outright, and even Madden's Portuguese, disregarding alike his exhortations and example, shamefully turned their backs.

At ten o'clock the fight was over. Virues was taken, Mendizabal and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made an orderly retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men; a few reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos by the bridge, and nine hundred bodies strewed the field. Eight thousand, including armed followers, were

Appendix, No. II. Section 8.

BOOK XII. 1811. February.

made prisoners, and all the guns, colours, muskets, ammunition, baggage, fell into the enemy's hands. It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter, Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in constant service. Mendizabal, instead of destroying the bridge over the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely pass to attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have gone through Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches with his whole army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers.

In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments and posted three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important position they had gained. The next day the works of the siege were renewed with greater activity, but the difficulty of Soult's undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual rains interrupted the arrival of his convoys and obliged him to employ a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two thousand had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in this battle, many also were sick and Badajos was still powerful. The body of the place was entire. The garrison was nine thousand strong, and by the flight of the inhabitants well provided with food, and there was no want of other stores: the governor was resolute and confident; the season was rigorous for the besiegers; no communication had been yet opened with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary expectation that his reinforcements would arrive,

was impatient to bring on a crisis. Meanwhile, the duke of Dalmatia's power in Andalusia was menaced in the most serious manner. CHAP. II. 1811. February.

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

When general Graham knew of Soult's departure from Chiclana, and that the fifth corps had also quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. In this view troops, sailing from Cadiz on the 29th of January, were to disembark in rear of the French, and to be joined by major Brown with the garrison of Tarifa, and with three thousand Spaniards from San Roque, under general Beguines. Contrary winds delayed the troops at Cadiz, and the dispatch vessels carrying counter orders to Brown and Beguines being likewise retarded, those officers advanced, the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor having notice of the project at first kept close in his works; but when he knew the state of affairs he sent troops to retake Medina and Casa Vieja, and in the course of February he was reinforced with twelve thousand men, drawn from the northern governments of Spain and directed upon Andalusia. His corps was thus increased to twenty thousand men, fifteen thousand of whom were in the lines, the remainder at San Lucar, Medina Sidonia, and other posts. Nevertheless ten thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry of the allies were again embarked at Cadiz, being this time to land at Tarifa and march at once upon Chiclana. General Zayas, who remained in command of the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was meanwhile to cast a

Official Abstract of Military Reports. MSS.

Appendix No. I. Section 5.

BOOK XII. 1811. February.

bridge over the San Patri near the sea mouth, and Ballesteros with the remains of his defeated army was to menace Seville. The Partidas were to keep Sebastiani in check, and insurrections, some of which did break out, were expected in all quarters.

The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22d, but landing at Algesiras they marched to Tarifa the next day, and were there joined by the twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second regiments. Thus somewhat more than four thousand effective troops, including two companies of the 20th Portuguese and one hundred and eighty German hussars, were assembled under general Graham; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and of a ready temper for battle. General La Peña arrived on the 27th with seven thousand Spaniards, and Graham to preserve unanimity, immediately ceded the command although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day the whole moved forward twelve miles, and passed some ridges which descending from the Ronda mountains to the sea separate the plains of San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana. Being now within four leagues of the enemy's posts, the troops were re-organized. The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; the centre to the prince of Anglona; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the British troops, was confided to Graham; the cavalry of both nations formed in one body, was commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the Spanish service.

Appendix, No. XII. Section 2.

The French covering division was under general Cassagne. It consisted of three battalions and a regiment of horse placed at Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before

La Peña's arrival, the irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general Beguines had taken Medina; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry from Arcos, retook and entrenched it the 29th. The signal of action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces, perceiving the people were ready for commotion, gathered in their scattered troops, and following Soult's orders concentrated at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba. In Grenada however the insurgents were especially active, and Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his head, concentrated a column at Estipona, which was a good covering point to the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda. Victor manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Troccadero with a mixed force of refugee French juramentados and regular troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana, between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the unfolding of the allies' project.

Intercepted Letter of General Werle to Sebastiani, Alhama, March 12.

Appendix, No. I. Section 6.

At first La Peña's march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard stormed Casa Viejas on the 2d of March, and Beguines' troops, amounting to sixteen hundred infantry besides several hundreds of irregular cavalry, coming in, encreased his force to twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia was entrenched, turned towards the coast and drove the French from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his movement, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the English the heights of Barosa;

BOOK XII. 1811. February.

then only four miles from the sea mouth of the Santi Petri.

The hill of Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast about one mile and a half, and overlooking a high broken plain of small extent. This plain was bounded on the left by the coast cliffs, on the right by the forest of Chiclana, in front by a pine-wood, beyond which rose a long narrow height called the Bermeja, filling all the space between the Almanza creek and the sea, and to be reached by moving either through the pine-wood in front or by the beach under the cliffs. The crisis of the expedition had now arrived, Graham foreseeing that Victor would come out of his lines to fight, had previously obtained La Peña's promise to make short marches, to keep the troops fresh for battle, and not to approach the enemy except in a mass. Nevertheless, the march from Casa Vieja, made along bad roads with ignorant guides, had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been still more fatiguing. The troops therefore came up in a straggling manner; and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his colleague, without either disclosing his own plans or communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent general Lardizabal with the vanguard, reinforced by a squadron and three guns, straight to the mouth of the Santi Petri. Here Zayas had cast his bridge on the 2d, and commenced an entrenchment, but in the night he was surprised by the French and driven again into the Isla; the movement of the Spanish vanguard was therefore most dangerous; however Lardizabal, after a sharp fight in which three hundred Spaniards fell, forced the French posts and effected a junction with Zayas.

Appendix, No. IX. Section 8.

CHAP. II.

1811. March.

La Peña desired the British troops to follow the vanguard, but Graham was extremely desirous to hold the Barosa height in strength. He argued that Victor could not attack Lardizabal and Zayas, as no general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy by assailing that ridge while the Barosa hill was thus occupied by the allies. Lascy, the chief of the Spanish staff, controverted this reasoning, and La Peña peremptorily commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to Bermeja. With great temper he obeyed this uncourteous order, but he left the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second regiments under major Brown to guard his baggage, and he moved also in the full persuasion that La Peña would remain on the Barosa hill with Anglona's division and the cavalry, and the more so that a Spanish detachment was still on the side of Medina. Yet the British had scarcely entered the wood in front, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of battle, and directing the cavalry to follow repaired himself by the sea-road to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage and protected only by a rear-guard of four guns and five battalions.

During these events Victor kept so close to the forest of Chiclana, that the allies' patroles could find no enemy, and Graham's march of only two miles seemed safe; but the French marshal was keenly watching his opportunity. He had recalled Cassagne's infantry from Medina Sidonia when La Peña reached Barosa and momentarily expected its arrival, and he felt so sure of success, that the great body of French cavalry, then at Medina and Arcos. was directed upon Vejer and other points to cut off the fugitives after the battle. He had already con-

Appendix, No. I. Section 7.

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centrated fourteen pieces of artillery and nine thousand excellent soldiers commanded by Laval, Ruffin, and Villatte; from this force he drafted three grenadier battalions to form reserves; two of them and three squadrons of cavalry he attached to Ruffin's brigade which formed his left wing; the other waited on Laval's brigade which formed his centre; Villatte's brigade, two thousand five hundred strong, which had been originally on the Bermeja, but retired from thence before Lardizabal, was now posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of the camp and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and the Bermeja.

BATTLE OF BAROSA.

Cassagne had not yet arrived, but when Victor saw Graham's corps in the wood, Zayas and Lardizabal on the Bermeja, a third body and all the baggage on the Barosa height, a fourth in movement by the coast, and a fifth still on the march from Vejer, he poured at once into the plain and begun the battle. Laval was directed against the British troops in the wood, but Victor, leading Ruffin's troops in person, ascended the rear of the Barosa height, and having thus intercepted the Spanish detachment left on the road of Medina, he drove the whole of the rear-guard off the hill towards the sea, dispersing the baggage and the followers of the army in all directions, and taking three Spanish guns.

Major Brown kept his companies in good order, but unable to stem the torrent, slowly retired into the plain and sent to Graham for orders. The latter who was then near to Bermeja sent him a

hasty answer to fight, and facing about himself regained the plain with great celerity, expecting to find La Peña with the corps of battle and the cavalry on the Barosa hill. But when the view opened he beheld Ruffin's brigade flanked by the two grenadier battalions near the summit on the one side, the Spanish rear-guard and the baggage flying toward the sea on the other, the French cavalry following the fugitives in good order, Laval close upon his own left flank, and La Peña nowhere!

In this desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja and thus bring the enemy pell-mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge must be disastrous, wherefore, without a moment's hesitation, he resolved to attack although the key of the field of battle was already in the enemy's possession. Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval's column, and colonel Andrew Barnard running vehemently out with his riflemen and some Portuguese companies, commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, with one of which general Dilkes marched hastily against Ruffin, while colonel Wheately led the other against Laval. Duncan's guns ravaged the French ranks, Laval's artillery replied vigorously, Ruffin's batteries took Wheately's column in flank, and the infantry on both sides pressed forward eagerly and with a pealing musquetry. But when the masses drew near, a fierce rapid and prolonged charge of the 87th regiment overthrew the first line of the French, and though the latter fought roughly, they were dashed violently upon the second line and both being broken by the shock went off, the reserve bat-

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talion of grenadiers, hitherto posted on the right, alone remaining to cover the retreat. Meanwhile Brown receiving Graham's laconic order, fell headlong upon Ruffin; and though nearly half of his detachment went down under the enemy's first fire, he maintained the fight, until Dilkes' column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopt even to reform the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a fighting mood, and then the whole run up towards the summit. There was no slackness on any side for at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met them, and a dreadful, and for some time a doubtful combat raged. Finally Ruffin, and Chaudron Rousseau, who commanded the chosen grenadiers, fell, both mortally wounded, the English bore strongly onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers. The discomfited divisions, retiring concentrically from their different points of battle, soon met, and with infinite spirit endeavoured to reform and renew the action; but the play of Duncan's guns, close rapid and murderous, rendered the attempt vain; whereupon Victor quitted the field of battle, and the British having been twenty-four hours under arms without food, were too exhausted to pursue.

While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, nor any part of his army to the assistance of his ally; nor yet menacing Villatte who was close to him and comparatively weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some Guerilla cavalry, turned indeed without orders, and came up just as the action ceased, and it was expected that

colonel Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of Spanish horse, would have done as much. But no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain indeed was this, that colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, and charging the French squadrons in their retreat, overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted though vainly to sabre Rousseau's chosen battalions.

Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour and a half, but most violent and bloody, for fifty officers, sixty serjeants, above eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than two thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded: six guns, an eagle, two generals both mortally wounded, together with four hundred other prisoners fell into the hands of the victors.

Graham remained for some hours on the height, still hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri, the Spanish general was therefore at the head of twelve thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while before him were only the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling was extinct in La Peña, and as Graham could no longer endure such com-

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mand, he left the dastard on the Bermeja and filed the British troops over the bridge into the Isla.

On the French side, Cassagne's reserve came up from Medina, and a council of war being held in the night of the 5th, Victor, although naturally desponding, proposed another attack, but the suggestion being ill received nothing was done. On the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing his seamen and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession of the latter place; this caused such confusion and alarm in the French camp, that the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of his lines and a rear guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked; and if La Peña had even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero: yet the 6th and 7th passed, without even a Spanish patrole following the French. On the 8th Victor returned to Chiclana, whereupon La Peña recrossed the Santi Petri and destroyed the bridge; his detachment on the side of Medina was thus cut off from the Isla, and soon afterwards retired to Algesiras.

Official Abstracts of Military Reports, MSS.

All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La Peña was surprizingly contrasted with the heroic vigour of Graham, whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise so sudden was the decision, so swift so conclusive the execution. The original plan of the enterprise has however been rather rashly censured. "Sebastiani," it is said, "might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have

crushed them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity." This is a shallow criticism. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve under another, judged that Sebastiani would not hastily abandon his own district, menaced as it was by insurrection, to succour Victor before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, whereas from Sebastiani's nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina. Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason to expect several days of free action, and thus indeed it happened; with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade; more than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija, and they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia.

Appendix, No. IX. Section 5.

The real error of the French dispositions has however been pointed out by the emperor Napoleon. Soult he said disseminated his forces too widely and did not make his combinations with skill. Seville and the lines before Cadiz were the only important points necessary to guard during his absence; he should therefore have collected all his hospitals in Seville, so as to leave his scattered posts free to move to any point at once. Sebastiani and Godinot should have been placed under Victor's orders, who could then have drawn their troops to his succour in time, and have crushed the allies. In this manner it is certain that Sebastiani might have prevented the expedition altogether: but general Graham as I have said, knew that he was not

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under Victor's command and it was a proof of genius to reckon so confidently on the effect which the insurrections in Grenada would have upon him. The error was with Sebastiani, who having sixteen thousand excellent troops was paralyzed by some insurgents.

Victor's attack on the 5th, was well-judged, well-timed, and vigorous; with a few thousand more troops he alone would have crushed the allies; the unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this disaster; but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an enclosure, having the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña's misconduct, the French, although defeated, gained their main point, the blockade was renewed, and during the action a French detachment passed the Santi Petri near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, and brought back prisoners: with a few more troops Victor might have seized the Isla.

Ballesteros, who had gone against Seville during the operation near Chiclana, was chased in a miserable condition to the Aroche hills by Daricau. Meanwhile violent disputes arose in Cadiz. La Peña, in an address to the Cortes, claimed the victory for himself; he affirmed that all the arrangements previous to the battle were made with the knowledge and approbation of the English general, and declared the latter's retreat into the Isla to be the real cause of failure: Lascy and Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold

their statements. But Graham, incensed at these unworthy proceedings, wrote a letter to the British envoy in which he exposed La Peña's misconduct, and refused with disdain the title of grandee of the first class voted to him by the Cortes: and when Lascy used some expressions relative to the action personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his sword. Having thus shewn himself superior to his opponents at all ways, the gallant old man relinquished his command to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington's army.

CHAP. II.

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CHAPTER III.

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WHILE discord prevailed at Cadiz, nearly the whole of Andalusia was disturbed by insurrections of the peasantry; nevertheless, Soult's resolution to take Badajos continued unshaken. Early in March, the second parallel was completed, the Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches carried by sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the counterscarp. However, Rafael Menacho was in no manner dismayed. His sallies were frequent and vigorous, his courage and activity gave his troops confidence, his fire was still superior to that of the French, he had entrenched all the streets behind the breach, and every thing seemed favourable. But on the 2d of March, in a sally, by which the nearest French batteries were carried and the guns spiked, this brave man was killed and the command fell to Imas, a general so base that a worse could no where be found. The spirit of the garrison then died away, the besiegers' works advanced rapidly and the ditch was passed; a lodgement was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March the place was summoned in a peremptory manner.

At this time the great crisis of the campaign having passed, a strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the siege of

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Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by letter, and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed that Massena was in full retreat, and an army actually in march to succour the place. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army reduced, by sickness by detachments and previous operations, to less than fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter and instantly surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus obtained to the enemy. He also demanded that his grenadiers should march out of the breach: it was granted, and he was obliged to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington's indignant remonstrances forced them to bring him to trial, but they made the process last during the whole war.

Lord Wellington's Despatch.

When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seizing Alburquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara made six hundred prisoners, but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia. He had in fifty days mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth; he had killed or dispersed ten thousand men, and taken twenty thousand with a force which at no time exceeded the number of his prisoners. Yet great and daring and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of his expedition was frustrated: Massena was in full retreat. Lord Wellington's combinations palsied the hand of the conqueror!

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While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in the main positions of either army at Santarem. The French general had been encouraged to maintain his ground by the destitute state of the Portuguese army, which he hoped would break up the alliance; for such had been the conduct of the Regency, that the native troops were starving in their own country while the British were well fed; and the deserters from the former, without knowing the cause, had a story, as true as it was pitiable to tell of their miseries. The English general, certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, only waited for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men against Soult. The battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements would not then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve Badajos; and it was no longer a question of starving Massena, but of beating him before Soult could take Badajos and the two armies be joined; the prince of Esling therefore had reason to say, that instead of being succoured by Soult he had covered that marshal's operations.

Lord Wellington's plan of attack was to post ten thousand men before the hill of Santarem to hold Reynier in check; to make Beresford cross the Tagus at Abrantes and fall on Massena's rear; meanwhile, moving himself with the rest of the army by Rio Mayor and Tremes, he proposed to force back the French centre and right, and cutting off their left, drive it into the Tagus. But nothing could be attempted until the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain expecta-

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tion of their coming. They had been embarked in January and would have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, if the admiral, sir Joseph Yorke, had taken advantage of a favourable wind which blew when the troops were first put on board; but he neglected the opportunity, contrary gales followed, and the ordinary voyage of ten days was prolonged for six weeks.

On the other hand, the French general's situation was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and that fortress although an important strategic point for the allies, who had a moveable bridge, was not so for the French. Massena could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For some time he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left. However that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and Massena knew only that Soult was before Badajos, and nothing more. Thus time wore away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and the conspiracy to put St. See Vol. II. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain was by no means relinquished. Under these accumulating difficulties the prince of Esling's obstinacy at last gave way, and he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would serve his army for the march.

This tardy resolution was adopted at the mo[illegible]

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when to maintain his position was more important than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena's failure. This can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of the Gebora, Mendizabal could have assembled twenty thousand men on Soult's rear, there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga, and Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese regulars, besides ordenança. The infinite number of boats at lord Wellington's command would have enabled him to throw troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia; and if the latter had been defeated, with what argument could he have defended his reputation as a general, for having left three or four garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank and rear: to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of Barosa. The true cause of Massena's failure was the insufficiency of his means to oppose the English general's combinations.

The French infantry reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of Drouet's troops at Leiria, were now quite unable to maintain their extended positions against the attack meditated by lord Wellington, and when Massena heard through the fidalgos, that the English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those troops landed the 2d of March, and the 6th the French were all gone from the position of Santarem.

At this time Napoleon remodelled the armies of Spain. The king's force was diminished, the army of the south increased; general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to join the fifth corps, which he was appointed to command in place of Mortier; the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received. Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any plan of action that might seem good to him, without reference to his original base: the order for the execution of these measures did not indeed reach the armies until a later period; but several lines of operation were even now open to the prince of Esling.

Muster-Rolls of the French Army.

Appendix, No. VII.

1°. He could pass the Tagus, between Santarem and Punhete or between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats, or possibly by fords which were often practicable after a week of dry weather. 2°. He could retire by the Sobreira Formosa upon Castello Branco, and open a communication with the king by Placentia, or with the duke of Dalmatia

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by Alcantara. 3°. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. 4°. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that river towards Guarda and Almeida; or crossing it, march upon Oporto through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was perilous because the weather was too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The second and third were difficult from the ruggedness of the Sobreira; and exposed, because the allies conld break out by Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last so far as to gain the Mondego; but he and the emperor both designed that he should halt on that river, reduce Oporto by a detachment, and with the aid of his ninth corps and other troops, which it was calculated would increase his army to seventy thousand fighting men, maintain himself until the following September, when the attack on Lisbon was to be renewed with greater means on both sides of the Tagus while a connecting corps marched upon the Zezere. Meanwhile he had as a preliminary step, to make a flank march, carrying with him more than ten thousand sick men and all his stores under the beard of an adversary, before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a manner befitting a great commander.

Commencing his preparations by destroying ammunition, and all guns that could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage by degrees upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting men in the front, and at the same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. When the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly [illegible]mbled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the

Lys near Leiria, as if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile the second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete, in the night of the 5th, fell back by Pernes upon Torres Novas and Thomar, and destroyed the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat, while the remainder of the army made rapid concentric marches towards a position in front of Pombal. The line of movement to the Mondego was thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although aware that a retreat was in progress of execution, was quite unable to take any decided step lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the 5th, and discovering the empty camps of Santarem at daylight on the 6th, followed the enemy closely with his own army.

Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart crossed the Tagus at Abrantes with the greatest part of Beresford's corps, whilst the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, marched to Golegao: the light division also reached Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of the royal staff-corps. As the enemy had burned all the boats on the Zezere, the Abrantes bridge was floated down to that river on the 7th, whereby Stewart crossed and moved to Thomar; and on that place the divisions at Golegao were likewise directed. Massena's line of retreat was now how-

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ever decidedly pronounced for the Mondego, wherefore the troops at Thomar halted; but the light division, the German hussars, and the royal dragoons followed the eighth corps, and took two hundred prisoners.

This day's march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered to be filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had died but sitting by the bodies were fifteen or sixteen still living, of whom one only was a man, and all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we could offer to them. The youngest had fallen first, all the children were dead. None were emaciated, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving an appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life, the women appeared patient and resigned; and, even in this distress, they had carefully covered and arranged the bodies of those who first died.

While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and fifth divisions moved from the Lines upon Leiria; the Abrantes' boats fell down the river to Tancos, and a bridge being fixed there the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed to return from Thomar, recross the Tagus, and march to the succour of Badajos: Beresford who had remained with a part of his corps near Barca, likewise sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that purpose. Meanwhile lord Wellington, misled, partly by a letter of general Trant's, partly by information obtained in Santarem, partly by Massena's feigned movement, at first thought the retreat would be by the Puente de Murcella, and

indeed the French general had at one time contemplated a march by that line. But on the 8th the English general was convinced the object was Coimbra. CHAP. III. 1811. March.

The 9th the French commander, instead of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps and Montbrun's cavalry, on a table-land in front of Pombal, where the light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German horse charging his cavalry with success, took some prisoners. Here, finding the French disposed to accept battle, Lord Wellington was compelled to alter his plans. For to fight with advantage, it was necessary to bring up from Thomar the troops destined to relieve Badajos; not to fight, was to give up to the enemy Coimbra and the untouched country behind as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire with the advantages of a conqueror. The dilemma was perplexing; but at the moment letters received from Badajos, described that place as being in a sufficient state to hold out for a month, which decided the question. The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for the Alemtejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale was directed to move with a brigade of the first division and some horse by the road of Espinal, to observe the second corps; the rest of the army moved concentrically upon Pombal.

How dangerous a captain Massena could be was here proved. He had in a wonderful manner maintained an army for nearly six months in a country supposed to be incapable of sustaining it for fifteen days; and now he had in very difficult circumstances carried that army off with an easy skill that marked his consummate knowledge of war. His first movement began the 4th, it was the 11th

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before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to fight him at Pombal; and during these seven days he had executed one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four marches, and completely organized his system of retreat. And had any rain fallen on the first day, the allies could not have followed him with artillery, such was the state of the roads, whereas he had before sent off or destroyed all his guns, except a few light pieces drawn with picked horses, and would thus have had another advantage.

COMBAT AT POMBAL.

Pack's brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, with the Portuguese troops, attached like the Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on the 10th, when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure river in the night, by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. He was closely followed by the light division, the streets were still encumbered, and Ney drawing up a rear-guard on a height behind the town, threw a detachment into the old castle of Pombal. He had however waited too long. The French army was forced to move with some confusion by a very long and narrow defile between the mountains and the Soure river, which was fordable, and the British divisions were in rapid motion along the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down and cutting the line of retreat. The fall of night indeed prevented this operation, but a combat took

place at Pombal, where the riflemen and the third caçadores of the light division, after some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town with such vigour, that they could not destroy the bridge although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy was somewhat greater.

In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick marched first, protected by the reserve cavalry; they were followed by the eighth corps, while the sixth reinforced with some light cavalry and the best horsed of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been directed to detach Marcognet's brigade from the Lys river on the 10th, to seize Coimbra, but he neglected the order and Massena now sent Montbrun on that service; a very important one, for lord Wellington's object was to hurry Massena past Coimbra, and thus force him to quit Portugal. He designed to effect this by operating on his flanks rather than by battle, for he judged the moral effect would suffice for the general cause; but as the reinforcements lately arrived from England were still distant, he was forced to keep the fourth division and the cavalry, though required for the succour of Badajos, still with him, and was therefore willing enough to strike a sudden stroke if occasion offered while he had these troops. But the country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined by mountains on either hand, and every village formed a defile; the weather also, was moderate, and favourable to the enemy, and Ney with a happy mixture of courage and skill, illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war.

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Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles of march, with some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a hollow way, leading to some table-land, on which Ney had disposed five thousand infantry a few squadrons of cavalry and some guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings were covered by wooded heights which he occupied with light troops, his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha stream, which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long and dangerous defile. Beyond the stream, some very rugged heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of heavy guns, all so skilfully disposed as to give the appearance of a very considerable force.

COMBAT OF REDINHA.

After examining the enemy's position for a short time, lord Wellington directed the light division, now commanded by sir William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney's right, and in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second, the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, aided by a company of the forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the same moment a squadron of the third French hussars, led by colonel La Ferriere, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This

officer never failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most critical moments, sometimes with a squadron, sometimes with only a few men; but during the whole campaign he was always sure to be found in the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry.

Erskine's line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six guns, was formed in such a manner that it out-flanked the French right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha; it was now reinforced with two regiments of dragoons, and meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights protecting the French left. Thus Ney's position was laid bare. Nevertheless, that marshal, observing that lord Wellington, deceived as to his real numbers, was bringing the whole mass of the allied troops into line, far from retreating charged Picton's skirmishers and held his ground with an astonishing confidence; though the third division was nearer to the village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained for about an hour, when three cannon shots were fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and suddenly a most splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with troops, and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain bending on a gentle curve and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the French battalions: the latter were

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instantly hidden by the smoke, and when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen!

Ney, keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed Picton's foremost skirmishers with his left, while he withdrew the rest of his people, and with such rapidity that they gained the village before even the cavalry could touch them: the utmost efforts of Picton's light troops and the horse-artillery only enabled them to gall the hindmost of the French with their fire. One howitzer was, however, dismounted, but the village of Redinha was in flames between it and the pursuers, and the marshal, wishing to confirm the courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, ordered the French colonel Brüe to cover it with some infantry while in person he superintended the carrying off the injured piece; this was effected yet with the loss of fifteen or twenty of Brüe's men, and with great danger to Ney, for the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops of the third division, chasing like heated blood-hounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the latter then cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh disposition of attack was made by lord Wellington, the third division continued to press the left, and Ney fell back upon the main body at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear.

The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and wounded in this combat. The enemy lost as many, but he might have been destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his first position, and lord Wellington, deceived by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, paid him too much respect. Nevertheless the extraordinary faci-

lity and precision with which the English general handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and produced a palpable effect upon the after operations.

On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o'clock discovered the French army, the second corps which was at Espinhal excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena's retreat had arrived. The defiles of Condeixa leading upon Coimbra were behind him, and those of Miranda de Corvo leading to the Puente de Murcella were on his left; but in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, and his position was only to be approached by the high road which led through a deep hollow against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct this passage, a pallisado barred the hollow, and breast-works were thrown up on each side, for here Massena designed to stop the allies while Montbrun seized Coimbra; and had he succeeded he would have assumed a permanent position behind the Mondego, and maintained it until the operations of Soult should draw off lord Wellington, or the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north should enable him to resume the offensive: nor would this have been very difficult, for he calculated justly that the devastated state of the country between the Lines and the Mondego would prevent the allies from pressing his new position.

Hitherto the French general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary assumed the superiority. When at Thomar, he had, in expectation that Massena would cross the Mondego, directed Baccellar to look to the security of Oporto, intending to follow the French himself with the utmost

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rapidity; and he had also ordered Trant and Wilson to abandon the Mondego and Vouga rivers the moment the fords should become passable; they were to retire across the Douro, to break up the roads as they retreated, to remove all boats and means of transport, and to defend that river to extremity, that the army might have time to close upon the enemy's rear. Wilson had been in observation of the Ponte Murcella road, but hearing the enemy were menacing Coimbra, he crossed the Mondego at Pena Cova, passed between the French parties, and effected a junction with Trant. Both then fell back, Wilson upon Busaco, Trant towards the Vouga. But the latter soon returned, for the river was flooding, and having previously destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge and placed guards at the fords as far as Figueras, when the sound of guns reached these outposts he felt assured the allied army was close at the heels of the enemy.

On the 11th Baccellar forced him to send the greatest part of his force again towards the Vouga, yet he resolved to dispute the passage of the Mondego with the remainder, and on the evening of that day some French patroles appeared at the suburb of Santa Clara, while a party of their dragoons actually forded the Mondego at Pereiras.

The 12th some French officers examined the bridge, one of them was wounded by a cannon-shot, a skirmish took place along the banks of the river, and a party attempting to feel its way along the bridge was dispersed by grape-shot. The fords were however actually practicable for cavalry, and as there were not more than two or three hundred militia men to defend the river, if Marcognet's brigade had marched in time Coimbra must have

fallen. The French thought the reinforcements lately arrived from England had come by sea to the Mondego, but this was a great error; Coimbra was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it after the battle of Busaco.

Montbrun finding such resistance sent an exaggerated report early on the 13th to Massena, and the latter too readily crediting his account of Trant's strength, relinquished the idea of passing the Mondego. In his report to the emperor he assigned as an additional reason that the reports made general Hill in march with a strong corps from the valley of the Zezere across the mountains to the Mondego, but general Hill was really in England, no troops marched that way, and Trant's boldness had completely deceived the French general who now resolved to retreat upon the Puente de Murcella. To insure the power of changing his line and to secure his communications with Reynier who was marching from the side of Espinal, he had brought Loison's division to Fonte Coberta, a village situated five miles on his left, at the point where the Anciao road falls into that leading to the Ponte Murcella. He now reinforced him with Clauzel's division, and thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, with Reynier's corps behind on the line of communication, and Ney in possession of Condeixa, he judged his position secure, and showed as confident a front as if he had gained Coimbra. His baggage was however observed filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Condeixa, and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the true state of affairs as instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over the Sierra de Anciao to turn his extreme left.

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For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena had repaired in person to Fonte Coberta, leaving Ney orders to set fire to Condeixa at a certain hour, when all the divisions were simultaneously to concentrate at Casal Nova on a second position, perpendicular to the first and covering the road to Puente Murcella. Towards three o'clock, however, Picton was descried winding round a bluff end of the Anciao Sierra about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the French left confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke soon arose from Condeixa, columns were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova, and the British troops pushed forward. The felled trees and other obstacles impeded the advance at first, and a number of fires simultaneously kindled covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery; hence the skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the enemy, but so rapidly as to penetrate between the division at Fonte Coberta and the rest of the French, and it is affirmed that the prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light troops.

Condeixa being thus gained, the British cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, cut off Montbrun, and took some of his horsemen. The rest of the army kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up to the enemy, but in the night, about ten o'clock, the French divisions, whose presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, passed close along the front of the British posts and made for Miranda de Corvo. This march was

heard but supposed to be the moving of baggage to the rear and was so reported to sir William Erskine, whereupon that officer, concluding the French army was in full retreat, without any further inquiry or care at day-light on the 14th, put the light division in march.

COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.

The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was heard on the hills in front, it was evident the French were there in force, and several officers represented the rashness of thus advancing without orders and in such a fog; nevertheless Erskine, with astounding indifference, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even before the piquets had come in from their posts. The road dipped suddenly into a valley and the regiment was immediately lost below in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops, unconsciously passing the enemy's out-posts, had like to have captured Ney himself, whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into the same gulf, when the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were heard; then the vapour rose slowly, and the fifty-second was seen on the slopes of the opposite mountain, closely engaged without support in the midst of the enemy's army.

At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn the left of the French, for

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their front position was very strong, and behind it they occupied the mountain ridges in succession to the Deuca or Deixa river, and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was however a road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was already in march by it for Panella, having orders to communicate with Nightingale, to attack Reynier, and to gain the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers. Between the fourth division and Casal Nova, the third division was more directly turning the enemy's left flank, and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but, marching in one column, it required time to reach the field. Howbeit Erskine's error forced on the action and the whole of the light division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second.

The enemy's ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick and so easily supported, that in a little time, the division was necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in every part without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an equal front until Picton sent the riflemen of the sixtieth to prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side, some advantages were gained, and the right of the enemy was partially turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near, and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then the first fifth and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, also came up on the centre and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge with admirable precision. For a long time he did this without confusion and with very little loss, but

towards the middle of the day the British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and his retreat became more rapid and less orderly: yet he finally gained the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been meanwhile secured by the main body of the French. Here Montbrun rejoined the army. He had summoned Coimbra on the 13th at noon, but without waiting for an answer passed over the mountain, and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very difficult march. CHAP. III. 1811. March.

The loss of the light division this day was eleven officers and a hundred and fifty men. The enemy's loss was greater, and about a hundred prisoners were taken; but during the action at Casal Nova general Reynier hastily abandoned Panella on the approach of the fourth division; whereupon Cole, effecting his junction with Nightingale who had continued to follow the second French corps, passed the Deuca, and Massena fearing lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda and crossed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed and crowded in one narrow line, between the high sierras and the Mondego, and to lighten the march he destroyed a quantity of ammunition and baggage. Yet encumbrances were still so heavy, and the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the passage with a few battalions, charging him however not to risk an action: but Ney, little regarding his orders, kept on the left bank ten or twelve battalions with a brigade of cavalry and some guns, and thus provoked the

COMBAT OF FOZ D'ARONCE.

The French right rested on some wooded and

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rugged ground, their left upon the village of Foz d'Aronce. The weather was obscure and rainy, the allies did not reach the Ceira until four o'clock on the 15th, and little expecting an action proceeded as they came up to kindle the fires; but lord Wellington, having cast a rapid glance over the French position, directed the light division and Pack's brigade to hold their right in play, ordered the third division against their left, and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney's left wing, surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards the river, that some missing the fords rushed into the deeps and were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the action resolved itself into a skirmish, and Ney was enabled to use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile darkness came on and the defeated troops in their disorder fired on each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the British; the enemy's loss was not less than five hundred, of which one-half were drowned, and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed of the river when the waters subsided. In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; but Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, kept his post on the left bank of the Ceira until every encumbrance had passed, and then blowing up seventy feet of the bridge sent his corps on, remaining himself with a weak rear-guard on the right bank.

Thus terminated the first part of the retreat from [illegible]ntarem, during which the French commander, if we

except his error with regard to Coimbra, displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit. I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be attributed to the disorder which usually attends a forced retreat: yet the town of Leiria and the convent of Alcobaça were given to the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and though the laws of war, rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog to devour the dead and dying, and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, had ordered a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed, and the inhuman fellow charged with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to starve. They were thus found by the British army on that day, and the mute but deep expression of pain and grief visible in these poor creatures' looks, so wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers, and so little weight has reason with the multitude when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that

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Lord Wellington's despatches

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moment. A humane feeling would thus have led to direct cruelty. This shows how dangerous it is in war to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy emotion could be thus perverted by an accidental combination of circumstances.

The French have however been accused of many crimes which they did not and could not commit: such as the driving of all women above ten years of age into their camp at Redinha, near which there were neither men nor women to be driven! The country was a desert! They have also been charged by the same writer with the mutilating of John the First's body in the convent of Batalhá, during Massena's retreat; whereas to my certain knowledge the body of that monarch had been wantonly pulled to pieces, and carried off by British officers during the retreat to the Lines!

Southey's Peninsular War, Vol. III.

CHAPTER IV.

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On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days' bread; the allies depended upon a commissariat which broke down under the difficulties, not from any deficiency in Mr. Kennedy the chief of the department, who was distinguished alike for zeal probity and talent; but from the ill conduct of the Portuguese government, which deaf to the repeated representations of lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their magazines, nor collect the means of transporting food during the march. Hence, after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been unable to continue the pursuit, and the brigades under general Pack and colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction, the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general's means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and necessity obliged lord Wellington to halt. There was also an appearance of treachery. Twice during the retreat, namely, at Coimbra and on the Alva,

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general Trant discovered large supplies placed by Portuguese government agents within reach of the French at most critical moments. In despite of all these difficulties Wellington had saved Coimbra, forced Massena into a narrow intricate and ravaged country, and had with an inferior force turned him out of every strong position which he attempted to defend. And this by a series of movements evincing great mastery in war. For noting the skill and tenacity with which the French prince clung to every league of ground, he had constantly menaced the passes in his rear by flank movements, and thus forced them to abandon positions which could scarcely have been forced.

This mode of turning the strength of a country to the profit of the assailants is the secret of mountain warfare; the army which receives battle in the hills has always the advantage, and the general who first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle. Acting upon this plan lord Wellington dislodged Massena from many important posts; and with inferior numbers after passing Redinha; for when Coimbra was saved, and it was clear the French would not deliver a general battle, a brigade of cavalry, some guns, and a division of Portuguese infantry was detached from Condeixa to the Alemtejo. Again in the night of the 13th, when intelligence of the fate of Badajos arrived, an event which uncovered Lisbon, the fourth division was detached also to the Alemtejo, to reinforce Beresford and enable him to retake the fortress before the breaches could be repaired. The subsequent operations against Massena were necessarily slower and more circumspect. Lord Wellington erroneously believed the whole of the ninth

corps to be with the French army, and therefore made the fourth division available for one day more; for the road of Espinhal was the shortest line to his bridge over the Tagus, and the division while moving on Panella to gain that road menaced Massena's left flank on the 13th, and as we have seen caused Reynier to retreat in a hasty manner. Meanwhile Trant and Wilson moving up the right bank of the Mondego, parallel to the French line of retreat, forbad his foragers to pass and were ready either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to harass his flank and rear.

These dispositions were certainly finely combined, and successful; but the military horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north, that Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to draw together at Zamora above seven thousand men, and menaced an invasion of Gallicia; and though Mahi had an army of sixteen thousand men lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabal, proved that from Spain no useful co-operation was ever to be expected. Mortier also had now invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom it had been delivered under an engagement of honour, contracted by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and two hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend a fortress which required a garrison of five thousand regulars. Nor was the enemy immediately in the British front the last to be considered.

Appendix, No. II. Section 9.

Ibid.

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Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the 17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty, while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge made in the night by the staff-corps: but the French having repaired the broken bridge of Murcella and thus passed the Alva were in position behind that river. They occupied the Sierra de Moita, and having again destroyed the Ponte Murcella, and another bridge near Pombeira, resolved to halt for several days. In this view Massena sent the second corps up the stream to guard the higher parts and then spread his foragers to a great distance; but he was disturbed sooner than he expected. For three British divisions, sent on the 18th by the Sierra de Guiteria, made way over that rugged mountain with persevering strength, and while they menaced Reynier on the Upper Alva, two other divisions cannonaded Ney on the lower parts of that river.

The Upper Alva, thus threatened by Wellington's right was parallel to the French line of retreat, and Massena finding the ruggedness of the mountain was no protection to him immediately recalled Reynier, and abandoning the Lower Alva also, concentrated on the Sierra de Moita for a battle; it then behoved the allies to concentrate also lest their separated columns should be crushed in detail; but this was difficult to effect in advance, for the Lower Alva was deep, wide and rapid, and there were no pontoons; yet the staff-corps contrived an ingenious raft bridge, by which the light division passed between Murcella and Pombeira; at the same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil on the Upper Alva, and Trant and Wilson closed on the farther side of the Mondego. Massena thus pressed re-

commenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being desirous to gain Celorico and the defiles leading upon Guarda betimes, again destroyed baggage and ammunition; and abandoned even his more distant foraging parties, who were thus intercepted and taken to the number of eight hundred; for lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army was assembled there on the 19th.

The 20th the pursuit was renewed through Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry; the communication was however again opened with Wilson and Trant who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira who was about Trancoso; the third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them.

Massena reached Celorico the 21st with two corps and the cavalry. He immediately opened a communication with Almeida, and posted detachments of horse on the Pinhel, while Reynier who had retired through Govea occupied Guarda with the second corps. He had now regained his original base of operations, and his retreat may be said to have terminated; yet he was far from wishing to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general: shorn also of half his authority, because Bessieres now commanded the northern provinces, which at the commencement of the invasion had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal that his previous retreat might appear only a change of position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other incum-

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brances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, make a countermarch through Sabugal and Pena Macor to the Elga, and so establish new communications, across the Tagus with Soult and by the valley of the Tagus with the king.

But the factions in his army had now risen to such a height he could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants. Drouet, Montbrun, Junot, Reynier and Ney, were all at variance with each other and with him. The first had in the beginning of the retreat been requested to secure Coimbra, instead of which he quitted Portugal, and carried with him Claparede's division. Marcognet's brigade was then ordered for that operation, but it did not move, and Montbrun undertook it but failed as we have seen in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by his wound, yet his faction did not the less shew their discontent. Reynier's dislike to the prince was so strong that the officers carrying flags of truce from his corps never failed to speak of it to the British, and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied Massena's authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, Marcognet's neglect, and the too sudden evacuation of the position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged by his censurers, that far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the signal for a preconcerted retreat, he had promised Massena to maintain the position for twenty-four hours. The personal risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, would seem to confirm this; but when Picton was observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from the army and the passes of

General Pelet's Notes. See Vol. xxi. Victoires et Conquêtes des Francais.

Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have been insane to have delayed his movement. CHAP. IV. 1811. March.

At Miranda, the long gathering anger between the prince and the marshal broke out in a violent altercation; and at Celorico Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida to shorten the term of the retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to Coria; he even moved his troops in a contrary direction, but Massena, a man not to be opposed with impunity, deprived him of his command and gave the sixth corps to Loison. Each marshal sent confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the emperor, and from both of those officers I have derived information, but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved by Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points; I have therefore set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each, without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus judging, it appears that Massena's general views were as superior to Ney's, as the latter's readiness and genius for handling of troops in action were superior to the prince's. Yet the duke of Elchingen often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by him the least important.

From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was only two days march longer than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its fortresses and reserves, and separated from the central line of invasion: whereas by

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gaining Coria a great movement of war wiping out the notion of a forced retreat would have been accomplished. A close and concentric direction would thus have been given to the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and then a powerful demonstration against Lisbon would inevitably have brought lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of the north could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier of Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders on the 23d for the execution, but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him. Meanwhile the English horse and the militia hovering round Celorico, made in different skirmishes a hundred prisoners and killed as many more, and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the second corps at Belmonte; the eighth corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of the Estrella.

Ney's insubordination nullified the plan of marching upon the Elga, but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone. And independent of this general advantage, it was essential to hold Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left Almeida with only ten days' provisions. Soon

however lord Wellington's ready boldness disarranged the prince's calculations. CHAP. IV. 1811. March.

The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the reinforcements from Lisbon, which were organized as a seventh division. The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at Celorico, drove the French from Frexadas, and occupied the villages beyond that place: at the same time, the militia took post on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, and the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. This done, three divisions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry were disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle round the foot of the Guarda mountain, and early on the 29th ascended by as many paths, leading concentrically upon the town and overlapping both the French flanks. They were supported on one wing by the militia, on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first and seventh divisions. A great battle was expected, but the absence of Ney was at once felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied columns threw the French for the first time into the greatest confusion, and without firing a shot this nearly impregnable position was abandoned. Had the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack it is not easy to see how the second corps could have rejoined Massena; but Reynier quitted Belmonte in the night and recovered his communication with a loss of only three hundred prisoners, although the horse-artillery and cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th; and much more could have been done, if general Slade had pushed his

BOOK XII. dragoons forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required.

1811. April. On the 1st of April, the allied army descending the mountains reached the Coa; but the French general, still anxious to maintain at once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the side of Coria or Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was again in position on the right bank of that river. The sixth corps held Rovina, with detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayon; the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of the ninth corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça; the second corps occupied the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, with strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford of Rapoulha de Coa; the eighth corps was at Alfayates, and a post was established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second and the sixth corps. The French army was thus disposed on two sides of a triangle, the apex at Sabugal, and both fronts covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated in a sharp bend of the stream. Massena was even inclined to retake the offensive, for a notion prevailed in his camp, that the allied divisions were very much scattered and might be beaten in detail; the disputes amongst the superior officers prevented this enterprize, which was founded on false information; but the strength of the position again lulled the generals into a false security from which they were roughly awakened.

During the first two days of April lord Wellington occupied a line parallel to the enemy's right, which could not be attacked, because the Coa, which is in itself a considerable river, runs along its

whole course in a rugged channel continually deepening as the stream flows. Trant and Wilson were however directed to pass below Almeida and penetrate between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, thus menacing the enemy's right flank and rear. Meanwhile lord Wellington, leaving the sixth division opposite Ney's corps at Rovina, and a battalion of the seventh division at the bridge of Seceiras to cover the left flank and rear of the allies, resolved with the remainder of the army to turn and attack the left of the French position. For this purpose general Slade's cavalry was directed to cross the Upper Coa, where the bed was most practicable, at daybreak on the 3d; the light division was ordered to ford the river a little below; the third division still lower; the fifth division and the artillery were to force the bridge of Sabugal; the first and seventh divisions, with the exception of the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. Thus ten thousand men, pivotted upon the fifth division at Sabugal, were destined to turn Reynier's left, to separate him from the eighth corps, and to surround and crush him before the sixth corps could come from Rovina to his succour: one of those accidents which are frequent in war marred this well-concerted plan.

BATTLE OF SABUGAL.

The morning was foggy and the troops could not gain their respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is so essential to success; in the light division no measures were taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right direction, the brigades were not even held together,

BOOK X. 1811. April.

and he carried off the cavalry without communicating with colonel Beckwith; that officer, who commanded the first brigade, being thus left without instructions halted at a ford in expectation of further orders. In this state a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily asked why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but with an enemy in his front he could make no reply, wherefore passing the river, which was deep and rapid, he ascended a very steep wooded hill on the other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth leading the way were followed by the forty-third regiment, and meanwhile the caçadores and the other brigade, having before passed the river higher up were moving independently to the right upon the true point of direction. They were now distant, a dark heavy rain rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes, and owing to the obscurity, none of the other divisions of the army had yet reached their respective posts: this attack was therefore made too soon, in a partial and dangerous manner, and at the wrong point, for Reynier's whole corps was in front, and Beckwith having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of riflemen, was assailing more than twelve thousand infantry supported by cavalry and artillery.

Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact and strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third, the weather cleared at the instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt all the danger, but his heart was too big to quail. With one fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and gained and kept the summit of the hill, although two French howitzers poured their showers of grape into his ranks, while a fresh force came

against his front, and considerable bodies advanced on either flank. Fortunately Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the convenience of water placed his main body in the low ground behind the height on which the action commenced. His renewed attack was therefore up hill, yet his musketry, heavy from the beginning, soon increased to a storm, and his men sprung up the acclivity with such violence and clamour, that it was evident nothing but the most desperate fighting could save the British from destruction. CHAP. IV. 1811. April.

Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third, running out to the right, with admirable presence of mind seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding the ascent up which the French troops turning the right flank were approaching. His first fire was so sharp that the assailants were thrown into confusion; they rallied but were again disordered by the volleys of this company; and when a third time they endeavoured to form a head of attack, Hopkins with a sudden charge increased their disorder, and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second regiment, attracted by the fire, entered the line. Meanwhile the centre and left of the forty-third were furiously engaged, and wonderfully excited, for Beckwith with the blood streaming from a wound down his face, rode amongst the foremost of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men in the loud and cheerful tone of a man sure to win his battle. The musket bullets flew thicker and closer every instant and the fight became very perilous, but the French fell fast and a second charge again cleared the hill. One howitzer was taken by the forty-third, and the

BOOK XII. 1811. April.

skirmishers were descending towards the enemy's ground below, when small bodies of cavalry came galloping in from all parts and obliged them to take refuge with the main body, which instantly reformed its line behind a low stone wall.

In this state of affairs, a French squadron of dragoons, having surmounted the ascent, rode with incredible daring up to the wall and were in the act of firing over it with pistols, when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground; at the same time a very strong column of infantry rushing up the face of the hill, endeavoured to retake the howitzer, which was on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third's fire. Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the fifty-second charging violently upon the flank of the enemy's infantry again vindicated the possession of the height; nevertheless fresh squadrons of cavalry, which had followed the infantry in the last attack, seeing the fifty-second men scattered by this charge, flew upon them with great briskness and caused some disorder amongst the foremost skirmishers, but they were soon repulsed.

Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending up his troops piece-meal, now put all his reserves, amounting to nearly six thousand infantry, with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and outflanking the division on its left appeared resolute to storm the contested height. But at this critical period the fifth division passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the hills beyond the enemy's left, and general Colville emerging from the woods on Reynier's right

with the leading brigade of the third division, opened a fire on that side, which instantly decided the fate of the day. The French general then fearing to be surrounded, hastily retreated upon Rendo, where he met the sixth corps which had been put in march when the first shots were heard, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly two hundred killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous: three hundred dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were wounded! So unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant was the English fire. The principal causes of this disproportion were, first the heavy rain which gave the French only a partial view of the British; secondly the thick wood, which ending near the top of the hill left only an open and exposed space for the enemy to mount after the first attack: yet it was no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, "that this was one of the most glorious actions British troops were ever engaged in." Official Despatch.

The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria. Massena was however in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th he crossed the frontier of Portugal. The vigour of the French discipline on sudden occasions was now surprisingly manifested. Those men who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one continued course of violence and devastation, having now passed an imaginary

BOOK XII. 1811. April. Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.

line of frontier became the most orderly of soldiers; not the slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every thing demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and moderation.

While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant having crossed the Lower Coa with four thousand militia, took post two miles from Almeida. But the river suddenly flooded behind him, all the bridges had been broken by Massena, and near fort Conception, there was a brigade of the ninth corps which had been employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo. To extricate his troops Trant constructed a temporary bridge with great difficulty and was going to retire on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters, desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with Almeida, and fearless, because the next morning a British force would be up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he boldly interposed between the fortress and this brigade of the ninth corps, but the promised succours did not appear, and the still advancing French were within half a mile of his position! His destruction appeared inevitable, when suddenly two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the enemy's troops hastily formed squares in retreat, and in ten minutes six squadrons of British cavalry and a troop of horse artillery came sweeping over the plain in their rear. Military order and coolness marked the French retreat across the Turones, yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their dense

masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco, but with the loss of three hundred men killed wounded and prisoners. Trant was thus saved as it were by a miracle; for some unexpected accident had prevented the English infantry from marching in the morning according to lord Wellington's promise, and he had pushed on this cavalry which would have been useless an hour later.

The prince of Esling reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before this event, and lord Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt.

CHAPTER V.

BOOK XII.

1811. April.

MASSENA entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men, and his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand. He repassed the frontier with forty-five thousand, wherefore the invasion of Portugal cost him thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army would have been destroyed, though with great loss to the assailants. A retreating army should fight as little as possible.

When the French reached the Agueda, their cavalry detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents, again augmented the army to more than fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want of provisions would not suffer them to shew a front to the allies; wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, they fell back to Salamanca and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army was disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the headquarters were transferred to Villa Formosa, where colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources he had refused his parole, and

when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged; this man betrayed counsel, but his servant detecting the treachery secretly offered his own aid; but Waters told him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened and no more, for his design was one of open daring. He was placed under the guard of four *gens d'armes*, and when near Salamanca, the chief, who rode the only good horse of the party, alighted for a moment, whereupon Waters gave the spur to his own mare, a celebrated animal, and galloped off! It was an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a wide plain, and before him and for miles behind him the road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and thus marked he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others firing at him, the *gens d'armes* being always sword in hand, close at his heels. Suddenly he broke at full speed between two of the columns, gained a wooded hollow, and having thus baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy's army and the third day reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent!

Appendix, No. VII.

Massena, having occupied Salamanca and communicated with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable to prevent its entrance. He had been forced by want of money to disband all the militia and had disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, to blockade Almeida; he even caused two temporary bridges to be laid where the road from Cinco Villas to Pinhel crosses the Coa, to secure a retreat for the troops on that side if pressed, which might easily

BOOK XII. 1811. April.

happen; for the Portuguese army was in a dreadful state, and the continued misconduct of the Regency, and the absolute want of money, gave little hope of amelioration. It was therefore impossible to take a position beyond the Agueda.

The depots were now re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego, and magazines of consumption were formed at Celorico, from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way of Castello Bom. Measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments to be supplied from Abrantes; but the transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda and Coa, rendered it too dangerous to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida together: for the covering troops would have had those rivers behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. Indeed the blockade of Almeida was only undertaken, because, from intercepted letters and other sources it was known to have but two weeks' provisions, and lord Wellington was prepared to relinquish it if pressed, since it formed no part of the plan which he contemplated.

The success in Portugal having given stability to the English ministers, it would appear they were satisfied, and designed to limit their future efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool now required the return of many battalions to England. But offensive warfare in Spain, occupied the general's thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented themselves to his mind.—1°. Supposing that Massena could not for a long time make another serious attempt on Portugal, he could leave a

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.

part of his force to defend Beira while he marched with the remainder to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2°. If Almeida fell to his blockade he might besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; if Almeida did not so fall he might in time besiege both together; and if they were taken march at once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia and the army of Sicily. Such a great movement as this would have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation, for Madrid the great depôt of the French would have been taken, the northern and southern armies separated, a new base obtained by the English on the Mediterranean, and as the whole of the allied armies would thus have been united a few great battles would have decided the fate of Spain.

Full of this grand project lord Wellington demanded reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his designs into execution if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret aspirations when he reflected upon the national pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, upon their uncertain proceedings, and the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining any reasonable concert and assistance from them. And when to this he added the bad disposition of the Portuguese Regency, the timid temper of the English ministers, so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view, adapting his proceedings to circumstances as they should arise.

His projects were however necessarily conditional, because if Napoleon reinforced his armies again, new combinations would be created; and

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before any other measure, it was essential to recapture Badajos. The loss of that place had affected the safety of Cadiz, and interfered with the execution of both the above mentioned plans and with the safety of Portugal, by enabling the enemy to besiege Elvas. So deeply and sagaciously however had the English general probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to interrupt the blockade of Almeida, he left the command of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but this was one of the most critical periods of the war, and it is essential to have a clear notion of the state of affairs in the South at the moment when Beresford commenced his memorable campaign.

Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor. His arrival at Seville and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, and confidence amongst the troops. Yet both had been so grievously shaken by the battle of Barosa, that the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and Alcala de Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. However discontent and gloom also prevailed in Cadiz. The government had for some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor, but as the fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, Zayas was finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry to Huelva: his object being to gather provisions in the Condada de Neibla. Ballesteros had,

Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbe, Mar. 25th.

Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811. MSS.

on the 10th of March, surprised and dispersed Remond's detachment in that part, but the French were soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D'Aremberg, many of his men deserted to Ballesteros and he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, Ballesteros and Copons were both placed under his orders, and the united corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, were called the *fourth army*. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallied the fugitives from the battle of the Gebora at Villa Viciosa, and reorganized them as the *fifth army*.

During these proceedings, Mortier after occupying Alburquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, besieged Campo Mayor, which being commanded at four hundred yards distance by a hill on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once but for the courage of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred men, and five mounted guns, he made such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, though ill seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and when summoned the second time demanded and obtained twenty-four hours to wait for succour: none arrived, and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores to Badajos.

Such was the exact posture of affairs when Beresford, who had quitted the northern army

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after the combat of Foz d'Aronce, arrived at Portalegre with twenty thousand infantry, more than two thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns. His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and besiege Olivenza and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal being only two marches distant, judged that he might surprise the besieging corps, and with this view put his troops in motion.

COMBAT OF CAMPO MAYOR.

In the morning of the 25th the advanced guard, consisting of all Beresford's cavalry supported by a detachment of infantry under colonel Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor. General Latour Maubourg was then just marching out with nine hundred dragoons, three battalions of infantry, some horse artillery and the battering train of sixteen guns; but his troops were in great disorder, the English cavalry under general Long immediately turned the town by the left, the French retreated by the Badajos road, and the allies followed along some gentle slopes, gradually forming a half circle round the enemy, who was now on a fine plain. Colonel Colborne, although still at a considerable distance, was coming up at a running pace, he was followed by the rest of the second division, and in this state of affairs the French infantry halted and formed a square, placing their own horsemen both before and behind them, while their baggage and guns continued to hurry on towards Badajos.

General Long keeping the heavy cavalry in reserve ordered the thirteenth dragoons, and some Portu-

guese squadrons under colonel Loftus Otway, to attack. The thirteenth under colonel Head moved forward boldly, the French hussars as readily rode out from their infantry, and with loose reins the two bodies came fiercely together. Many men were dismounted by the shock, but the combatants pierced clear through on both sides, then reformed and again charged in the same fearful manner! The fighting now became desperate, but Head's troopers riding closely together, overthrew horse and man and finally forced the enemy to disperse. The French square fired upon the victorious squadrons, but the latter galloped without flinching past the long line of the convoy, hewed down the gunners, and being joined by the Portuguese, the hussars still fighting here and there in small bodies, continued the pursuit.

See Notice at the commencement of this vol.

They thought with reason, that the heavy dragoons the artillery and the infantry, for some of the latter were close up, would be sufficient to dispose of whatever part of the enemy's force was thus passed. But marshal Beresford would not suffer the heavy dragoons to charge; he would not suffer more than two guns to be brought up when he might have had six; he would not suffer those two guns to fire more than a few rounds; and the French marching steadily onward, recovered their battering train and effected their retreat in safety! Meanwhile the thirteenth and the Portuguese, pushed even to the bridge of Badajos, from whence after having cut down the drivers and taken some guns close to the place, they were repulsed by the fire of the fortress, and being followed by Mortier in person, and met by the retiring square, and by all of the beaten cavalry who could find refuge with

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it, lost some prisoners. Of the allies one hundred men were killed or hurt and above seventy taken. Of the enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper of the thirteenth.

To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive movement. When this combat commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a staff-officer, deceived by appearances, told him, the thirteenth had been cut off: hence the marshal, anxious to spare his cavalry which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up the first blow, observing that the loss of one regiment was enough. But the regiment was not lost, the country was open and plain, the enemy's force and the exact posture of affairs easy to be discerned without trusting to baron Trip. The errors of the day therefore rested entirely on Beresford's shoulders, and yet, when the groundless nature of Trip's report was discovered, the thirteenth dragoons who had behaved so nobly were severely reprimanded for pursuing so eagerly! The unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them.

Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left eight thousand rations of bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated Alburquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, being infinitely dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: indeed so secretly and promptly had lord Weltington assembled it, that its existence was only known to the enemy by the blow at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was necessary to be as rapid in exe-

cution, giving the enemy no time to recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, because the breach of Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four hundred men had been thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; and thus, including the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier's numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men. He could not therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication by Jerumenha with Elvas. The fall of Badajos would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor, and the moral impression produced by the charge of the thirteenth dragoons, guaranteed the success of this march: the English general might even have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained his object. Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of the soldiers, especially those of the fourth division, who had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month and were bare-footed and exhausted.

He had been instructed by lord Wellington to throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha, to push back the fifth corps, and to invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government were to have provided some of the means for these operations, and a report had been made that all things

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necessary, that is to say, provisions shoes battering-guns ammunition and transport were actually collected; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas, and all other necessaries would be sent from Lisbon. It now appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores were prepared; that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta's boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable craft on the river, and some small pontoons sent from Lisbon were unfit to bear the force of the current or to sustain the passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions that the garrison stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army.

All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line of operation; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil state of affairs on the right bank did not require the presence of an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, in these circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary effort from such an excellent division: it might without much risk even have been left behind.

Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means of passing at Jerumenha, an error that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained lord Wellington more than a year on the frontiers of Portugal. For during Beresford's delay, general Phillipon, one of the

ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; and Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, covered the country with his foraging parties and filled the magazines.

The engineer, Squire, having fixed trestle piers on each side in the shallows, connected them with the five Spanish boats formerly belonging to Cuesta, and meanwhile a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over by a deep ford to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April the bridge was finished, and the troops assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, intending to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly swelling swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately procured, the Spanish boats were therefore converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, and Squire constructed with the pontoons, and some casks taken from the neighbouring villages, a slight narrow bridge for the infantry. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army commenced passing the 5th of April; it was however late in the night of the 6th ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position on a strong range of hills covered by a swampy rivulet.

During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in securing and provisioning Badajos that his foragers were extended fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of Beresford's proceedings. This error savoured rather of the Spanish than of the French method of making war; for it is evident that a moveable column of

BOOK XII. 1811. April.

five thousand infantry with guns and cavalry, could, notwithstanding the guns of Jerumenha, have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and completely frustrated the operations. A number of the allies sufficient to have resisted any attack should have been ferried over, and entrenched on the left bank to cover the construction of the bridge. Beresford seems to have tempted and Latour Maubourg to have neglected fortune with equal perseverance. At last when the allies had secured the left bank the French general, awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry and four guns at Olivenza, and marched at daylight on the 7th to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. The effort was not even then made in vain, for he surprised and captured a squadron of the thirteenth dragoons, and then advanced so close to the main body of the army as to exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested!

While Beresford was effecting the passage of the Guadiana the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia d'Alcantara and Alburquerque, and pushed cavalry posts to La Rocca and Montijo, Ballesteros entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was appointed to command in Gallicia as well as Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, but he had a grudge against Blake. At first he pretended to the chief authority as the elder captain-general, but Blake demanded a like power over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, was fearful lest Beresford should in these

circumstances refuse to pass the Guadiana, and therefore arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. Thus the inferior officer commanded in chief.

To cover his bridges, which he reconstructed in a more substantial manner, Beresford directed extensive entrenchments to be executed by the militia from Elvas; then leaving a strong detachment for their protection he advanced with the remainder of the army. Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and the allies, who had been joined by Madden's cavalry, summoned Olivenza on the 9th. No defence had been expected, for it was not until after the governor had rejected the summons that major Dickson was sent to Elvas to prepare a battery train for the siege. Meanwhile the army encamped round the place, the communication with Ballesteros was opened, and Castaños entering Merida pushed his cavalry to Almendralejos. The French then fell back to Llerena, and Beresford, leaving general Cole with the fourth division and Madden's cavalry to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera on the 11th. In this position he communicated by his left with Castaños, spread his horsemen in front to cut off all communication with Badajos, and as the army lived on the resources of the country, a brigade was sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies.

The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and being placed in battery on an abandoned horn-work formerly noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison three hundred and eighty men with fifteen guns, soon surrendered at discretion.

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Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of Almendral, and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, was already in motion for the same place by the royal causeway. His object was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and to cut off general Maransin, who had pursued Ballesteros after the retreat of Zayas, had defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, and was now following up his victory towards Salvatierra. He was in great danger, but when the allies were close upon him, an alcalde gave him notice and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, reached Los Santos, between which place and Usagre they were charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously that one hundred and fifty were killed or taken, without the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers.

On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops, for they had seen great masses put in motion without any adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow without being prudent. The whole army had passed the Guadiana on the 7th, and including the Spaniards from

Montijo, Beresford commanded at least twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging far and wide: yet the French general, without displaying much skill, had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days. And during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and other materials for the defence at his pleasure. The arrival of lord Wellington gave a spur to the operations. He came on the 21st, forded the Guadiana on the 22d just below the mouth of the Caya, and pushing close up to Badajos with Madden's Portuguese cavalry and Alten's Germans, endeavoured to cut off a convoy which was coming to the place: but the alert governor immediately sallied, the allies lost a hundred men, and the convoy reached the town.

Beresford had despised his enemy, but lord Wellington, judging that Soult would certainly disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, before he would commence even the investment of Badajos. 1°. That Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros. 2°. That Ballesteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. 3°. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by their right, with Ballesteros: these dispositions were made to watch the passes of the Morena. 4°. That Castaños should furnish three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. 5°. That the British army should be in

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second line, and in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces.

The battering train and stores for the attack of Badajos were necessarily taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; it was therefore necessary to insure the safety of the guns, lest that fortress should in the end be itself exposed half dismantled to a siege. Now the Guadiana, rising ten feet on the 24th, had again carried away the bridges at Jerumenha; wherefore lord Wellington directed the line of communication with Portugal to be changed, making it run by Merida until settled weather should admit of fresh arrangements. But ere this was effected political difficulties forced him to delay the siege. Mendizabal's troops had committed many excesses in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were of daily occurrence, the Spanish general had pillaged the town of Fernando, and the Portuguese government in reprisal, resolved to seize Olivenza which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish Regency then publicly disavowed Mendizabal's conduct, and Mr. Stuart's strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general's plans. Meanwhile intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should

Appendix, No. II. Sect. 10.

enable a British reinforcement to arrive, he ordered the militia of the northern provinces again to take the field, and repaired with the utmost speed to the Coa.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed and the army so disposed as to cut off all communication. But the allies were distressed for provisions. Great part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma, being smuggled by the peasants through the French posts, and then passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river near its confluence with the Douro. Meanwhile Massena sent two convoys to Ciudad Rodrigo, and though general Spencer, crossing the Agueda with eight thousand men, overtook and surrounded the rear-guard of the last with his cavalry in an open plain, it reached the place in safety.

The French general having thus succoured Ciudad became intent to relieve Almeida; and he was strong enough to do so, for his retreat to Salamanca was only to restore the equipments and organization of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo without consuming the stores of that fortress. But his cantonments extended from San Felices on the Agueda to Ledesma and Toro on the Douro, so that he still lent his hand as it were to Almeida. His cavalry were in bad condition, and his artillery nearly unhorsed by the retreat from Santarem; but he demanded aid of men, horses and provisions from Bessieres, and prepared to retake the offensive. Discord, the bane of military operations, impeded

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his progress. Bessieres had neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal, writing remonstrances and giving counsel when men and guns were asked for. He disliked the war in Spain, condemned the mode of conducting it, and turned his mind rather towards Russia than the peninsula; for his opinion that a northern war must ensue was even then so openly expressed as to reach the English camp: meanwhile Massena vainly demanded the aid necessary to secure the only conquests of his campaign.

However towards the end of April the new organization decreed by Napoleon was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining eleven thousand infantry and cavalry to reinforce and take the command of the fifth corps, when Massena, having at last received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, prevailed upon Drouet to defer his march until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the sources of the Azava partly behind Gallegos; and while in this situation, colonel O'Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade were taken by Julian Sanchez, the affair having been, it was said, preconcerted to enable the former to quit the French service.

On the 23d, two thousand French infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the bridge of Marialva, but the passage was bravely maintained

by captain Dobbs, with one company of the fifty-second and some riflemen.

On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 27th, his advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja to Marialva. But lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Duas Casas river. The Azava was now swollen and difficult to ford, and the enemy merely continued to feel the line of the outposts until the 2d of May, when the waters having subsided, the whole French army came out of Ciudad Rodrigo. The light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement from that place and from Espeja upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Duas Casas, but an open plain, separating the two lines of march, offered the enemy's powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. The French however appeared regardless of this advantage, and the separated brigades of the division remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain until the middle of the night, the march was then renewed and the Duas Casas safely crossed at Fuentes Onoro.

This beautiful village had escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied alternately for above a year by both sides. Every family in it was well known to the light division, and it was therefore a subject of deep regret, to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of houses where three days before a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton mischief was warmly felt through the whole army, and eight thousand dollars were afterwards collected by

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general subscription for the poor inhabitants: but the injury sunk deeper than the atonement.

Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior numbers; for so culpably negligent had the Portuguese government been, their troops were starving under arms; the infantry abandoned their colours or dropt from extenuation by thousands, the cavalry were rendered quite useless, and it was feared that a general dispersion would take place. Nevertheless, when the moment of trial arrived, the English general trusting to the valour of his soldiers, and to that ascendancy which they had acquired during the pursuit from Santarem, would not retreat, although his army, reduced to thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French horse, to oppose the enemy's march in the plain.

The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones and the Duas Casas. The left was at Fort Conception, the centre opposite to the village of Alameda, the right at Fuentes Onoro. The whole distance was five miles; but the Duas Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, protected the front of the line; and the French general could not with any prudence venture to march by his own right against Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank and drive him upon the Lower Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by Pack's brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division opposite Alameda.

The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the steppe of land occupied by the army turned back on the Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river.

FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.

The French came up in three columns abreast. The cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet's division threatened Fuentes Onoro, but the eighth and second corps, moved against Alameda and Fort Conception, menacing the allies' left, wherefore, the light division after passing the Duas Casas reinforced the sixth division. General Loison however, without waiting for Massena's orders, fell upon Fuentes Onoro. It was occupied by five battalions of chosen detachments taken from the first and third divisions, and most of the houses were situated in the very bottom of the ravine; but an old chapel, and some buildings on a craggy eminence which overhung one end was a fixed and prominent point for rallying. The low parts were vigorously defended, yet the violence of the attack was such, and the cannonade so heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the seventy-ninth regiments, marching down from the main position charged the French very roughly, and after a severe contest drove them quite over the Duas Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn; but the three suc-

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couring regiments were left in the village, where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the French had fallen.

On the 4th Massena arrived, accompanied by Bessieres, who brought up twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard. He examined all the line and made dispositions for the next day. His design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, and to turn their right with the remainder of the army. Forty thousand French infantry, and five thousand horse with thirty pieces of artillery were under arms; they had shewn in the action of the 3d that their courage was not abated, and it was therefore a very audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle. For though his position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was strong and free for the use of all arms, and covered his communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; yet on his right flank, the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d'Aver, where a considerable hill, overlooking all the country, commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack them while entangled between the Duas Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress of Almeida: the bridge of Castello Bom alone would then have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding to general Spencer's earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing out to Nava d'Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him with the seventh division under general Houstoun. Thus the line of

See Note, Appendix, No. I. Sect. 2.

battle was above seven miles in length, besides the circuit of blockade. The Duas Casas indeed, still covered the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half-way between Fuentes and Nava d'Aver.

BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.

It was Massena's intention to have made his dispositions in the night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the 5th; but a delay of two hours occurred and the whole of his movements were plainly descried. The eighth corps had been withdrawn from Alameda, and being supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the village of Poço Velho; both this place and the swampy wood, were occupied by the left wing of the seventh division commanded by general Houstoun, his right wing being thrown back into the plain towards Nava d'Aver. The sixth corps and Drouet's division took ground at the same time to their own left, yet still keeping a division in front of Fuentes Onoro and menacing that point. At this sight the light divison and the English horse hastened to the support of Houstoun, while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of Poço Velho and it was fast gaining ground in the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point restored the

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fight. The French cavalry now passed Poço Velho and commenced forming in order of battle on the plain between the wood and the hill of Nava d'Aver. Julian Sanchez was posted there, but he immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger because his lieutenant having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer and shot by a soldier of the guards before the action commenced.

Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour, but when the Guerilla chief had entirely fallen back, he turned the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry which had moved up to its support. The combat was very unequal, for by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not more than a thousand English troopers were in the field. The French therefore with one shock drove in all the cavalry outguards, cut off captain Ramsay's battery of horse artillery and came sweeping in upon the reserves of cavalry and upon the seventh division. But their leading squadrons, approaching in a disorderly manner, were partially checked by the British, and at the same time a great commotion was observed in their main body; men and horses there closed with confusion and tumult towards one point, where a thick dust arose, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and the flashing of pistols indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the mass was rent asunder and Norman Ramsay burst forth sword in hand at the head of his

battery, his horses breathing fire stretched like greyhounds along the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low and pointed weapons, in desperate career. Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, seeing this, instantly rode forth and with his squadron shocked the head of the pursuing troops, while general Charles Stewart, joining in the charge, took the French colonel Lamotte fighting hand to hand. The main body of the enemy however came on strongly, and the British cavalry retired behind the light division, which was immediately thrown into squares; but ere the seventh division, which was more advanced, could do the same, the horsemen were upon them and some were cut down. Nevertheless the remainder stood firm, and the Chasseurs Britanniques, being ranged behind a loose stone wall, poured such a fire that their foes recoiled and seemed bewildered.

While these brilliant actions were passing at this point, the French were making progress in the wood of Poço Velho, and as the English divisions were separated, and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost if the original concentrated position above Fuentes Onoro was not quickly regained. Lord Wellington therefore ordered the seventh division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada while the light division retired over the plain, and the cavalry covered the movement. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, to place them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe before described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.

General Crawfurd, who had now resumed the

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command of the light division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the enemy's horsemen who continually outflanked him but never dared to assail his formidable masses. However as they approached the new position they surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards under colonel Hill, making that officer and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their course against the forty-second regiment they were repulsed. Many times Montbrun's strong cavalry made as if they would storm the light division squares, but the latter were too dangerous to be meddled with, yet there was not during the war a more dangerous hour. For the whole of that vast plain, as far as the Turones, was covered with a confused multitude amidst which the squares appeared but as specks; and there was besides a great concourse, composed of the commissariat followers and of servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity all being mixed with the broken piquets and parties coming out of the woods; the seventh division was separated from the army by the Turones and five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were trampling the ground bounding, shouting, and impatient to charge, while the infantry of the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen, and the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps. If the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had then come forth, while Drouet's divisions fell on that village; if the eighth corps had attacked the light division and the whole of the cavalry made a general charge, the loose

multitude encumbering the plain, driven violently in upon the first division, would have intercepted the latter's fire and broken its ranks. No such effort was made. The French horsemen merely hovered about Crawfurd's squares, the plain was soon cleared, the allied cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and was there again joined by Julian Sanchez irregular cavalry. At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French army stopped short and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution amongst the closely formed masses of the allies; but twelve British guns replied with such vigour that the violence of the enemy's fire soon abated, their cavalry drew out of range, and a body of infantry attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards.

All this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun's cavalry should turn the right wing; it was however two hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments made a desperate resistance, but, overmatched in number and unaccustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were pierced and divided. Two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town was carried; the upper part was, nevertheless stiffly held, and the rolling of the musketry was incessant.

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Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet's division thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been forced and the left of the new position outflanked. But now lord Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes; and as the French continued also to reinforce their troops, the whole of the sixth corps and a part of Drouet's division were finally engaged. Several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the rugged heights and around the chapel; some of the enemy's skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main position; yet the village was never entirely abandoned by the defenders, and in one charge made by the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and eighty-eighth regiments combined and led by colonel M'Kinnon against a heavy mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the French fell. Thus the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties; the British maintained only the chapel and crags, the French retired a cannon shot from the stream.

After the action a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments in the village, a slight demonstration by the second corps, near Fort Conception, was checked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies. That of the enemy was estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but

this exaggerated calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition, that four hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, more than one-third of which were British.

During the battle the French convoy for the supply of Almeida had been kept at Gallegos in readiness to move; lord Wellington now sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada to menace it, and disturb Massena's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro; lord Wellington also entrenched that part of the position which was immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of the latter would have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, was not tenable. There was a wooded tongue of land on the British right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet it was too distant from the position to be occupied by the allies; had Ney been at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been held by submitting to a butchery.

On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, and made no demonstration of attack; the 7th passed in a like inaction and the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th, Massena withdrew his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but still maintained posts at

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Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda, the sixth and eighth corps and the cavalry passing at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps at the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres then carried off the imperial guards, Massena was recalled to France, and Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal.

Both sides claimed the victory. The French, because they won the passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to relinquish three miles of ground and to change his front. The English, because the village of Fuentes, so often attacked, was successfully defended, and because the principal object, the covering the blockade of Almeida, was attained. Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages. Napoleon would have made them fatal! Yet it is also certain, that with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm, the prince of Esling merely indicated as it were the errors of the English general's position, and then stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to extreme negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that the discord in his army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order—Junot did not second him cordially—Loison disregarded his instructions—Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight, and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle would not work.

CHAP. V.

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General Pelet, Massena's first aid-de-camp, censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second position was taken up. He asserts that any danger on that side would have forced the French to retreat. This criticism is however unsustainable, being based on the notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez' Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may be with more justice objected to Massena, that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celorico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general's position would then have been clearly exposed; for though the second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated, that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill is commonly a series of errors and accidents.

Appendix, No. I, Section 8.

The operations on both sides furnished ample illustrations of this truth. Ney's opposition prevented Massena's march upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor and probably added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg's tardiness had like to have cost Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. Beresford's blunder at Campo Mayor and his neglect of the line of Merida, enabled the French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet's negligence placed Almeida at

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the mercy of the allies. A mistaken notion of Massena's sufferings during the retreat induced lord Wellington to undertake two great operations at the same time, which was above his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not stop there. The prize contended for was still to present another example of the uncertainty of war.

EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.

General Brennier, made prisoner at Vimiero but afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in the place. When all hopes of succour had vanished, a French soldier named Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, to penetrate in uniform, for he refused to be a spy, through the posts of blockade, carrying an order for Brennier to evacuate the fortress and rejoin the army by Barba del Puerco. Meanwhile Massena, by crossing the Agueda, seemed to abandon Almeida to its fate, and the British general placed the light division in its old position on the Azava with cavalry-posts on the Lower Agueda. He also desired sir William Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, and he directed general Alexander Campbell to continue the blockade with the sixth division and with general Pack's brigade. Campbell's

dispositions were however either negligently made or negligently executed, Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth regiment, and it was under these circumstances that Brennier, undismayed by the retreat of the French army, resolved, like Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty of the enterprize; yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he mined all the principal bastions and destroyed his guns by a singular expedient; for always he fired several guns at one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another; thus while some shots flew towards the besiegers others destroyed pieces without attracting notice.

At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and passed between the quarters of the reserves with a nicety that proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General Pack following with a few men, collected on the instant, plied him with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, which in silence and without returning a shot gained the rough country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, just as daylight broke, and Pack still pursuing, knowing that some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier's previous prac-

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tice, but Pack's fire roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was now close at hand, and the fourth also, having heard the firing at Valde Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier driving off the cavalry recommenced his march, but the British soldiers, throwing away their knapsacks, followed at such a pace that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco where they killed and wounded many and took three hundred. However the thirty-sixth regiment rashly passed the bridge itself and by the second corps which drawn up in order of battle, had been awaiting Brennier's arrival was repulsed with a loss of thirty or forty men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders in time, the French column would have been lost.

Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several previous examples of undisciplined valour, now put forth a strong rebuke to the troops. And the following remarks are as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:—"*The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies unsupported successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons.*"

CHAPTER VI.

CHAP. VI.

1811. May.

WHEN Marmont, now commanding the army of Portugal, had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew the greatest part of his forces to Salamanca, and lord Wellington, placing general Spencer with the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions and the cavalry on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and the second German hussars upon Badajos. The 15th, hearing that Soult, hitherto reported by Beresford to be entirely on the defensive, was now actually advancing at the head of a powerful army into Estremadura, he set out himself in all haste for that province, but ere he could arrive a great battle had been fought with extraordinary fury.

See notice at the beginning of this vol.

While awaiting the Spanish generals' accession to lord Wellington's plan, Beresford had fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos: meantime Latour Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal and his parties foraged the most fertile tracts between the armies. To check them Penne Villamur was reinforced with five squadrons, and colonel John Colborne was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads and raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction in concert with Villamur,

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created great confusion amongst the enemy's parties. He intercepted several convoys, forced the French troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the other frontier towns; and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so much address, that the latter imagining a great force was at hand, abandoned Guadalcanal also and fell back to Constantino.

Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and by a hardy attempt was like to have carried it. For riding on to the drawbridge with a few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish army which, he said, was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French officer was amazed at the appearance of the party, but was too resolute to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed, galloped off under a few straggling shot. After this, taking to the mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss. During his absence, the Spanish generals had acceded to lord Wellington's proposition; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballesteros was at Burgillos; the waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed for the

FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

The 5th of May, general William Stewart, having two squadrons of horse, six field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, invested the place on the left of the Guadiana; and the formation of the depôt of

the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery.

On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand Spaniards under Carlos d'España, encamped in the woods near the fortress; Madden's Portuguese remained in observation near Merida; and a troop of horse-artillery, coming from Lisbon, was attached to the English cavalry which was still near Los Santos and Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha and re-established near the mouth of the Caya, but was again drawn over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open some French horse had come down the river.

The 8th, general Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with a brigade of the second division, four light Spanish guns, the seventeenth Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted from the garrison of Elvas. But these troops did not arrive simultaneously at the point of assembly, which delayed the operation, and sixty French dragoons moving under the fire of the place maintained a sharp skirmish beyond the walls.

Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English government, no army was ever worse provided for such an enterprise. The engineer officers were exceedingly zealous, and notwithstanding some defects in the constitution and customs of their corps, tending rather to make regimental than practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in the theory of their business. Yet the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of sappers

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and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into war without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the commonest materials and the means necessary for their art were denied to the engineers.

Colonel Fletcher's plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take the defence in reverse, and false attacks against the Pardaleras and Picurina were commenced by re-opening the French trenches; it was however necessary to reduce San Christoval before the batteries against the castle defences could be constructed; and captain Squire was directed to commence the works there on the night of the 8th, at a distance of only four hundred yards, though the moon shone bright and he was ill provided with tools: he was thus exposed to a destructive fire of musquetry from the fort and of shot and shells from the town. Nevertheless he continued to work with great loss until the 10th, when the French making a furious sally carried his battery; and though they were immediately driven back, the allies pursuing too hotly were taken in front and flank with grape and lost four hundred men. Thus five engineers and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the line were already in-

Appendix, No. X. Section 3 and 4.

scribed upon the bloody list of victims offered to this Moloch, and only one small battery against a small outwork was completed! On the 11th it opened, and before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the besiegers. Nor could any other result be expected. The exact concert essential to the success of all double operations whether in sieges or in the field was totally neglected on this occasion by Beresford. For Squire's single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress before the approaches against the castle were even commenced; and two distant batteries, which had been constructed on the false attacks, scarcely attracted the notice of the enemy.

To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the labour, and directed the trenches to be opened against the castle; but the intelligence was true, and being confirmed at twelve o'clock in the night, the working parties were again drawn off and measures taken to raise the siege.

SOULT'S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

The duke of Dalmatia had resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard of Beresford's being in Estremadura, and the latter's tardiness had given the garrison time to organize a defence, the French general time to tranquillise his province, and to

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arrange a system of resistance to the allied army in the Isla during his absence in Estremadura. For that purpose he had commenced additional fortifications at Seville, and renewed the construction of those which had been suspended in other places by the battle of Barosa; he thus deceived Beresford, who believed that far from thinking to relieve Badajos he was trembling for his own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy thousand fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing with him eleven thousand men.

Appendix, No. II. Section 11.

On the 10th of May Soult quitted Seville with three thousand heavy dragoons, thirty guns, and two strong brigades of infantry under the command of general Werlé and general Godinot. This force, composed of troops drawn from the first and fourth corps and from the reserve of Dessolles, entered Olalla the 11th, and was there joined by general Maransin. Godinot then marched by Constantino to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne's operations.

The 13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, resigning that of the fifth corps to general Girard, who immediately advanced to Los Santos.

The 14th the French head-quarters reached Villa Franca, and being then within thirty miles of Badajos, Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night to give notice of his approach to the garrison, the expedient however

failed of success. The 15th, in the evening, the whole French army was concentrated at Santa Marta.

Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege, contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who promised to put him in possession of the place in three days if he would persevere. This promise was naught, and if it had been good Soult would yet have surprised him in his trenches: his firmness therefore saved the army, and his arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and at twelve o'clock on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank being passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines were burnt, and the flying-bridge removed. These transactions were so well masked by the fourth division, which in concert with the Spaniards continued to maintain the investment, that it was only by a sally on the rear-guard, in which the Portuguese piquets of the fourth division were very roughly treated, that the French knew the siege was raised; and of the cause they were still ignorant.

Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde, on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village of Albuera. Ballesteros' and Blake's corps having already formed a junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera before twelve o'clock on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an arc, sweeping through Valverde Albuera and Talavera

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Real, it was arranged that Blake's army should watch the roads on the right, the British and the fifth Spanish army those leading upon the centre, and that Madden's Portuguese cavalry should observe those on the left, leading through Talavera Real. The main body of the British being in the woods near Valverde could reach Albuera by a half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from Badajos; but the enemy, being on the 14th still at Los Santos, was eight leagues distant from Albuera; hence, Beresford, thinking that he could not be forstalled on any point of importance to the allies, continued to keep the fourth division in the trenches.

On the 14th Colborne rejoined the army with his moveable column, Madden retired to Talavera Real, and Blake's army reached Almendral. Meanwhile the Anglo-Portuguese cavalry under general Long fell back before the enemy from Zafra and Los Santos to Santa Marta and was there joined by Blake's dragoons.

In the morning of the 15th the Anglo-Portuguese army occupied the left of the Albuera position, which was a ridge about four miles long, having the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. The right was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten's German brigade. Behind the Germans the second division, under general William Stewart, formed one line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Val-

verde road passed, the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of battle was continued, in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under general Hamilton and colonel Collins.

The right of the position, stronger, higher, and broader than any other part, was left open for Blake's army, because Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of the position as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry of the fifth Spanish army were still before Badajos; but general Cole had orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas and throw a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana by a ford above Badajos if practicable; finally to be in readiness to march at the first notice.

In this posture of affairs, about three o'clock in the evening of the 15th, and while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light horsemen, came in from Santa Marta, and no infantry being posted beyond the Albuera to support them, they passed that river in retreat. Thus the wooded heights on the right bank were abandoned to the enemy, his force and dispositions were thereby effectually concealed, and the strength of the allies' position was already sapped. Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry and artillery, stretched his picquets along the road to Almendral, and sent officers to hasten Blake's movements; but that general, who had only a few miles of good road to march and had promised to be in line at noon, did not reach

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the ground before eleven at night, and his rear was not there before three o'clock in the morning of the 16th: meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were called up. The order failed to reach Madden, but Cole brought the infantry of the fifth army, two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth division to the position between eight and nine o'clock, and his third brigade, unable to pass the Guadiana above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, the two brigades of the fourth division were drawn up in columns behind the second division, and the Portuguese squadrons were sent to reinforce colonel Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forwards in front of the left wing. Meanwhile the great mass of the allied cavalry was concentrated behind the centre, and Beresford dissatisfied with general Long gave general Lumley the chief command.

The position was now occupied by thirty thousand infantry, more than two thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery of which eighteen were nine-pounders; but the brigade of the fourth division being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength of battle, did not exceed seven thousand, and already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority. The French had forty guns, and four thousand veteran cavalry, but only nineteen thousand chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one discipline and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general's talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary's.

Soult had examined Beresford's position without hindrance on the evening of the 15th, and hearing that the fourth division was left before Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before the 17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected the weakness of the English general's disposition for battle. The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front. But the heights on the right presented a rough broken table-land, trending backwards towards the Valverde road and looking into the rear of the line of battle; and if a powerful mass of French troops could be suddenly placed there, they would, unless beaten off again by a counter-attack, inevitably roll the allied army up on its centre, and push it into the valley of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and the strong cavalry of the French would complete the victory.

Now the right of the allies and the left of the French approximated to each other, being only divided by a hill, about cannon-shot distance from either, but separated from the allies by the Albuera and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. During the night he placed behind it the greatest part of the artillery under general Ruty, the fifth corps under Girard, and the heavy cavalry under Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men and thirty guns within ten minutes' march of Beresford's right wing: and yet that general could neither see a man, nor draw a sound conclusion as to the real plan of attack. The light cavalry, the brigades of Godinot

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and Werlé, and ten guns, still remained at the French marshal's disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the Albuera. Werlé was to keep in reserve; but Godinot was to attack the village and bridge, and to bear strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract Beresford's attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed.

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

Blake and Cole brought up more than sixteen thousand men, the former in the night, the latter at nine o'clock in the morning when the action was already begun; but so defectively had Beresford occupied his position that Soult although he saw how greatly the allied army had been reinforced made no change of disposition. A little before nine o'clock Godinot emerged from the woods with his division in one heavy column preceded by a battery of ten guns. Flanked by the light cavalry and followed by Werlé's division, he made straight for the bridge of Albuera and with a sharp cannonade and musquetry attempted to force the passage, while general Briché led two hussar regiments further down the river in observation of Otway's horsemen. Dickson's guns, posted on the rising ground above the village, answered the fire of the French, and ploughed through their column which was crowding towards the bridge although the stream was passable above and below. Beresford, observing that Werlé's division did not follow

closely, was now convinced that the principal effort would be on the right, and therefore ordered Blake to form a part of the first and all the second line of the Spanish army on the broad part of the hills, at right angles to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten at the bridge, and directed general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of battalions, ready to move to any part of the field. The thirteenth dragoons he posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge, and sent the whole of the second division to support Blake. The horse artillery, the cavalry under Lumley, and the fourth division also took ground to the right, and were posted, the horsemen and guns on a small plain behind the Aroya, the fourth division in an oblique line about half musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front, and with great heat told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, that the real attack was at the village and bridge. A second time he was entreated to obey, but remained obstinate until Beresford arrived in person, and then only he assented because the enemy's columns were beginning to appear on his flank. Yielding to this evidence he proceeded to change his front, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford impatient of his folly took the direction in person.

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Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops were completely formed the French were amongst them. For scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten's brigade, when Werlé, leaving only a battalion of grenadiers to support the former and some squadrons to watch the thirteenth

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dragoons and connect the attacks, countermarched with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the allies. At the same time the great mass of the light cavalry also quitted Godinot's column, crossed the river Albuera above the bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of the fifth corps joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face of Lumley's squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render Beresford's position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain that he endeavoured to keep the Spanish line sufficiently in advance to give room on the summit of the hill for the second division to support it; the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musquetry fire, and their cavalry, outflanking the front and menacing different points, put the Spaniards in disorder; the latter fell fast and gave back.

Soult thought the whole army was yielding, he pushed forward his columns, his reserves mounted the hill behind him, and general Ruty placed all the French batteries in position. But at this critical moment general William Stewart arrived at the foot of the height, with Colborne's brigade, which formed the head of the second division. This officer, seeing the confusion above, desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent, but Stewart, whose boiling courage generally overlaid his judgment, led up without hesitation in column of companies, and having passed the Spanish right, attempted to open

out his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. The enemy's fire was very galling and destructive, and the foremost troops charged; but a heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had turned the right flank in the obscurity, now came galloping in upon the rear of the line at the instant of its advance, and slew or took two-thirds of the brigade. One battalion only, the thirty-first, being still in column, escaped this charge, and maintained its ground while the French horsemen riding violently over every thing else penetrated to all parts and captured six guns. The tumult was great and in the midst of it a lancer fell upon Beresford, but the marshal, a man of great strength, put the spear aside and cast the trooper from his saddle. When the confusion was greatest, a shift of wind blowed aside the smoke and mist, general Lumley perceived the mischief from the plain below, and sending four squadrons out against the straggling lancers cut many of them off; Penne Villemur's Spanish cavalry was also directed to charge the French horsemen in the plain, and they galloped forwards until within a few yards of their foes but then turned and shamefully fled.

Appendix No. IX. Section 4.

During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great was the disorder, that the Spaniards in one part continued to fire without cessation though the British troops were before them; and in another part, flying before the lancers, they would have broken through the twenty-ninth regiment, then advancing to the succour of Colborne's brigade, but with a stern resolution that regiment smote friends and foes without distinction in their onward progress. Meanwhile Beresford urged the

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main body of the Spaniards to advance, and finding his exhortations useless seized an ensign by the breast bearing him and his colours by main force to the front, yet the troops would not follow and the coward run back when he was released from the marshal's grasp. In this crisis the weather which had ruined Colborne's brigade saved the day. Soult could not see the whole field of battle, and still kept his heavy columns together when the decisive blow might have been struck. His cavalry indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them on the plain, Colborne still remained on the height with the thirty-first regiment, the British artillery, under Julius Hartman, was coming fast into action; and William Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill with general Houghton's brigade, which he brought on with the same vehemence, but instructed by his previous misfortune in a juster order of battle. The day now cleared and a dreadful fire poured into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the fight was yet to be won.

Houghton's regiments reached the height under a very heavy cannonade, and the twenty-ninth, after breaking through the fugitive Spaniards, was charged in flank by the French lancers, but two companies wheeling to the right foiled this attack with a sharp fire. The third brigade of the second division then came up on the left, and the Spanish corps of Zayas and Ballesteros at last moved forward. Hartman's artillery was now in full play, and the enemy's infantry recoiled, but soon recover-

ing, renewed the fight with greater violence than before. The cannon on both sides discharged showers of grape at half range, the peals of musketry were incessant, and often within pistol-shot, but the close formation of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them one inch of ground, nor a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was however fierce and dangerous: Stewart was twice wounded, colonel Duckworth was slain, and the gallant Houghton, having received many wounds without shrinking, fell and died in the very act of cheering on his men.

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Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two officers, and more than four hundred men, out of five hundred and seventy that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone, and the other regiments were scarcely better off; not one-third were standing in any; their ammunition failed, and as the English fire slackened the enemy established a column in advance upon the right flank. The play of the artillery indeed checked them a moment, but in this dreadful crisis Beresford wavered! Destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated mind. He had before brought Hamilton's Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement; he now sent orders to general Alten to abandon the bridge and village of Albuera, and to assemble with the Portuguese artillery in such a position as would cover a retreat by the Valverde road. But while the commander was thus preparing to resign the contest, colonel Hardinge using his name ordered general Cole to advance with the

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fourth division; and then riding to the third brigade of the second division, which, under the command of colonel Abercrombie, had hitherto been only slightly engaged, directed him also to push forward into the fight. The die was thus cast and Beresford acquiesced; Alten received orders to retake the village, and this terrible battle was continued.

The fourth division was composed of two brigades, the one of Portuguese under general Harvey, the other, commanded by sir William Myers, consisted of the seventh and twenty-third regiments, and was called the fuzileer brigade: Harvey's Portuguese were immediately pushed in between Lumley's dragoons and the hill, where they were charged by some French cavalry, whom they beat off and meantime Cole led his fuzileers up the contested height. At this time six guns were in the enemy's possession, the whole of Werlé's reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column of the French, the remnant of Houghton's brigade could no longer maintain its ground, the field was heaped with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper parts of the hill, and behind all, Hamilton's Portuguese and Alten's Germans, now withdrawing from the bridge, seemed to be in full retreat. Soon however Cole's fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, drove off the lancers, recovered five of the captured guns and one colour, and appeared on the right of Houghton's brigade precisely as Abercrombie passed it on the left.

Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's

heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed, Cole, the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. But suddenly and sternly recovering they closed on their terrible enemies; and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult with voice and gesture animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans break from the crowded columns and sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order, their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as slowly and with a horrid carnage it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the height. There the French reserve mixed with the struggling multitude and endeavoured to sustain the fight, but the effort only increased the irremediable confusion, the

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mighty mass gave way and like a loosened cliff went headlong down the steep: the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!

CHAPTER VII.

WHILE the fuzileers were striving on the height, the cavalry and Harvey's brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons, being also battered by Lefebre's guns, retired before them, yet still threatening the fuzileers with their right while with their left they prevented Lumley's horsemen from falling on the defeated infantry. Meanwhile Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge's decision had brought on the critical moment of the battle, endeavoured to secure a favourable result. Alten's Germans were ordered to retake the village, which they effected with some loss, and Blake's first line, which had not been at all engaged, was directed to support them; Hamilton's and Collins's Portuguese, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men, were brought up to strengthen the attack of the fuzileers, and of Abercrombie's brigade; and at the same time the Spanish divisions of Zayas, Ballesteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the fuzileers, that the enemy's infantry were never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for general Ruty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious activity while the fifth corps still made head; and when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera and protected the passage of the broken infantry.

Beresford was too hardly handled to pursue, but

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he formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops were now rallying with their usual celerity. The fight still continued at the bridge, but Godinot's division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, and the action was entirely terminated before three o'clock. The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space of time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On Beresford's side only two thousand Spaniards and six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded, and hence it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they had but eighteen hundred men left standing! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front.

The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several stand of colours. The British had nothing of that kind to boast of, but the horrid piles of carcases within their lines told with dreadful eloquence who were the conquerors; and all the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the woods, resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the piquets were posted few men remained

to help the sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent colonel Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that general's breast, and he refused, saying, it was customary with allied armies for each to take care of its own men.

Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations, the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies, and the dark masses of Soult's powerful cavalry and artillery, covering all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the victory; the right of the French also appeared to threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford in gloom and doubt awaited another attack. But on the 17th, the third brigade of the fourth division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha; this enabled the second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde and the Badajos roads, and on the 18th, Soult retreated.

He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men, too deeply wounded to be removed; but all that could travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio to Seville. Now protecting his movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army in the morning to its right, and so gained the road of Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road. Soult however halted the 19th at Solano, designing to

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hold on in Estremadura, and to draw reinforcements from Andalusia; for he knew well, though Beresford was no longer in a condition to hurt Badajos, Wellington would soon come down and fresh combats would be necessary to save that fortress. He had as early as the 14th commenced repairing the castle of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa Marta; and he now continued the work, with a view to form a head of cantonments, which the allies should be unable to take before the French army could be reinforced.

When Beresford discovered the enemy's retreat, he despatched general Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, and it was effected at daybreak the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meantime the allied cavalry, supported by Alten's Germans, followed the French line of retreat. Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente del Maestre, but the Spanish cavalry cut off some of his men and menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the same day, and after examining the state of affairs, desired the marshal to follow the enemy cautiously: then returning to Elvas himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on the right bank. During this time Beresford advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, where he found some more wounded men; and his further progress was not opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and discontent; the garrison at Villalba was so little disposed to maintain the castle,

that the duke of Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23d, placing his cavalry near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was however a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed was more fruitful and open, and he could draw greater advantage from his superior cavalry; the mountains behind him were so strong he had nothing to fear from an attack, and by Belalcazar and Almaden he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he expected Drouet's division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, by which he could draw reinforcements from Cordoba and from the fourth corps, and as the allies durst not venture to expose their left flank by marching on Monasterio he effectually covered Andalusia.

From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partida corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country beyond Usagre. This led to an action. The town, built upon a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, and when Latour Maubourg approached Lumley retired across the river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was then lying close behind a rising ground, and when

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the French regiments had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebre's guns opened on them, and the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons charged them in front while Madden's Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, which being choked with the remainder of the French cavalry, advancing to their support, the fugitives turned to the right and left and endeavoured to save themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river; there they were pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite side, seeing their distress, checked the victors by a fire of carbines and artillery. Some wounded prisoners were taken, but a Guerilla party which had not joined in the attack suddenly massacred them. However, forty killed in fair fight and more than a hundred wounded, attested the vigour of Lumley's conduct in this affair, which terminated Beresford's operations; for the miserable state to which the Regency had reduced the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal's presence elsewhere. General Hill having now returned to Portugal re-assumed the command of the second division, amidst the rejoicings of the troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in person.

OBSERVATIONS.

No general ever gained so great a battle with so little increase of military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army

withered his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated without change and without abatement even to this hour; and a close examination of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections and others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general feeling was right.

When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the fifth corps upon Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened before he invested Badajos was unjustly attributed to him: it was lord Wellington's orders, resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval belonged to himself; and he is especially responsible in reputation for the latter as for the former, because captain Squire earnestly warned him of the inevitable result, but his words were unheeded. Appendix, No. X. During the progress of the siege also either the want of correct intelligence, or a blunted judgement, misled the marshal. It was remarked that at all times he too readily believed those idle tales of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which the spies generally and the deserters always interlarded their information: thus he was incredulous of Soult's enterprise, and that officer was actually over the Morena before the orders were given to commence the main attack of the castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable and praiseworthy. It would have been

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happy if he had shewn as much magnanimity in what followed.

When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived without danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight, affirming that his troops already in a miserable state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued, that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear; that a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and after a dispiriting retreat; that there was a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province; finally that as the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the army endangered to protect their passage.

But these plausible reasons were but a mask. The true cause why the English general adopted Blake's proposals was the impatient temper of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the late battles under lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second divi-

sion were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During Massena's retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and unjust clamour would have been raised against him; and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him by an officer on his own staff that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of troops and the designing of a campaign, but the ascendancy of spirit which leads the wise while it controls the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of nature.

Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should be deserted or Badajos abandoned; but whether lord Wellington's combinations, his great and well considered design for the deliverance of the Peninsula should be ruined and defaced at a blow. To say

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that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was mere trifling. Soult, with twenty, or even thirty thousand men, dared not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps before the allies broke up from Badajos, hence Beresford was certain that additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the 23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore slight, and the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent it remains to analyze the chances of success.

Soult's numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained that he had not less than twenty thousand veteran troops; he had also a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was peculiarly suitable for these arms. The martial character of the man was also known. Now the allies could bring into the field more of infantry by ten thousand than the French, yet they were of various tongues, and the Spanish part, ill armed starving and worn out with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy, each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of spirit or of discipline or of command. On what then could marshal Beresford found his hopes of success? The

British troops. The latter were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total destruction of two superb divisions, and to encounter a certain and heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated upon them alone for victory in such circumstances?

To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with skill. Albuera was the point of concentration. Colonel Colborne's brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and there was no certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not arrive until three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division not until nine o'clock, when the action had commenced. Kemmis's fine British brigade and Madden's cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the whole plan was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient force to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the keeping up the investment of Badajos, although laudable in one sense was on the whole a great error; it was only an accessory; and yet the success of the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead of passing by Villa Franca in his advance, had pushed straight on from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when Beresford had not much more than half his force in position; the point of concentration would then have been lost and the allies scattered in all directions. If the French had even continued their march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis's brigade. Why then did the French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in prefe-

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rence to attaining his object without one? And why did he neglect to operate by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done? Because the English general's dispositions were so faulty that no worse error could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope for a great and decided victory: a victory which would have more than counterbalanced Massena's failure. He knew that only one-half of the allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the ground every thing promised the most complete success.

Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of error wanting, this fact would suffice, he had superior numbers of infantry on a field of battle scarcely three miles long, yet ten thousand of his troops never fired a shot, and three times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake's conduct was very perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart's error cost one brigade, and annihilated the command of colonel Colborne, a man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops than those swept away from him by the French cavalry: but the neglect of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position, was Beresford's own error and a most serious one; so also were the successive attacks of the

brigades, and the hesitation about the fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in critical moments which marks the great commander? It was colonel Hardinge who gave the fourth division and Abercrombie's brigade orders to advance; it was their astounding valour in attack, the astonishing firmness of Houghton's brigade in defence, that saved the day. The person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen every where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the great commander was seen no where.

Beresford remained master of the field of battle, yet he could not take Badajos; that prize was still to be obtained by many great efforts, and many deep combinations on the part of a far greater man; neither did he clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained his positions from Llerena to Usagre. What then did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank of the Guadiana; I say simulating, for if the third and seventh divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the price of seven thousand men. With a smaller loss lord Wellington had fought two general and several minor actions, had baffled Massena, and turned seventy thousand men out of Portugal!

Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result of defeat? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of Jerumenha; and had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, the Valverde road would have been in Soult's possession and the line of retreat cut; had it even been otherwise, Beresford, with four thousand victorious

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French cavalry at his heels, could never have passed the river. Back then must have come the army from the north,—the lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied—a French force fixed on the south of the Tagus—Spain ruined—Portugal laid prostrate—England in dismay. Could even the genius of lord Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And yet, with these results, the terrible balance hanging for two hours, twice trembled to the sinister side and only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of the fusileers. The battle should never have been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without reinforcements, and with them it could have been renewed without an action, or at least without risking an unequal one.

But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day at Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors. His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after that, the mode of fighting in dense columns being followed beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered in Spain to the French arms. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so, that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance of Houghton's brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from a total defeat? The fire of the enemy's columns alone destroyed two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have swept away all!

It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second Soult with sufficient vigour, and the latter certainly did not display any great

energy; but the village was maintained against him by Alten's Germans, good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of Portuguese. Latour Maubourg's movements seem to have been objected to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep in check their cavalry. He was undoubtedly superior in numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill and courage, drawing all the advantage possible from his situation; and in the choice of that situation none can deny ability to marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength, so well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour Maubourg's proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. For if he had charged in mass under the fire of Lefebre's guns, he must have been thrown into confusion in passing the bed of the Aroya at the moment when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have opened a musquetry on his right flank: Lumley could then have charged, or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. Great loss might thus have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious impression against the three arms united. It was therefore another error in Soult not to have joined some guns and infantry to his cavalry, when he perceived that his enemy had done so on his part. Ten guns, and half the infantry uselessly slaugh-

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tered in columns on the height above, would have turned the scale of battle below. For it is certain that when the fuzileers came up the hill, Houghton's brigade was quite exhausted, and the few men standing were without ammunition; but if a French battery and a body of infantry had been joined to the French cavalry the fuzileers could not have moved.

On the other hand, seeing that Latour Maubourg was not so strengthened, a repulse might have been fatal not only to himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If he had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like manner, have exposed the flank of Soult's infantry, his movements would have been eccentric and contrary to sound principles; and in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really happened, destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action and kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted that, with such superior numbers, he should have more closely pressed Lumley.

When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera the battle ceased, each side being so hardly handled and so exhausted that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the greatest failure of the French commander. He had lost eight thousand men, but he had still fifteen thousand under arms; his artillery and his cavalry

were comparatively untouched; whereas of the allied army, only eighteen hundred British infantry were left standing, and all the troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spanish infantry had been feeding on horse-flesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue and misery, that for several days previous to the battle they had deserted in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping thus to get food. These circumstances should be borne in mind when reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander as Blake, and enduring such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution and honourable to them that they fought at all. Their resistance, feeble when compared to the desperate valour of the British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations they probably did not understand: when the fortune of the day changed they followed the fuzileers with alacrity, and at no period did they give way with dishonour.

Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could not be equal to a second desperate struggle; a renewed attack on the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French; and so conscious was Beresford of this, that on the evening of the 16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a certain and ruinous defeat the next day, and was resolved not to survive it. The resolution with which he maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, Beresford must

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have retired. It was a great and decided mistake of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more essential in war than a confident front; a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in Livy, who relates, that after a drawn battle a god calling out in the night, declared the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! Whereupon the former retired, and the latter remaining on the field gathered all the fruits of a real victory.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES.

Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier.

AFTER the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve.

The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson's brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other respecting myself.

The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line.

You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the twenty-third.

Believe me

Very sincerely yours,

F. PONSONBY.

Malta, Dec. 30, 1829.

Note sur la Situation actuelle de l'Espagne.

Rochefort, le Août, 1808.

1°. Les évènemens inattendus du général Dupont sont une preuve de plus que le succés de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne conduite, et de l'experience du général.

2°. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d'Affry, on avoit diviné tous les évènemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de concentrer l'armée et d'évacuer Madrid.

En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu'ils se sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños n'avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués, ou se fut battû avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complétement défaits.

3°. On pense qu'on aura tout le tems d'évacuer les blessés de Madrid qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu'il sera possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au maréchal Bessières, de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu'il faut reorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province de Navarre; elles comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine d'être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre.

4°. On pense que l'armée doit être divisée en trois corps, *le corps principal*, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu'on porteroit à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal Bessières, d'environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit arriver de Gallice ou d'Estramadure, occupant Valladolid par une division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les circonstances; enfin le *corps de gauche*, ou d'Arragon, destiné à maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono et Tudela, et liant sa droite en corps du centre, par une division qui au besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps volant.

Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s'appuyer sur Burgos, et le corps d'Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune.

5°. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce but, on croit

qu'on doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14me et 44me de ligne, 200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu'on tireroit du corps devant Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4me legère, 15me legère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon; de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43me, et du 51me de ligne, du 26me de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de 4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d'une régiment Polonais de la garde; on réuniroit le 3me bataillon aux deux premiers de tours les régimens d'infantérie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens.

On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevroit le corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des 18,000 qui le forment à present..... 18,000

Du renfort évalué à..... 10,000

Le détachement du dépôt du 4me legère, 15me legère.

14me, 44me, 43me, et 51me de ligne, le 2me et 12me legère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à .. 30,000 hommes.

Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleures mains, que sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire.

Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d'Aranda, ses communications bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se nourrira par Burgos, et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono.

Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d'Estramadure et de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échellons, et se nourrissant de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon.

On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de le Biscaye et de tous les derrières.

On estime qu'on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14me et 44me de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit être formé en trois divisions, et destiné à maintenir la Navarre. La position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu'à Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans

l'ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée sur l'armée.

6°. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun rassemblement armé à deux marches d'aucun corps d'armée. Si l'ennemi s'approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s'est passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. L'ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte: il y sera reduit du moment qu'il aura eu quelque example.

Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu'on seroit sérieusement attaqué par l'ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du maréchal Bessières. Ce maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour la roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes.

7°. Il faut débuter par des coups d'éclât, qui rélèvent le moral du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l'habitant qu'il doit rester tranquille; un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui seroit utile pour réléver l'opinion et compenser l'évacuation de Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu'on rappelle de Saragosse, aidée d'une detachement du corps du centre, soumette Soria, le désarme, et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter tout ce qui se présentera doit être l'instruction générale, donnée au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de sorte qu'à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François, il n'y ait aucun rassemblement d'insurgés; on est d'opinion que si l'avant garde du général Castaños s'avance sur l'Aranda et dépasse les montagnes de Buitrago, il faut, avec tout ce qu'on réunira dans un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s'y établir sérieusement, le culbuter, le jetter au delà des montagnes, et si l'affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L'ennemi doit essayer de déloger l'armée Française de cette position, par trois points, par la Gallice et l'Estramadure, par la droite d'Aranda, et enfin par les rassemblemens des provinces d'Arragon, de Valence, et autres de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l'ennemi, et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu'ils se formeront sur tous les points et qu'on les tienne à distance d'une ou deux marches du cantonnement François, si alternative-

ment les François prennent l'offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position derrière la rivière, et à l'abri detoute attaque; tantôt au centre avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers du corps de gauche, l'ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande circonspection.

8°. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui s'y trouve, du 14me et 44me de ligne, de la brigade du général Mouton, de celle du général Le Fevbre, qui en dernier lieu a été renvoyée au maréchal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu' amène le maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de 14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l'ennemi eut voulu se mesurer avec des forces aussi considérables et s'exposer à une perte certaine.

9°. Si de fortes raisons obligoient d'évacuer Aranda, on perdroit l'espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le cas où un évènement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessières, le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l'Ebre, et avoir toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir l'Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route principale. Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers arriveront à l'armée, jusqu' à ce qu'enfin les divisions de la grande armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrenées.

On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est necessaire de l'occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne de l'Ebre, c'est une vedette d'autant plus utile qu'elle domine la plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l'ennemi s'en emparoit.*

10°. La troisième position que se présente à l'armée, c'est la gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement être de quelque utilité, les évènemens modifient nécessairement les dispositions, tout dépend d'ailleurs de saisir un moment.

11°. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est possible.

* [Note in Napoleon's own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu'en approchant de France tout favourise la desertion.

Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en occupant le ligne du Duero.

Le troisième, de conserver l'Ebre.

Le quatrième, de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St. Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés.

LE GEN. BERTRAND.

Rochefort, 6 *Août*, 1808.



Pyrenees
Soldatar
Canal
Imal
Echo
Pampeluna
Sanguessa
Yso
S.t A. Delagna
Jaca
Tafalla
Cinco Villas
Aragon R.
Gallego R.
Sierra de Guara
High Valleys
Ainsa
Venasques
Grus
Todo
Vero R.
Huesca
Barbastro
Benavres
Cinca R.
Sen Lorgel
Tudela
Borjas
Monegros Mountains
Valdorrel
Almunia
Sierra Alcubierre
Monzon
Balaguer
Ayerbe
Ballobar
Montsoni
Aranduez
Cartuna
Calatayud
N.S. Dagnila
Candasnos
Lerida
Mequinenza
Ebro R.
Segre River
Monzenat
Mayalde
Almela
Borjas
Belchite
Caspe
Ordal
Molins
Alcaniz
Guadalop R.
Villarluenga
Tivisa
Tarragona
Origuela
Tremendal
Morella
Torlosa
St.a Felipe de Balaguer
Alcaracin
Teruel
Alventosa
Pen Scola
Manzanera
Segorbe
Villa Real
Murviedro
Luria
Valencia
Sinue
SUCHET'S OPERATION
1809-10.


Lerenza La Muga
Palmeres
Rosas
Castel Follit
Rapot
Olot
Berga
Barcara
Manolas
Ter R.
Amer
Gerona
Labispal
Vich
Fornels
Casa de Selva
Hostalrich
Cardedeu
Manresa
Arenys de Mar
Tarasa
Molet
Barcelona
Villafranca
Reus
Tarragona
Salt
Ter River
Garcia Conde's Convoy
Breach
Mirador
Castellar
Bispal
Nerdera 1st Sept.
Hostalrich
Casa de Selva
Lagostera
Blakes
Columb


Guadarrama Mts
MADRID
Guadalajara
Tajuna R.
Aranda
Perales
Salvanes
Morata
Villa Mauriques
Illescas
Griñon
St Cruz de Zarza
Villa Rubias
Nobléjas
Villa Tobas
Talavera
Tagus R.
Toledo
Ocaña
Yepes
Dosbarrios
Mostrin
Aguardia
Tembleque
Lillo
Toledo Mts
Mora
Yevenes
Quintanar
Madridejos
Herencia
Puerto Piche
Guadiana R.
Villarta de S. Juan
Manzanares
Almagro
Despeña Perros
Morena Mts
La Carolina
AREIZAGA'S
Operations.
1809.
French before the Battle
Spaniards &c
French in Battle
Spaniards &c





INVASION
of
ANDALUSIA
1810.



SPAIN
Astorga
Puebla Sanabria
Benavente
Valença
Monterey
Bragança
ENTRE MINHO
E DOURO
Chaves
Miranda
TRAS OS MONTES
Tormes R.
Salamanca
Lederma
Oporto
Lamego
Douro R.
Agueda R.
Moimenta de Beira
Pinhel
S. Felices
Ciudad Rodrigo
Viseu
Trancoso
Almeida
Celorico
Forgoa
R. Vouga
Carregado
Sardao
Mondego R.
Alva R.
Coimbra
Penamacor
Castello Branco
Salvaterra
Alcantara
Thomar
Abrantes
Niza
Castello Vide
ALEMTEJO
Portalegre
Alegrete
Albuquerque
Campo Mayor
Badajos
Elvas
Olivenza
Juramenha
LISBON
Setuval
Defence of PORTUGAL

Vol 3 Plate 6


Ciudad Rodrigo
Gurkal
Agueda R.
Ford
Marialva
Gallegos
Villa Puerca
Alameda
Lapoja
Quinta
Villar
Villa Formosa
Naval d'arce
Duas Casas R.
Almeida
Valdia Mula
Villar Mayor
Ford
Cabeza Negra
Sideira
Alfaiates
Carvalhal
Guarda
Ford of Carve
Tenda R.
Douro
CRAWFURD'S


Mountnum's Cavalry
OPERATIONS
1810.
Unfinish'd Tower
French Charge
Almeida
French Inf? attacking 24th July
Cavalry
43
43 9?
checking Enemy
French
Coa R.
Ford
Allies Defending the Bridge
Cabeza
Negro
Cavalry watching the Ford






Trem Lamego
Moimenta da Beira
To Pinhel
To Almeida
Alverca
To Oporto
Vouga R.
Vizeu
3d
Arganoso
5th Corps
Maca de Chao
Mangualde
Tortosa
2d Corps
To Sabugal
Gouvea
Guarda
Mondego R.
Ponte Nova
Sardao
Penalva
Celorico
Belmonte
Martagoa
Fadao
Linhares
Alva R.
Milheada
1st Division
Pena Cova
Foz d'Arouce
Zezere R.
Tentugal
Coimbra
Espinal
To Thomar
Condeixa
OPERATIONS
on the
MONDEGO,
1810.
French in march to Sevl
Col Trant
Ayelens
8th Corps
1st Cavalry
2d Corps
Portl Cavalry
Alva R.
Mondego R.



LINES
of
Torres Vedras
1810.




From Chiclana
Grenadiers
Village
Wheatfield
Lavillizona
Lapeña
Zayas
Bermeja
Whittingham
1 Mile
BATTLE of BARROSA
5th March 1811.
Neve
Medina Sidonia
Chiclana
Barrosa
Casa Vieja
Puerto de Santa Maria




MASSENA'S RETREAT
Combat of Sabugal
(1811)






Lerenza La Muga
Rupia
Olot
Bezalu
Besora
Planolas
Ter R.
Amer
Gaza Roca
Gerona
Arbucias
Hostalrich
Arenys de Mar
SIEGE of GE
1810
Manresa
Moncada
Tarrasa
Granollers
Molet
Sabadel
Tiralles
Martorel
Villa Franca
Tarragona
Rivera Claros
Salt
Ter River
Garcia Conde's Convoy
Mirandola
Pedret
Hostalrich
Blanes
Lagostera
Malcompinas
Vich
Blakes
Column





SIEGE of GE
1810
Lerenza La Muga
Figueras
Rosas
Bellgarde
Castel follit
Biesglu
Bascara
Planolas
Ripoll
Olot
Ter R.
Gerona
Labisbal
Fornels
Hostalrich
Arenys de Mar
Mataro
Granollers
Martorell
Tarasa
Molet
Esparraguera
Villa franca
Ordal
Molins
Barcelona
Rovera Claros
Tarragona
Reus
Salt
Ter River
Garcia Conde's Convoy
Amer
Anglee
Dalmau
Verdiera 1st Sept.
Vernet
St Cyrs 1st Sept.
Hillario
St Celoni
Woods
Lagostera
Malcrquinas
Valcarca
Blakes
Columns
Casa de Selva






Vol.3 Plate 3
Guadarama Mts
MADRID
Guadalaxara
Tajuna R.
Puerto Pico
Moranda
Peralez
Morata
Salvañes
Illescas
Bayona
Villa Mauriques
Quiachon
Aranjuez
Valiente
Villa Robar
Malpuchia
Noblejas
Talavera
Tague R.
Toledo
Villa Tobaz
Arzobispo
Ocaña
Yepes
Dezbarios
Guardia
Ajofrin
Trabuque Mts
Trembleque
Mora
Lille
Yevenes
Tembleque
Madrilejos
Herencia
Puerto Piche
Guadiana R.
Villarta de S.t Juan
Manzanares
Almagro
Despena Perros
Morena Mts
CAREIZAGA'S
Operations.
1809.
French before the Battle
Spaniards d.o
French in Battle
Spaniards d.o






Albuquerque
Talavera de Puerto
Truxillo
Manzanares
Campo Mayor
Caceres
Torremocha
Almagro
Merida
Guadiana R.
L A M A N C H A
Elvas
Medellin
Ciudad Rodrigo
Villa Nueva de Infantes
Juramenha
Valverde
Olivenza
E S T R E M A D U R A
Almaden
Mudela
Mouron
Fte Maestre
Xerez de los Caballeros
Zafra
Belalcazar
Carolina
Guadalimar R.
Bujalance
Baeza
Leon
Leyva
Cordoba
Jaen
Sierra Morena
Sierra Bazan
Zafra R.
Zalamea
Guadiana
Ecija
Alcala Real
Niebla
Lucena
Carmona
Seville
Alcala
Huelva
Tinto R.
Guadalquivir R.
Moron
Utrera
Genil R.
Granada
Sierra Nevada
Xerez
Puerto Real
Antequera
Medina Sidonia
Chiclana
Ronda
Malaga
Motril
Estepona
Marbella
Tarifa
Gibraltar



INVASION
of
ANDALUSIA
1810.
French Lines of
Investment
Guadalete R.
San Pedro R.
Port Royal
Isthmus
Chiclana
Marsh
Isle of Leon
Grand Canal
Matagorda
Trocadero
Fort Puntales
Light House
Entrance of the Harbour
Cadiz
Fort St Peter




SPAIN
Zamora
Puebla Sanabria
Benavente
Viana
Monterey
Bragança
ENTRE MINHO
E DOURO
Chaves
Miranda
TRAS OS MONTES
Ferras R.
Ledesma
Oporto
Lamego
Douro R.
Agueda R.
S. Felices
Ciudad Ro
Pinhel
Almeida
Viseu
Trancoso
Vouga
Vouga R.
Cerveira
Caria
Vouga
Ulz R.
Sardao
Mondego R.
Gea
Estrella
Alfayate
Penella
Alpedrinha
Alcantara
Coimbra
Pinhel
Fundaburla
Pinhel Mayor
Fundão
Atalaya
Penamacor
Castel Branco
Ladoeiro
Salvaterra
Rosmaninal
Idanha Velha
Valencia Alcantara
Leyria
Thomar
Torres de Vedras
Niza
Castello Vide
ALEMTEJO
Batalha
Alcobaça
Portalegre
Alegrete
Albuquerque
Campo Mayor
Elvas
Badajoz
Ribatejo
Santarem
Almeirim
Lisboa
Salvaterra
Juromenha
Defence of PORTUGAL






CRAWFURD'S
OPERATIONS
1810.
Montbrun's Cavalry
French Infty attacking 24th July
French Charge
Almeida
Cavalry
French
Allies Defending the Bridge
Cavalry watching the Fords
Cabeza
Nagos





From Lamego
Monumenta da Beira
To Pinhel
To Almeida
Almeida
8th Corps
6th Corps
Trancoso
Mass de Dias
Viseu
3d
Vouga R.
Ponte de Sul
6th
2d
Fornos
Mortiosa
Mesquitella
Mondego R.
To Sabugal
Gouvea
Guarda
Sardao
Ponte Nova
Belmonte
Begalva
Martagoa
Fendaõ
Pinhel
Alva R.
Milheada
1st Division
Penna Cova
Fuentes de Onoro
Tentugal
Coimbra
Zezere R.
Espinel
To Thomar
OPERATIONS
on the
MONDEGO.
1810.


French in march 26th Sept
Martagoa
Col. Trant
Sardao
Begalva
S. Cavanda
Cavalry
2d Corps
Ayeiros
Portl Cavalry
Milheada
Penna Cova
Alva R.
Mondego R.
Coimbra




Leiria
Thomar
6e Corps
Torres novas
Rio Mayor
Alhandra
Punhete
Golegao
Barca
Chamusca
Cabeza
Punhete
Obidos
Bde Cavalry
Zambugeira
Valle
Reynal
Alhandra
Carlos
Rio Maior
6th Corps
Alcoentre
Terra Cortada
Almagace
Granada
1st Corps
Cavalry
2d Corps
Ireda
Villa Velha
Romanil
Pinheiro
Barreiro
Serra de Mafra
LISBON
Tagus
Palha Gallega
Almada
Setuval
LINES
of
1810.




From Chiclana
Grenadiers
Wheatley
Villate
Lardizabal
Lapena
Zayas
Bermeja
Whittingham
1 Mile
BATTLE of BARROSA
5th. March 1811.
Vere
Medina Sidonia
Chiclana
Barrosa
Casa Vieja
Vejar la Frontera

SECTION 2.—STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

April, 1810.—Head-quarter Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, commanding.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
2d corps d'armee	18,378	4,449	1,119	198	1,628	7	21,195	3,580	1,051
6th Ditto	33,759	10,189	496	110	5,086	349	39,690	7,140	2,198
8th Ditto	28,045	7,070	25	„	3,976	99	34,145	5,312	1,738
Total active army	80,176	21,678	1,640	942	12,690	455	94,961	15,978	5,948
Imperial guards	17,380	3,800	174	15	733	„	18,287	2,851	984
Province of St. Ander	13,464	752	276	„	1,774	377	15,891	752	„
Province of Valladolid	4,309	194	123	„	859	145	6,136	„	194
Total under Massena's command.	115,329	26,354	2,213	257	16,056	977	135,275	19,555	7,056

15th May, 1810.

Etat major et gens-d'arme	229	241	„	„	„	„	229	241	„
2d corps Reynier	16,903	2,921	992	231	1,337	42	19,232	2,186	988
6th do. Ney	28,883	5,421	1,224	264	4,940	337	35,067	2,152	4,233
8th do Junot	20,782	4,228	7	30	5,642	75	26,451	2,142	2,116
Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun	4,776	4,851	246	189	95	„	5,117	5,040	„
Total active army	71,573	17,662	2,469	1,414	12,014	474	86,847	11,761	7,515

15th August, 1810.

Etat major, &c.	199	222	„	„	3	„	202	222	„
2d corps	16,418	2,894	2,494	397	3,006	„	21,918	1,969	1,304
6th corps	23,456	2,496	1,865	577	5,541	193	30,862	1,701	1,372
8th corps	18,809	2,959	436	169	4,996	98	24,235	2,016	1,112
Reserve of cavalry	4,146	4,322	1,138	831	157	31	5,441	4,007	946
Artillerie et genie et du siege	2,794	2,969	206	159	409	„	3,339	„	3,128
Total active army	65,746	15,862	6,139	2,119	14,112	302	85,997	10,815	7,162
6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras	19,693	3,045	639	20	1,775	641	15,107	2,231	134
Asturias et St. Ander. Bonet	12,913	„	1,394	15	1,578	107	14,885	434	„
Total under Massena	91,352	18,907	8,172	2,154	17,465	1,050	115,989	14,180	7,296
9th corps, Drouet Comte D'Erlon	19,144	2,456	94	„	3,147	„	22,315	2,456	„
General Total	110,496	21,343	8,196	2,154	20,612	1,050	138,304	16,616	7,296

Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th October.

The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st September only.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
Etat major	192	219	„	„	4	196	219	„
2d corps	16,375	2,921	2,597	287	2,214	21,186	1,872	1,336
6th do.	23,224	2,478	1,708	600	5,418	30,350	1,730	1,348
8th do.	18,807	2,938	663	140	4,656	24,126	2,027	1,071
Reserve of cavalry	4,146	4,322	1,138	831	157	5,441	4,007	946
Artilleries of siege	3,022	3,115	206	159	409	3,637	146	3,128
Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 28 of October	„	„	474	16	„	474	16	„
Total	65,966	16,013	6,186	2,033	12,858	85,410	10,017	7,129
9th corps	19,062	2,078	413	„	3,516	22,991	1,755	317
Division Serras	8,586	1,015	269	35	1,730	10,605	1,050	„
Grand Total	93,614	19,100	7,868	2,068	18,104	119,008	13,822	7,446

Army of Portugal—1st January, 1811.

Head-quarters, Torres Novas.

Second corps, Head-quarters, Santarem.

	Under Arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Horses.	Hospital. Men.	Effective. Men.	Horses. Cavalry.	Draught.
Merle's division, 9 battalions	4,368	,,	150	,,	1,549	6,067	,,	,,
Heudelet's do. 12 do.	5,718	,,	451	,,	2,646	8,815	,,	,,
Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons	1,146	993	523	537	231	1,900	1,530	,,
Artillery and engineers	1,984	1,121	52	9	89	1,485	112	1,018
Total	12,516	2,114	1,176	546	4,515	18,207	1,642	1,018

Sixth corps, Thomar.

Marchand, 11 battalions	4,987	28	529	,,	1,121	6,637	28	,,
Mermet's 11 do.	6,252	,,	743	,,	1,077	8,104	,,	,,
Loison, 12 do.	4,589	,,	1,037	,,	3,291	8,917	,,	,,
Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons	652	651	663	663	117	1,432	1,314	,,
Artillery and engineers, 28 companies	1,769	1,372	47	78	165	1,981	52	1,398
Total	18,949	2,051	3,019	741	5,771	27,071	1,394	1,398

Eighth corps, Pernes.

Clausel, 11 battalions	4,007	18	484	,,	3,989	8,697	18	,,
Solignac, 14 do.	4,997	,,	1,953	,,	3,337	10,946	,,	,,
St. Croix's dragoons, 12 squadrons	991	1,034	698	698	238	1,917	1,732	,,
Artillery and engineers	1,105	859	94	4	393	1,592	151	712
On leave	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	906	,,	,,
Total	11,091	1,901	3,159	702	7,956	22,618	1,891	712

Montbrun, Ourem.

Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery	2,729	2,871	1,486	1,466	178	4,533	4,337	
Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army	1,546	614	,,	,,	983	2,090	614	

Ninth corps, Leiria.

Claparede, 15 battalions, Almeida	7,865	11	369	,,	482	8,714	,,	
Conroux, 12 battalions, Leiria	7,392	27	447	,,	1,299	9,238	27	
Fournier's cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro	1,698	1,391	60	67	114	1,872	1,658	
Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo	670	464	,,	72	748	,,	464	
Total	17,823	2,093	876	139	2,637	19,984	2,149	

Note.—Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses.

	Present under arms. Men.	Horses.
General Total of the army of Portugal in the position of Santarem	46,171	9,551
Ninth corps	17,823	2,093
	63,994	11,644
Deduct troops of the ninth corps not in Portugal	10,231	2,066
Real number under Massena	53,763	9,578

Army of Portugal—1st April, 1811.

	Under arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Horses.	Hospital. Men.	Effective. Men.	Horses.
8th corps, Junot	13,448	„	992	„	5,719	20,159	„
6th do. Marmont	13,984	„	1,574	„	1,576	16,934	„
2d corps, Reynier	10,837	„	1,350	„	4,318	16,505	„
Montbrun. Dragoon, 23 squadrons	4,173	4,404	„	„	„	4,173	4,404
Montbrun. Light cavalry, 14 squadrons	3,636	3,906	„	„	38	3,636	3,906
Montbrun. 1 squadron of gens-d'armes	190	72	„	„	5	102	72

		Under arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Horses.	Hospital. Men.	Effective. Men.	Horses.
Artillery and Engineers.	Foot artillery. Almeida & Rodrigo.	936	„	„	„	88	1,055	„
Artillery and Engineers.	Horse artillery	410	425	„	„	23	433	425
Artillery and Engineers.	Artillery of the train	2,181	2,378	„	„	257	2,448	2,378
Artillery and Engineers.	Workmen	230	„	„	„	25	225	„
Artillery and Engineers.	Engineers	1,448	60	„	„	140	1,623	„
Artillery and Engineers.	Military equipage	596	897	„	„	60	668	897
Total artilleries, engineers &c.		5,969	3,335	„	„	673	6,542	2,760
Total of infantry		37,269	„	3,716	„	11,613	53,598	„
Total of cavalry		7,999	8,382	„	„	43	7,911	8,382
General Total		51,237	11,717	3,716	„	12,329	68,051	11,142

Note.—In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal for May. Two divisions of the ninth corps, directed to be added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided the brigade of general Fournier, from the ninth corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, engineers, &c. are deducted.

SECTION 3.—ARMY OF THE SOUTH—SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING.

	Under arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Horses.	Hospital. Men.	Effective. Men.	Horses. Cavalry.	Draught.
1st of January	55,602	12,092	5,744	1,999	6,412	67,758	10,856	3,823
15th of May	75,133	13,194	3,915	1,336	11,420	90,468	12,156	2,304
Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north	11,917	1,619	„	„	„	13,310	1,220	399
Real total of the army of the South	63,216	11,575	3,915	1,336	11,420	77,158	10,936	1,905

SECTION 4.

Fifth Corps, 15th January.

Under arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Horses.
18,766	6,158	3,035	640

16 December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie va faire le siège de Badajos, avec tout le 5me corps d'armée, 8 regimens de cavalerie, formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les 1ere et 5me corps d'armée sous les ordres de général Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63me regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d'artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sappeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie Espagnol.

SECTION 5.

First Corps before Cadiz.

	Under arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Horses.	Hospital. Men.	Effective. Men.	Horses. Cavalry.	Train.
15th February, 1811 ..	20,972	1,886	1,331	681	1,954	23,457	1,495	1,072
Reinforcement on the march from the Governments	5,809	775	,,	,,	743	5,952	712	63
Total.....	25,781	2,661	1,331	681	1,997	29,409	2,207	1,035
4th corps, 13th Feb...	16,708	4,007	741	397	1,699	19,143	3,619	798
Reinforcement on the march from the Governments	6,080	1,457	,,	,,	878	6,890	1,457	,,
Total.....	22,788	5,464	741	397	2,577	26,033	5,089	798

Note.—A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise joined the fifth corps while in front of Badajos.

SECTION 6.—ARMY OF THE NORTH—BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING.

	Under arms. Men.	Horses.	Detached. Men.	Hospital. Men.	Effective. Men.	Horses. Cavalry.	Train.
1st February, 1811.....	58,518	8,874	1,998	6,860	67,767	7,979	1,073
15th April, 1811	59,146	6,090	2,221	5,350	60,719	6,065	879

SECTION 7.—ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L'ESPAGNE 1me CORPS.

Situation des présens sous les armes à l'époque du 22d Mars 1811.

Division.	Designation des Regimens.	Etat des presens sous les armes.	Dans les Forts et Redoutes.	Emplacement des Troupes dans les Forts et Redoutes.	Disposables.	
1	9me Infantrie ligne.....	1,000			1,000	Sta Maria.
	24me do. do.	800	400	Depuis et compris le Fort St. Catherine jusqu'au Rio St. Petro	400	Do.
	96me do. do.	1,100			1,100	Do. San Lucar, Esta, Chipiona [la Viala Atta.
2	16me do. do.	350	350	Xeres et la Cartuxa	..	
	8me do. do.	718			718	Port Reale au Trocadero.
	45me do. do.	1,072	744	Depuis et compris le Fort Napoleon jusqu'à Chiese fe	328	Port Reale.
	54me do. do.	820			820	Chiclana.
	Bataillon d'Elite	236			236	Do.
3	27me Infantrie ligne.....	1,400			1,400	Do.
	63me do. do.	845			845	Porte Reale.
	94me do. do.	1,500	650	Depuis et compris la Redoute jusqu'à cette de Vellati.....	850	Chiclana.
	95me do. do.	1,414	472	Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et Conil....	942	Do.
Régiment de Marine.	43me Battalions de Marine	900	900	Au Trocadero		
	2e do. d'Ouvriers do. ..	615	615	Do.		
	5e Chasseurs.....	320			320	Vejer et Conil.
Cavalerie.	1e de Dragoons.....	230	50	De Montesà, Alcazar de Xeres	180	Xeres.
	2e do. do.	218	72	Do. et à la Cartuxa	146	Arcos.
Artillerie.	à pied à Cheval	678	500	Sur la ligne du Blocus.....	178	Santa Maria, Puerto Reale, et [Chiclana.
	Sapeurs	323	323	Au Trocadero.....		
	Mineurs	77	77	Do.		
		14,611	5,158		9,458	

By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but was found amongst colonel Lejeune's intercepted papers, it appears that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne's detachment being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle.

SECTION 8.—STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S RETURNS.

	Under arms. Men.	Sick. Men.	Detached. Men.
Cavalry 4 regiments	1,525	274	542
Infantry 41 battalions	20,700	8,880	3,214
Artillery	1,378	144	1,156
Total of all arms.....	23,603	9,298	4,912

Guns....24 British, 18 Portuguese Total 42

Note.—There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and the Partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms.

No. II.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

SECTION 1.

"*November*, 30, 1809.

"I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the duke of Alburquerque and the duke Del Parque in this plan of diversion.

"Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty's ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

"The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now enclose a copy.

"I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation

with the Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and accordingly your lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of general Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general's own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant."—"I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke D'Alburquerque's corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move."

SECTION 2.

"*December* 7, 1809.

"——— I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the Duke D'Alburquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the duke D'Alburquerque which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke Del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government have given orders to the duke D'Alburquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a

position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it."

SECTION 3.

"*January* 31, 1810.

"———There is no doubt that, if the enemy's reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit."

SECTION 4.

"*January* 12, 1811.

"My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry."

SECTION 5.

"*January* 19, 1811.

"At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from

Seville general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condada de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza."

"The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabal received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach general Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville."

SECTION 6.

"*February* 2, 1811.

"The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service."

SECTION 7.

"*February* 9, 1811.

"General Mendizabal has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don't believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana,

is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year."

SECTION 8.

" *February* 23, 1811.

" Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if the misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain." " The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one."

SECTION 9.

" *March* 21, 1811.

" It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal Bessieres has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He

thus threatens an attack upon Gallicia, in which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that general will make no defence, and that Gallicia will fall into the hands of the enemy."

SECTION 10.

"*May* 7, 1811.

"Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged."

"I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence."

"Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

SECTION 11.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Stuart to lord Wellesley, relative to Disputes with the Patriarch and Souza.

" *Sept.* 8, 1810.

" I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, that the Regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary, followed by a reflection on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purpose respecting the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington."

SECTION 12.

Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M'Kenzie, commanding in Portugal.

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

SIR,

The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and Blake, the one in Biscay and the other in Arragon, have been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird's corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it.

I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence;

colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celorico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os Montes. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, together with colonel Murray's letter to colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. Moore.

P.S. Elvas should be provisioned.

No. III.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF VARIOUS PERSONS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.

SECTION 1.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. C. B. Vaughan, Secretary of Legation at Cadiz, to Mr. C. Stuart.

" *March* 6, 1810.

" I received your letter of 22d February. It was indeed time that a little common sense should be substituted in that country (Portugal) for that supreme humbug with which the Portuguese have hitherto been treated."*

" When the French *passed the Morena*, 20th January, the Supreme Junta gave orders for the Provincial Juntas to *provide for the defence of the provinces, and permitted the demolition of the forts commanding the bay of Cadiz;* at the same time the Junta stole away from Seville for Isla de Leon. Romana and Bartholomew Frere remained till 24th January, Seville being in commotion, demanding that the Supreme Junta should be abolished. Montijo and Palafox released from prison, and the former sent an order to Romana to appear before the revolutionary junta. He was desired to take the command of Seville; according to B. Frere's account a most perilous post, as the people had no arms. Why was this fact not known after the defeat of Ocaña? And why also were the immense stores of cannon, ammunition, &c. &c., accumulated at Seville, not moved to Cadiz? Romana, to avoid the defence of Seville, got appointed to bring down Del Parque's army to the defence of the city, and the people appointed a military junta, namely, Castaños, Montijo, Palafox, and Romana.

" Frere set off for Cadiz, and at Xeres found the *president*, *vice-president*, and Cornel, imprisoned by order of the people of Seville. January 26th, the authority of the Supreme Junta of Seville was disavowed at Cadiz, and a junta of defence elected, and on the 30th the Supreme Junta assembled to nominate a

* This refers to Mr. Canning's system of diplomacy.

regency, namely, Castaños, Escano, Savaaedra, bishop of Orense, and Lardizabal, a deputy to the Cortes recently arrived from Mexico. 3d. Cadiz saved from being surprised by the French by the arrival of Alburquerque. 4th. The French appeared at the bridge of Zuazo."—" I never felt so little hope of Spanish independence as at this moment. It is not the rapid advance of the French into Andalusia that makes me despair, but *the manner in which they have been received by the people*. Seville, Cordoba, Jaen, Grenada, and Malaga surrendered to them without firing a shot, by the inhabitants, Joseph Buonaparte studiously endeavouring to profit from this dispirited state of the people to conciliate them. Three thousand Spaniards, well paid, well clothed, and well fed, *at this moment doing duty at Seville in his service;* while upon this last spot of ground that remains, a government has been established professing indeed to act upon very different principles to the last, but without having yet accomplished one single act that can tend to procure them the confidence of the people; protected by a Spanish force, wretchedly clothed, their pay in arrear to an immense amount, and by no means well fed. We now hear of disciplining an army, but very little has been done towards it since the arrival of the troops in the Sota. Depend upon it *Cadiz must be defended by the English.*"

SECTION 2.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

" *Cadiz, March* 28, 1810.

" The quarrel between the duke of Alburquerque and the Junta has ended. The duke is going to England on a special mission, and Whittingham proposes to go with him. Depend upon it they will do their best to get out to South America. But the duke is so weak a man, so hasty, and so much the dupe of others, that I cannot think it prudent to give him any assistance in such views."

SECTION 3.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

"The pontoon ran upon the French coast with 34 staff-officers, 337 officers, and 348 soldiers, French prisoners of war. The boats were under the *beastly* necessity of firing into her, while the poor devils were attempting to escape, and at last she was set fire to before all the prisoners had been able to get ashore. To me this is a most disgusting event in war; there were also eleven officers' wives on board!"

General Graham to Mr. Stuart.

"*May* 18, 1810.

"You will hear of the escape of a great number of French officers by the pontoon. They were confined in going adrift in a gale the other night."—"The Spaniards are very angry, and *regret that this hulk was not set on fire before the prisoners got on shore.* I am afraid our gun-boats fired into her, but I was glad to hear that our officer of artillery at Puntales, who had the care of the upper batteries, (where the only two guns of the fort that could be brought to bear on the hulk were,) refused to fire on the poor devils, *many of them most unjustly confined since the battle of Baylen!*"

Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart.

"*June* 2, 1810.

"Another pontoon went on shore a few days ago, on the French side of the bay. It was the hospital-ship, and so severe a fire was kept up on it *by our boats* that few of the prisoners escaped, and many were burnt to death when the hulk took fire. I like not such scenes, but we always continue to get the greatest possible share of odium for the least possible good!"

SECTION 4.

Extract from the Correspondence of an Officer of Engineers employed at Cadiz.

"*May* 7, 1810.

"We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am

almost at a loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the general cause, has kept us so long inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools."

SECTION 5.

"*Isla, June* 1, 1810.

"We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important position, and our numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs requires."—"We have in our respected general (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could not bear. We may possibly maintian our ground. If we do, although our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept an enterprizing enemy off with very inadequate means, should be rewarded by his country's good opinion, although none but those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory."

SECTION 6.

"*June* 29, 1810.

"I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery-officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh

in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is not attended to? We have now been here three months, and although they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of."—" We have now one thousand three hundred labourers of the line and eighty carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with from our ally is so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself."—" Of our seven subalterns of engineers, two are generally ill; we are obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army.

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.

SECTION 6.

General William Stewart, March 13, 1810.

" The enemy's force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the Spanish troops."

General Graham, March 26, 1810.

" The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, very precarious."

May, 1810.

" General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had been very deficient."

October, 1810.

" The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed a very formidable character, while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line."

January 2, 1811.

"——— As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the Cortadura de St. Fernado until after much delay and very unpleasant contests."

No. IV.

EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH'S CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION 1.

The duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810.

(Translation from the Spanish.)

" Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have arrived at saying, that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the

Spaniards attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgment, and that it will soon subside, being void of probability."

SECTION 2.

Ministerial letter from the King to the marquis of Almenara.

(Translation from the Spanish.)

" *September* 21, 1810.

" The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid, the governor, Kellerman, has taken possession of them." " Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals."

SECTION 3.

The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé.

" *Madrid, September* 12, 1812.

" ———Si l'Andalusie n'est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte de Cadiz existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l'attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, et aux trames ourdies par la junta et l'Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le decret du 8 Febrier, qui

établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l'Arragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneurs Francaises ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie."

" ———Mais combiens n'est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s'obstiner à prolonger l'insurrection d'Espagne plutôt qu'a la soumettre ! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d'exclure toute idée de l'autorité du roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l'empereur, mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia pretassent serment de fidelité et d'obeisance à sa majesté imperiale comme si la nation Espagnole n'avoit pas de roi."

SECTION 4.

Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara to the prince of Wagram.

(Translation from the Spanish.)

" *Paris, September* 16, 1810.

" ———The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same for all the generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the prince of Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations."

SECTION 5.

Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of state, written to his wife, June 18, 1810.

" Il y a six mois que l'on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons.

" ——— Avant hier j'écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le pryant de m'accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre espérant un réponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu'il n'avait rien."

" ——— Rien que la faim m'attend anjourd'hui."

No. V.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON.

SECTION 1.

" *Celorico, May* 11, 1810.

" ——— I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the conntry. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and, however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and the ministers, I con-

sider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his majesty's government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of his majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrate to proceed to and remain at any station

with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, desertion from the service either with or without carriages, &c.; 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them."

SECTION 2.

Lord Wellington to M. Forjas.

Gouvea, September 6, 1810.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit

public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shews to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION 3.

Gouvea, September 7, 1810.

——— In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that *I will not stay* in the country, and that I will advise the king's government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, lying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy's force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately dis

covered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the regency. (Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION 4.

Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.

——— You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty's leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either

a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will: and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavouring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands.

SECTION 5.

Pero Negro, October 28, 1810.

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M. Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their [illegible] are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, [illegible] military nature: first, they are liable to a forfeiture of [illegible]onal property, upon information that they are absent [illegible] corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be [illegible] to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon

the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia

after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there was no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed."———

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 6.

"*October* 29, 1810.

"——— In answer to lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the bettter; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the principal (which *must* be done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. If there is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Prince Regent should interfere, they have only

to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal Souza's detailed instructions for his "*embuscados*" on the left bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to M. de Forjas' note of the 22d, enclosed in yours, (without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point."

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 7.

"*Pero Negro, October* 31, 1810.

"——— I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of the militia. The *ordenanza* artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No. —, of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have staid here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of removing every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!"

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 8.

"*Pero Negro, November* 1, 1810.

"I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz. that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between

the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the

left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks; the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them every thing that could be useful to the enemy, and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ————, to which I propose to draw the attention of his royal highness the prince Regent and of his majesty's government. His royal highness and his majesty's government will then see in what manner the existing regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures from M. Forjas, shew the sense, which the Regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time,

nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will shew what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that his royal highness the prince regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenança would disperse. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different descriptions of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable, if the government would leave, exclusively, to marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations, who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are

to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus."

SECTION 9.

"*December* 5, 1810.

"All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la Foéns, I hold the command of the army independent of the local government of Portugal. Secondly, That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the kingdom with the king's government, when sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 10.

" *Cartaxo, January* 18, 1811.

" It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the Regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, ' which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom his royal highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his royal highness's armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he

recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on 'the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' The patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest when he talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third time, been brought into 'the heart of the kingdom.' Although the patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's posi-

tion in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should

annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the prince regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.

"WELLINGTON."

No. VI.

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL.

SECTION 1.

"*Seville, August 4th*, 1810.

"Par une décision de l'Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S. M. détermine qu'à compter du 1er Janvier toutes les dépenses d'administration générale du genie et de l'artillerie seraient au compte du gouvernement Espagnol; aussitôt que j'en fus instruit je sollicitai S. M. C. d'assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000 de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore le Roi entendait il que les payements ne remontassent qu'au mois

de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n'ai cessé d'en faire la representation, ainsi que Monsr. l'Intendant Général; nos demandes n'ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir autant que possible la différence j'ai dû avoir recours aux recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. J'espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques sommes. L'état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvremens qui ont été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000 f. du crédit mensuel à l'époque du 1er Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000 f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000 f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses d'administration générale) anterieurement à cette époque. J'avais fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l'Intendant Général des Valeurs pour plus d'un million qui devait servir à payer une partie de l'armée. Mr. l'Intendant Général justifie de l'emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n'admettent pas les comptes que je presente; d'abord ils ne veulent pas allouer la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée a l'article des dépenses d'administration générale, s'appuyant sur ce sujet sur la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu'au mois de Fevrier, quoique l'empereur ait expressement entendu que le mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils pretendent en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. il n'est pas dans mon pouvoir d'admettre leurs motifs, la décision de l'empereur est expresse, et tant que je serai dans la situation délicate ou je me trouve, mon devoir m'obligera de pourvoir aux besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de l'artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l'administration générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu'on ait absolument rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j'ai en même temps pu faire payer trois mois de solde à l'armée, c'est sans doute bien peu quand il est du 8 à 10 mois d'arrière à la troupe et que l'insuffisance des moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien je crois qu'il m'était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle même convaincue si elle veut s'arrêter un moment sur l'apperçu que je vais lui donner des charges que l'Andalusie supporte. On consomme tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l'Alhambra de Grenade,

au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu'à Fuengirola, le château d'Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d'Olbera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de l'Estremadura qu'on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadix et la construction d'une flottille occasionnent. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique d'armes, laquelle jusqu'à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l'arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d'affuts. J'ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les nitrières de l'Andalusie, à présent on compte aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu'aux bombes de 12 pouces, tout le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit les affûts necessaires pour l'armement des battaries devant Cadix. On a fait des requisitions en souliers et effets d'habillement dont la troupe a profité. J'ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules qui ont été données à l'artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au génie. J'ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets et vont être repartis dans tous les corpes d'armée. La totalité de ces dépenses ainsi qu'une infinité d'autres dont je ne fais pas l'énumeration sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays les supporte independamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 £ et des recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu'il y a possibilité dont l'application a lieu en faveur de l'administration générale de l'armée, du genie, de l'artillerie, des étâts majors, des frais de courses et des dépenses secrettes. Ces charges sont immenses, et jamais le pays n'aurait pu les supporter si nous n'étions parvenus à mettre de l'ordre et la plus grande regularité dans les dépenses et consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire; c'est au point que malgré que nous soyons à la recolte il faut déjà penser à faire venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l'Andalusie étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de l'armée. Cependant S. M. C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenues de l'Andalusie: je dis les revenues, car leurs demandes dépassaient les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en

consequence aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures, et je me suis trouvé dans l'obligation de m'opposer ouvertement à l'effet de cette mesure dont l'exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l'armée, mais occasionné peut-être des mouvemens séditieux; d'ailleurs il y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. extrait d'une lettre que j'eus l'honneur d'écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier, et copie de celle que j'adressai à Monsieur le marquis d'Almenara, ministre des finances, le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait l'état désespérant des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance V. A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du présent rapport à S. M. l'empereur.

" J'aurai voulu pour que S. M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s'est fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus; mais j'ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les details se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur l'intendant général sur l'administration. Cependant d'après ce que j'ai dit S. M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l'état de ses troupes et des embarras de ma situation: elle est telle aujourd'hui que je dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S. M. au nom même de son service de daigner la prendre en considération: j'ai des devoirs à remplir dont je sais toute l'étendue, je m'y livre sans reserve mais la responsibilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où je me trouve je puisse la soutenir; en effet j'ai à combattre des prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec ceux de l'armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l'empereur; je suis forcé par mes propres devoirs de m'opposer à l'exécution des divers ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J'ai aussi constamment à lutter contre l'amour propre des chefs militaires, que souvent peuvent différer d'opinion avec moi et naturellement prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations me font regarder la tâche qui m'est imposée comme au dessus de mes forces et me portent à desirer que S. M. l'empereur daigne me faire connaitre ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l'Espagne, un chef plus capable que moi d'en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de l'empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont dans le midi de l'Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu'aux deux mers suivent

le même système d'opérations, et soyent par conséquent commandés par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l'empereur, et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui serait fait opposition d'une manière quelconque, il puisse se conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué; tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionera inévitablement des désagrémens qu'on peut autrement éviter.

" J'ai l'honneur, &c.

" (Signé) LE MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE."

SECTION 2.

Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, 13th July, 1810.

SIRE,

L'état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, major-général, a pris l'initiative de tous les mouvemens meme le plus minutieux de 5eme corps rend ici ma presence tout-à-fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d'excellentes troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l'Andaluise et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni resultat. Dans cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra de me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s'il ne juge pas à propos de m'accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que reclame ma santé à la suite d'une maladie grave dont je suis à peine convalescent.

J'ai l'honneur, &c. &c.

LE MARECHAL DUC DE TREVISE.

No. VII.

SECTION 1.

Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated July 10, 1810.

" Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington's head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his Lines."

General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8, 1810.

" We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its position and works, and which has been attacked with but little method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, does not move: we compose the corps of observation; we are on the look out for them."

Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du maréchal prince d'Essling.

" 1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.—Le capitaine du génie Boucherat arrive du 2e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu'il en a dressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d'eau, doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien difficiles, et en certains endroits il n'y a pas plus de 20 toises de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos;) mais la rivière n'est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La route d'Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, cependant non absolument impracticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, profond jusqu'à Abrantes * * * * * Au dessus de cette ville, ou plutôt au confluent du Zezère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage s'élargit; il n'y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout est très practicable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu'à la mer pour celles de Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les directions. J'ai fait copier cet itinéraire."

" 1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.—Causé avec le général Loison des position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince."

" 1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l'ennemi se retranche à Alhandra et Bucellas. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d'après de bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais copier."

SECTION 3.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 *Septembre,* 1810, *à* 10 *heure* ½.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir du général Reynier et copie d'une réponse.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier adressée à votre excellence.

Je vous renouvelle, prince, l'assurance de ma haute consideration.

(Signé) LE MARECHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26 *Septembre, à* 8 *heure du matin.*

Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on apperçoit sur le Serra au delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s'est éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon et un détachement d'infantrie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une ligne de tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s'étend depuis le chemin qui monte du village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du 6e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6e corps; mais comme on ne les apperçoit que de revers, ou ne peut juger de leur nombre.

On ne peut deviner s'il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d'après l'organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes sont étroites, et qui a des pentes rapides de chaque côte, il ne doit pas avoir de terrain pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me parait une arrière garde, mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des dispositions pour l'attaquer avec succès. J'attends des nouvelles de ce que l'ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si vous jugez que c'est une arrière garde et que vous l'attaquiez, j'attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d'attendre les ordres de Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, j'attendrai aussi, comme je pense qu'il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

(Signé) REYNIER.

A Monsieur le Général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre 1810, *à* 10 *heures ½ du matin.*

Je reçois à l'instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. Je pense qu'une grande partie de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé la nuit sur la crète des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de Moira. Un paysan dit qu'il existe de l'autre côté de ces montagnes une plaine assez belle d'une demi-lieue d'étendue, et très garnie d'Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l'ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d'Oporto ; cependant il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc que couvre le couvent des minimes nommé Sako ; et il montre une 12me de pièces d'artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très près de ce couvent.

J'ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d'Essling pour lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu'il serait nécessaire qu'il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j'avais le commandement, j'attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant ; mais je crois, mon cher général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant sur la droite de l'ennemi ; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car c'est véritablement par ce point qu'il faudrait le forcer à faire sa retraite.

Je vous renouvelle, &c.

(Signé) LE MARECHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

SECTION 4.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Decembre, 1810.

Monsieur le prince d'Essling, le géneral Foy que vous avez expédié est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre ; il a fait connaître à sa majesté et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s'est passé et votre situation.

Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d'Almeida avec un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le compte d'Erlon avec les divisions Claparède, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre.

L'Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage et que vous en avez un sur le Zézère, défendu sur les deux rives par de fortes têtes de pont.

Sa majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, que vous occupez devant l'ennemi; qu'Abrantés se trouvant à 800 toises du Tage, vous l'aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L'Empereur vous recommande d'établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d'opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crète des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau l'ordre déjà réitéreé plusieurs fois au duc de Dalmatie, d'envoyer le 5^{me} corps sur le Tage entre Montalveo et Villaflor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L'Empereur croit qu'il serait nécessaire de s'emparer d'Alcantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage, d'assurer toutes vos communications en saisissant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, soient à l'abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d'Essling, l'avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour l'obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d'organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeyda.

L'armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles.

Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, indépendamment d'une consommation énorme d'hommes et d'argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à

vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde ; ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre, datées du 12 Novembre.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 5.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Decembre, 1810.

Je vous expédie, Prince, le général Foy que l'Empereur a nommé général de division ; je vous envoie les moniteurs ; vous y verrez que nous apprenons par les nouvelles d'Angleterre qu'au 1 Décembre, vous vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem.

L'Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage ; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles des journaux Anglais, il parait qu'il y a beaucoup de malades dans leur armée, ils ne comptent que ——— 27 à 28 mille hommes sous les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, y compris la cavalerie et l'artillerie. La situation de l'armée Anglaise en Portugal tient Londres dans une angoise continuelle, et l'Empereur regarde comme un grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de leur faire perdre du monde dans les affaires d'avant-gardes, jusqu'à ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l'ordre de marcher sur le Tage avec le 5^{me} corps.

Le comte d'Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l'offensive et battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos communications et sur vos flancs.

Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos

opérations la plus naturelle parait devoir être par la rive gauche de cette rivière.

Le général Foy, à qui l'Empereur a parlé longtemps, vous donnera plus de détails.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 6.

A Monsieur le maréchal d'Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 16 *Janvier*, 1811.

Je vous préviens, Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de ce mois, l'Empereur à formé une armée du Nord de l'Espagne, dont le commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie qui va établir son quartier général à Burgos.

L'arrondissement de l'armée du Nord de l'Espagne est composé: —

1°. De la Navarre formant le 3e gouvernement de l'Espagne.

2°. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, formant le 4e gouvernement.

3°. De la province des Asturies.

4°. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5e gouvernement.

5°. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et Zamore, formant le 6e gouvernement.

6°. De la province de Salamanque.

Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de l'arrondissement des armées du centre et de l'Arragon.

Cette disposition, en centralisant le pourvoir, va donner de l'ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d'activité aux opérations dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l'Espagne; et Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida.

Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service.

D'après les ordres de l'Empereur je préviens Monsieur le duc

d'Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer l'armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours; je le préviens aussi que le 9me corps d'armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce corps rentrerait en Espagne.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 7.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811.

Vous verrez par le moniteur d'hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l'année dernière dans la même position. L'Empereur me charge de vous renouveller l'ordre de vous porter au secours du prince d'Essling, qui est toujours à Santarem; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que les eaux soient diminuées pour en jetter un sur le Tage. Il parait certain que le 9me corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, c'est-à-dire, par Almeyda.

L'Empereur *espère que le prince d'Essling aura jetté un pont sur le Tage;* ce que lui donnera des vivres.

Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupé par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone sera tombé entre nos mains, comme l'a fait la place de Tortose; alors Sa Majesté *pense que le 5me corps* et une partie *du* 4me pourront se porter au *secours* du prince d'Essling.

Le Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 8.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811.

Je vous préviens, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie s'est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 5me corps d'armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je mande au duc de Dalmatie qu'après la prise de cette place il doit

se porter sans perder de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous donner les moyens d'assiéger et de prendre Abrantès.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 9.

Au Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6 Fevrier, 1811.

Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur d'aujourd'hui au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc d'Istrie, aux commandans de Cuidad Rodrigo et d'Almeida, aux général Thiébaut, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au duc d'Istrie en lui envoyant le moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu'il y trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du 13; que tout parait prendre une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajos a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc *de Dalmatie a pû se porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l'établissement du pont au prince d'Essling :* qu'il devient donc très important de faire toutes les dispositions que j'ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince d'Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire connaître la situation du duc d'Istrie, et lui réitérer l'ordre *de favoriser le prince d'Essling* pour son passage du Tage; que j'espère que Badajoz aura été pris dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le 20 *Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage*, avec le prince d'Essling; qu'il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du 4me corps; *qu'enfin tout est sur le Tage.* Sur ce je prie Dieu, mon cousin, qu'il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde.

(Signé) NAPOLEON.

P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d'Istrie, faites le partir.

SECTION 10.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, Commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Fevrier, 1811.

Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal ; elles vont jusqu' au 13 Janvier, et annoncent *que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marçher des troupes sur le Tage, et vous faciliter l'etablissement d'un pont.* Je lui en ai donné et je lui en réitère l'ordre ; l'Empereur espère que la *jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous sur le Tage.*

Les deux divisions d'infanterie du corps du général Drouet, vont rester entièrement à votre disposition d'après les ordres que je donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, commandant en chef l'armée du nord de l'Espagne ; je lui mande de porter son quartier général à Valladolid, d'établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la province de Salamanque afin d'assurer d'une manière journalière sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Ciudad Rodrigo et Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui pourront parvenir à l'armée de Portugal.

Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6,000 hommes qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda, empêcher qu'il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du 9me corps, et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette frontière du Portugal.

De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d'où elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle se trouvera d'ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant les circonstances.

De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle sera en mesure d'appuyer la première ; et de réunir le reste de la garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos.

Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d'infanterie du 9me corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition, et avec ce secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtems la position que vous occupez ; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage ; ou enfin d'agir comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur le nord de l'Espagne, puisque le duc d'Istrie sera à portée de

marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire.

Dès que le duc d'Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra un officier au général Drouet, pour l'en instruire et lui faire connoître qu'il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer.

Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec 4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 11.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Guarda, le 29 Mars, 1811.

Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du Portugal, l'armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec toute ma volonté et la patience de l'armée, je crains de n'y pouvoir tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne.

J'écris à M. le Cte d'Erlon pour qu'il fasse approvisionner Almeyda et Rodrigo; ces deux places n'auraient jamais dû cesser d'avoir pour 3 mois de vivres aux quels on n'aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d'apprendre qu'il n'y a que pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu'il se place à portée de marcher au secours d'Almeyda.

Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières d'Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l'ai dit, je ne vois guère la possibilité d'y rester.

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(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 12.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811.

Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l'armée occupe ne pouvant en

aucune manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et l'itineraire de marche de chaque corps d'armée.

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(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 13.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811.

Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l'armée sur Ciudad Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain ; et je suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnements de Rodrigo 200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d'ordonner de remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j'ai eu soin de vous faire connaître. J'espère que vous aurez bien voulu faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d'y faire préparer des vivres, seul moyen d'y faire maintenir l'ordre.

Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l'ennemi ne s'approacherait pas des places.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 14.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811.

Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus alarmante; les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, je serai forcé de faire prendre à l'armée des cantonnements où elle puisse vivre, et d'abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de défendre et encore bien moins d'approvisionner, mes troupes manquant absolument de vivres.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 15.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811.

Le général Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, ainsi que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d'Essling, le capitaine Porcher, et le chef d'escadron Pelet. Il parait que le prince d'Essling avec son corps d'armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, et Alfayates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et l'Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s'établir facilement avec l'armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu'on ne prévoit pas, le prince d'Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l'armée Anglaise, l'empereur pense que *vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15me de milles hommes*. L'armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur Alcantara. L'armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà fait partir, et d'après le prince d'Essling, elle va se trouver assez forte pour ne rien craindre de l'ennemi.

(Le reste est sans interêt.)

Le Major-Général,

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 16.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 *Avril*, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,

Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise ont pris position aux environs d'Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait encore des vivres pour une 20^{ne} de jours, et que les Anglais et les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l'armée de Portugal n'etant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de plus une division d'infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi, s'il nous attend dans ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins

à celles de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi ; si on ne peut leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l'eau de vie à la suit de l'armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces d'artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d'état de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l'ennemi ne soit déposté et chassé hors des frontières de l'Espagne et au delà de la Coa. Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour de jour ; je suis sans le sol, vous pouvez tout ; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l'eau de vie, du pain et de l'orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de marcher au secours d'Almeyda. C'est à vous à donner vos ordres ; et vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 17.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,

J'ai recu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi s'évanouissent donc dans le moment où j'en ai besoin ; ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1re opération et la seule qui peut nous donner la faculté de rendre l'armée de Portugal disponible, lorsqu'on n'aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles ; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie ; on peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l'armée d'Andalousie. Mais ne serait il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, en présence de deux maréchaux de l'Empire ? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l'impossibilité où se trouvent les chevaux d'artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que je dois envoyer le 9me corps en Andalousie ; je voulais aussi le faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m'envoyer de la cavalerie, et des attelages d'artillerie, si vous voulez garder votre matériel ? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement le 26 ? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup ; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu'on ne répare plus.

Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions ; c'était pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importans occupés par les corps d'armée ; mais de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie sont un secours dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie à marches forcées. Réflechissez qu'une fois les places réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des $\frac{4}{5}$ de l'armée, et que cette opération passe avant tout.

En m'offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 18.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 *Avril*, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,

Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l'armée sera réunie le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d'Almeida est du plus haut intérêt pour les armes de S. M. ; et il eut été bien à désirer que les secours que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous demander nous eussent été envoyés. L'ennemi parait avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de cette place. Vous dire que je n'aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l'armée, c'est vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m'eut été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et pour la tranquillité du nord de l'Espagne. Je n'ai pas ménagé mes instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n'étaient pas heureux ; votre dévouement pour le service de l'Empereur, vous ferait certainement regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous m'aviez fait espérer, avant que j'en eusse besoin.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 19.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 *Avril*, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,

Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle

du 22, vous me dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l'instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière de Salamanque ; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini ; et vous me témoignez vos regrets de n'avoir pû y coopérer. Convenez, mon cher maréchal, que si l'armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l'artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la cavalerie ; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu'il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de l'approvisionnement des places d'Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je n'aurais pas mieux demandé que d'employer l'armée de Portugal sous mes ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l'armée du midi ; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres ?

Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J'ignore quelle pourra être l'issue de ce mouvement ; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la journée de demain ; votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après demain 1er Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans s'arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n'aurez pas manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources comme beaucoup d'autres, arrivent à Rodrigo ; cette place n'aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d'ici, il faudra que des convois considerables y soient envoyés.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION 20.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE,

Vous trouverez ci-joint l'ordre de l'Empereur qui vous donne le commandement de l'armée du Portugal. Je donne l'ordre au maréchal prince d'Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. Saisissez les rènes d'une main ferme ; faites dans l'armée les changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L'intention de l'Empereur est que le duc d'Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos ordres. S. M.

compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses généraux, pour être persuadé qu'ils vous seconderont de tous leurs moyens.

L'Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince d'Essling en quittant l'armée n'emmène avec lui que son fils et un de ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d'état-major, le général Fririon, le colonel Pelet, ses autre aides-de-camp, tous les officiers de son état-major doivent rester avec vous.

Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une confiance entière.

Le Major Général, &c.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

No. VIII.

Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison, Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le Général Trant, Gouverneur de la Ville et Province d'Oporto.

MONSIEUR LE GENERAL,

Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la maison rue S. Jean, penétré des obligations qu'il vous a, desirerait vous offrir individuellement l'expression de sa reconnoisance. C'est nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur organes, et nous sommes d'autant plus flattés de cette commission agréable qu'il n'y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier n'ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible témoignage de notre gratitude et les sincères remerciments que nous venons vous présenter pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eus pour nous. Ce n'est pas sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que votre solicitude s'étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets.

Ce n'est pas, monsieur le général, d'aprés l'étendue de notre lettre qu'il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnoissance; nous sommes mieux en état de sentir que d'exprimer ce que nous vous

devons et lorsque des circonstances plus heureuses nous ramèneront vers notre patrie, nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous êtes donnés pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d'agréer l'assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles nous avons l'honneur d'être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et très obeissants serviteurs,

Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guèrre,

FALLOT,

Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au grand quartier général des l'armée de Portugal.

Le colonel sous inspecteur aux revues des troupes Françaises,

CATELOT.

H. DELAHAYE,

Com. de la Marine.

No. IX.

SECTION 1.

Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 14th March, 1811.

SIR,

You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late expedition.

But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence.

Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of

Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides.

Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the 4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper escort.

The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned.

When the British division began its march from the position of Barrósa to that of Bermeja, *I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it;* and, when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real), which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.

Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to envelop the enemy's left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired in-

stantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, *and nothing was done!* Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself and the British division under the direction of the Spanish commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But I have a right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, *had we been supported as we had a right to expect?*

There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was within our grasp as it were.

The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one.

I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing

of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was *that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was lost;* and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained.

In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the enemy's number at St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat's division,) that, by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat's division had charge of the whole line,—what, then, must be the strength of that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of this division.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) THOS. GRAHAM,
Lt.-General.

P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.

With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the Bermeja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army.

SECTION 2.

Adjutant-general's state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under the command of lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810.

Designations.	Number of Bayonets.	Commanders.
Two squadrons of 2d German hussars	,,	Major Busche.
Detachment of artillery. ..		Major Duncan. 10 guns.
Detachment of engineers..	47	Captain Birch.
Brigade of guards, re-inforced by a detachment of the 2d battalion 95th rifles	1221	Brigadier-gen. Dilkes.
1st battalion 28th foot; 2d battalion 67th; 2d battalion 87th: re-inforced with 2 companies of the 20th Portuguese.	1764	Colonel Wheatley.
Flank battalion composed of detachments of the 3d battalion 95th rifles and two companies of the 47th foot	594	Lt.-col. A. Barnard, 95th regt.
Two companies of 2d battalion 9th regt.; two companies of 1st battalion 28th regt.; two companies of 2d battalion 82d regt.	475	Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt.
One company of the royal staff corps	33	Lieutenant Read.
Total number of bayonets..	4134	
The hussars were about..	180	
Total of sabres and bayonets	4294,	with 10 guns.

SECTION 3.—BATTLE OF BARROSA.

Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby.

" I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned to their camp."

SECTION 4.—BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

Extract of a letter from colonel Light, serving in the 4th Dragoons at the Battle of Albuera.

" After our brigade of infantry, first engaged, were repulsed, I was desired by general D'Urban to tell the count de Penne Villamur, to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought, to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy the whole pulled up, and there was no getting them farther; and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could."

		Tués.								Blessés.								Restés sur le Champ grièvement blessés.						Total general.
		Generaux de Brigade.	Colonels.	Chefs de Br. ou Escadron.	Capitaines.	Lieutenants.	Sous Lieutenants.	Sous Officiers et Soldats.	Total.	Generaux de Division.	Colonels.	Chefs de Bat. ou Escadron.	Capitaines.	Lieutenants.	Sous Lieutenants.	Sous Officiers et Soldats.	Total.	Generaux de Division.	Colonels.	Capitaines.	Sous Lieutenants.	Sous Officiers et Soldats.	Total.	
St. Petri, 4.....	95 de Ligne ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	3	..	2	..	1	1	1	32	37	..	..	..	..	5	5	42
	Etat Major ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
5 Mars 1	Etat Major ..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	3
	9 Infr. Ligne .	..	..	..	..	1	..	14	15	..	..	1	1	2	..	70	74	..	..	..	1	18	19	108
	24 Ligne	..	..	..	1	1	..	33	35	..	1	..	4	2	..	214	221	..	..	2	1	21	24	280
	96 Ligne	..	1	..	1	..	..	39	41	..	..	1	3	2	..	199	205	..	..	1	1	1	3	249
	1 Br. Elite ..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	2	..	..	..	2	..	3	136	141	..	..	1	..	59	60	203
	Etat Major ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
	2 45 Ligne	..	..	..	1	..	..	7	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	44	44	..	..	..	..	3	3	55
	8 Ligne.....	..	1	2	3	2	3	63	74	..	..	..	2	6	3	622	633	..	..	..	..	19	19	726
	54 Ligne	..	..	1	2	..	..	26	29	..	..	..	4	5	1	284	294	..	..	..	..	..	..	323
	Etat Major ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
	3 27 Infr. Ligne	..	..	..	..	1	..	20	21	..	..	1	2	3	1	150	157	..	..	..	2	21	23	201
	94 Ligne	..	..	..	..	1	..	9	10	..	..	..	1	1	1	49	52	..	..	..	..	..	..	62
	95 Ligne	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	32	32	..	..	..	..	1	1	34
	Dragoons 1 Regt.	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	2	..	..	..	3	1	2	30	36	..	..	1	..	3	4	42
	2 Regt.	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	12	12	..	..	..	..	4	4	19
	Artillerie	..	..	..	1	..	..	16	16	..	..	..	..	3	..	31	34	..	1	..	..	..	1	51
Puerte St. Maria	45 Ligne	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	10	..	..	..	..	..	..	43	43	..	..	..	1	27	28	81
	Artillerie	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	2	..	..	..	..	6	6	9
Médina, 9 Mars,	94	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	29	29	..	..	..	..	..	..	33
8 Dr.	95	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	4	..	..	1	..	..	..	18	19	..	..	..	..	1	1	24
		1	3	3	10	6	3	255	281	1	5	5	24	27	12	1997	2071	1	1	5	6	189	202	2554

Total 2554

Note by the Editor.—Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri.... 45
„ „ at Puerta Santa Maria 81
„ „ at Medina..... 64

190

Remains loss at Barrosa 2361

Certified copy by Count GAZAN.

SECTION 6.

Intercepted papers of colonel Lejeune.

ORDRE.

Il est ordonné a Monsieur le colonel baron le Jeune, mon A. D. C. de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et parcourir l'Andalousie et l'Estramadure.

Monsieur le colonel le Jeune se rendra d'abord à Grenade auprès de Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4me corps d'armée, et il lui remettra les ordres qui le corcernent.

De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadiz, et verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l'Empereur. Monsieur le Jeune remettra a Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadiz, soit partout où il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5me corps d'armée commandé par Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure; le corps doit être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage.

Monsieur le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et de celle des troupes de l'armée du centre commandée par le général qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en communication avec l'armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles que l'on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce coté.

Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour pouvoir répondre à toutes les questions de l'Empereur, sur la situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure, d'où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission.

LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHATEL,
Major-général.

Paris, le 14 *Février*, 1811.

SECTION 7.

Extracts from Lejeune's reports.

CADIZ.

" Montagnes de Ronda foyer d'insurrection entre le 4me corps et le premier."

" Les obusiers à la villantrois portent à 2560 toises: l'obus doit peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge

l'obusier à poudre d'un $\frac{1}{3}$ du poids de l'obus pour obtenir cette distance. Il n'y en a que le 4 en batterie : à la redoute Napoléon on en a 12 en fondus : mais il manque de projectilles et de la poudre en suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n'éclatent pas en ville."

" Le pont de St. Petri a été traversé le jour de l'affaire par un sergent du 24me qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l'on a pris. Le moment eut été favorable pour s'emparer de l'Isle."

" Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner : bon général, mais voyant les choses trop en noir."

SECTION 8.

Puerto Real, 20 *Mars*, 1811.

MON CHER GENERAL,

Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le réçit que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois.

L'une des choses qui mérite d'abord de fixer votre attention, est la composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup assaillis. J'ai déjâ dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain sans aucun accident. Il parait que les Anglais en réunissant les garnisons d'Algeciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjâ formé à Tarifa un petit corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le général Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 où 300 hommes de cavalerie, l'avant garde de l'expedition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de 10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien où mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer le 5. Il parait que Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que tard de la vraie direction prise par l'armée ennemie. Il arriva à Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de la 1re et 2de division : le plan d'opérations auquel il s'arrêta fut d'envoyer sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver l'ennemi, de lui résister foiblement pour l'engager à suivre notre mouvement de retraite et de l'attirer ainsi sous la position St. Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation extrêmement

s'établir. Quand les deux divisions furent formées, elle se trouvèrent en présence d'une armé, beaucoup plus nombreuse qu'on ne l'avait cru d'abord. L'artillerie n'était pas encore arrivée, et celle de l'ennemi commençait à jouer de toute parts. Le général Vilatte n'avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, qui étaient au moment d'être prises, n'étant alors défendues que par un seul bataillon du 27^{me} d'infantrie legère.

Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le ravin dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d'Almanza. Ce mouvement empêcha le général Vilatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions, qui n'ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essuyaient un feu terrible de la part de l'ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d'autant plus sensible que le nombre des combattans n'était que le tiers de celui de l'ennemi. Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu'on eut pu entamer la ligne des Anglais. Il n'y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs en avant de Chiclana, où l'on fit camper une division pendant la nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l'île de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d'occuper notre position du Moulin d'Almanza et de St. Petri. Si l'ennemi voulant continuer ses opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d'évacuer le terrain jusqu'à Puerto Réal, où on aurait pris la position dont j'ai parlé plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations ont manqué d'ensemble, Il s'est contenté de rentrer dans l'île et pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, qui n'eut d'autre résultât que d'enlever une batterie défendue par quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de St. Marie. Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus d'effet, sur l'armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions qu'on auraient pu prendre."

No. X.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRE, OF THE ENGINEERS.

SECTION 1.

"*March* 1, 1811.

"I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade of nine-pounders to arm them.

"Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington, and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy's bridge is about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery."

SECTION 2.

"I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well, reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we'll go and look at it to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised."

SECTION 3.

"May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made,

however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning of the 11th, at four a. m. its fire was opened. The enemy's fire was, however, very superior to our own, and, before sunset, the three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist till our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the place, but they scarcely excited the enemy's attention, our little corps bore the brunt of the enemy's exertions, which were great and spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed."

SECTION 4.

"*Elvas, May* 20, 1811.

"Had our operations been conducted with common activity aud common judgement, Badajos would have been in our hands before the 15th of May. But what has been the fact? Our little corps on the Cristoval side was absolutely sacrificed. The whole fire and attention of Badajos was directed against our unsupported attack, and our loss in consequence was severe."—"Our operation before Cristoval was absurdly pressed forward *without any co-operation on the left bank of the river.* The marshal hesitated—delayed, and at last withdrew his troops at such a moment that he was scarcely time enough to meet the enemy in the field!"

No. XI.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

"*Gibraltar, October* 23, 1810.

"The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field."

END OF VOL. III.

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